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ADVAITSMODA
(A STUDY OP ADVAITA AND VI^ISTSDVAITA)
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
of The Australian National University
July, 1986
by
Michael Comans
This thesis is the result of my own
research carried out while enrolled
as a Ph.D. candidate at The Australian
National University, 1983 - 1986.
c
Michael Comans
ABSTRACT
This work consists of (a) a translation of the Sanskrit text
Advaitamoda and (b) my own supplementary comments to the discussion
contained in the text. The work is divided into four chapters,
corresponding to the Snandasrama publication of the text. The Sanskrit
text has been further divided into sections with the translation
following directly under each section in double spacing. My comments
upon the text are in 1 .5 spacing and have been placed under the
translation of the relevant section.
The first chapter: "the teaching of Advaita" ( Advaitamatam ) gives a
detailed overview of the philosophy of the Advaita Vedanta. The second
chapter: "the teaching of Visistadvaita" ( Visi st advaitamatam ) outlines
the philosophical view of the Visistadvaita Vedanta, At the conclusion
of the second chapter, the author summarizes what he considers to be
the fundamental differences between Advaita and Visistadvaita. The third
chapter: "the logical untenability of the Visistadvaita teaching"
( Visi st advaitamatanupapatti h) and chapter four; "the logical tenability
of Ignorance" ( avidyopapatti h) constitute the major part of the text.
These chapters consist of a detailed reply to Ramanuja's critique of
Advaita in the Laghusiddhanta and the Mahasiddhanta portions of his
£rlbhasya 1 .1 .1 . The procedure followed in these chapters is that the
author firstly cites the ^ribha s ya passage and then takes up that passage
for discussion. In this manner, the major part of the above sections of
the Saribha s ya are systematically discussed.
Dedication
FOR MI PARENTS
V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A list of acknowledgements indicates, quite rightly, that no
piece of work is a creation ex. nihilo . On the contrary, a completed
work is the result of a number of causes -instrumental as well as
material— and I now have the welcome opportunity to acknowledge these
"causes 1 ', which took the form of the assistance I received during the
course of my studies.
Firstly, I wish to thank my principal supervisor, Professor J, W,
de Jong, who allowed me the freedom to pursue my interests while
guiding my research with an expertise derived from his vast experience.
If I have completed my studies under his supervision by developing a
value for textual precision and scholarly detail, then I think he will
consider his task satisfactorily accomplished. I wish to thank my
supervisor Dr Tissa Rajapatirana who kindly read through the entire
work -Sanskrit and English- in its final stages and eliminated many of
my errors of commission and omission.
I would like to express my gratitude to Pt. T. S. Srinivasasastrl
of Deccan College, Pune, who effortlessly answered whatever questions
I cared to raise with regard to my difficulties in understanding this
text. I value the memory of the time I spent with him. I would also
like to thank Mr K. Venugopalan of Deccan College who freely gave his
time to clarify my understanding of certain arguments in the text and
who has indeed been of great assistance at the latter stages of my
work. I wish to record my gratitude to Sri Dayanandasarasvati who
teaches the bha s yas of Sankara with immense clarity and insight. I would
also like to thank Dr N. Ramaswamy for providing a solid foundation in
Paninlya grammar and for stimulating my interest in this area. To such
people, I cannot do better than to quote Sankara’s introductory verse
to the Taittiriyopanisat
yair ime gurubhih purvam padavakyapramanatah /
vyakhyatah sarvavedantas tan nityam pranato 1 smy aham //
I would like to thank Dr R. Balasubramanian of the Dr S. Radha-
krishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of
Madras , for initially suggesting Advaitamoda for translation and for
reading some passages of the Srlbha s ya with me, in spite of his heavy
schedule. I wish to express my thanks to Mr Mahadev Spte of
Xnandasrama Publications for his permission to incorporate the text of
Advaitamoda along with the translation. I would like to express my
vi
appreciation to Mr G. K. Abhyankar for assisting me with the
biographical details of his grandfather ^rT Vasudevasastr" Abhyankar,
I would also like to thank Dr and Mrs Ashok Tulpule for assisting me
with the Marathi biography of Vasudevasastr! Abhyankar.
Apart from my supervisors whom I mentioned above, I would like to
thank the other members of the South and Vest Asia Centre: Dr Luise
Hercus, Dr Richard Barz and Mr Yogendra Yadav, for the friendliness
and help which they showed daily. Also, I would like to acknowledge the
assistance of the other Ph.D. students, all scholars of Buddhism, with
whom I had the good fortune to share an office at various times: Akira
Saito, Yasuo Tsukada and Richard Stanley. They all proved themselves
to kalyanamitras ' in one way or another, I wish to thank Miss Betty
Kat, venerated secretary of the South and Vest Asia Centre, for her
patience, consistent good humour and constant willingness to be of
assistance, X, like all previous Ph.D. students of this department, will
remember her fondly.
Finally, I would like to thank the Faculty of Asian Studies for
providing a pleasant enviroment conducive to work and The Australian
National University for the use of the excellent facilities and also
for the material support.
WT!I
via
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements v
Introduction viii
Abbreviations xviii
Table of Contents to Advaitamoda xx
Author's prefatory remarks xl
Chapter One: "The teaching of Advaita" 1
Chapter Two: "The teaching of Visistadvaita" 115
Chapter Three: "The logical untenability of the
Visistadvaita teaching" 208
Chapter Four; "The logical tenability of Ignorance" 514
Bibliography
619
Till
INTRODUCTION
VXSUDEVASSSTRT ABHYANKAR (1863-1942)
Vasudevasastri was born into a family prominent in the field of
Sanskrit scholarship. His grandfather, Bhaskarasastrl Abhyankar (1783-1871),
was a student of Nllakanthasastrl Thatte of Pune who had studied Sanskrit
grammar at Varaijasl. Bhaskarasastrl founded a school of traditional
learning ( pathasala ) at his home at Satara in Maharastra. When Vasudeva¬
sastri was less than two years old his father died and Bhaskarasastrl
became responsible for the welfare of his grandchildren. Living in the
home of Bhaskarasastrl and surrounded by his grandfather's students, by the
age of seven Vasudevasastri had memorized such texts as: Amarakosa ,
_ _ _ _ _ „ _ 1
Rupavali and the Ast adhyayi of Panini.
After the death of Bhaskarasastrl, the education of Vasudevasastri
was continued by Ramasastrl Godbole, a principal student of Bhaskarasastrl.
Each day, Ramasastrl would travel from his own residence at Mahooli, some
three miles from Satara, to teach at the pa t hasala in his teacher's home.
He did not receive a salary for teaching and the pa t hasala was funded
through grants. Ramasastrl taught at the pa t hasala from 1871-1906. He
generally taught about twenty-five students at any time and classes were
conducted in the mornings from 9 until 11 o'clock and in the afternoons
from 1 until 4. Vasudevasastri studied under Ramasastrl from the age of
eight until he was twenty-four. His education was traditional; he primarily
studied Sanskrit grammar for twelve years beginning with Siddhantakaumudi
and concluding with portions of the Mahabhasya . The remaining four years
were devoted to the study of the Taittirlya Samhita and Brahman a, Advaita
Vedanta and works on poetic composition. He received no "secular"
education and he studied subjects such as mathematics, history and
geography on his own. His course of study with Ramasastrl was as follows;
IX
Age
Principal Studies
Complementary Studies
8-11
Siddhantakaumudi, Raghuvamsa
ch.2. Some portions of the
work of Magha.
11-13
Manorama-sabdaratna
Tarkasangraha with DTpika,
(karakanta).
Muktavali.
13-14
^abdakaustubha (ninth
MathuranathT-panc alaksanx,
section).
Gadadhari-svalaksana,
1 4-16
Paribhasendusekhara.
Kuvalayananda,
Mahabhasya, the ninth
16-20
^abdendusekhara and
Laghuman.iusa (important
chapters).
section and the
angadhikara.
20-23
TaittirTya-Samhita and
Kavyaprakasa, Pancadasi,
Brahmapa (by he art).
Vedantaparibha§a, Brahmasutra'
bha g ya . Also, teaching other
students.
23-24 Advaitasiddhi (Fifth portion). Teaching, writing commentaries
" Tattvadarsa " on Paribha s endu-
sekhara and " Gudharthaprakasa "
on Laghusabdendusekhara .
After completing his formal studies, Yasudevasastrl married and, in
1891, he travelled to Pune to gain employment. He carried with him a letter
of recommendation from Ramasastrl to Justice M.G. Ranade. He began his
teaching career at a Sanskrit pathasala founded in 1885 by Vit^halasastri,
a former student of Bhaskarasastrl. He continued to teach at the pathasala
until 1942, a career which spanned more than half a century. In 1892,
upon the recommendation of M.G. Ranade and Namdar Gokhale, he was appointed
a sastrl at Pergusson College when the Sanskrit department was depleted by
the death of V.S. Apte in that same year. He taught at Pergusson College
until 1927. His daily routine was to teach at the pathasala from 7.30 until
X
9.00 am., and at Fergusson College from 11.00 until 2.00 pm.
Yasudevasastrl was connected with the Bhandarkar Institute from the time
of its foundation and he served on its Regulating Council for more than
two decades. In 1921 he was awarded the title of Mahamahopadhyaya by the
Imperial Government.^ The publications of Vasudevasastrl are listed below;
1. Tattvadarsa , (1886) Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. A
grammatical work. It is a commentary upon Nagojibhatta' s
Paribha g endusekhara based upon notes Abhyankar made while he was
tutoring the text.
2. Gudharthaprakasa . (1888) A grammatical work. It is a commentary
upon Nagojibhatta's Laghusabdendusekhara . It is not available in
its complete form.
3. Brahmasutrasankarabhagya . (1900) Advaita Vedanta. It is a Marathi
translation of Sankara’s commentary upon the Brahmasutras .
4. Samasokti . (1904) Samskrta-pathasala, Pune. Visi^tadvaita. A
brief commentary upon the ^rlbha s ya-catussutrl . It paraphrases
Sudarsanasuri's ^rutaprakasika in a lucid manner.
5. Prakasa . (1906) Snandasrama. Visistadvaita. A commentary upon the
Visi^tadvaita text Yatlndraroatadlpika .
6. ^r~bha s ya-prathamasutra . A commentary, prepared for students,
upon the first sutra of the ^rlbha s ya .
7* Visi st advaitamata . Samskrta-pathasala, Pune. An original work
in Marathi, of approximately thirty pages, explaining the
teachings of Visistadvaita.
8. Kavyaprakasa of Mammata. (1911 ) Snandasrama. Alarikara . This is
a work of six hundred pages containing an edition of the
Kavyaprakasa with the commentaries Udyota by Nagojibhatta and
Pradlpa by Govindathakkur.
9. £rlbha sya ~vivytti . (1914) Bombay Sanskrit Series. Visistadvaita.
This work is in two parts. The first contains an edition of the
jjrlbhagya and the second part contains an explanation of difficult
portions of the text.
XI
10. Patanjalayogasutran i. (1917) Bombay Sanskrit Series, A large
work of four hundred and fifty pages bringing together
commentaries on the Yogasutras by Vyasa, Vaeaspatimisra and
Nagojibhati^a. For the preparation of this critical edition,
Abhyankar used eight manuscripts of Vyasa's commentary, five of
Vacaspati's commentary and three manuscripts of Nagoji's
commentary.
11. Advaitamoda . (1918) Snandasrama. Advaita and Visistadvaita. In
this original work, Abhyankar firstly portrays the teachings of
Advaita and Visistadvaita and he then gives a detailed critique
of the Laghu and Mahasiddhanta portions of the fsribha s ya from
the standpoint of Advaita.
12. Kavyaprakasa of Maramata. (1921) Snandasrama. Alankara . An edition
containing the commentary Sanketa by Manikyacandra.
13. Sutrantaraparigrahavicara . (1922) Xnandasrama. Dharmasastra ,
This work attempts to resolve differences between the followers
of the Rgveda and followers of the Krsn ayajurveda concerning
the recitation of certain texts during the performance of yajna .
14. Parsanankura . (1924) B.O.R.I, This work is a commentary on
Sayana-Madhava's Sarvadarsanasangraha .
15. Samskarapaddhati . (1924) Snandasrama. A work on dharmasastra .
dealing with the karmakan da.
16. Nyayakosa . (1928) B.O.R.I. A dictionary of technical terms used
in Indian philosophical traditions. Abhyankar revised and re-
edited this work,
17. Binduprapata . (1928) B.O.R.I, Advaita. A commentary upon the
Siddhantabindu of Madhusudanasarasvati.
18. Dharmatattvanirnaya . (1929) Inandasrama. Dharmasastra . This work
deals with topics such as changes in social and religious
customs which relate to inter-religious marriages, widow
remarriage etc.
19. Kun^ arkodayi . (1931) Inandasrama. Dharmasastra . This work is a
commentary upon the treatise Kun darka which deals with the
mathematical proportions of a Yedic altar.
20. Prabha . (1937) B.O.R.I. MTmamsa. A commentary upon the Mimamsa-
nyaya-prakas a of Spadeva.
21 . Advaitankura . (1938) Shandasrama. A commentary upon the first
two chapters of the Bhagavadgita .
22. Yvakarana-mahabha s ya . (1938 onwards) Deccan Education Society,
Grammar. A Marathi translation, in six volumes, of Patanjali's
Yyakaranamahabha s ya .
23. Yyakarana-mahabha s ya . (1938) Deccan Education Society. Grammar.
A Hindi translation of the ninth section of Patanjali’s
Yyakaranamahabha s ya .
24. Kayaparisuddhi . (1939) Jnandasrama. Vedanta. A discussion about
liberation from the "three bodies", i.e. the physical ( sthula ),
subtle ( suk s ma ) and causal ( kara na) bodies.
ADYAITIMODA
Abhyankar published five works dealing with the philosophical
tradition known as Visigtadvaita. After the publication of one such work,
Visi g tadvaitamata , it is said that:
...some of the sastri’s friends started saying jokingly
that his views have changed and he has become a follower
of Visiijtadvaita,. .to clear the misunderstanding that he
had changed his views to that of Ramanuja, in 1918 he
wrote Advaitamoda ...in which he put a very strong case
in favour of the teachings of Sankara. After this book,
3
the misunderstanding was cleared.
The word " Advaitamoda " can be resolved as a Karmadhaiyjya , a BahuvrThi ,
or as a genitive Tatpuru ga compound. The latter is most likely, in which
case the word means: "the fragrance of Advaita". The work can be
conveniently divided into four chapters. The first and second chapters
xiii
are useful descriptions of the Advaita and Visi^advaita philosophy
respectively. In the first chapter: "the teaching of Advaita", the author
has based his exposition largely upon the Vedantaparibha sa though he has
also drawn upon a number of sources which I have tried to identify where
possible. The second chapter: "the teaching of Yisis^advaita" , closely
follows the Yisiftadvaita manual of instruction, YatindramatadTpika , upon
which the author had written a commentary. At the conclusion of this
chapter, Abhyankar lists what he considers to be the major differences
between Advaita and Yisi^tadvaita; these are arranged as thirty three
points.
Chapter three; "the logical untenability of the Visistadvaita
teaching" and chapter four: "the logical tenability of Ignorance ( avidya )"
constitute the major part of the work. These chapters attempt to refute
Ramanuja's criticisms of Advaita as expressed in the "Small Conclusion"
( Laghusiddhanta ) and the "Great Conclusion" ( Mahasiddhanta ) of the
^rlbha s ya 1,1.1. Abhyankar's method is to firstly cite a passage from the
^ribha s ya and then to direct his arguments against statements contained in
that passage. The text proceeds in a systematic manner and the most
important parts of the Laghu and Mahasiddhanta are quoted in their due
order and then discussed. Abhyankar has sometimes paraphrased the ^rxbha s ya
text and such occasions have been noted. However when he has done so, there
has been no compromise with the original meaning.
As far as I am aware, Advaitamoda is the first Advaita work to
discuss the Laghu and Mahasiddhanta portions of the ^ribhagya in such a
detailed manner. Ramaraya Bellankonda's £risankarasankarabha g yavimarsah is
a later work (1953) which masterfully discusses Ramanuja's and
Sudarsanasuri's arguments as presented in ^ribha s ya 1.1.1. and the
commentary ^rutaprakasika . However it does not follow the text of the
^rxbha g ya as closely as Abhyankar does in Advaitamoda . A Visi^tadvaitin's
XIV
reply to Advaitamoda : Paramarthaprakasika by U. Viraraghavacarya, was
published in 1940, I have occasionally consulted the latter text, which
is of a comparable size to Advaitamoda , in the preparation of this work.
However the limitations of time and the size of this work have meant that
the Paramarthaprakasika could not be utilized to any significant extent
and I must leave the analysis of the counter arguments to Advaitamoda
to another student of the subject.
At this juncture, it is necessary to make some remarks about the
contents of the first chapter which are, I feel, open to some criticism.
Firstly, the author has devoted considerable attention to a topic of
relatively minor importance like the combination of the five elements
( paneTkaran a) at the expense of more significant matters in Advaita
teaching such as the analysis of the three states of experience; waking,
dream and deep sleep. Nor does Abhyankar devote sufficient consideration
to the discrimination of the real meaning of "I", a topic which is of
such importance to Advaita that it forms the subject matter of Sankara's
celebrated introduction to Brahmasutra 1 .1 .1 , Secondly, there is an
inadequate presentation of how the sacred texts, i.e. the Upani§ads,
operate as the means of knowledge ( praman a) for Brahman, The author does
not discuss the usage of essential definition ( svarupalak gana), such as
Tai. 2.1.1., for ascertaining the nature of Brahman. Nor does he explain
the use of implication ( lak gana) in the comprehension of the mahavalrya ;
" tat tvam asi" (Ch.6,8.7.). Such omissions can perhaps be accounted for
by the fact that Abhyankar was trained primarily as a grammarian, by
teachers who were themselves essentially grammarians and not Advaita
preceptors. While the study of logic and grammar are certainly helpful
for understanding all disciplines of knowledge ( Kanadam Paniniyam ca
sarvasastropakarakam ) it does not necessarily mean that other disciplines
can be fully understood without undergoing instruction from within the
XV
methodological framework established by their respective traditions.
Thirdly, his description of the various views concerning the nature
of maya (1.23-25.) cannot be clearly associated with particular Advaita
authors. Finally, his discussion of the theory of a single individual
soul ( eka.jTvavada ) (1 .29-30.) should be treated with circumspection as it
contains a factual error and it is given undue emphasis in relation to
the style of the rest of the chapter, which is a useful compendium of
Advaita philosophy.
In chapter one, I have added a fairly extensive commentarial portion
with the object of supplementing the main text with a more detailed
portrayal of certain facets of the Advaita teaching. I have drawn upon
a number of well known Advaita texts but have kept the writings of
^aAkara as my primary source. The comments to the second chapter again
attempt to provide a more detailed supplement to certain parts of the
main text. The comments are principally drawn from the Yatlndramatadlpika
and sections of the .‘arlbha s ya and Siddhitraya . In chapters three and four,
the commentarial portions have a twofold purpose; (a) to explain some of
the more difficult passages in Abhyankar's writing and (b) to supplement
the discussion. In order to do the latter I have chiefly drawn upon the
writing of Ramaraya Bellankonda in the ^risankarasankarabha s yavimarsah .
The arguments contained in Ramanuja's ^rlbha s ya and Abhyankar's
responses to them form the bulk of the subject matter of Advaitamoda .
Ramanuja, writing in the twelfth century A.D., and Abhyankar in the
twentieth century, illustrate the subtlety of argument and depth of
scholarship which characterize much of the philosophical literature
composed in Sanskrit. It is hoped that the translation and study of
Advaitamoda provide a glimpse of the richness which is the Sanskrit
philosophical tradition.
XVI
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION.
1, S.Y. Sahasrabuddhe and M.D. Sathe, Mahamahopadhyaya VasudevasastrT
Abhyankar Caritra va Karya . Pune, 1963. p.12.
2, "Obituary Notice", Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research
Institute . Vol. XXIV. 1943.
3, Sahasrabuddhe and Sathe, op-cit ., p.45 , 46,
EDITIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL TEXTS CITED.
(1) Sankara , Page and line numbers refer to the editions of Sankara's
commentarial works published by Motilal Banarsidass, (a) Ten Principal
Upanishads with ^ahkarabhasya . First edition: Delhi, 1964. Reprinted
1978, (b) BhagavadgTta with ^ankarabhasya . First edition: Poona, 1929 .
Reprinted: Delhi, 1978. (c) Brahmasutra-£>ankarabha s yam . ¥ith the
Commentaries: Bha s yaratnaprabha of Govindananda, BhamatT of Vacaspatimisra
and Nyaya-Nirnaya of Xnandagiri, First edition: Delhi, 1980. References
to the UpadesasahasrT follow the edition prepared by S, Mayeda, A
Thousand Teachings , The Upadesasahasri of Sankara , Tokyo: Uni, of Tokyo
Press, 1979.
(2) Other Advaita Texts . References to the Naiskarmyasiddhi follow the
edition prepared by M, Hiriyanna, The Naiskarmya-Siddhi of Suresvara .
Vith the " Candrika " of Jnanottama. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research
Institute, Fourth Ed. 1980, References to the Vedantaparibha sa follow
the edition by S.S, Suryanarayana Sastri, Vedantaparibha sa. Madras:
The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Reprint 1971. References to the
Vedantasara follow the edition by M, Hiriyanna, Yedanta-Sara ( a work
on Vedanta Philosophy by Sadananda ). Poona: Oriental Book Agency, Second
Ed. 1962.
(3) Ramanuja . Page and paragraph numbers of the Yedarthasangraha refer
to the edition by J.A.B. van Buitenen, Ramanuj a 1 s Yedarthasangraha . Poona:
Deccan College, 1956, Page and paragraph numbers of the ^ribhasya refer
to the edition by R.D, Karmarkar, ^rTbhasya of Ramanuja . Poona: Uni. of
Poona, 1959-64. (Three Volumes)
xvii
NOTES ON THE TRANSLATION.
(1 ) Sanskrit authors employ the word “knowledge** ( jSana ) in a number of
different senses. In the translation, the initial letter of the word
“knowledge" is not capitalized when the word stands for the object of
knowledge ( jnayate iti jnanam ), or when it refers to the means whereby
an object is known ( jnayate anena iti jnanam ) such as in the case of
perceptual or inferential knowledge etc. When knowledge is used in the
sense of cognition ( jnaptir iti j nanam ), I have capitalized the initial
letter. Even in regard to cognition, or Knowledge, the Advaitin makes a
distinction between cognition occurring as a mental function (v rttijnana )
and awareness per se ( svarupajnana ) which is the essence of the
individual soul and identical with Brahman. Both the latter meanings are
rendered as "Knowledge" and the distinction between them will be made
evident through the context.
(2) When the Advaitin employs the word "ignorance" ( avidya / ajnana ) to
denote the power which brings about the appearance of the world, I have
capitalized the initial letter.
(3) With regard to the Advaita conception of the self, I have not
capitalized the initial letter of the word "self" when the word refers
to the individual soul (java). When the word refers to the "essential
Self", I have capitalized the first letter. On one or two occasions such
a distinction has been difficult to maintain since, for the Advaitin,
the essence of the individual soul is nothing but the supreme Self.
(4) With regard to the Visistadvaita conception of the self, I have not
capitalized the initial letter when the word "self" refers to the
individual soul . I have capitalized the initial letter when the word
refers to the Lord i.e, the supreme Self.
(5) Sanskrit words are cited in their stem ( pratipadika ) form. However
the word " karman " is more familiar in its nominative singular form: " karma "
and it has been cited in this way. When the word " karma " stands for
"ritual action" it has been translated as such. When it has the moral
sense of the result produced by previous good or bad actions, I have not
translated the word and it appears in the text as " karma ".
LIST OP ABBREVIATIONS
Ai.
• 0
Aitareya Upanisad
Amara,
0 0
Amarakosa
Aparoksa.
0 0
Aparoks amibhuti
Stma.
0 0
Stma Upanisad
B .S.
0 0
Brahma-Sutra
B ,S .L .
0 0
Brahma-Sutra—$ankarabhasya
B .S .Si.
0 0
Br ahma-S ut r a-Siddhantadar sana
Bha.P.
0 0
Bhasaparic cheda
Br .B.
0 0
Brahmabindu Upanisad
Brh.
0 0
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad
Brh.B.V.
0 0
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad Bhasyavartika
Brh,$.
0 0
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad ^aftkarabhasya
Ch.
0 0
Chandogya Upanisad
Ch.3.
0 0
Chandogya Upanisad i^ahkarabhasya
Cu.
0 0
Culika Upanisad
De,Gi ,
0 0
Devi Gita
G.
0 0
Bhagavad-Gita
G.S.
0 0
Bhagavad-Gita £ankarabhasya
Gaud. Ka»
0 0
Gaudapada Karika
Isa.
0 0
Isavasya Upanisad
Tsa.£.
0 0
Isavasya Upanisad ^ankarabhasya
J.S.
0 0
Jaimini-Sutra
Katha,
0 0
Katha Upanisad
Katha.£.
0 0
Katha Upanisad ^ankarabhasya
Ke.
0 0
Kena Upanisad
KeJ.
0 0
Kena Upanisad ^ankarabhasya
M.Na,
0 0
Mahanarayana Upanisad
Ma.
0 0
Mandukya Upanisad
Ma .
0 0
Mandukya Upanisad iSsahkarabhasya
Maitri.
0 0
Maitri Upanisad
Manu.
0 0
Manu-Smrti
Mbh.5.
0 0
Mahabharata Sranyaka—Parva
Mbh.^a.
0 0
Mahabharata ^anti-Parva
Mu.
0 0
Muncjaka Upanisad
Mu,^.
0 0
Mundaka Upanisad ^ankarabhasya
Mukti.
0 0
Muktika Upanisad
N.S.
0 0
Naiskarmyasiddhi
Nr.Pu.
• *
Nrsirfihapurva TapanTya Upanisad
xix
Nya,Ku.
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P.D.
• 0
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P.S.
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^atapathabrahmana
S.3,
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Sam,Si,
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dv.
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Tai,1.
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Tai.B.V,
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0 0
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0 0
YatTndramatadTpika
XX
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter One: ADVAIT AHAT AM
1.1. Liberation is the ultimate human goal.
1 .2. The scope and method of the Vedic revelation.
1.3. Descriptive presentation of the origin of Sanskrit grammatical
texts and the school of PurvamTmamsa.
1.4. The composition of the Brahmasutra .
1.5. Decline in Vedic learning and the growth of disbelief.
1.6. Triumph of the MTmamsakas
1.7. The coming of ^ahkaracarya.
1.8. Verse in praise of Sankara.
1.9. Statement concerning the Advaita method of interpreting the
Upani§ad texts.
1.10. (a) Consciousness is the reality of the seer and the seen.
(b) Consciousness is of two types.
(c) Brahman is the substratum of superimposition.
1.11. The cause is more subtle and pervasive than the effect,
1.12. The primary cause must be free from distinction.
1.13. Brahman is free from the three types of distinction.
1.14. The sacred texts ( sruti ) and the traditions (smrti) teach that
Brahman is free from distinction.
1.15. The meaning of the text; "free from quality".
1.16. Brahman is of the nature of consciousness.
1.17. Brahman is eternal.
1.18. Brahman is non-dual,
1.19. Brahman is pure existence,
1.20. Consciousness is identical to existence.
1.21. The three orders of reality: paramarthika . vyavaharika and
pratibhasika .
1 .22. Explanation of the three orders of reality.
1.23. Ignorance ( ajnana ), the first description.
XXI
1 .24.
1 .25.
1 .26.
1 .27.
1.28.
1.29.
1 .30.
1 .31.
1 .32.
1 .33.
1 .34.
1 .35.
1 .36.
1 .37.
1 .38.
1 .39.
1 .40.
1 .41 .
1 .42.
1 .43.
1 .44.
1 .45.
1 .46.
1 .47.
1.48.
Ignorance, second description.
Ignorance, third description.
The nature of the individual soul and the Lord.
The nature of the soul and the Lord according to Vacaspatimisra
and Suresvara.
The nature of the soul and the Lord according to Sarvajnatman
and Prakasatman.
Examination of the view that (a) there is a single soul, (b)
there are a plurality of souls.
The view that there is a single soul ( ekajivavada ).
Discussion concerning the beginningless nature of the soul with
regard to the views of the previous authors.
The ''reflection theory" ( pratibimbavada ).
The nature of Ignorance ( a.jnana ).
Ignorance and the process of creation. Real transformation
( parinamavada ) and false appearance ( vivartavada ).
The origination of the five organs of knowledge and the internal-
organ.
The origination of the five organs of action and the vital-breath.
The process of division and combination of the five elements.
The "five sheaths" ( pancakosa ).
The purya sf akam .
The "three bodies" and the "fourth state" ( turiyavastha ).
The difference between the "fourth state" and liberation while
living,
The apprehension of the indeterminable ( anirvacaniyakhyati ).
The relation between scripture and the knowledge of the truth.
The six means of knowledge: (a) perception.
Determinate ( savikalpaka ) and indeterminate ( nirvikalpaka )
perception.
(b) Inference.
(c) Comparison.
(d) Verbal testimony.
XXI1
1.49. (e) Postulation.
1.50. (f) Non-cognition.
1.51. Knowership belongs to the internal-organ.
1.52. The fourfold qualifications ( sadhanacatus t aya ).
1.53. Hearing ( sravan a), reflection (manana) and meditation
( nididhyasana ).
1 .54. The application of hearing, reflection and meditation.
1.55. The removal of obstacles to liberation.
1.56. Liberation ( mok sa).
1.57. Liberation while living ( .jlvanmukti ).
1.58. The mode of life for the liberated person.
1.59. Liberation free from the body ( videhamukti ).
1.60. There is neither happiness nor sadness in liberation free from
the body,
1.61. ^ankaracarya.
Chapter Two: VI £ IST5DVAITAMATAM
2.1. Rarnanujacarya,
2.2. Verse in honour of Ramanuja.
2.3. Statement concerning the Visi§tadvaita method of interpreting
the Upani§ad texts.
2.4. Reality is threefold; inert matter, individual souls and the Lord.
2.5. Alternatively, reality can be described in a twofold way:
substance and quality. Substance is sixfold.
2.6. (a) The Lord who has a fivefold manifestation.
2.7. The Lord's qualities, of which there are two categories.
2.8. (b) The individual soul,
2.9. (c) Nityavibhuti .
2.10. (d) Consciousness.
2.11. (e) Prakrti .
The order of the origination of the elements.
2 . 12 .
XXX XI
2.13.
2.14.
2.15.
2.16.
2.17.
2.18.
2.19.
2 . 20 .
2.21 .
2 . 22 .
2.23.
2.24.
2.25.
2.26.
2.27.
2.28.
2.29.
2.30.
2.31 .
2.32.
2.33.
2.34.
2.35.
2.36.
(f) Time.
The mutual similarity and dissimilarity among the six substances.
The qualities are tenfold: (a) sattva , (b) ra.jas and (c) tamas ,
(d) sound, (e) touch, (f) colour, (g) taste and (h) smell,
(i) conjunction,
(j) potentiality.
Attributive consciousness is both a substance and a quality.
Body-soul analogy.
The three types of distinction: sari&tiya , vij atlya and svagata ,
exist in the supreme Self.
Explanation of the text: "He desired, 'let me become many' "
(Tai.2.6.1.).
Explanation of the text: "When he makes just the smallest
difference..." (Tai.2.7.1.).
Explanation of the text; "...one alone, without a second" (Ch.
6 . 2 . 1 .).
Explanation of the text; "There is no diversity whatsoever here"
(Brh.4.4.19.).
Explanation of the text: "Brahman is real, Knowledge and limitless"
(Tai.2.1.1,). Brahman must possess distinction on account of
texts teaching creatorship.
Distinctions between the various qualities belonging to the
supreme Self,
Explanation of the text; "free from qualities" (Cu,7.2,).
The twofold nature of consciousness is established by the sacred
texts.
The supreme Self is an object of knowledge.
The sacred texts do not contradict the above view.
The supreme Self is eternally unchangeable ( kutasthanitya ).
The meaning of (a) texts denoting identity, (b) the term
Visi gt advaita and (c) the expression "the identity of souls".
The plurality of souls.
Existence is an object of awareness.
The world is the body of the supreme Self and it is real.
XXIV.
2.37.
2.38.
2.39.
2.40.
2.41 .
2.42.
2.43.
2.44.
2.45.
2.46.
2.47.
2.48.
2.49.
2.50.
2.51 .
2.52.
2.53.
2.54.
2.55.
2.56.
2.57.
2.58.
2.59.
2.60.
The author of the Brahmasutra accepts real transformation
(parinamavada ).
Knowledge of the truth removes the false notion that the body
is the self and it reveals that the self is the body of the
supreme Self.
All modifications are dependent upon the Lord. The world is real.
The apprehension of the real ( satkhyati ).
Examples of satkhyati .
The scripture is real.
The three means of knowledge. The definition of valid knowledge.
(a) Perception,
Indeterminate ( nirvikalpaka ) and determinate ( savikalpaka )
perception.
Another classification of perception.
(b) Inference.
Two classes of inference: for oneself and for another person.
(c) Verbal testimony.
The Veda is a single scripture consisting of two parts.
Primary and secondary signification of words.
Comparison is not a separate means of knowledge.
Postulation is not a separate means of knowledge.
Non-cognition is not a separate means of knowledge.
The logical tenability of "attributive consciousness"
( dharmabhuta.jnana ).
The difference between the "I-notion" ( ahankara ) and "I-ness"
( ahambhava ).
The nature of attributive consciousness. The soul is minute in
size.
Inquiry into the nature of Brahman follows upon the investigation
of the nature of ritual action.
There is no liberation while living.
Liberation according to Visi^advaita,
Inclusion of the categories of the Naiyayikas into those accepted
by Visi^advaita.
Summary of the differences between Advaita and Visi^advaita.
xxv
Chapter Three: YI^ISTjDYAITAMATlMJPAPATTIH
3.1. The teaching of maya existed prior to the Brahmasutra .
3.2. The author of the Brahmasutra has accepted the teaching of maya .
3.3. The etymological meaning of the word "Brahman".
3.4. Continuation of the topic.
3.5. Verse no. V.
3.6. The state of liberation.
3.7. Continuation of the topic with reference to "the absence of the
cognition of a connection to a second object".
3.8. Liberation while living.
3.9. Continuation of the topic.
3.10. The action of a liberated person.
3.11. Knowledge of the real nature of the Self is the means to
liberation.
3.12. The meaning of the word " tattvajnana ".
3.13. The nature of bondage, the nature of action and the nature of the
Self are to be demonstrated for the purpose of liberation.
3.14. The cause is the reality of the effect.
3.15. Continuation of the topic.
3.16. Reply to the objection; even after the destruction of samsara ,
it would persist in some way because the destruction of a thing
only means that it continues in another form.
3.17. Continuation of the topic.
3.18. Verse no. VI.
3.19. Inquiry into the pre-requisite implied by the word "Thereafter"
( atha ) in B.S.1.1 .1 .
3.20. Ramanuja's view.
3.21. Advaitins view that the prior and later mimamsa are separate
treatises.
3.22. Reply to the objection; there is a single mimamsa scripture
because dharma is taught in both treatises.
3.23.
A "connection" does not of itself establish that there is a single
XXVI
scripture.
3.24. Knowledge of ritual action is not the pre-requisite for inquiry
into the nature of Brahman.
3.25. Continuation of the topic,
3.26. The knowledge of dharma is not the pre-requisite. The "fourfold
means" ( sadhanacatugtaya ) are the pre-requisite.
3.27. The direct apprehension of the Self removes Ignorance.
3.28. Immediate knowledge can arise from the sacred texts.
3.29. Reply to the objection; the knowledge of difference cannot
logically persist after the knowledge of non-duality has arisen.
3.30. Explanation of scriptural texts cited in ^rl.B., Laghusiddhanta .
3.31 . Reply to the statement; the word "knowledge" is intended to mean
contemplation because "to know" (vid) and "to contemplate" ( upas )
have been used in the same passage without distinction.
3.32. The meaning of "steady remembrance" ( dhruva smrtih).
3.33. Reply to the statement; Katha. 2.23. teaches that "steady
remembrance" is the means to liberation.
3.34. Reply to the statement; "steady remembrance" is a synonymn for
devotion ( bhakti ).
3.35. Ramanuja states that (a) knowledge, i.e. meditation, must be
performed until death in order to attain Brahman, (b) To assist
meditation, action must be performed according to the stage of
life. Reply to (a).
3.36. Reply to (b).
3.37. The "sevenfold means" enumerated by Ramanuja can be included
within the "fourfold means" etc.
3.38. The scope of action as a means for liberation.
3.39. Reply to the objection; there should be a combination of
knowledge and ritual action.
3.40. Reply to the objection as to why Janaka preformed action.
3.41. Reply to the statement; the "fourfold means" will not be acquired
without the study of the karmamlmamsa .
3.42. Continuation of the topic.
3.43. Control of the mind ( saroa ) etc. are the means to Self-knowledge
and they are also the means toward the desire to know.
3.44. Reply to the statement; the texts dealing with chanting ( udgxtha )
etc., which occur in the Upani§ads, require the study of the
prior mimamsa .
3.45. Verse no. VII.
3.46. Reply to the statement; there is no means of knowledge for an
entity free from distinction.
3.47. Continuation of the topic.
3.48. The nature of maya , the individual soul and the Lord. The supreme
Self is free from qualities.
3.49. The meaning of texts which denote freedom from qualities.
3.50. Freedom from distinction can be arrived at through inference.
3.51. The meaning of the text; "From which words return..." (Tai.2.4.).
3.52. Texts which deny qualities, deny them in their entirety.
3.53. Verse no. VIII.
3.54. A distinction has the nature of its universal.
3.55. An entity does not possess distinction because of the absence of
possessing a quality.
3.56. A distinction does not contain a distinction.
3.57. Reply to the statement; verbal testimony can only reveal an
entity possessing distinction.
3.58. Verse no. IX,
3.59. The nature of indeterminate ( nirvikalpaka ) perception.
3.60. Critique of Ramanuja's explanation of determinate and
indeterminate perception.
3.61. Critique of Ramanuja's statement that inference only denotes
something which possesses distinction.
3.62. Brahman, free from distinction, is apprehended in the "fourth
state" ( turlyavastha ).
3.63. The Advaitins position that difference is difficult to logically
establish.
3.64. Continuation of the topic that difference is difficult to
establish.
3.65. Critique of Ramanuja's statement; configuration is equal to the
generic character and the generic character is identical to
difference.
3.66. The generic character is not identical to difference. Difference
means the cessation of non-difference.
XXVIIX
3.67. Generic character and difference are not identical because the
generic character does not require a counter correlate while
difference requires a counter correlate.
3.68. Reply to the objection: the ordinary perception of difference is
contradicted if perception apprehends bare existence.
3.69. Objection that (a) if perception apprehends bare existence, the
scripture would have no scope, (b) Brahman would be an object of
knowledge.
Terse no. X.
3.70. Reply to the above objection.
3.71. Reply to the objection: there is no contradiction between the
existence and non-existence of a thing at a different time and
place and consequently there is no relation of sublating and
sublated.
3.72. Continuation of the reply. Are consciousness, inert objects and
the imagined objects in dream (a) absolutely unreal, (b) absolutely
real, or (c) is one real and another unreal? The first is the
view of the Madhyamika. The second is the view of Ramanuja.
3.73. Continued.
3.74. Continued.
3.75. Reply to the objection: negation certainly exists in the case of
the rope-snake because it is subsequently recognized that the
snake never existed. But the same cannot be said in the case of
a pot etc.
3.76. The manner in which there is negation of the world following the
knowledge of reality.
3.77. The third view (cf., 3.72.) belongs to the Advaitins,
3.78. Reply to the objection; awareness is not identical to existence.
3.79. Continued.
3.80. Reply to the objection; awareness is not always self-luminous,
3.81. Reply to the objection; if awareness cannot be experienced, it
would have the same reality as a sky-flower.
3.82. Objection that ; awareness apprehends the prior non-existence of
awareness.
Terse no. XI.
3.83. Reply to the objection concerning the apprehension of the prior
non-existence of awareness.
3.84. Reply continued. The nature of awareness which is "universal"
( anubhutis amanya ).
3.85. Continued.
XXIX
3 . 86 .
3.87.
3 . 88 .
3.89.
3.90.
3.91 .
3.92.
3.93.
3.94.
3.95.
3.96.
3.97.
3.98.
3.99.
3.100.
3.101 .
3 . 102 .
3.103.
3.104.
3.105.
3.106.
3.107.
3.108.
The meaning of; awareness is "eternal", "one", "self-luminous".
Reply to the statement; perceptual consciousness is limited by
time.
Reply to the statement: awareness does not exist without an
object.
There is no "non-perception which is capable [of being perceived]"
( yogyanupalabdhi ) in respect of awareness.
Refutation of Ramanuja's statement; "the rule as to non¬
remembrance establishes the absence of experience".
Reply to the objection; the statement "I did not know anything"
proves the absence of pure awareness in deep sleep.
The destruction of prior non-existence is not a modification.
Reply to the objection; it cannot be said that what is
unoriginated is without destruction, because Ignorance has no
origination and can be destroyed.
Author's comment upon Ramanuja's definitions of "perceptual
consciousness", "self-luminosity", "eternity", "oneness".
What does not exist does not constitute an attribute.
Continuation of the topic.
The use of an uncompounded negative particle.
Reply to the objection; awareness can only be proved to exist in
a subject-object relation.
Verse no. XII.
Awareness which is "universal" ( samanya ) is the Self.
Explanation of distinction ( vise ga) and universal ( samanya ).
The Self is free from all objective elements.
The cognizing subject in the cognition "I know" is also an
objective element.
Continuation of the topic.
The "I-notion" ( ahankara ) manifests "I-ness" in the individual
self.
Criticism of the view that the function of the "I-notion" is to
manifest the "I-ness" which is intrinsic to the soul in the body
etc.
Continuation of the topic.
There is no cognizer; "I know" in liberation free from the body
(videhamukti)
xxx
3.109.
3.110.
3.111 .
3 . 112 .
3.113.
3.114.
3.115.
3.116.
3.117.
3.118.
3.119.
3.120.
3.121 .
3.122.
3.123.
3.124.
3.125.
3.126.
3.127.
3.128.
3.129.
The "happiness" in videhamukti is actually the total absence of
sorrow.
The resolve: "May I enjoy limitless bliss" does not mean that
in videhamukti there is the cognition as the "sense of I".
The meaning of the word "liberation" ( moks a).
(a) There is the possibility of fear when a second entity exists.
(b) Liberation is the total absence of sorrow.
There is no knower-known relation in videhamukti .
Objection that: consciousness is only established on account of
its connection to oneself.
Terse no. XIII.
Reply to the above objection (3.114.). Particular awareness
requires a locus, not awareness as a universal.
Knowership is not the essential nature of the Self.
Reply to the statement; the self has consciousness as its nature
and consciousness as its quality.
Continuation of the topic.
Continuation of the topic.
Reply to the objection: the word "consciousness" always expresses
a relation such as between the knower and the known.
Reply to the statement; the "sense of I" is not co-existent with
awareness, but awareness is what qualifies the "sense of I".
The consciousness which is the essential nature is not an object
of cognition.
Reply to the objection; the "I-notion" ( ahankara ) cannot possess
knowership.
The mind is the agent and the object of a cognition with
reference to the different mental modifications.
Terse no. XIT,
(a) The awareness manifested by the "I-notion" is not eternal.
(b) The Self would be non-eternal if the contraction and
expansion of awareness were its intrinsic attributes.
The "I-notion" manifests ordinary awareness as being located in
the "I-notion".
The "I-notion" manifests this ordinary awareness while it is
itself illumined by such awareness.
XXXI
3.130.
3.131 .
3.132.
3.133.
3.134.
3.135.
3.136.
3.137.
3.138.
3.139.
3.140.
3.141 .
3.142.
3.143.
3.144.
3.145.
3.146.
3.147.
3.148.
3.149.
Refutation of the statement concerning how the Self is
manifested by the "I-notion", because the Advaitin does not
accept that the Self is manifested by the "I-notion”.
The ordinary awareness which is in the form of a mental
modification (vr tti ), though an effect of Ignorance, is able to
remove the ignorance centred upon the knower.
Reply to the objections; (a) a mirror does not manifest a face
etc,, (b) in the absence of the "I-notion", consciousness could
not be established as "inner".
"I-ness" is not the Self because it is absent during deep sleep.
The statement; "I did not know anything" demonstrates that the
"sense of I" is not cognized during sleep.
During deep sleep the Self remains as the witness of Ignorance.
In the state of liberation while living, the "sense of I" appears
and actions continue according to the prarabdha karma .
(a) Expressions of "I-ness" in the statements of sages are
because they transact according to the understanding of the
people, (b) In liberation free from the body ( videhamukti ), there
is no appearance of "I-ness".
Verse no. XV.
Though the scripture does not have absolute reality, it reveals
the truth.
Continuation of the topic.
Though depending upon unreal difference, the scripture does not
communicate what is false as being true.
The method of communication in the Upani^ad texts.
The scripture removes the false view of difference and then
negates the difference centred upon itself.
What is required is only that the instructor is not in error
concerning the thing to be taught.
Scripture has no defect concerning what is to be taught.
Perception has a possible defect.
The knowledge of the non-dual Brahman is not subsequently
negated..
Criticism of Ramanuja's view that the dream-knowledge is not
false since it is not negated.
Continuation of the topic.
Continuation of the topic.
XXXI1
3.150.
3.151 .
3.152.
3.153.
3.1 54.
3.155.
3.156.
3.157.
3.158.
3.159.
3.160.
3.161 .
3.162.
3.163.
3.164.
3.165.
3.166.
3.167.
3.168.
3.169.
The knowledge of the real from what is unreal can be illustrated
by the knowledge of a real letter from particular printed lines.
Criticism of Ramanuja's view that, in the case of the letter and
a line, the real arises only from what is real.
Reply to the objection; if the scripture is false, its object,
i.e. Brahman, would also be false.
Continuation of the topic.
Reply to the statement; if the knowledge of fire is false, then
the fire -which is the object of that false knowledge- is also
false.
Continuation of the topic.
Criticism of Ramanuja's statement; it is incorrect to say that
the knowledge of the non-dual Brahman is not subsequently negated
Because it is negated by the statement: "reality is emptiness".
Does the sentence; "reality is emptiness" negate itself or not?
Reply to the first alternative.
There is no fault even though the scripture operates in itself.
Reply to the second alternative, i.e, "reality is emptiness" does
not negate itself.
Verse no. XVI.
The meaning of the text; "My dear, this was existence alone in
the beginning..." (Ch.6.2.1,).
The word "existence" in this text means the Self.
Reply to the Visi§j;advaitins statement; texts which teach
Brahman as the material cause must be interpreted in a
figurative sense.
The contradiction in the Visistadvaitins interpretation of; "Ify
dear, this was existence alone" (Ch.6,2.1.) and "In the beginning
this was indeed the Self" (Ai.1.1,).
Difficulties in upholding the view that "existence" and "Self"
have the meaning that the Self is qualified by a body.
Difficulties in upholding the view that the words "existence"
and "Self" refer to the Self without connection to a body.
Continuation of the topic.
In the sentence: "By which what is unheard becomes heard..."
(Ch.6.1.3.), the word "by which" refers to the object i.e. the
Self.
Objection that; in the sentence "By which what is unheard
becomes heard...", is the knowledge to be gained something
XXXI11
3.170.
3.171 .
3.172.
3.173.
3.174.
3.175.
3.176.
3.177.
3.178.
3.179.
3.180.
3.181 .
3.182.
3.183.
3.184.
3.185.
3.186.
3.187.
3.188.
3.189.
different from the Self or not?
Reply to the objection.
Criticism of Ramanuja's interpretation of "...this was existence
alone..." (Ch.6,2,1.),
Interpretation of the text according to Advaita.
Refutation of the view that the word "existence" ( sat ) refers
to the subtle primary matter ( pradhana ).
Explanation of the text: "The wise behold that which cannot be
seen..." (Mu.1.6,).
Continuation of the topic.
Explanation of the text: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless"
(Tai.2.1.1.).
Continuation of the topic.
Continuation of the topic: the meaning of the word "real".
Continuation of the topic: the meaning of the word "Knowledge".
The use of the three words "real" , "Knowledge" and "limitless"
in the definition of Brahman.
Grammatical apposition ( samanadhikaranya ).
Verse no. XVII.
Criticism of Ramanuja's explanation of the word "without a
second" in Ch.6.2.1.
The word "through which" ( yena ) in Ch.6.1.3., must signify only
a single entity.
The use of the example of the pot and clay (Ch.6,1,4,).
The meaning of the text; "My dear, this was existence alone..."
(Ch.6.2.1.).
Continuation of the topic.
Continuation of the topic: the meaning of the word "without a
second" (Ch.6.2.1.),
The teachings of (a) Emptiness, (b) that there is solely an
efficient cause, (c) that there are multiple material causes, or
(d) the cause possesses distinction, cannot establish the
proposition: "through the knowledge of the one, there is the
knowledge of everything".
3.190.
Summary of the topic concerning the proposition: through the
knowledge of the one, there is the knowledge of everything.
XXXIV
3.191 .
3.192.
3.193.
3.194.
3.195.
3.196.
3.197.
3.198.
3.199.
3.200.
3.201.
3 . 202 .
3.203.
3.204.
3.205.
3.206.
3.207.
3.208.
3.209.
3.210.
3.211 .
Verse no. XVIII.
Brahman is in reality free from distinction.
Critique of Ramanuja's interpretation of the text; "...whose
desire is true, whose resolve is true" (Ch.8.1.5.).
Continuation of the topic.
Critique of Ramanuja’s interpretation of the text: "He who knows
the bliss of Brahman" (Tai.2.9.1.).
Critique of Ramanuja's interpretation of the text; "He attains
all desires, together with the wise Brahman" (Tai.2.1.1.).
Continuation of the topic.
Interpretation of the text; "For whom [Brahman] is not thought...
(Ke.2.3.).
Critique of Ramanuja's interpretation of the text: "From which
words return..." (Tai.2.4.1 .).
Critique of Ramanuja's interpretation of the text: "You cannot
see the seer of seeing" (Brh.3.4.2.).
Ramanuja's view is that the sacred texts do not deny real
diversity. Criticism of this view by means of an explanation
of what is meant by the word "different" ( bhinna ),
Continuation of the topic. Seeing oneness in diversity is
possible only when there is a single material cause.
Continuation of the topic with reference to the text; "He who
sees diversity, as it were, here..." (Brh.4.4.19.).
Critique of Ramanuja's interpretation of the text: "All this is
indeed Brahman...Thus being peaceful, may one contemplate"
(Ch.3.1 4.1 .).
Critique of Ramanuja's interpretation of the text; "For when he
makes the slightest interval ( antara )..." (Tai.2.7.1.).
Continuation of the topic.
Explanation of B.S.3.2.11; "There is no twofold characteristic
for the supreme, even on account of place, because everywhere
[it is taught otherwise]".
The purport of the Bhagavadgita is that Brahman is free from
distinction.
The purport of the Vis nupuran a is that Brahman is free from
distinction.
The falsity of the world is taught in the Vi^.P.
The Visi^tadvaitin position that the etymological derivation of
XXXV
the word " bhagavat " shows that Brahman is an object of speech.
3.212. Criticism of the above view. Distinctions are admitted only in
the sphere of ordinary relations ( vyavahara ),
3.213. Discussion of the meaning of the verse: "The nature of
Knowledge..." (Vig.P, 1,2.6.).
3.214. Explanation of the questions in Viiji.P. 1.1.9. concerning the
nature and cause of the world and the explanation of the reply,
in Vis.P. 1,1,35., to those questions.
3.215. Ramanuja's interpretation of Vi§.P. 1.1.9. and 1,1.35.
3.216. Criticism of Ramanuja's interpretation of the above two verses.
The word "from what" ( yatah ) in Vi§,P. 1.1.9. cannot refer to
both the efficient and the material cause.
3.217. Continuation of the criticism of Ramanuja's interpretation of
these verses.
3.218. Critique of Ramanuja's objections to the Advaita interpretation
of these verses.
Chapter Pour; AYIDYOPAPATTIH
4.1. Ramanuja's seven objections to the Advaitins conception of
Ignorance ( avidya ).
4.2. Verse no. XIX.
4.3. Reply to the first objection concerning the locus of avidya .
4.4. Reply to the second objection concerning the concealing by
avidya .
4.5. Reply to the third objection concerning the nature of avidya .
4.6. Continuation of the topic.
4.7. The statement: "I am ignorant" refers to avidya which is
something positive in nature ( bhavarupa ). This is a partial
reply to the fifth objection concerning a means of proof for
avidya .
4.8. The meaning of the negative particle in the statement; "I am
ignorant" ( aham ajnah ).
4.9. Reply to the fourth objection concerning the indeterminable
nature of avidya .
4.10. Brahman as such does not have the experience of avidya .
4.11. Reply to the objection: if unreal error is based upon an unreal
avidya , there is the possibility of error without a real
substratum and the result would be Emptiness.
XXXVI
4.12.
4.13.
4.14.
4.1 5,
4.16.
4.17.
4.18.
4.19.
4.20.
4.21 .
4.22.
4.23.
4.24.
4.25.
4.26.
4.27.
4.28.
4.29.
4.30.
4.31 .
4.32.
4.33.
4.34.
4.35.
Reply to the fifth objection concerning a means of proof for
avidya .
Ramanuja's objection to the use of inference as a means of proof
for avidya . The first interpretation of Ramanuja's objection.
Reply to the objection.
The second interpretation of Ramanuja's objection and the reply.
The applicability of the example in the inference under discussion.
Ramanuja's nine counter-inferences against the concept of avidya .
Critique of the nine counter-inferences.
The destruction of a positive entity can occur through knowledge.
Reply to the objection: since Knowledge is momentary, upon the
apprehension of fear there would be the cognition of multiple
fears.
Continuation of the topic concerning the use of inference in regard
to avidya .
Verse no. XX.
The material cause of the false world can only be false.
Discussion of the objection: only what is perceived is the object
of cognition, error and sublation.
The apprehension of the indeterminable ( anirvacanr.yakhyati ).
There is no appearance of one thing in another manner.
Criticism of Ramanuja's mode of refuting the Advaitin.
Reply to the objection: why does a thing having an indeterminable
reality become an object of the idea and the word "silver" and
not something else?
Criticism of the apprehension of the real ( satkhyati ).
Continuation of the topic.
Continuation of the topic.
Criticism of Ramanuja's view that in dream the Lord creates the
dream objects for each soul.
Continuation of the topic centred upon the discussion of the sutra:
"But [the dream creation] is mere maya ,.." (B.S.3.2.3.).
Further criticism of satkhyati .
Criticism of satkhyati through a discussion of the examples of
the crystal and the China rose and the yellow conch-shell.
4.36.
4.37.
4.38.
4.39.
4.40.
4.41 .
4.42.
4.43.
4.44.
4.45.
4.46.
4.47.
4.48.
4.49.
4.50.
4.51 .
4.52.
4.53.
4.54.
4.55.
4.56.
4.57.
4.58.
xxxvii
Discussion of the examples of the circle caused by the turning
of a fire-brand and the appearance of a face in a mirror.
Discussion of the example of the confusion of direction.
Ramanuja’s explanation concerning the sight of a double moon.
Criticism of Ramanuja's explanation.
The relation of negated and negating.
Verse no. XXI.
The text; "enveloped by the untrue (anrta)" (Ch.8.3.2.) is a
means of proof about avidya being positive in nature.
The meaning of the word "rta" in Katha.1.3.1.
Continuation of the topic.
The nasadasiya hymn (Tai.Bra.2.8.9.3,4.) is a means of proof about
avidya whose nature is indeterminable as real or unreal.
Criticism of Ramanuja's explanation of the nasadasiya hymn.
Continuation of the topic, with reference to Ramanuja's use of
the words " sat " and " tyat " (Tai.2,6.1. ).
Sayanacarya' s commentary upon the nasadasiya hymn.
Continuation of Sayaija's commentary.
The meaning of the word " maya ".
The nature of maya as described in the Devipuran a, Pancadasi and
the Vi s nupuran a.
Explanation of the texts cited in the &rT.B. with reference to
maya .
The text; "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) is a means of proof about
an indeterminable avidya .
Question: does the word "you" refer to Brahman (a) as qualified
by the individual soul, or (b) as an attribute of the soul?
Criticism of the first view.
Criticism of the second view.
Criticism of Ramanuja's view that all words finally denote the
supreme Self.
Continuation of the topic.
Quotations from the Vayupuran a and the Devigita .
The Vi§.P. text: "The stars are Vi§nu...what exists and what does
not exist" (Viis .P.2.1 2.38. ) .
xxxviii
4.59. Reply to the objection: identity statements such as "The -stars
are Vi§^u" refer to the relation of body and the one embodied
( sarirasariribhava )«
4.60. Further criticism of the concept of sarirasarlrin .
Interpretation of words such as "body" occurring in the Vi§.P.
4.61. Explanation of the words; "...what exists and what does not exist"
(Vi§.P.2.12,38.).
4.62. Criticism of Ramanuja’s interpretation of the words; "what exists",
"what does not exist".
4.63. Explanation of the Vi§.P. verse: "Because the Lord is of the
nature of Knowledge" (Vi§.P.2.12.39.).
4.64. Criticism of Ramanuja's interpretation of the above verse.
4.65. Ramanuja's interpretation of the Vi§.P. verse; "But when
Knowledge is pure..." (Vis.P.2,12.40.) and the critique of that
interpretation.
4.66. Continuation of the topic.
4.67. Vi§,P,2.1 2.41 and 42.
4.68. Interpretation of the Vis.P. verse; "Therefore.,.other than
Knowledge there is no collection of objects whatsoever..." (Vis.
P.2.12.43.) and the criticism of Ramanuja's interpretation.
4.69. Interpretation of the Vis.P. verses; "Knowledge is completely
pure..." (Vi§.P.2.12.44.) and "I have thus told you what is
reality..." (Vis.P.2.1 2.45.).
4.70. Criticism of Ramanuja's interpretation of these verses on the
grounds that he has connected the subject of some verses with the
predicate of others.
Criticism of Ramanuja's statement that these verses do not denote
Brahman as free from distinction, or maya , or a world super¬
imposed by maya .
Further criticism of Ramanuja’s interpretation of these verses.
Reply to the sixth objection concerning an agent for the
cessation of avidya .
4.74. Verse no. XXII.
4.75. Reply to the seventh objection concerning the cessation of avidya .
4.76. Vi§ .P.2,6.47 and 48, with the commentary of ^rldharasvamin.
The subject-object distinction occurring in the text; "...the Self
should indeed be seen" (Brh.2,4.5.) must pertain to a limiting
adjunct because non-difference is explicitly taught by the text;
"you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.).
4.71 .
4.72.
4.73.
4.77
4.78. The nature of avidya .
4.79. Illustration with reference to the above explanation.
4.80. Avidya is immediately dispelled by knowledge.
4.81 .
Brief concluding statement.
xl
farft: i
qR^Rnw rht-
TRpT fw: jt^tort l I^tr: r^twt-
RRR i iwr ^ nft%r sTFrqr^TR^T^T
Hil.fr^T <rarsc*ritoift^r s fawfa; i ?rt ^ dwn-
I ^nf^^THRr FRTTSiq ^
i ^Rn^rfT wt ^tfa \kmm I
Rwg<r: ot^rt I m tr RF^n qr
*k4 ^ ^twirr^r ^nwiTiii^i wrarciV-R \
^tn^rt ^sjRR^jfe^r: I w ^rr^^rt i
SRPRmt R ^RTtR?*R?S? | W^d-
rrs: ?%TO^#m^rs?rfwRt i <r %n^HRmfW *n% 3^-
rrprtr RKtq^R I
Introductory Communication
The supremely compassionate Lord, desirous of saving the people
immersed in the ocean of worldly existence experiencing pleasures and
sorrows in accordance with their own individual actions, set forth
various knowledges. For there is the sacred text: "the Lord of all
knowledges". In regard to those knowledges, each particular knowledge is
on acco un t of the difference of the subject matter to be taught. Although
at first glance a contradiction appears to exist among some, nevertheless
that can be removed because there is a difference among those who are
qualified [for each knowledge]. And so the praise of a particular
knowledge is for the engagement of the respective person who is qualified.
Even the condemnation seen somewhere about a certain [knowledge] is for
the non-engagement there of a person who is not qualified for that
[particular knowledge]. Just because of this [condemnation] it should not
be suspected that a particular knowledge has no validity. This alone is
the purport of even the condemnation of action; "what is uncreated is
not [gained] through an action". For this very reason, even though
xli
action has been condemned, the Lord taught it to Arjuna having observed
his qualification: "therefore you must certainly perform action".
A qualified person is one who has experienced the condition prior
to that. For example, a person qualified for investiture with the sacred
thread is one who has undergone the purificatory rite of tonsure. A person
who is not qualified is of two types; one who has not experienced the
condition prior to that and one who has experienced that condition [i.e.
the end result itself]. For example, a person who is not qualified for
investiture with the sacred thread is one who has not undergone tonsure
or one whose investiture with the sacred thread has already been done.
With regard to the second person who is not qualified there, the condem¬
nation is specifically employed for the non-engagement there once again.
( m m ^ w i%tt l qtf^nsn-
^ mm i
iwn I to
Although the knowledges have been taught as fourteen in the
Vi s nupura na :
Indeed, these knowledges are fourteen: the [six]
limbs [of the Veda], the four Vedas, the mimamsa
[divided into two] which is an elaborate system,
the treatises concerning dharma and the Puranas
still, only a twofold grouping is primarily seen. For there is the sacred
text; "there are two knowledges which should be known, the higher and the
lower". Having shown there the lower [knowledge] by; "the Rg-Veda, Yajur-
xlii
Veda" etc., the higher knowledge is shown: "Then there is the higher
[knowledge], by which that Imperishable is attained". The pre-eminence
of the higher knowledge is indicated just by the word "higher" ( para ).
This higher knowledge is certainly more esteemed than the others because
it is the means for the highest human goal which is the attainment of
Brahman, In the Muri dakopa ni g ad , having commenced with: "Then there is the
higher", the result -which is the attainment of Brahman- is taught by:
"...by which that Imperishable is attained" etc. certainly prior to
showing the nature of the higher knowledge. Because there would especially
be an engagement towards seeing the nature of something when the greatness
of the result is already known.
r ferTcTO^Tprf Mfaqttwro? an|:-snsr M
HIT ^ tfftf
l I RR-
R S^SPST wmm %TRf HT,*
♦ fN
#FRf ^ptt
r * *nw#n4t^i% mh I wmr?
groans
ct t^tssvrtr
wsj P^TTff-THRTa^RTT RR-
srprft q?4 rktoji
This sacred text attracts people toward the higher knowledge with
more affection than even thousands of parents. In the expectation; "and
what is the mode of procedure there?", £sri ^ankaracarya says sacred texts
such as; "the one who knows Brahman becomes Brahman indeed", which show
that liberation is at that very instant following the knowledge of Brahman,
xliii
remove [the notion] that something else must be done in between [the
knowledge of Brahman and the gain of liberation]. But Ramanujaearya says
that devotional meditation has to be performed after knowledge.
The primary difference between these two teachings is the acceptance
of the teaching of maya on the one side and, on the other, the non-
acceptance of it. And in this matter, being uncertain as to which of the
two should be accepted and which of the two should not, as soon as I was
desirous of knowing the truth, at that very time I was instructed by the
sacred text: "what is uncreated is not [gained] through an action" flashing
before the eyes and revealing that; to attain liberation there is no scope
for even a trace of something to be done. For if the manifest world is
absolutely real, something would have to necessarily be done in order to
bring about its cessation. Therefore that [world] is certainly without
absolute reality. And that is difficult to be stated without the teaching
of maya . Thus the mind of myself -who was considering that the intended
meaning of the sacred texts is that the teaching of maya alone is superior
and who was accompanied by the thought; "how can this error of the people
be removed?"- engaged in writing Advaitamoda .
Although the mind turned back a little due to its deficiency in
being very sharp, it proceeded again with an abundance of enthusiasm due
to the urging of the venerable J&rl £>ahkaracarya which was awakened within
it [the mind]. Having become bound to the faith that the very feet of the
teacher [Sankara] and the grace of a true preceptor will provide the
assistance here, [the mind] placed his feet in this work and even though
sinking now and then into an ocean difficult to cross, it somehow or other
reached the further shore mounted upon the raft of faith.
um m w ht^hvh'
xliv
^ fWm gw: gwmww gfi r yfc qrwi-
I 3Tcft gWWWn^ftfftw^: W$TIWhSW WIWcRPJ j WWT-
iTHmrfia I r ^_ , -- , , r ': r ' ^_ A A- .<? rs . ^ ' '
wtww^ i ffti s w wr^wswr
fcWAlIW-
g<*mw-
?cvo
This work was accomplished due to the feet of the teacher
[Sankara] and they alone can bring about the engagement of the learned
people here. In whatever manner the author of the SrPbha s ya , having
restated the view of the Advaitin, is seen to make an effort in refuting
that, in that manner, my own effort -which has the removal of that
[refutation] as its object- is only in accordance with that [refutation].
Hence it has happened that a repeated investigation of the very same
subject has to be done at some places. For this reason, the learned
people must not regard it as affected by the defect of repetition etc.
And those whose minds are controlled by clinging [to a certain view]
cannot smell that fragrance. My wish is that among those [who say]:
"faults are certainly easily acquired by a human being", some critics
who are disposed to love only good qualities, though they are impartial,
will point out the faults,
Vasudevasastri Abhyankar
Pune , 1 840,
(1918, Christian era.)
1
1 . 1 .
5wq^K^*-?isw ^ wrpw: l
*WT RcqriH I ws^ | tpq% m~
f^T VHi #m
#p* ( m° c i ? i \i ^ <ptt i *t tT
( 3T® <S HH I O ffw ^PTT <FPT Rr^TPnWIT^ I WfifldiWfa
“ 5 5^r *t i%t^” (*n° c i \\ ) fm I
1,1. Indeed here in the world, people should primarily endeavour only
to obtain the goals of mankind. Although the human goals are fourfold,
consisting of religious and social values ( dharma) , worldly prosperity
(artha ), satisfaction of legitimate desires ( kama ) and liberation ( moks a),
nevertheless, among those, liberation alone is the ultimate human goal.
The other are not, because they do not last. The transience of worldly
prosperity and of the satisfaction of desires is understood just by
direct perception. [The result gained from] religious and social values
is also in the same manner, for there is the sacred text:
Just as here, the world which is acquired by action
perishes, in just the same way the other world which
is acquired by merit perishes (Ch. 8.1.6.).
However, liberation’is not like that, for it is understood to be eternal
on account of the sacred text: "he does not return again" (Ch. 8.15.1.).
In the Bhagavadgita also [liberation is understood to be eternal]: "but
having reached Me, 0 Kaunteya, there is no further birth" (G. 8.16.),
comment
The introduction to Advaitamoda is based upon that of the
Vedantaparibha sa,
1 . 2 .
2
par: ” # I wim
I ^ mn’r shtihtc wto
ftWi^T %m spfiTTSpR w I
1.2 In matters which are not within the scope of sense perception the
Veda alone is the :tseans. of knowledge. And there [in the Veda], because
of the elaborate teaching of ritual actions such as sacrifice in the
*
Brahmana section, the understanding of the people would be like this:
"having performed ritual action such as sacrifice, obtaining the result
such as heaven is alone the primary human goal". The manifestation of
the Upanisads in the sacred text is for the removal of that [false belief].
In the Upanisads, Brahman is revealed by a twofold method according to the
capacity of people for the knowledge of Brahman: by means of positive
statements and by means of negative statements.
comment
The scope of the Veda is delineated to be the revelation of what
cannot be ascertained through the operation of an ordinary means of
knowledge ( praman a). Perception and such perceptually based means of
knowledge as inference require the relationship between sense data and
the respective sense organ. According to the orthodox ( astika ) view
metaphysical truth falls outside this relation:
for this entity [i.e. Brahman] is not an object of
perception since it is without form etc. And since
it has no inferential mark etc., it is not an object
of inference, etc. But like dharma , this entity can
only be attained through the scriptures [i.e. the Veda]
alone.
Thus there are two orders of knowledge: concerning ordinary relations
(vyavaharika ) and metaphysical truth ( paramarthika ) and two corresponding
levels of praman a. The Veda is solely a means of knowledge for "matters
which are not within the scope of sense perception".^
The Advaita analysis of the Veda distinguishes sharply between the
karmakanda such as the brahmana portion dealing with ritual observances
---- -- -.—-
and the jfianakan da, specially the Upanisads, which reveal the nature of
reality. Brahman. In his introduction to the Rg Veda, Sayana specifies
that:
3
dharma and Brahman are, respectively, the subject matter
of the prior and later portions in the Veda... the knowledge
of them both is directly the purpose of the Veda.^
To the Advaitin both portions of the Veda are a valid praman a. They
differ, however, in that the karmakan da is within the world of "becoming"
(samsara ) while the jnanakan da teaches the liberating knowledge of
*
Brahman. Sankara held the view that:
it is reasonable that just as [the scripture] teaches
the true means such as the agnihotra sacrifice for a
person desirous of heaven etc., so too it teaches the
Self in its real nature to the person desiring liberation
(through texts like) "That is the Self. You are That,
0 Svetaketu.^
The perceptually based means of knowledge and Vedic revelation
each relate to a separate domain and as a consequence it is held that
£
they do not conflict. They do, however, appear to come into contradiction
because Advaitins consider that the sruti reveals the falsity of perceptual
plurality:
there is no diversity whatsoever here [in Brahman].
He who sees diversity here, as it were, goes from
death to death.
The Advaitins then argue that Vedic testimony possesses greater validity
8
than perceptual experience. The sruti does not negate the cognition of
duality (dvaitapratiti) but it sublates (badha ) by knowledge the
assumption of reality which is based upon that cognition. The position
of the Advaitins is that the perceptually based means of knowledge are,
and continue to remain, valid within their own sphere of operation though
that sphere is sublated by knowledge from Vedic revelation:
the mere validity pertaining to ordinary relations
is not negated by the scripture dealing with non-duality,
but their validity as pertaining to reality is negated.9
Abhyankar mentions a "twofold method” of the Upanisads: the use of
positive statements (vidhi) and the use of negative statements (ni s edha ).
By the word vidhi , the author refers to various forms of meditation
( upasana) prescribed in the sacred texts and passages which present
Brahman as possessing attributes. The subsequent negation of the ultimacy
of upasana and attributive statements is nisedha .^ Sankara considered
that in the Upanisads:
4
Brahman is understood to have two aspects - qualified by
the limiting adjuncts which are different modifications
of name and form and, contrary to that, being free from
all limiting adjuncts ... There are texts by the thousand
showing that Brahman has two aspects according to the ^
difference between the sphere of knowledge and ignorance.
*
Advaitins see in the sruti a deliberate method of revealing Brahman,
taking into account the different degrees of understanding on the part
of the student. Sankara and Mandana both refer to this method
( adhyaropapavadabhyam ni s prapancam prapancate , i.e. "[Brahman] free
from the manifest world is explained by means of superimposition and
12 —
negation") which is the false ascription of attributes ( avastvaropah )
13 _
upon Brahman (vastuni) followed by the negation ( apavada) of those
attributes to reveal Brahman as free from all duality. This method can
be illustrated by the aruiidhatipradarsananyaya "^ which describes how the
tiny star known as Arundhati is indicated by firstly pointing out larger,
nearby stars as Arundhati and then successively negating them until the
eye is able to apprehend the more subtle form of the real Arundhati .
In his commentary towards the end of the B rhadaranyaka, Sankara makes a
significant statement concerning the application of the method of
adhyaropapavada . While explaining the sentence: "Brahman is indeed free
from fear. The one who knows in this manner certainly becomes Brahman
free from fear", he states:
The one who knows the Self described above to be Brahman
which is free from fear, he certainly becomes Brahman
free from fear. What has been told is the compressed
meaning of the whole Upanisad. For the correct
understanding of this very meaning, the idea of
origination, maintenance, dissolution, etc., and the
superimposition of action, its factors and results have
been brought about on the Self. And again, in the
negation of those, by means of the elimination of the
superimposed distinctions [by the process of] "not this,
not this", the truth is communicated.15
faM q | ITPTT l *&&&'• I wf
sRjrfprf faifa yfoRf fTFwnf ^
fat snftsnwft q srfopf: l f%w q #mqqrs-
epamft portal i sqr tor i mwti
wnfa I 3TTO^^q*ftf*Rts3% ^rrqr:
*rg$<m i ^^ttt torto 1 TO^nfen wfimi I to TOrnf
%^T%H ^Trf nftf 12 TO TOfTO*ft^ |
^t^q^qRr: ^TTtxT5c =3 TO TO3f TO 1 W ^ “ Sq-
frroimsq ^ ^fM^: ! f%g
TOR^^TRtoTO/R’T TOTTRqTTOTO%
%H( ^TOT^T I
m\ 4t^sr ^oro^fTO ^ #rw^ i ^ifw r %-
Ptosn I
tffafercn f| qfTO'^ITOt STfgfi ?TkT I
iraisl: qraaro q^TO^qigfr: || ^ u
#w[ ^H^rfrorfeTR' p jqro “ to%TO
5^r: $m*\ tot^ to tor I
1.3. The sacred texts are exceedingly difficult to understand because
the sentence of the sacred text is concise and it is generally bereft of
sentences supplying a connection. And the language is very ancient.
And people are successively of mediocre intelligence. Even though the
faithful were confidently engaged upon the path shown by the sacred
texts, among other people there was a slackening in enthusiasm for the
path of knowledge and the path of action. At that juncture, disbelievers
appeared. Then the sages performed austerities to know the meaning of
the Veda. Because of the strength of their austerities the sages gained
the capacity [to comprehend the meaning] and they composed grammatical
treatises beginning with Aindra ,^ etymology and the rules concerning
phonetic changes .^ Later, in just the same way, Panini composed the
As tadhyayi and because of that there arose the knowledge of the
meaning of words, for the division of words into the stem (prakrti ) and
the terminal affix ( pratyaya) was shown in it. And Jaimini composed
18
the Dvadasadhyayl and because of that there arose the knowledge of
the meaning of a sentence, for many rules were contained in it which
6
were useful in determining the meaning of a sentence. A grammarian is
one who knows the meaning of a word and a Mimamsaka is one who knows
the meaning of a sentence. Then, when the people gained the knowledge
of the meaning of the Veda, there was an attentive engagement in the
ritual actions. And successively [the engagement in ritual] occupied
the supreme position. Accordingly, the thought of the people was in
such a manner: "this Upanisad portion is not the pinnacle of the sacred
texts. On the other hand, by teaching that the individual self has an
imperishable nature and thus by means of generating faith in the other
worldly happiness such as heaven, it only confirms the ritual portion
dealing with sacrificial offerings etc. and so it is subsidiary to that."
The path to liberation shown by the Upanisads became impassable to people,
like it was full of thorns. Even the Vedantins came to be looked upon
with sharp glances of the Mimamsakas as the disbelievers [were looked
upon]. It has been told that:
when an inquiry into the meaning of sentences is begun,
the Mimamsakas thwart the understanding of the people
as they impede the sight of the people with the dust
in the form of deceptively clever statements.
At that juncture, it was as though a time of the non manifestation of
the Upanisads and once again the firm opinion of the people was
recognised as: "having performed ritual action such as sacrifice,
obtaining the result such as heaven is alone the primary human goal."
1 . 4 .
m WWRTc[-
wfT SPSUJflR stfoRPT I ■'TIWjfaWRT
rrt: m mm m I
mm m mwm m-
7
1.4. The revered Badarayana, refuting this common opinion and
engendering an enthusiasm on the part of the people for the path of
liberation, composed the Brahmasutras . All the logic,[i.e. syllogistic
reasoning]taught by Jaimini which was useful [for understanding] the
meaning of a sentence was certainly accepted by Badarayana. But the part
which comprised this much: the Upanisad portion is subsidiary to the
ritual portion, was not accepted by Badarayana. Having taught the
meaning of the Upanisads only through the methods taught by Jaimini and
having established that [the meaning of the Upanisads] to be the portion
which is the pinnacle of the sacred texts, Badarayana made the door to
liberation free from obstruction. And the path to liberation shown by
the Upanisads became free from thorns.
1.5.
^ qffftft Tift ntoh* s-qr^Rt i
URqfFfa: i
I ft
I q>r: | ^ i ^ ^(ft:
wwq, i nRT i vni^qqft fft$-
^ ^ ” $lft I
1.5. After a long time had passed in this way, once again a difficult
time was at hand. The mind of the people was assailed by a lack of faith.
Only the name remained of the followers of the path of knowledge and the
path of ritual. Just as before, once again disbelievers, known as
"materialists" ( carvaka ), appeared. For they spoke in this manner: "there
is no one known as an individual soul distinct from the body. There is
no liberation. There is no other world. Revelation is no means of
knowledge. There is no one known as the Lord who is the ruler. This
world arises and perishes out of its own nature."
8
- 1 . 6 .
^T^^Rt^q^qqm^^Tiwi #r: i *ffafa-
qrcfcnra tights; qfrsfa^n-
hr^h^,t: ^pff qi fc rertftq fTwffqiqfa ^fr-
gqq^qqf^rr^ ^ ^ ^ qrak-TftlfsqtTOf w l
1.6. According to the maxim of the turning of the wheel, once again
in the course of the revolution of time the prevalence of the
materialist view was reduced to complete disgrace by the followers of
the path of ritual with assistance obtained from the king of that time.
Beginning with Mandana Miira, the leaders of the Mimamsakas gained
eminence in the assembly of the king and fancying themselves to be
learned, they then regarded even the followers of the path of knowledge
to be fools as they did the disbelievers [as fools]. Conditions were
observable everywhere like at the time of the non-manifestation of the
Upanisads and like at the time prior to the composition of the sutra .
1.7.
tfR^Ri^Rk- I %t-
__ j *
1.7. At this -juncture, Lord Siva, desirous of saving the people,
>•
descended in the form of Sahkaracarya and having composed the
/» —
Sarlrabhasya in the form of an exposition of the Brahmasutra , like the
author of the sutras (Badarayana) he made the door to liberation once
>* j * __ _
more free from obstruction. This incarnation as Sri Sahkaracarya was
solely for reviving once again the Vedanta scriptures.
9
comment
Abhyankar follows traditional hagiography in portraying Sankara to
19
be an incarnation of the god Siva.
^ 111 11
^ ,
1.8. Sri Sankara, whose feet are worthy of veneration
throughout the world, composed a commentary on the basis of
the teaching of maya upon the Bpanisads, the
Bhagavadgita and the Brahmasutras . He is
ever pre-eminent. 1.
1,9 ‘ m I
fci %jpwsr: »4r
qkraf: ^rPr u
3r|<Tfnr:
#ra: w ^ n
1.9. Now, the teaching which has come from Sankara is being portrayed
for easy understanding.
In the sacred texts, the statements of freedom from
qualities always aim at discarding all qualities.
Expressions of the possession of qualities have a
figurative meaning because of the superimposition
of auspicious qualities on the supreme Brahman.
The sacred texts [teaching] non-duality refer to
what is the fact. An expression of difference
relates to limiting adjuncts. Therefore the
teaching which has come from Sri Sankara, being in
harmony with all the sacred texts, is supreme. 2.
10
comment
The validity of the Vedas as a means of knowledge is contingent upon
the pre-supposition of the internal consistency of their teaching. Yet
there are passages which describe Brahman as possessing qualities (sagun a),
while passages also denote Brahman to be free from qualities ( nirgun a).
Some passages portray Brahman as "other" while' some teach that there is
"nothing other". If Vedantins are unable to explain these contradictions
the status of the Vedas as a praman a cannot be upheld. Vedantins, however,
refuse to admit inherent contradiction in the Vedic texts and expend
immense exegetical effort in demonstrating the mutual concord (samanvaya )
, ,, 20
of all passages.
Sankara recognises a seeming contradiction in the texts and he argues
that a solution cannot be found by granting sagun a and nirgun a statements
equal status:
the supreme Brahman cannot logically have, of itself,
both characteristics. Because one and the same thing
cannot be ascertained as naturally possessed of
qualification such as form and as the opposite of
21
that on account of the contradiction.
Therefore an order of primary (mukhyartha ) and secondary, figurative
(gaunartha ) texts must be determined:
when there is a contradiction, this is the principle
for a decision between the two alternatives: those
that have that [formless Brahman] as their object
are more authoritative than those which do not have
22
that [formless Brahman] as their object.
According to Sankara, the purport of the Upanisads is contained in
those statements which denote Brahman to be free from quality and
non-dual. However contrary passages which teach the possession of
qualities or the distinction between Brahman and the soul are not
without meaning, since:
it is not correct to admit some sentences of the Veda
as having meaning and some as meaningless, because the
23
status of a means of knowledge is common.
11
Rather, the passages which present Brahman as sagun a are with reference
24
to a limiting adjunct (upadhi ) ; they are for the purpose of worship
- - 25
and meditation ( upasana) and are subsequently negated by the texts
teaching non-duality.*^
If the question is raised as to why nirguna statements such as
27
"not this, not this" ( neti neti ) are more authoritative than sagun a
passages, Sankara answers that the nirguna statements negate the
28 *
sagun a passages. In order for there to be negation, a relationship
of prior ( purva) and posterior (apara ) must exist between the two
types of texts. A negative statement such as " neti neti " pre-supposes
the presence of its counter correlate, in this case the sagun a
statement, and then only it is able to negate. The nirgun a statement
is more authoritative precisely because it is logically subsequent to
29
the sagun a passages. Sankara maintains that texts denoting difference
( bheda ) and qualities can be interpreted as a preparation for teaching
the ultimate truth whereas the nirgun a texts do not lend themselves
30 -
to another meaning. Moreover Sankara considers that the texts
which reveal unity convey a knowledge which is complete in itself
( nirakahks a) but sagun a and bheda statements do not have the capacity
31
to put an end to further seeking.
1 . 10 .
wz m m qtwrcg p*W sprnlr I
rrw: mm I 1
trf#f *qsqqrpre% I m wm\ I m m
mm q^~qwnqR|^w4 <rcrsrq mi#
*[<Tf
st^tt rwi^t mmm
^ ! m FRqmm Wm l m ^ fm-
qrmr mi ^ l 'rw-
% ^Tf4 v 4to‘4 l wmf^Rr m ^tt
m \
qT fRR ^TTf% STR^T ( So 3 I X I O # ^ 5WTTO mi
(1 1 ? 1 ^ ^ tfWppwq
qftqpR !
12
1.10 Among the means of knowledge beginning with perception, verbal
testimony is primarily able to reveal Brahman. Then subsequently, in
conformity with that [verbal testimony] the other means of knowledge
also begin to reveal that [Brahman]. Verbal testimony such as: "My dear,
this was existence alone in the beginning, one alone, non-dual"
(Ch. 6.2.1.) very clearly states that reality is one alone and is of
the nature of the Supreme Self.
That Supreme Self is of the nature of "Seeing". Although a
three-fold category of seer, seen and Seeing is undoubtedly experienced
by everyone from young to old, still, the seer is the locus of Seeing
and the seen is the object of Seeing. So because both of these, the seer
and the seen are with regard to Seeing then the ascertainment of their
essential nature is dependent upon the ascertainment of Seeing. Seeing
alone is, in actual fact, reality. The seer and the seen, however, are
certainly superimposed (kalpita ). Seeing is Knowledge. That Seeing is
of two types: without reference to limiting adjuncts and with reference
to limiting adjuncts. The Seeing without reference to limiting adjuncts
is Knowledge which is of the nature of pure existence, without locus or
object. That Seeing which is without reference to limiting adjuncts does
not depend upon anything in regard to the obtaining of its own nature.
This [Seeing] is indeed what is expressed by the word Brahman and by
the word supreme Self. The seeing which has reference to limiting
adjuncts is with regard to a locus and an object and it is in the
form of knowledge which is produced by the ordinary means of knowledge
etc., which have a locus and an object. So it is certainly superimposed
like the seer and seen.
And so, as the locus of all superimposed things is the substratum
of the superimposition. Brahman is therefore the root [cause] of the
whole world. The definition of Brahman as: Brahman is the root cause
13
of the whole world, is taught In the sacred text: "from which, indeed,
these beings are born" (Tai.3.1.1.) and in the sutra : "The birth etc.
of this [world] is from which" (B.S.1.1.2.).
comment
Sankara's position on the relation between reasoning and verbal
testimony is unambiguous. He considers that reason is unable, by itself,
to reach finality on issues of metaphysics:
because reasoning which is independent of the Vedas
depends merely upon the conjecture of people and ^
lacks conclusiveness, for conjecture has no limit.
Reasoning should be in accord with what is ascertained to be the
conclusive teaching of the scriptures and in this role it serves as
"a subsidiary means" to realization. Although the position of reason
is solely supportive, its utility should not be disregarded. The Veda
employs "argumentation and demonstration among its own modes of
expression and communication." Reasoning is used to expose fallacious
35
argument and to ascertain the purport of scriptural passages.
Importantly, Advaitins rely on methods of reasoning such as separating
to ascertain the true nature of the individual self, which is an
- 31
indispensable condition for the understanding of the mahavakya .
Abhyankar attempts to demonstrate the Advaita conclusion regarding
the nature of consciousness through a method of reasoning based upon
37
such Upanisad texts as: "there is no loss of the seeing of the seer."
Proceeding upon the basis of common experience that all cognitive
activity reveals a seer, the object seen and Seeing or awareness which
connects the two, he argues that both the seer and seen can only be
denoted with reference to awareness. Since seer and seen are never
cognised without relation to awareness they are dependent upon
awareness: for the determination of their existence is dependent upon
their being ascertained by means of awareness. Reality is equated with
awareness because the latter is invariable whereas both the seer and seen
38
are inconstant and are, therefore, adventitious.
39
There are two "types" of awareness: the first can be expressed
by the word Brahman and it forms the essence of the individual. This
awareness is not the knowledge of "such and such" ( Idrsam tadrsam) but
14
it is awareness as such : identical with the existence and essence of
the sense of self (svarupacaitanya ). It is self-effulgent (svaprakasa)
in the sense that it does not depend upon another thing for its
illumination ( ananyaprakasya) . In relation to mental states this
40
awareness is known as saksicaitahya and it constitutes the real
referent of the word "I" (ahampratyaya ). Without relation to the
limiting adjunct of the mind it is mere, unchanging, awareness in
which both subject and object are superimposed.
Awareness conditioned by the modes of the mind (sopadhika )
constitutes the second type. The Vedantaparibhas a specifies this
awareness to be of three kinds: as associated with the object ( visaya-
caitanya), with the means of knowledge (pramanacaitanya) and with the
- 41
knower ( pramatrcaitanya ). The first is awareness limited by the object
(ghatadyavacchinham caitanyam) , the second kind is awareness limited by
the mode of the mind (antahkaranavrttyavacchinnam caitanyam) and the
-■ —I . . M # T I— . .. *
third is awareness limited by the mind (antahkaranavacchinnam caitanyam).
J —— ..i n . M. i> — ... r. i
This means pure awareness, conditioned by the mental modes, assumes
the functions of knower and the means, of knowledge, and it also modifies
to represent objects in perception. These forms of particularized
awareness depend upon the limiting adjunct of the mind and hence have
beginning and end.^
Abhyankar has argued that the seen objects and the sopadhika seer
and act of seeing have no reality independent of awareness. Awareness
constitutes the substratum upon which all else is superimposed. The
substratum is equivalent to the root cause, in the same manner as a
rope is the root cause for the superimposition of a snake form. The
author cites the definition of Brahman (Tai. 3.1.1. B.S.1.1.2.) which
44
Advaitins consider to be an incidental definition (ta t asthalaksana)
and which seems to connect Brahman with causal agency. Abhyankar,
however, demonstrates that this definition need not imply causal agency
since it can equally refer to Brahman as the mere substratum of
superiraposition. In this sense it becomes a definition of Brahman as
cause only in the manner of an apparent transformation (vivarta).
42
15
qw q qqq&srqr ^*4 sqm q qqfq l
^q^lfact |q JFsn^TRhrcq |
^JTRIWI% qjMwqcr. H ( Ho Hfo ^ I ? ) # |
qq qm^yt qfqRpqq } qqRtr *pjq^rqi qqqqq^qRnqq
3<nsf^qqwq R^ts^Riq i ^rhurttwr'i q<mm$-
^3 I q^Ri qsmmRqiq: l qrqqM^tH^mc-fciqT?gqw-
?3^ip^R wipi rerag qTRRqqq^g qqT% qqm
qqqkRRTFto rrru q fw^n I q q qqqftRqT
^ ^r< 4 m| <Rq RjqqRmRmq qnmrmtqfmq qr^qq; I
qq: qqqg mR^^q qnqkRfqfntqqqr q rtwh
R^Rmreq ^qqRt ^gwr q
q^arm r^hr Rrqq^mqfanq I qqr rwtwriw-
sqtiq;4 q
?qq q^Rw qqqsqmifqq 1 mqnqfq-
4t m^MT R^m 5 RTIWT q RT^T I qfqmtfqT ^4
sqm q l ffft ^3^q qqqferfq'qq^qt q^qro qm*qrq l
q^TRTqRqgqRT RRq qrcsqrRqqrRRqiq I qtqsqf qq qqptfq-
q^4q qqqqqTfwq l qRTq^qifq qq: gjpf sqm q I qqqmfr-
$<qq Rm^iRiqfmRmiqr qpq:q^mm^ i q^qRqw-
^qqrqqqiqi^qqq RTR^IRf q^qi^Riq^mq I qq R ^TOT-
qmi%q% qqiqqqr ?$qqq tg: l qqmqrft mq; r^4t qm^ I
Rmrog qqrqRq^q RRqq mgqqR^m^ i qqqwqTOT
rrt sqm q I qqqm^ I qq: q^iRtm 4qf I R^RT
ftm q qqRTiqqq qq I qq qqqiqm^g sqmRf q
qt^qq I
1.11. With reference to the effect the cause is subtle and pervasive.
This has been told in the UpadesasahasrI (9.1.):
Subtlety and pervasiveness should be understood
successively from [the series] beginning with smell,
on account of abandoning each preceding one up until
the Inner Self.
Here [in the verse] earth is expressed by the word smell: because
qualities are: not perceived separately with regard to the possessor
of qualities, therefore only the absence of difference between
16
qualities and their possessor has been accepted in the final conclusion.
"Up until the inner Self", means extending as far as the Supreme Self.
"Abandoning" means giving up the form of the effect. Subtlety and
pervasiveness should be understood by giving up the form of the effect
in due order as [all] things extending as far as the Supreme Self are
successively cause with regard to the preceding effects: earth, water,
fire, etc.
It should not be said: if the cause is subtle with regard to the
effect, then because it is of a lesser size how could it pervade the
effect ? Because although the essential nature of the cause exists in
the effects it is not clearly evident in its own nature since it is
hidden in the form of the effect. For this reason subtlety is said
here but not as a consequence of being of a lesser size. So because
only what is accompanied by all the modifications is the material cause,
the cause pervades the effect through being in a greater position
with regard to the effect. Therefore it is established that earth is
subtle and pervasive with regard to its effects. Water is subtle and
pervasive with regard to earth. Because there is the perception of
sweat in the body and of springs within the rocks of mountains and
within the earth. And because everywhere on the earth there is the
perception of taste which is the special quality of water. And because
there is the experience of the penetration of water everywhere on earth
without obstruction.
Fire is subtle and pervasive even with regard to water. Because
the entry of the sun's rays and of the minute particles of fire is seen
without splitting the water. And because although fire is able to be
extinguished by water, the portions which enter into warm water are seen
to be not extinguished by the water. Indeed there, subtlety alone with
regard to the water is the reason for the non extinguishing of those
17
portions. Air is subtle and pervasive even with regard to fire.
Because the passage of air is certainly seen when sunbeams are present.
Space is subtle and pervasive even with regard to that. Because the
perception is just so. For separation is observed even for a stone and
without accommodation there is certainly no possibility of separation.
In this manner subtlety and pervasiveness should be understood [in all
things] up to the Supreme Being.
comment
The author's explanation of this topic is largely derived, in form
and content, from Ramatirtha's commentary upon this verse in the
UpadesasahasrI .
Abhyankar explains that Sankara uses the word "smell" instead of
earth because qualities are not perceived separately from their locus
and since smell is the special quality (asadharanagun a) of earth it can
be used to refer to the latter.
The idea of this passage is that a material cause is more subtle
and pervasive than its effect, for example clay is more subtle and
pervasive with respect to all the products derived from it. Based upon
the description of the origination of matter presented in Tai.2.1.1.
("From that [Brahman], i.e. from the Self, space was produced. From
space, air [was produced]. From air, fire. From fire, water. From water,
earth.")^ each preceding element is said to be more subtle and pervasive
than its product. This discussion of subtlety and pervasiveness is
intended to show the Self to be the most subtle and pervasive since
everything has originated from it. Ramatirtha sums up the purport more
clearly than Abhyankar:
all this [world] is experienced as certainly pervaded
by existence and manifestation, thus pure existence-
awareness is the material cause of everything ... since
the entire collection of visible [things] is consumed
by pure existence-awareness, there is nothing at all
existing separate from that. 47
18
1 . 12 .
^#nVri* l ^HNi^wicTHf q±HAHi<MiWilMnnf wnr-
^PTprf l ^ m
i m €m toj w^rff
arrcTRtfttffe^ g^misfq
I tTWR ^fM^T-
f^r tF^PSyf ^nFWTTf^n^E^iqHf 7 : I cn^rwnr iproW
i <% ^ i
1.12. Indeed because of pervasiveness the cause is universal with regard
to the effect. That means it is free from the distinctions belonging to
the effect. Because the distinctions such as potness and dishness which
belong to the effects such as a pot and a dish are not seen in clay
which is the causal state. For this very reason. Brahman, which is
the root cause of all effects, is free from all distinction. Suppose
there should be some distinction there [in Brahman], then there should
be some other root cause even for Brahman which is free from that
particular distinction. If that also possesses distinction then once
again there should be another root [cause] of that which is free from
that particular distinction, so there would be the consequence of an
infinite regress. For the removal of that [fallacy] the root cause
must necessarily be said to be free from all distinction and that alone
is out Brahman.
comment
The relation between the universal ( samanya ) and the distinction
(vise sa) is an important argument which Abhyankar will later use
against the Visistadvaitins,
The author attempts to demonstrate that Brahman must be free from
all distinctions on account of being the root cause (mulakarana) of
.'...t. ra i
everything. He argues that an effect must inhere in its material cause.
48
The cause, however, is universal in relation to the effects, which
means that it must be free from the distinctions of those effects.
19
For if a material cause such as clay intrinsically possessed the
distinction of a given effect such as potness then it could not also
take the form of another effect such as a dish. Thus the cause must
inherently be free from the qualities of its effects. Extrapolating
from this, Abhyankar argues that the primary cause of the world must
be devoid of all distinction. Should the mulakaran a also possess
distinction, then such a distinction must inhere in its universal
which in turn must be free from that distinction. To avoid infinite
regression, the primary cause should be accepted as free from all
. 4
distinctions. Sankara has also made reference to such an argument.
1.13.
5TRTqTS%cRr SRPHf W R ^
rtr rwih
1.13. Indeed because of being free from qualification, no difference
is possible there [in Brahman] from anything whatsoever of the same
class, of another class, or residing in [Brahman] itself. Because
only what possesses qualification is subject to difference. Therefore,
there is nothing different [from Brahman]: neither a sentient being
belonging to the same class as Brahman, nor [something] insentient
belonging to a different class from Brahman, nor an attribute belonging
to Brahman. In every way Brahman is established as free from
qualification, without the three-fold difference, pure and non-dual.
comment
The structure of the argument is as follows: (a) the cause is more
subtle and pervasive than the effect and as Brahman is the primary cause.
Brahman is the most subtle and pervasive. (b) On account of its
pervasiveness of the effects the cause is the universal: which means
it is free from the qualifications inhering in the effects. Therefore
the primary cause must be free from all qualification. (c) Because the
primary cause has no distinguishing characteristic it is free from
20
(1) the difference which belongs to members of the same class ( sajatiya-
bheda) , (2) the difference which belongs to members of a different class
( vij atiyabheda ), (3) internal difference ( svagatabheda) and hence it
is non-dual.
This verse in the PahcadasI vividly portrays the three-fold
difference:
For a tree there is difference within itself because
of the leaves, flowers and fruits etc.. There is
difference within the same class on account of
another tree. There is difference from another
class due to rocks etc. 50
The negative prefix "a" in the word advitiya indicates the
complete absence of duality. This is a more precise term than "monism"
because the negative particle eliminates the possibility of
svagatabheda .
1.14.
/\ * __ * rs „
^ || ( [%o £\% )
I *TT% u ^RT TO” (to
* m m $ I \s I mzj
^ 1
1.14. That alone is Brahman, undivided, free from
distinction, pure - free from distinction
and limitless - without a cause or an
example. (Br.B. 8.9.)
Thus in the sacred text Brahman is very clearly said to be free from
qualification on account of the word "free from distinction" ( nirvikalpa) .
Furthermore, if Brahman possesses qualification [then] in keeping with
that qualification Brahman would be able to be taught by a word in the
manner of being "such and such". If that was the case, the sacred
text: "from which words return" (Tai.2.9.) and the tradition:
"not the object of words" (Vis.P.6.7.53.) would be contradicted.
1.15
* \o vs i r ) 5 ft ^ ^tfI-
guiRTTOFR M I grfr =fp | 3STO: tiff
g*rc sram: WMW#( *m ^1^11
5T HR[ l u *?: jm* ” (s° ? I ? I ^ raw:”
(wo <1^)0 $wktt: F^^qwfrf^^iqmqif^T: i
*piFFp p ^%cq
ftSprag; t%r ft§q$ft*urf% 3 q i ftfisq sng s q-
*wftpi*Tftt$?r sfcrenft l^iqpr-
I #3in(^Riqft 5^:^T%JTO^T f%PR-
w Fp I <t*n nm ( ^jo ?, ’fo vs r ) 5ft ^Nt-
f^on^r RfftM ^ vk\ i f* ^ qrrsrsrfa ^mm-
vsi *pm ^pt ^ tffcr i f%^r toiwhu^^ip^w: ^tr*i-
pn #(R[ i
<T%3^lRr: <rcmwg*lT q^q^ p I ^^wlq^lftf^TT-
‘ q^qq p *Tqft |
1.15. Moreover the sacred text: "free from quality" (Atma. 1. Cu. 7.2.)
negates all qualities universally with regard to Brahman, the
auspicious as well as those that must be given up. This is correct.
For if Brahman possesses quality then due to that quality Brahman
must necessarily possess qualification and therefore that [Brahman]
could not be the root cause of the world according to the reason
which was previously mentioned.
However the sacred texts [denoting] the possession of qualities
such as: "He is omniscient" (Mu. 1.1.9.), "one whose desire is true,
one whose resolve is true" (Ch, 8.7.1.) teach qualities which have
been superimposed. Accepting that there are, in reality,
qualities in Brahman, but in justifying the sacred text [denoting]
freedom from qualities in so far as [Brahman] is free from qualities
that are to be given up, then even the individual soul would be able
to be expressed by the word "free from quality" since it is free
from qualities such as form and taste which can be apprehended by
the external senses. Even the elements such as earth would be able
to be expressed by the word "free from quality" since they are free
22
from qualities such as pleasure and pain. When that is so, by [using] the
term "free from quality" nothing additional would be said by the previously
cited sacred text: "free from quality". So in reality there are certainly
no qualities in the supreme Brahman, even those that bestow good.
Furthermore, the qualities which bestow good and which are accepted
as abiding in the supreme Self are useful for individual souls only in the
state of being an individual soul. And that state has been superimposed
by Ignorance. So even the qualities of the supreme Self which are useful
there are only superimposed. Even the chariot, which is useful in the
action of going superimposed by the one who resides in the dream state,
is only superimposed.
comment
The mention of "qualities which must be given up" ( heyagun a) is in
reference to the view of the Viiistadvaitins who interpret the word
* * 52
nirgun a to signify the absence of any inauspicious qualities.
Advaitins consider sagun a statements such as: He is omniscient" to
refer to Brahman possessing the attribute of omniscience due to the
- - 53
limiting adjunct of mava . As previously mentioned, the nirgun a
statement ultimately sublates its sagun a counterpart.
On account of the sentence: asserting that the "qualities which bestow
good ... are useful ... only in the state of being an individual soul" it
would be incorrect to assume that Advaitins believe the Lord (iAvara) to be
a conscious fiction projected for the purpose of worship and of a lesser
order of reality ( pratibhasika ) than the worshipper. Rather, the Lord,
the world and the soul possess an equivalent ontological status in so far
- - 54
as they partake of the same vyavaharika reality. This state is negated
in toto as the creation of Ignorance ( avidya) from the paramarthika
standpoint relating to Brahman, where there is neither a Lord, nor a world
or a soul. In his example of the dream chariot the author shows that
objects existing in a particular state possess the same degree of reality
while from another standpoint they are equally false.
23
1.16.
wwft ^ I “I^rer;” (w* y
V l?R ) “wri WR;” ( to R I ? _) “%H*]R^ W ,,C ( fo
11 ^ Rc) (|o h l » l ?»)
31*85* ^icW cftq TCWfa %^'MM ^#IRW-
?RmRRW3[ i
vzfe 3R*TWT * §*>
Wi^ I
1.16. Moreover, Knowledge is the essential nature of the supreme Self,
not its quality. Because this is in accordance with the sacred texts such
as: "a mass of consciousness" (Brh. 2.4.12.), "real Knowledge" (Tai.2.1.),
"Brahman is consciousness, bliss" (Brh.3.9.28.), But the mention of
knowership in the sacred text: "[by what] my dear, [should one know] the
knower" (Brh.2.4.14.) is figurative. Because the relation of attribute
and its possessor, which is based upon difference, is an impossibility
in the supreme Brahman which is without a second, therefore there is no
possibility of that [Brahman] being, in reality, the locus of Knowledge.
In the very same manner, because the relation of cognition and its object
which is based upon difference is also an impossibility there [in Brahman],
in reality that [Brahman] is not to be known.
comment
The author presents the established conclusion of the Advaitins that
Brahman is identical with pure Knowledge, or awareness as such . Sankara
states: "The gruti says Brahman is pure consciousness, devoid of other
55
aspects contrary to this and free from distinction." 4
The statement: "in reality, that [Brahman] is not to be known" means
that Brahman can not become an object of cognition, like a pot, because
Brahman is the awareness which illumines cognition itself: "that which one
does not think with the mind, by which, they say, the mind [itself] is
thought, know that alone to be Brahman. This is not [Brahman] which people
57
meditate upon as "this"." Suresvara argues against the view that the
Self can become its own object:
24
What is seen in a locus by the seer is a quality of
that [locus] alone but not [of the seer]. Because
what belongs to the seer, like the consciousness of
the seer, never becomes the object of perception. 58
1.17.
^ q^RTT SJT 7 ?: | 3TTWFT:
qr q ft <pr FPpqfoR I
§ “ ^ RT ^ HfFR snRTSvnfctrfon^ m ” ( f°V IV l )
“ Htqf $ I U )
fqqq*[! ■wpw-qq' i sf^r fpt f q^-
r^q q qqr% w w l ^\w-
*m\ i%t: I HT q R?W q §q-
^ qf^mqi^r^T l w gqq. ^#-
q <rar qp^qi i “ frqns ” (*q° ^ l ) ^n^:-
qpr qfpqFn^wi i j% 3 aim:
^Aiq firrqTTT I q$$q f^R f^qfqrqq I
1.17. There is certainly unanimity of thought among almost all in that
the supreme Self is eternal. However, disbelievers such as the Carvakas
do not think that there is indeed a supreme Self, even less its eternity.
Therefore they belong to a different category. Whereas for those who rely
solely on the sacred texts its eternity is certainly accepted because of
sacred texts such as: "That great, birthless Self is undecaying, undying,
59
immortal Brahman" (Brh.4.4.25.) , "eternal among the lasting" (Sv.6.13.).
Inference also finds scope here: Brahman is eternal. Because [Brahman]
is the root cause. What is non-eternal is not the root cause, like a pot,
etc. If the root cause was non-eternal there would be the occurrence of
the production of an effect without a cause and that is impossible. In
this way, the reasoning here conforms [to the sacred texts].
That eternity is not the eternity of what is subject to
transformation, like gold. Gold, even though transforming into the form
of various ornaments, does not perish like the ornaments and thus it is
25
eternal with reference to the ornaments. The supreme Self is not like that.
Because there is the mention of that [Brahman] being free from change in
the sacred texts: "without parts, without action" (Sv.6.19.) etc. so there is
no possibility of transformation. Rather, Brahman has unchangeable eternity.
Unchangeable eternity is always existing in one and the same form.
comment
— 60
Abhyankar's inference is based upon kevalavyatirekavyapti .
Parinaroa is the causal explanation where both cause and effect have the
61
same degree of reality ( samasatta ) and the cause transforms into the
effect ( purvavasthapayena-avasthantarapattih ) like gold transforms into
the form of various ornaments.
According to Advaita, only what is free from change is absolutely real:
"a thing is real when it does not change the nature that is ascertained to
6 3
be its own" and consequently if Brahman transforms into the world then
Brahman could not be eternal. Advaitins accept Brahman as the cause of
the world only in the manner that the world is an apparent transformation
( vivarta) of Brahman. Vivarta means that the cause and effect have
different degrees of reality (vi s amasatta) ^ and the cause, without
undergoing change, appears in the form of the effect (purvavasthanapaye*
vasthantarapattih ). The standard Advaita illustration is the case of
a rope mistaken for a snake. The snake appearance has no separate
existence apart from the rope, its material cause. The rope, however,
has undergone no change to appear as the snake and so they both possess
a different order of reality. The rope is the vivarta cause and
Ignorance (avidya) is the transformative cause which accounts for the
appearance of the snake. Similarly, Brahman is the vivartakaran a for
the appearance of the world and avidya is the parinamikaran a.
Though the word vivarta belongs to post-Sankara Advaita, Sankara
clearly considers the world to be only an apparent transformation of
„ . 66
Brahman.
i.i8. l mwt ^rfrrvrrf
^ j « snsr ” ( ^to 3 |
W I O “ $ ” ( j®
^ I v? I ) a
$ i < I «) i m%n-
i mfii
26
1.18. Brahman which is of this nature is without a second. There is
nothing at all which is connected with Brahman, or not connected with it,
which is its body, or a part of it, or an attribute of it. Because of the
conformity with the sacred texts such as: "indeed all this is Brahman"
(Ch.3.14.1.), "all this is this Self" (Brh.2.4.5-6), "all this [world] has
This for its self" (Ch.6.8.7,). Even what is well known in this teaching:
that Brahman is non-dual, agrees with the correct view. Because in reality
there is no duality in Brahman in any manner whatsoever. For this very
reason, this is celebrated as the teaching of non-duality.
1.19.
i
1.19. Brahman is of the nature of pure existence. It is only possible
to say that "it is" but not that it is "such and such". But upon mentioning
a distinguishing characteristic such as "like this", because of the rule
that a distinguishing characteristic excludes, then upon the occurrence
that Brahman has the one that is excluded as its second, there would be
contradiction with the non-dual texts.
comment
On the basis of Upanisad texts such as: "My dear, this was existence
6 7
alone in the beginning, one alone, without a second", Advaitins consider
that existence as such is Brahman and "indeed, everything is based upon
» 68
existence, because the idea of existence persists everywhere." Existence
69
is held to be unsublatable for both affirmative and negative statements
occur in reference to "is" which, in itself, is not negated even upon the
denial of the substantive to which it refers.
To denote Brahman as "such and such" means that Brahman possesses
some qualification and a qualification invariably excludes one thing from
something else: red excludes all that is not red. If Brahman has a
27
qualifying factor, then such a qualification excludes Brahman from being
another thing.
1 . 20 .
'TITr^TT wm | 3*tt ^
“Ptfw. n (f RlvUR)
1.20. Because Brahman, whose essential nature is Knowledge, is of the
nature of pure existence, therefore Knowledge is also of the nature of the
pure existence of that [Brahman]. But pure existence is not an object
there [in Knowledge]. If [Knowledge] has either a locus or an object like
ordinary knowledge, because that [Brahman] would not have the nature of
existence in general, therefore Knowledge would not be the essential nature
of Brahman. In that case, there would be contradiction with the texts
cited previously such as: "a mass of consciousness" (Brh. 2.4.12.).
comment
Brahman is awareness which is identical to pure existence. Sankara
remarks on this identity in the sutrabha s ya :
It cannot be said that Brahman only has the characteristic
of existence and not the characteristic of awareness.
Because the sacred texts such as: "a mass of consciousness
only" would be meaningless. How could Brahman which is
bereft of consciousness be taught as the Self of the
conscious individual soul? Nor even can it be said that
Brahman only has the characteristic of awareness and not
the characteristic of existence. Because the sacred texts
such as: "[the Self] is to be apprehended as existing"
would be meaningless. And how could awareness which is
bereft of existence be accepted? 70
1 ’ 21 *
sfNr fstrr i
«imr ||
H ) wu ( $ ) wnm-
wm f? fw?T
RTiwm sqw*iK*i ^ i 'tthtwei
i <rer l sqr^iMf sttt
28
m^rrer
I HT1%-
*nra€f i*4? 3 -nfr nw v*[-
rTT^t 1 tfFf ^FTT^ I T^f ^ STr^ |
1.21. [objection] If Brahman is non-dual, the statement of the learned
is contradicted:
For us, there are six which are beginningless: the individual
soul, the Lord, pure awareness, the distinction between the
individual soul and the Lord, Ignorance and the association
of that [Ignorance] and awareness.
Because duality has been very clearly demonstrated by mentioning the
beginninglessness of these six here: (1) the individual soul, (2) the
Lord, (3) Brahman, (4) the distinction between the individual soul and
the Lord, (5) Ignorance and (6) the connection of Brahman with Ignorance.
[reply] Existence is threefold: concerning what is absolutely real,
what is empirically real and what appears real. In regard to those, the
existence concerning what is absolutely real is only for Brahman, not for
anything else. For that [Brahman] is not able to be negated at any time.
The existence concerning what is empirically real is for the whole world
consisting of the elements and their products. For although that [world]
is negated in the state of liberation, it cannot be negated in the state
of ordinary relations. The existence concerning what appears real is that
of silver etc. which appears upon a pearl-oyster etc., because that is
negated even in the state of ordinary relations. It exists only at the
time of its appearance.
comment
In Advaita, the definition of truth is linked to unsublatability.^
What is real cannot be subject to negation and what is negated cannot be
fully real. In the case of a pearl-oyster mistaken as silver, the sublation
of silver results from a closer inspection of the object. The silver exists
only at the time of its appearance (pratihhasika) , whereas the pearl-oyster
persists in everyday life.
29
The world, however, is not absolutely real since it too is sublated.
In relation to the enlightened standpoint of the liberated person the world
ceases to exist as world and is seen to exist as Brahman appearing in the
form of the world. The world is said to have empirical (vyavaharika)
72
reality since its validity persists until liberation. Advaitins confer
the status of absolute reality (paramarthika) only to Brahman: pure
awareness, existence, which is never sublated. This is further explained
in the verses:
1.22. cp|TfvR—
iRilRfFm fnr j
snsrmfcq^p-rki j;
arferci ssr: mi oqrcfcsqfauftqp*. i . j
sraftcfoROT qr&qri%qjRRet u
qqr<to <li#,%sqqr i
cksiicTHn%% mi wifi m\\ il
qqifa i
mi m-4 hm n \
qiwi%R^nqqT^q \ *Tr fa
q^r q mmtH mi {% 5 sqreiu%^ 1
3 q™rr <r qftwR s 1 qirwi^q st^Isr^rirrr =q 1
qrqq 1 ^qqf qs^Rf RRi%qsrq
^FRRqq 1 qqf Firimsiq qt^qRf mnnq; I mvt
#^qwfSRR =Rmr 1
q qqr l \% 3 #i^’qTRqTqq?rqr^q fqqrer: 1
sTORRkiqi qtw^qiqf sforeraro^far-
^ v\mwi q 1
1.22. That has been told:
Objects are considered to have three types of existence
on the basis of the absence of negation [respectively]:
in the three periods of time, at the time of the knower
and during the period of [mere] appearance. Brahman's
existence is considered to be absolute. The existence of
space etc. is empirical and the existence of the class of
things such as silver [seen upon a pearl-oyster] is
considered to relate to what is an appearance.
30
What can be sublated by a common means of knowledge when
the occasion relates to common life, that existence which
relates to appearance can be sublated when there is a knower.
What can be sublated by a scriptual means of knowledge when
the occasion concerns what is scriptural, that empirical
existence can be negated together with the knower.
The statement that Brahman is non-dual should be understood to mean
the absolute existence. In the verse cited, [beginning with] "the individual
soul, the Lord" the supreme Brahman is expressed by this: "pure awareness".
Excluding that [Brahman] the existence of the five such as the individual
soul does not relate to what is absolutely real but to what is empirically
real. The enumeration of the six there is because of beginninglessness
being common. The absolutely real Brahman is beginningless as well as
endless. That means it cannot be sublated in the three periods of time.
Although the other five such as the individual soul are beginningless, they
are not endless. Because although they exist as long as there is the cycle
of worldly existence, they are destroyed in the state of liberation. Moreover
among those, there is the destruction of these three totally: the distinction
between the individual soul and the Lord, Ignorance and the connection of
Brahman with Ignorance. But it is not in the same manner for the individual
soul and the Lord. But there is the destruction only of the limiting adjuncts
which bring about the status of an individual soul and a Lord. Because of
this [the argument] is set aside that: if the individual soul has [only]
an empirical existence, then because of the necessary destruction of the
individual soul in the state of liberation which is beyond the empirical
state, no one would strive for the attainment of liberation.
comment
Ramanuja advances the same objection:
If that [non persistence of the individual] was the case,
then "liberation is only self destruction" would be
postulated in another manner. 73
31
Abhyankar counters this objection by stating that liberation is the removal
of what is false, not the destruction of a real thing. For the Advaitin,
individuality has only an empirical reality brought about by the adventitious
connection of the Self with the limiting adjunct of the subtle body
(suksmasarira ). When the limiting adjunct ceases, the unconditioned self
remains.
1.23.
i Hrwi'TTp hcfh sfte: I
fm'W. I ^TtWR f
qf^TrWqRqfWT^'Hq I
^qr-
1.23. The limiting adjunct which brings about the status of the individual
soul and the Lord is beginningless Ignorance which is positive in nature,
composed of three qualities and which cannot be designated as existent
or non-existent. That Ignorance is twofold due to the distinction of maya
and avidya . Predominantly pure sattva can be expressed by the word maya
and predominantly impure sattva can be expressed by the word avidya . The
Lord is consciousness conditioned by maya . The individual soul is
consciousness conditioned by avidya.
comment
This is according to the Vivarana school of thought.
«
74
1.24.
I w?i iTRsfe I “
I -?\9 ) ^ I HT H
I3: I
mnw 1 m hr-
thht%: I ht h
l rnrJHrHFHTqHiH^T THr 1 m HTmifrqq-
“ 7T3R ^ H ” ( 50 ? | vs ) I
1 fRHta^N^^qor Rr^fr ^mfr:
^ 1 TO H m | r#q?n%q'TRq~
32
1.24. Alternatively, Ignorance is essentially just one. But it has a
twofold power: the power of knowledge and the power of action. The power
of knowledge is sattva which is not dominated by raj as and taroas , for there
is the traditional text: "knowledge arises from sattva" (G.14.17.). That
[power of knowledge] is the cause of the knowledge relating to words etc.
The power of action is twofold: the power of concealing and the power
of projecting. The concealing power is tamas which is not dominated by
rajas and sattva . That [concealing power] is the cause of the expression
such as "there is no pot, it is not visible". The projecting power is
raj as which is not dominated by tamas and sattva . That [projecting power]
is the cause for the origination of the world beginning with space. Because
the Lord is the material cause of the world only through the nature of being
conditioned by Ignorance which possesses the power of projection. The
sacred text such as "just as a spider emits and withdraws [its thread]"
(Mu. 1.7.) is the means of knowledge in this matter. Urnanabhi is the
insect which is a spider. The Lord is said to be the creator of the world
through the nature of being conditioned by Ignorance which possesses the
power of knowledge.
According to the view here. Ignorance which predominantly has the
power of concealing is said to be avidya and Ignorance which predominantly
has the power of projecting is called roaya . The limiting adjunct [which
brings about] the status of the individual soul and the Lord should be
understood just as before,
comment
This is according to the view of Vidyaranya in the Pancadasi .
I
1.25.
^44 SN: I
. 75
1.25. Alternatively, the two words maya and avidya are only synonyms
commonly expressing Ignorance endowed with the twofold power. The
33
distinction between the individual soul and the Lord should be understood
in this manner: the Lord is the original consciousness conditioned by
avidya . The individual soul is consciousness which is a reflection and
which has been reflected in avidya .
comment
76
It has been suggested that this view is Abhyankar's own. The author
now proceeds to discuss the principal conceptions of the nature of the
individual soul.
1,26 ‘ I *rft-
to t i ^—
3?nrwf qrfeq -i i
?iWr lUi% I
*mnfHrs£ i w §wrr%«ntw%
TT^m ! ^RiRrqf|?T I I
1.26. Here, this should be understood. Several views are possible with
regard to the nature of the individual soul and the Lord: the teaching of
limitation, the teaching of appearance and the teaching of reflection.
That is [stated] like this:
It is considered thus: the "limited” is for Vacaspati,
"appearance" is for [the author of the] Vartikas and for
the author of the Samksepasariraka there is "reflection".
Avaccheda means immanence. What has that is limited (avacchinna ). For
example the space immanent in water is said to be limited by water. A thing
appearing elsewhere because of the connection with something else is
"appearance". For example redness appears in a crystal because of the
proximity with a red rose. This [crystal] is indeed said as "conditioned".
The "reflection" is well known.
comment
The theories of "limitation" ( avacchedavada ), "appearance" (abhasavada )
and "reflection" ( pratibimbavada ) constitute attempts to provide a
systematic explanation of the nature of the soul, the nature of God and
their relation.
34
Each theory is linked to a particular mode of illustration. The
avacchedavada utilizes the example of space limited by a pot in relation
to the total space. Vacaspati writes:
just as the space within a pot is not different from the
total space, or is as though different as long as the pot
persists...in the same manner the individual soul,
superimposed through the limiting condition which is a
distinction in the imposition of beginningless,
indescribable Ignorance, Is not in reality different
from the supreme Self. 77
The abhasavada is illustrated through the example of a crystal which
appears to be red due to a red rose. On account of its proximity to the
crystal, the rose imputes its colour to the crystal and the latter is
mistaken as red so long as the crystal is not discriminated from the
appearance of redness. Similarly, Ignorance which is the limiting adjunct
(like the red rose) of consciousness (represented by the crystal) gains
identity with the latter. As a result, consciousness gains the status of
the Lord (like the redness of the crystal) owing to the non-discrimination
of the appearance from the pure consciousness (like the non-discrimination
of the redness from the crystal), In the same way, consciousness conditioned
by the intellect and becoming identified with it gains the status of an
individual soul owing to the absence of discrimination between the appearance
of consciousness in a certain form (like the redness of the crystal) and
pure consciousness. According to the abhasavada , the appearance of
consciousness ( cidabhasa) is neither identical with pure consciousness nor
is it different from it.
Pratibimbavada is linked to the illustration of the sun reflected in
water, or a face reflected in a mirror. It differs from the abhasavada in
maintaining that, while the reflection is false, the reflected image is
78
Identical to the original and hence real. Just as the reflection of a
face in a mirror is false because it is a reflection, while the reflected
image is as real as the original. Thus the soul, as reflected consciousness,
is identical to Brahman. The above verse ascribes this view to Sarvajnatman
who maintained that consciousness which is reflected in Ignorance becomes
79
the Lord and consciousness reflected in the intellect becomes the soul.
A similar view is advocated by Padmapada and the later Vivarana school of
thought. The difference between the position of Sarvajnatman and the
Padmapada-Vivarana description will be mentioned below.
Sankara did not exclusively propound any of these views. He refers
to the concept of avaccheda principally to show that a distinction between
81
the soul and Brahman is only due to the limiting adjunct. He utilizes
35
the illustration of a reflection when discussing how Brahman appears as
82
the individual self and in order to demonstrate that the defects affecting
83
the reflected image do not pertain to the original. He also employs the
— 84
word "abhasa", though often in the sense of a reflection.
1.27.
rs _*
__ ^ ^ ^ ^ .
^TfRp^r^f i ^TT^rcFrr
I ^fR 55 Tgf %cF4 I ^TfR ^ ^ ^RTW-
I
1.27. According to the view of Vacaspatimisra who holds the "limitation"
theory, the Lord is consciousness objectified by Ignorance. The individual
soul is consciousness which is the locus of Ignorance. According to the
view of the author of the yartikas (Suresvara) who holds the "appearance"
theory, the Lord is consciousness which is conditioned by Ignorance and
become one with Ignorance. The individual soul is consciousness conditioned
by the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance and become one with the
intellect. Some, however, accepting only the "appearance" theory, say that
the Lord is consciousness conditioned by collective Ignorance and the
individual soul is consciousness conditioned by individual Ignorance. They
say that Ignorance, in its essence, is manifold.
comment
In the view of Vacaspati, consciousness which is the object of Ignorance
is the Lord and consciousness which is the locus of Ignorance is the
individual soul. For example, in the situation that "I do-not know the
pearl-oyster" "I" is the locus of Ignorance and the pearl-oyster is the
object of Ignorance. In the same manner, "I" is the locus of Ignorance
( ajnanasraya ) and Brahman is the object of Ignorance (ajhanavisaya ). When
Brahman is not known, then Brahman conditioned by the limiting adjunct of
Ignorance is the Lord. According to Vacaspati, the Ignorance of the pearl-
oyster residing in the individual and having the pearl-oyster for its object
creates the appearance of silver. Similarly, Ignorance located in the
individual soul and having Brahman for its object creates the world. Just
36
as the pearl-oyster appears as silver without undergoing transformation,
in the same manner. Brahman appears in the form of the world (vivartopadana-
karan a). Ignorance is the efficient cause ( nimittakaran a) for the
appearance of the world.
Vacaspati holds that Ignorance is manifold and resides in each individual
soul. In this respect, as in other fundamental matters, he follows the view
85 —
of Mandanamisra. Vacaspati maintains that each Ignorance is the efficient
cause for the creation of its own world. Just as a flame is constantly
different though accepted as single, so too on account of their similarity
the different worlds experienced by each soul are accepted to be identical.
In the view of Vacaspati, the individual soul is consciousness conditioned
by the mind and because Ignorance and minds are manifold there is a
multiplicity of souls. The Lord is consciousness which has gained omniscience
86
and omnipotence on account of being conditioned by Ignorance. Because
the Ignorance located within the soul creates the world, the Lord is referred t
as the creator by way of courtesy in the sense that the Lord is the
8 7
substratum of the individual Ignorance and all worldly phenomena.
According to Suresvara, the Lord is the appearance of consciousness
which results from pure consciousness becoming conditioned by and
identified with Ignorance. Like the redness of the crystal conditioned by
the rose flower. The individual soul is the appearance of consciousness
arising from pure consciousness becoming conditioned by and identified
88
with the intellect. The last view referred to: "some, however..."
conforms to the Vedantasara though Sadananda does not appear to accept
89
that Ignorance is actually manifold.
1.28.
i
smi \
i t% wriw^s-
qfq m 1 qq q
37
1.28. According to the view of the author of the Sahksepasariraka who holds
the "reflection" theory, the Lord is consciousness reflected in Ignorance.
The individual soul is consciousness reflected in the intellect. However,
the author of the Vivaran a considers that there is the "appearance" theory
in regard to the Lord and the "reflection" theory in regard to the individual
soul. He says the Lord is the original consciousness conditioned by Ignorance.
The individual soul is consciousness reflected in Ignorance which has been
limited by the inner organ and its impressions. According to this view of the
author of the Vivarana, there is no superimposition of the subject who is a
. . .
reflection. However on the individual soul who is the subject and who is
certainly not superimposed [but] reflected in Ignorance, there is the
superimposition of the attribute in the form of being different from Brahman.
(objection) Then if the subject, which is of the nature of the
individual soul who is a reflection, is not superimposed, it would be real.
(reply) It is acceptable. But its reality is only in having the form
of the original, not in having the form of a reflection. Because the
reflection is not seen to have a reality separate from the original. Just
as the pot does not have reality in the form of a pot but only in the
form of clay. It is like that.
However Bharatitirtha says that there is indeed superimposition of
the subject, who is a reflection, in Ignorance. Moreover everything beginning
with the difference from Brahman is indeed superimposed there [in Ignorance].
Thus he says that the nature of the individual soul is false.
comment
Sarvajhitman considers the Lord to be consciousness reflected in
90
Ignorance and the individual soul to be consciousness reflected in the
intellect. Ignorance associated with the Lord is denoted as roaya and in
- 91
relation to the soul it is called avidya . Sarvajnatman maintains that the
92
Self, pure awareness, is the locus and the object of Ignorance while the
individual soul is the locus only in the sense that the soul manifests
93
the Ignorance.
38
Prakasatman is of the view that the Lord is the original consciousness
conditioned by Ignorance while the individual soul is consciousness reflected
94
in Ignorance which is limited by the mind and its impressions. Unlike
Vacaspati, Prakasatman maintains that Ignorance is single in nature and
has pure consciousness as both its locus and object, just as darkness
95
abides in and conceals the same locus. He argues that it is not
contradictory for Ignorance to have consciousness as its locus because the
witness consciousness ( saksicaitanya ) illumines Ignorance.
According to the Vivaran a, Ignorance resides in consciousness as
conditioned by the object. For example when the pearl-oyster is mistaken
for silver, the Ignorance of the pearl-oyster is located in consciousness
conditioned by the form of the pearl-oyster ( suktyavacchinnacaitanya) .
This Ignorance covers the pearl-oyster and transforms itself into the
silver. The pearl-oyster appears as silver without itself undergoing
change ( vivartopadanakaran a) and it is also the efficient cause for the
appearance (nimittakaran a). Ignorance is the material cause for the
transformation into the form of silver ( parinamyupadanaklran a). Similarly,
Brahman is both the efficient cause of the world and the vivarta material
cause ( abhinnanimittopadanakaran a) while Ignorance is the material cause
which transforms into the form of the world.
For Padmapada-Vivarana the reflected consciousness which is the
----•
essence of the individual soul is real and non-different from the original
consciousness. The author of the Vivaran a specifies that the soul is
97 ’
consciousness reflected in Ignorance.
1.29. Here, according to the view of those for whom the individual soul
is consciousness united with Ignorance - and that [individual soul] is
"limited", "conditioned" or "reflected" there [in Ignorance] - in their view
39
the individual soul is single even in the state of being an individual soul.
Because of Ignorance being single. This is the theory of a single individual
soul. The diversity of happiness and sadness etc. is due to the difference
of the limiting adjuncts.
However, according to the view of those for whom the individual soul
is consciousness united with individual Ignorance or with the intellect
which is an effect of Ignorance - and that [individual soul] is ’’limited",
"conditioned" or "reflected" there [in Ignorance] - in their view there are
many individual souls. This is the theory of a plurality of individual souls.
In this matter, according to the view of Vacaspatimilra there is a
single individual soul. According to the view of the author of the Vartikas ,
the author of the Vivaran a and the author of the Sanksepasarlraka there
are a plurality of individual souls.
comment
In the Siddhantabindu , Madhusudana portrays the theory of a single
individual soul:
. the individual soul alone is the material and the
efficient cause of the world on account of its own Ignorance.
All that is seen exists [only] in cognition. There is the
delusion of a difference of souls because of the difference
of bodies. Liberation is for the one [soul] alone, when there
is the direct apprehension of the Self from the firmness of
listening, reflecting and contemplation assisted by the
teacher and the scripture etc. which are [the souls^] own
superimposition. The hearing of the liberation of Suka etc.
is only a eulogy. 98
According to this view, there are only two states of existence: the
_ GO .>
absolute ( paramartha) and the apparent ( pratibhasika ). Sankara, however,
accepts the practical reality of ordinary relations ( vyavahara ) 100 and in
accord with that perspective, it is more natural to admit the transactional
distinction of a plurality of souls. Sankara's use of the plural form in
regard to souls would indicate his acceptance of the common sense view.^^
In Advaitamoda , Vacaspati is said to propound the theory of a single
individual soul. This does not appear to be correct. Vacaspati, as we have
seen, considers Ignorance to be manifold. If the reason for propounding a
single individual is "because of Ignorance being single" then Vacaspati
cannot uphold the ekajivavada . In the Siddhantabindu, Madhusudana writes
40
that Vacaspati upholds the view of a plurality of souls ( ajhanananatvaj jiva
nanatvam ). In a later commentarial work upon the Slddhantabindu ,
Abhyankar s explanation of this passage shows that he does not dispute
— 103 r
Madhusudana s statement. Accordingly, the following discussion should
be viewed with circumspection.
The theory of a single individual soul is contained in the Ist asiddhi
of Vimuktatman. Sarvajnatman also discusses it favourably in the
Sanksepasariraka .
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-1.30. Here, this is the reality. The theory of a single individual soul
is regarded as the definitive view. In reference to the theory of a
plurality of souls, whose Ignorance was transformed into the form of the
world ? If it is [the Ignorance] of Devadatta, there would be the absence
of a world from the standpoint of Yajnadatta. It should not be said that
numerous Ignorances, having combined, are transformed into the form of the
41
world like a cloth made from many threads, [reason] Because when some
people such as Suka and Vamadeva were liberated, on account of the
extracting of their respective Ignorances, there would be the diminishing
of the world: like the diminishing of a cloth when some threads have been
extracted from the cloth.
Furthermore, the individual soul is all pervasive. Otherwise, there
would be no origination of an object to be experienced by Devadatta in
another place by the merit and demerit of Devadatta. Because a minute
individual soul lacks pervasiveness in another place, therefore the merit
and demerit belonging to him will not be present there at the place and
time of the origination of the effect.
Furthermore, in a multitude of bodies there can be no recollection
in another body of the happiness or sadness experienced in one body.
Many bodies simultaneously supported by only one individual soul, on
account of his strength of asceticism or capacity in Yoga, are called
kayavyuha . That is certainly well known in the Puranas , etc.
Furthermore, in the case of its [the soul's] minuteness, there would
be the non-cognition of happiness etc. pervading the body. In the case of
[the soul] being of the size of the body, because the body has undetermined
dimensions due to such different states as childhood and youth and because
of the differences between ants, men and elephants etc., therefore the
individual soul would also have an undetermined dimension and there would
be non-eternity on account of the defect of undergoing modification.
Therefore, the all pervasiveness of the individual soul is established.
Also, in the case of the theory of a plurality of individual souls,
there is the logical impossibility in that case of the diversity of happiness
and sadness etc. For there is no restricting cause for a certain individual
soul to have a certain body, a certain action and a certain merit and
demerit because of the unavoidability of the connection of all the all
pervasive, all pervading individual souls with all bodies, all actions and
all merit and demerit. So because of the economy of explanation only the
42
theory of a single individual soul should be accepted. Whereas the diversity
of happiness and sadness etc. is logically possible due to the difference of
the limiting adjuncts such as the physical body. So the proponents of the
theory of a plurality of individual souls: the author of the Vartikas , the
author of the Vivaran a and the author of the Sanks epasariraka , have been
refuted.
1.31.
f^r ” pro sni
^ ( sr° 3 I ^
I ^ I $
I sfrt w mvi
wzmi m 3 ^: pi <i#-
wh? i*%*. I g
W ftf|<FTRM ^5 <Tnm?^ ^TRTT tf&RR
TOhf <ri tfiwr pjp1 vrm ^twtrt-
KR ^ WT^ I *T11^ ^iWfa#T ^TRm-
T^TRFf 5R^RlHWf f*PRt
^ I
1.31. Furthermore, the statement of the beginningless nature of the
individual soul which has been told [in the verse] beginning with "the
individual soul, the Lord" is contradicted in conforming to the view of the
author of the Vartikas in regard to the individual soul who is consciousness
conditioned by the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance. In the same
manner, it is contradicted in conforming to the view of the author of the
Sanks epasariraka in regard to the individual soul who is consciousness
reflected in the intellect. As the intellect is an effect of Ignorance and
as it is not beginningless, therefore what is conditioned by that or reflected
in that has no possibility of being beginningless. Thus [the contradiction]
43
can also be inferred in conforming to the view of the author of the
Vivarana in the case of the individual soul who is consciousness reflected
. “ 1 •
in Ignorance which has been limited by the inner organ and its impressions.
The beginningless nature of the individual soul is correct. It has
been told in the sutra : "but that very [individual soul]..." (B.S.3.2.9.)
that although the individual soul resolves into the supreme Self in the
state of deep sleep, because there is no destruction of the limiting
condition which brings about the state of being an individual soul, that
very [soul] rises up again in the waking state. Similarly, it should
certainly be said that even upon the dissolution [of the world], prior to
the state of liberation, there is no destruction of the limiting adjunct
which brings about the state of an individual soul. Otherwise, just as the
water in a vessel which is being thrown, without the vessel, into a mass of
water is unable to be extracted again, so too, because there is no
possibility of that [same individual soul] rising up again at [the time of]
creation the liberation of all could be easily attained.
However, if there is no destruction of the limiting adjunct which
brings about the state of an individual soul, like the water in a sealed
vessel though thrown along with the vessel into a mass of water is able to
be extracted again, so too, the appearance of that same individual once
again at [the time of] creation is easily attained. This agrees only with
the beginningless nature of the individual soul. However, if [the individual
soul] has a beginning, because the limiting adjunct of the individual soul
is the effect of Ignorance and because there is the destruction of the
effect of Ignorance at the dissolution [of the world], therefore there is
no possibility of the continued existence of the limiting adjunct of the
individual soul. Thus there could be no rule about the appearance of that
very same [individual soul] once again.
comment
Abhyankar's critique of Suresvara's, Sarvajnatman r s and Praka£atman’s
views on the nature of the soul can be summarized as follows: the soul
44
cannot be beginningless if it is consciousness conditioned by or reflected
in the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance. Because it is the product
of an effect. As a result of this, at the time of cosmic dissolution when
all the effects of Ignorance perish, the limiting adjuncts will also perish
and the cessation of the soul will occur. Thus there can be no assurance
that the same soul will emerge at the commencement of the following cycle.
This argument is based upon the view that the effects of Ignorance are
destroyed at the time of cosmic dissolution. However, if the effects merely
resolve into their cause - Ignorance - in a latent condition, then the
continued existence of the same soul can be explained. According to this
view, the subtle body ( suksmasdfxra ), of which the intellect is a constituent,
remains in a subtle form during the period of dissolution. This would appear
to be the accepted position in Advaita, for the subtle body is considered
106
to be beginningless and to persist until liberation.
Sankara affirms this position, for he states that:
As long as the soul continues to transmigrate, as long as
its transmigratory state does not come to an end through
correct insight, its connection with the intellect does
not cease ... In reality, there is no individual soul apart
from the nature which has been superimposed due to the^^
connection with the limiting adjunct of the intellect.
— >•
In Brahmasutra 2.3.31. Sankara replies to an objection of a similar import
to that put forward by Abhyankar:
This contact with the intellect certainly exists in a
state of latency during deep sleep and dissolution and
again appears during waking and creation .., Therefore
this is established: the contact with the limiting
adjunct such as the intellect continues as long as
[the individuality] of the Self. 108
Accordingly, we may conclude that the views of the three authors can be
upheld.
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45
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1.32. Although Vacaspatimisra has only resorted to the theory of a single
individual soul, nevertheless he has accepted the theory of limitation.
With regard to that, the reflection theory is certainly superior in the
case of the individual soul. Because it is observed that individual souls
have total dependence upon Ignorance. That is logically possible only in
the case of the theory of reflection.
Furthermore, just as no person is liberated when one foot is bound
with an iron chain, even though it is absent on the other foot, similarly,
in the case of the limitation theory although there is identity with
Brahman because of the destruction of one Ignorance for the person who
has been limited by that [Ignorance], there will still be bondage for that
very [person] because of the portion limited by another Ignorance. However,
this is not a defect in the case of the reflection theory. Because in the
original there is not even a touch of the impurities etc. which belong to
the reflection.
Furthermore, here in the antaryamibrahma na; "He who inhabits the
self, who is within the self ... who controls the self from within ..."
(Brh.3.7.22.) the location of the controlled and the controller has been
mentioned as at the very same place and that [location] agrees in the case
of the reflection theory. Just as space is twofold in the very same
location in water: space limited by water and space reflected in water,
similarly, consciousness is twofold in the limiting adjunct in the form
46
of Ignorance. There [in the limiting adjunct], the consciousness reflected
is the individual soul who is controlled. Whereas [the consciousness]
which has been "limited’ is the Lord who is the controller. Just as the
space limited by a pot is not different from the total space, the
consciousness which has been "limited" should be understood as not different
from the original. Thus the previously stated view alone remains the
definitive doctrine: the individual soul is consciousness reflected in
Ignorance and the Lord is the original consciousness which has been
conditioned by Ignorance. Pure consciousness, however, is certainly
unconditioned by Ignorance.
Moreover, among all these views which have been stated that alone
is constant: Brahman is non-dual. Because it is not correct that the
consciousness which is "limited", "conditioned" or "reflected" has a
separate existence in relation to pure consciousness. Duality cannot be
established in Brahman even by an inert object. Because the entire inert
world beginning with space is false (i.e. it has no independent
existence) since its material cause is Ignorance which is a positive
entity.
comment
The view which the author finally favours is that of Prakasatman
in the Pancapadikavivaran a (cf. 1.28.). Abhyankar concludes the
discussion by stating that although there are various opinions concerning
the nature of the Lord and the soul, the different authors are not in
dispute with regard to the principal teachings of the Advaita tradition.
Suresvara has aptly written:
By whichever [method] people can develop understanding
of the inner Self, that method should certainly be
known as good and as consistent [with the main teaching].
m sTfr ^tT-
t*T5Ti%
frr : “vm ^»
( $ l c )
47
“ WS&W f^cTcTT ffc qfa&fftct 1
4irfl ?RR l%fR*hf ^rr: ” II
“ sifi^Rija ?rc iN jtrftr ” (rfio ^ i ?^)
' “ fR*7 3 S^fR ^TiRsRRR: ” ( *fto *\ I H )
I wu *m %^r ^
titot rr ?r RTOFm^ro-TO
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m^mgqw'isfq w* wm to
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1.33. This Ignorance cannot be stated as existent or as non-existent,
it consists of three qualities, it is a positive entity and is removable
through knowledge. The means of knowledge in this matter is the experience
"I do not know Brahman" and the sacred texts such as: "[they saw] the
power of the divine Self concealed by its own qualities" (Sv.1.3.), "and
again at the end there is the cessation of the entire illusionary world"
(Sv.1.10.), "the supreme power of this [Lord] is heard of as being indeed
various" (Sv.6.8.) and also the tradition such as:
When which [Brahman] is placed in the heart, the
Yogi, who possesses a Self which cannot be measured,
crosses maya which is an extensive Ignorance. Salutation
to that [Brahman] whose nature is Knowledge.
... knowledge is concealed by Ignorance, due to that
people are deluded. (G.13.15.)
But for whom that Ignorance is destroyed by the
knowledge of the Self... (G.5.16.)
It should not be objected: how is this Ignorance, which is denoted by the
48
word ajnana , produced and for what reason is its connection with Brahman
brought into being ? {reason] Because Ignorance and its connection are
accepted as beginningless.
If [it is asked]: "what is the nature of the connection ?" It is
said: fire, for example, although directly unable to enter into water
which is contrary to itself, enters into water in a subtle form by such
means as a [heated] pot and having removed the coldness belonging to
that [water] it manifests its own heat there as belonging to it [the
water]. Similarly, this Ignorance is unable to directly enter, [but]
having entered there [in Brahman] in its own root form which is more
subtle and having concealed the essential nature belonging to that
[Brahman] i.e., being free from object and location and being the
supreme limit of what is universal, it manifests there its own form
which is distinguished by the possession of location and object. Because
the power of Ignorance itself possesses location and object. The object
there [of Ignorance] is the Lord and the individual soul is the locus.
This duality and the mutual distinction of both are indeed beginningless.
comment
"Ignorance" (ajnana , avidya) is a metaphysical principal to account
for the appearance of the world. If the sacred texts reveal Brahman as
pure being, pure awareness, actionless and free from all qualities, then
Brahman cannot do_ any action to originate a world. The existence of a
world is, in fact, a logical impossibility. Yet the appearance of a
world is undeniable. Advaitins attempt to account for such a
contradiction by maintaining that the Vedas reveal the existence of a
cosmic power which, though not ultimately real in itself and depending
upon Brahman, becomes the transforming principal whereby Brahman as
though appears in the form of the world.
Advaita authors such as Suresvara,^"^ Padmapada,^\ SarvajhStman,
Mandanamisra^^ and Vacaspatimisra'*'^^ consider Ignorance to be a positive
• •
entity (bhavarupa) endowed with a creative capacity which is responsible
for the appearance of the world. However, some authors do not accept
that Ignorance possesses such a function. Nagesabhatta argues in the
49
Vaiyakaranasiddhantalaghumarijus a that Sankara only uses the term Ignorance
in the sense of erroneous knowledge ( bhrantijnana) and its impressions.'*''*'"*
Thus Ignorance means superimposition ( adhyasa ) and its effects. More
recently, Sacchidanandendra Sarasvati and his supporters have brought
this interpretation into greater prominence. They are also of the opinion
that the Pahcapadika is a distortion of Sankara's teaching and, among all
_ __
the early post-Gaudapada Advaitins, only Suresvara is faithful to Sankara's
116
intent.
The central issue is to discover in which sense Sankara uses the term.
_ ■>*
In the introduction to the first Brahmasutra , Sankara states that Ignorance
is equivalent to superimposition ( evam'^lak sanam aclhyasam pan dita avidya-iti
1X7 >* * * * *
manyante) . Throughout the sutrabhasya Sankara frequently uses such
“• 118
expressions as "superimposed through Ignorance" (avidyakalpita) and
_ 119
"manifested by Ignorance" ( avidyapratyupasthapita) . These phrases are
not in themselves conclusive evidence, for they can be interpreted according
*
to either perspective. In his other commentarial works Sankara often
employs the word Ignorance in the sense of a fundamental error which
120
conceals the truth and thus lies at the basis of worldly life
121
characterised by sorrow and delusion.
122 -
However, in the commentary upon Brahmasutra 1.4.3. Sankara
indicates that his conception of Ignorance possesses another dimension.
The passage deserves close examination. He commences with the statement
that the Lord requires a "primary power" ( bijasakti ) for the purpose of
creation. Such a power, he says, is of the nature of Ignorance
(avidyatmika hi bijasaktih ) and can be expressed by the word "unmanifest"
( avyakta) . It depends upon the supreme Lord, it possesses wondrous
powers ( mayamayi) and it is a type of sleep: "in which the transmigrating
123
souls are sleeping without awakening to their essential nature".'
*
Sankara then specifies that the avyakta is sometimes designated by the
word "space" ( akasa ) or by the word "imperishable" ( aksara) or by the
word maya and he states that: "that maya is indeed unmanifest, because
it cannot be ascertained as real or otherwise . xhus far Sankara has
equated the power, whose nature is Ignorance, with the word avyakta and
declared it to be synonymous with indefinable maya .
Sankara then states that the sentence the avyakta is higher than
Sankara then states that the sentence the avyakta is higher than
the mahat" means the mahat , the cosmic intelligence associated with
Hiranyagarbha, originates from the avyakta (avyaktaprabhavatvan mahatah ).
Sankara then gives an alternative explanation whereby if the mahat refers
50
to the iiLdividual soul the sentence "the avyakta is higher than the raahat
is still congruent because the state of becoming an individual soul
depends ypon the avyakta . For the avyakta is Ignorance and it is only
through lining possessed of Ignorance that all the transactions of the
individual soul continue ( avidya hy avyaktam . avidyavattvena-eva jivasya
sarvah samvyavaharah santato vartate) . Finally, Sankara states that the
body can also be referred to by the word avyakta since it is the
modification of the avyakta ( tadvikare sarire parikalpyate) .
This passage reveals that, for Sankara, the conception of the avyakta
possesses a double significance. The first sense, clearly in evidence
through the expression of its nature as Ignorance, refers to a fundamental
misapprehension of the nature of things which is the basis of the cycle
*
of transmigration. Secondly, Sankara mentions that the roahat and the
physical body are the products of the avyakta . This indicates the
positive aspect of the avyakta as the transformative cause for the world.
Although later Advaitins do not refer to the word avyakta as much as to
its characteristic of Ignorance or to its synonym maya , nonetheless we
can see ia this passage a legitimate basis for the later specification
that Ignorance possesses both the power of concealing ( avaranasakti )
125
and the power of projecting (vik s epasakti ).
In discussing the locus and the object of Ignorance, Abhyankar
follows Va.caspatimisra. Suresvara, Sarvajnatman and Prakasatman maintain
that Brahman is the locus and the object. Sankara does not concern
126
himself with the issue.
1.34.
Fprfwnfowr- i *r(wT#r ^ vmm
5T2KIS JTTtTr^ l x^TC*T *
i trawrfq wM m wrfn-
o
m I ^ UTBTStm: I M I
qfcnw l sniTrrsrcr ^r-
bp mh I w I
^ i qigiWfc l ^ i
51
1.34. This [Ignorance] indeed manifests in Brahman, whose nature is
Knowledge, the possession of a locus and object as belonging to that
[Brahman]. The Knowledge which appears as possessing locus and object is
the mahattattva . Beginning with this [ mahattattva ] everything has a
beginning and is not beginningless. Thereafter, though Brahman is one and
of the nature of Knowledge, it appears as though divided due to the
relation of attribute and its possessor and subject and object. The
meaning is that it appears in the form of the knower and the known. In
regard to that, the knower is the "i-notion". The known is the subtle
element of sound and so forth.
All this which appears is a transformation with regard to Ignorance.
But with regard to Brahman it is only a false appearance. Transformation is
the gain of another state, preceded by giving up the prior state, by one
and the same object. Just as milk becomes fit for use as curd having given
up its fitness for use as milk. False appearance is the appearing in
another state only without having given up the prior state. Just as a
substance which actually exists as a rope appears in the form of a snake.
The subtle elements are said by the word tanmatra . Subtle space is
the tanmatra of sound. From that [ tanmatra of sound] comes the tanmatra
of touch, i.e., the subtle air. In this manner there is the successive
origination of the five subtle elements. There is the origination of the
respective gross element from the respective subtle element.
comment
127
The mahattattva refers to the subtle body of Hiranyagarbha.
Hiranyagarbha is consciousness associated with the sum total of all minds,
just as the individual soul is consciousness associated with a particular
128 129
mind. It is referred to as the first soul and as the "effect-Brahman"
*
which is Brahman identified with the entire subtle universe. Cf. Mu.S.1.1.9.
( karya"~~lak sa nam brahma hiranyagarbhakhyam jayate) .
The tanmatras are subtle elements originating from the Lord at the
time of creation. Cf. Tai.2.1.1. ( tasmad vai-etasmad atmana akasah
sambhutah. akasad vayuh. vayor agnih. agner apah. adbhyah p r thivi .).
52
The five subtle elements are: space, air, fire, water and earth. Their
respective qualities are sound; sound and touch; sound, touch and form;
sound, touch, form and taste; sound, touch, form, taste and smell. 130
Advaita authors, including Sankara, favour the description of the
creation by means of five elements rather than the three elements
- 132
mentioned in the Chandogya .
1 - 35 - j wi
wm I
'O
guilder: |
r 'iRTTRRRhiqh si m \
1.35. Because Ignorance consists of three qualities, everything which is
a transformation of that certainly consists of three qualities. Thus the
five elements also have the three qualities. In regard to that, the sense
of hearing arises from the portion of space associated with the quality
of sattva . The sense of touch is from the portion of air associated with
the quality of sattva . The sense of sight is from the portion of fire
associated with the quality of sattva . The sense of taste is from the
portion of water associated with the quality of sattva . The sense of
smell is from the portion of earth associated with the quality of sattva .
The internal-organ arises from the combined portions of the f,ive
elements which are associated with the quality sattva . That [internal-organ]
is fourfold. It has been told in the Vartika :
[The internal organ] is fourfold: mind, intellect,
the ego-sense and recollection. The mind is called
133
decision [and indecision].
The intellect has the
nature of ascertainment. Likewise, the ego-sense is
declared to consist of wrong presumption and memory
is said to have the nature of recollection.
134
(Pahcikaranavarttika 33,34.)
1 ’ 36 ' i i
I tfSpSTT I
q^^RRI ^nux I stsft fV^^T-
i to ^
^IRWRF-W^R^RRTR: I RR-
RRJ I ^R?RRS^r|^R: {
*RRt I
snofrqfo:
53
1.36. Similarly, the organ of speech arises from the portion of space
associated with the quality of rajas . The hands are from the portion of
air associated with the quality of rajas . The feet are from the portion
of fire associated with the quality of rajas . The organ of generation is
from the portion of water associated with the quality of rajas . The organ
of excretion is from the portion of earth associated with the quality of
raj as .
The life-breath arises from the combined portions of the five
elements which are associated with the quality of raj as . Moreover, that is
fivefold because of the difference in function. Pran a has a forward motion
and resides at the tip of the nose. Apana has a downward motion and
resides in the organ of excretion etc. Vyana has motion in all directions
and resides in the entire body. Udana has an upward motion and resides in
the throat. Samana brings about the assimilation of such [things] that
are eaten and drunk and it resides in the entire body.
comment
The V edant aparibhasa locates the samana in the navel. The Ved antasara ,
.’ ’ 135
too, says that it resides in the middle of the body.
54
1.37.
l q^Ri %
mm afercqqi q^Rf mt qqm I q§% qas^sqi^—
itqr faqiq q%% qjjqr span gn: 1
^^cR(|qki%q[ 5 Rfcq^ q^r q H ( q. q. ? t ^ 1
^rc-qpb —stffrt %t m fwq wr^Tt
ftwirq: I qq qpqr^iqf qffqWq 1
q 3 f#ffiwk; 1 ^qq qRRtssqm: 1 qq qf^qqwiNrRTqm-
?pqRR%3 qiRmrefq wm
qsffam qqft 1 qq qrwqRf q^rcgqhiRf
qi^qfqf<%3 qpWrwiq fq=snq
qqft l qqqq q^^^wngRRiq rr^1tp:%3
fkm qqft I |qqq ^mqwr 1 q^teqq q
$^3 3?3 ^ qwqimiR qq -qqirr qiqft-
^q qqfq I q<pfc “ qqiqRqiq:” (sr® ?to q 1 « 1 )
ffq 1 3 r qiqq^Rf ^rirqqqwRr R'rqi%TRi|qT toi^qtq-
^n'^Tqq qq^rwRi q 5 %qqrrq I ^rtr %rr qqqrfa-
^Ktm q^q^nqqrrr^n^q t
1.37. These elements become visible by their fivefold combination. These
are the portions of the five beginning with space which are associated with
the quality tamas . There is a mutual combining of those five. That has
been told in the PancadasI :
Having divided each one into two and again having
divided the first part into four, they each contain
five [elements] on account of joining with the second
portion other than their own. (1.27.)
This is the meaning: having divided space equally into two, one portion
of the two should again be divided into four. In the same way each one
of the four such as air should also be imagined as having five portions.
Among the five, one portion is one half. The other four are one eighth
portions. There [in the one eighth portions], there is the combining of
the four one eighth portions of space in the four half portions of air etc,
which are distinct from space. Similarly, there is the combining of the
four one eighth portions belonging to air in the four half portions of
55
space etc. which are distinct from air. In the exact same manner, there is
also the combining of the one eighth portions of fire, water and earth in
the four half portions which are distinct from their own [element]. This is
the procedure for the fivefold combination. When the gross elements have
become visible by the fivefold combination, where there is the half portion
of an element there is the expression by that word [designating that
element]: "this is space", "this is air". That has been told: "but because
of the preponderance there is the corresponding designation, there is the
corresponding designation" (B.S.2.4.22.). In regard to this, the origination
which has been mentioned from the portions- of space etc. associated with the
quality of sattva etc. should be understood to be from all those parts which
are subordinate to the other two and not from one single [part]. These
gross bodies of all beings certainly consist of the modification of the
elements which have been made fivefold.
comment
The result of the process of pahcikaran a can be shown as follows:
56
1.38.
wi: *Rt*rel \ nmzy.
i i wxfch
*rm: ! ir(%5: mti nil I |f^\%T?m-
^rt: I I ^ki wr
G C
ff^-
*w #w: ■ I jj ^ imi qR tM -
Srvmi 4f#qn^: i iirt^r^
wsw 1 # >nw^ ni\ &W~
1.38. The five sheaths which are well known thus: the modification of food,
the modification of the life-breath, the modification of the mind, the
modification of intelligence and the modification of bliss, are indeed
included here [in the topic of the elements]. The sheath which is a
modification of food is the physical body. The sheath which is a
modification of the life-breath is the life-breath together with the organs
of action. The sheath which is a modification of mind is the mind together
with the organs of knowledge. The sheath which is a modification of
intelligence is the intellect. The sheath which is a modification of bliss
is the Ignorance within that [intellect] or it is the Self.
The doership and enjoyership in the individual self only pertains
to the limiting adjunct. The limiting adjunct of doership can be expressed
by the word intellect and it is the inner organ which has a modification
in the form of ascertainment. The limiting adjunct of enjoyership is the
inner organ which has a modification in the form of happiness etc.
The subtle body is the combination of seventeen factors: the five
organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the five vital-breaths,
the mind and the intellect. This is the very same as the suksmasarlra.
.. . . . ' —
comment
The description of the five sheaths occurs in the Tai.2.1.1.-2.5.1.
The physical body (sthulaiarira) i s equivalent to the annamayakosa .
The pranamaya , manomaya and vijnanaroaya sheaths are included within the
57
subtle body ( suksmasarlra ). The anandamayakosa is the causal body
* 136
( karanasarira) , which has the nature of primary Ignorance. In the
Vedantasara , Sadananda explains the vijnanamayakosa differently from
Abhyankar by linking both it and the manomayakosa with the organs of
knowledge.
According to Advaita, the sense of doership and enjoyership only
pertain to the limiting adjunct of the inner organ and are falsely imposed
upon the actionless Self: "Similarly, [one superimposes on the Self] the
attributes of the internal-organ such as desire, resolve, doubt,
determination etc. In the same way, having superimposed the "I-thought"
on the inner-Self who is the witness of its entire activites, conversely,
one superimposes the inner-Self who is the witness of everything on the
inner-organ etc." Doership and enjoyership are said to be extrinsic to
the essential nature of the Self because their reality is contradicted
139
through their cessation in the state of deep sleep.
Abhyankar gives two meanings for the ariandamayakosa . Only the first
is congruent with the view of Sankara who maintains that the anandamaya
does not refer to the Self but only to the sheath which is a modification
, - ,. 140
of bliss.
i m I i
RR i 3TRT TR1 |.«rf
fwqR j ^TRTR | W sfog-
I srt i «rrmm
3 i m $r I
1.39. The group of eight consisting of the five organs of knowledge, the
fourfold inner organ, the five organs of action, the five vital-breaths,
the five subtle elements, ignorance, desire and action is called the
purya s takam . Here, ignorance should be seen as an effect. That [ignoranceJ
is the perception of that in what is not that. For example, the perception
of eternity in heaven etc. which is non eternal, the perception of purity
in the body, etc. which is impure, the perception of pleasure in [what is
really] pain and the perception of the Self in the body etc. which is not
58
the Self- Desire ( kama ) means passion. Action is of three types:
accumulated ( sahcita ), impending ( agami ) and what has begun ( prarabdha) .
Sahcita exists in an unseen form, having not yet given a result. Agami is
what will happen. Prarabdha is that [action] the result of which is
currently being experienced. At the time of liberation there is the
destruction of the sahcita due to the knowledge of the truth. As for the
agami , it certainly does not originate. The destruction of the prarabdha ,
however, is through the experience of the result.
comment
The purya s takam is mentioned in the Sanksepasariraka 3.16 ff.
1 ' 40 ' i
fww * 3 i 3 zvwm i <r 3
1 1 3
W& R3T5 I 3^FTT^^f
^rtt*tcr: j 3 l
smrfr 3 mronq 1 #133: i
1.40. All the bodies etc. which are a collection of insentient materials,
are composed of the five elements. The gross body perishes at the time of
death, but not the subtle body. However, at the time of the cosmic
dissolution there is the destruction of the subtle body. But there [in
the state of dissolution] the Ignorance which is the cause of the subtle
body remains. This is what is called the causal body. In the state of
liberation there is the destruction of that also due to the knowledge of
the truth. Although in the "fourth state" there is no wrong presumption
of a connection to the three types of bodies, nonetheless the connection
to the three bodies certainly cannot be avoided. There is the wrong
presumption on the part of the causal body in deep sleep. Whereas in dream
[the wrong presumption] is for the subtle body as well. But in the waking
state it is for the three types. The "fourth state" is the instant that
comprises the union between deep sleep and waking.
59
comment
It was previously mentioned that other Advaita authors consider the
subtle body to persist until liberation, not just until the cosmic
dissolution. Cf. comment to 1.31.
The "fourth state" ( turiyavastha ) is often popularly and erroneously
believed to be a transcendent state separate from the three states of
waking, dream and deep sleep. The correct understanding is that the turiya
is the locus of the three states and while it is intrinsically free from
the state of waking, dream and deep sleep the three states are in no way
separate from it: "Just as the differences of a snake, a streak of water,
etc. are superimposed upon a rope etc. [the states of waking, dream and
sleep] are unreal because they are mutually discrepant, though they are
1 ^ i
without any difference from the witnessing consciousness." Abhyankar
exemplifies this by referring to the turiya as the instant between sleep
and waking. At the time of waking the mind and the ego-sense reappear
from their absorption in the pure awareness and at the time of sleep the
mind and ego-sense resolve and what persists is pure awareness: "The
witnessing consciousness is real because it is everywhere without
deviation.
rs »
1.41.
f fro l shw
T I tjfFIRTTOf
W* <1^H«iTOT TpqVi WV-
wr ^ i
I * wm-
mR? ^ iwm SRRR tort l to wi^r-
*RTRT | 3RTJ ^WwRT~
RTTRI RTOPTT WR i ^R TJ T SZ TRR%’ I T ^TWTTRtTO
'tto itrt i *ft£tot < m\H I
1.41. [question] What is the distinction between the "fourth state" and
the state of a person who is liberated while living ?
60
[reply] The essential nature of Knowledge, the pure universal free
from distinction, remains even in both states. Because the prior mental
impressions are not destroyed in the "fourth state" that universal nature
of Knowledge is daily ready for modification, like the physical body in
the womb. Whereas in the state of a liberated person, because the prior
mental impressions are mostly destroyed, [the universal nature of Knowledge]
is ready to relinquish all modifications. Just as the physical body of a
person who is about to die is ready to relinquish the modifications which
are the means for all enjoyments. It is like that.
In the state of a liberated person, the seeing of sense objects
such as garlands, sandal paste and women is not in the form of the effect
but in the form of Brahman possessing the power of Ignorance which is the
cause. Therefore it is not able to produce a mental impression connected
to that effect. Nor even does it call to mind such a previous mental
impression. Hence the prior mental impressions ready to perish at that
time are mostly destroyed. Because the effect does not exist without the
cause, the person who is endowed with knowledge does not see objects in the
form of effects. Whereas the bound soul sees [them] in the form of effects.
w sjxfrf w tr l ^ ^ i
<n%M l w I i
^ t ^ I ItTT^qRT
l fwr” (
# i v i I
I | I
m fSITWRI l
^ ^rfRrfsf ! cr^n
*tt tfTsi%tw*R*nT^ l ^ l
trq ^ I ^ 1 fth
WMWf l m: ^tct: ¥*n$r|^bT l ^
I ” ( f® tf I ^ I ^ srF%*r
61
1.42. Therein [in relation to objects] there is only the apprehension
of the indeterminable everywhere. Because an effect is unable to be stated
as real or as unreal. Just like the silver appearing upon a pearl-oyster.
That is certainly not real, because there would be no logical possibility
of the sublation: "this is not silver". Nor even is it unreal, because
there would be no logical possibility of the cognition: "this is silver".
Therefore it is said to be indeterminable. When the pearl-oyster is known
as "this" but not as pearl-oyster then that ignorance of the pearl-oyster
which is an effect of the primary Ignorance, being assisted by the
knowledge arising as "this" and aided by the impressions of silver
recalled by the lustre etc., transforms into the form of silver.
Just like that, this entire world is not real, because there would
be no logical possibility of its sublation through the insight of the
person endowed with knowledge. And because there would be contradiction
with the sacred texts such as: "there is no diversity whatsoever here"
(Brh 4.4.19.). Nor even is it unreal, because there would be no logical
possibility of its cognition. Therefore it is certainly indeterminable.
That [indeterminable world] is the effect of the basic Ignorance which
possesses the power of projection by means of the mahattattva , the
ahankara, space etc. The effect of the basic Ignorance which possesses
the power of concealing is the ignorance of the pearl-oyster etc. which
is well known in the world. So the cognition of the indeterminable
world is indeed the anirvacaniyakhyatl. But [the cognition] is not the
apprehension of the real (satkhyati ). What is cognised is not real and
what is real. Brahman, is not cognised: because that [Brahman] is not an
object of cognition as it is of the nature of cognition. Therefore the
apprehension of the real is difficult to be stated.
Even the apprehension: "this is a sacred treatise" is only an
apprehension of the Indeterminable. For even the sacred treatise is
indeterminable since it is included in the indeterminable world which is
62
the effect of Ignorance. Because the scripture itself has proclaimed its
own indeterminable nature thus: "... the Vedas are not Vedas" (Brh 4.3.22.).
comment
According to Advaita, the ontological status of the world is strictly
indeterminable (anirvacaniya) as either real o* unreal. This position is
the outcome of applying an uncompromising definition as to what constitutes
143
real and unreal. For the Advaitin, what is real must be free from change.
If an object is perceived to be determined by certain characteristics and
if those characteristics change then the former state of the object cannot
be fully real since it is sublated by the latter condition. If the latter
condition undergoes change then its reality is sublated by the new condition.
Thus the absence of change, or more precisely, non-sublation is the
144
determining factor for the definition of reality. The Advaitin adopts
an equally uncompromising position with regard to what constitutes unreality.
What is unreal is totally devoid of an objective content, such as the son
145
of a woman who has never given birth.
The ontological status of the world cannot be subsumed under either
of these definitions. For example, if a clay pot is taken as the symbolic
representation of any physical object, the Advaitin argues that according
to the above definition its ontological position is indeterminable. The
pot cannot be called real because it is sublatable through breaking etc.
Nor is it unreal since there is the empirical presentation of a pot. It
cannot be both real and unreal simultaneously because that is mutually
contradictory. Consequently the Advaitin concludes that a pot, or any
object, cannot be categorically determined as real or as unreal.
Abhyankar illustrates the ahirvacaniyakhyati with the well known
146
instance of the silver appearing on the pearl-oyster. This example has
considerable instructive value for the Advaitin. Firstly, the silver
appears upon the locus of the pearl-oyster which does not undergo any
change to appear as silver. Also, when the pearl-oyster is cognized as
"this is silver", the "this" element refers to the locus which is the
pearl-oyster and which is not recognized as such because of the concealing
.power (avaranasakti) of Ignorance. The appearance of the silver is due to
the projecting power (vik s epasakti) of Ignorance which transforms into
silver due to some ocular defect, assisted by the prior mental impression
of silver which was called to mind due to the brightness of the shell.
Finally, the silver which appears cannot be determined as real or as
unreal. Similarly, the world appears upon Brahman, pure awareness and
63
existence, which undergoes no change in order to appear as the world. Like
the silver, the phenomenon of the world is a product of the twofold power
of Ignorance. The avaranasakti is evident in the statement "I do not know
myself" and its function is to conceal the truth and thus provide the
opportunity for error. The vik s epasakti brings about the appearance of
the world which is indeterminable as real or as unreal.
The author states why the cognition of an object is not the
apprehension of the real ( satkhyati) . What is real. Brahman, is not the
object of a cognition. The nature of Brahman is awareness which is the
very essence of cognition itself and awareness cannot itself be objectified
since everything is its object. The Self, according to Advaita, is pure
147
subject free from any objectification.
Abhyankar now elaborates on the relation between the scripture as
anirvacaniya and its function in revealing truth.
1 - 43 - i w rtot
srft to to ^
w i tor tosir?3TO I
5T Tf TO t 3 %^ TO TOTOKTOR to!'-
TO i ^^\ TOTWT%TO TO^R TORTO I TOHRTRTO -
t tototrto
totorito ttowt \ * mmm
TO= I f% § TOC TOTORT I TOF^—
to: I
#fit i
q:r TO : I RRRTOTORTO |
1.43. Although it is like that, it [the scripture] is certainly the cause
of the knowledge of the truth. For example, the elephants and horses etc.
in a dream, though they are themselves unreal due to being superimposed by
the individual soul, produce a real knowledge and indicate a real auspicious
or inauspicious result. It is like that. Furthermore, the scripture is the
cause of the knowledge of the truth only in that it removes Ignorance. The
scripture is certainly not unreal like a sky-flower. Rather, it only has
no status of being absolutely real. So even though the scripture is not
absolutely real, it removes Ignorance because Ignorance too has no absolute
64
reality. To this extent tfce scripture possesses validity, even though it
has no absolute reality. This is the position not only of the scripture
but of all the means of knowledge. That has been stated:
Just as the idea that the body is the Self is approved
as correct knowledge, so too, this ordinary means of
knowledge, but only until the Self is ascertained.
The division is a atmaniscayat . It means "till the ascertainment of the
Self."
comment
Sankara too uses the analogy of dream to illustrate how a false
148
phenomenon can give rise to real knowledge. Although the dream is
sublated by the waking state, the knowledge relating to the content of
the dream is not sublated upon waking and hence it is a real knowledge.
On the basis of the Chandagya text 5.2.8. Sankara argues, like Abhyankar,
149
that dream can portend a real future event.
Since Brahman alone is absolutely real the scripture cannot possess
the same ontological status for then there would be a plurality of
absolutely real entities, a position unacceptable to the Advaitin.
However, the scripture is also not unreal like a flower imagined in the
sky. Therefore, though its position is highly exalted, it has only the
same empirical reality ( vyavaharikasatta ) as the rest of the phenomenal
world.
The function of the scripture is to reveal the knowledge of the truth.
Sankara argues that there would be no scope for enjoining the knowledge of
a particular thing if there was no ignorance of that thing.Therefore
the scope of the scripture lies in revealing the truth through eliminating
the ignorance relating to it. Once this is accomplished, the efficacy of
the scripture is complete and when Sankara’s opponent suggests that
scriptural instruction is then meaningless, Sankara agrees: "certainly,
let it be meaningless, when [the truth] is known.
The verse quoted above ("just as ...") is cited by Sankara at the
conclusion of his commentary on B.S. 1.1.4. It is also quoted in the
_ _ _ 152 - 153
Vedantaparibhas a. The author has been identified as Sundarapandya.
1.44.
mR WUITH ^ I I
65
%i wwm i mv qP^Fft ffafa^pFr i ^
^ ^ri^pmfa =q qsri^TTOt | fP? |W ^R|-
I fiwfwwr ^ttth: l
qfw-n^mm: q;?AK^M^ l iw
SSHEWnon* f <F# ^ ?TP7i W$\ qraftfepT ^^«rf%-
^TW WT
I *RJ iHW( <FTT fr^T
famfi i qm^'4f^pn-^2?mq{^n% mw qfr^Fwrwqi-
front rV^wm I sre w^ffi cg ^ I M
^fi^'PTFcPq^'^q%S%q^ | “ im# ” ( ^To q | c I
vs) ^i(^|RRq^qFq«i^m s 4% 5 ^to^rnTf^q^q i^vri|-
^t^t i wm ^iwqr^^ f^rqm^nfs^-
Mm 1
1.44. Those means of knowledge are six, due to the difference of
perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, postulation and
non-cognition.
When the perception of an object such as a pot is produced through
the eye etc., at that time the inner-organ, which is in the form of the
heart [i.e. the locus of thought and feeling] and which is endowed with
the reflection of consciousness existing within it, without indeed giving
up its original location it goes out by means of the visual faculty etc.
and having gone to the location of the object such as the pot it transforms
into the form of the respective object. This transformation is said to
be a mental modification (v rtti ). Then, the object such as the pot is
pervaded by the mental modification and by the reflection of consciousness
existing within it. The pervasion by the mental modification is said to
be the capacity of being pervaded by the mental modification. The pervasion
by the reflection of consciousness within the mental modification is said
to be the capacity of being pervaded by the result. The reflection of
consciousness within the mental modification is called by the word
"result". The consciousness [limited by the] object which is being
66
reflected In that mental modification is not different to the reflection
of consciousness within that [mental modification]. Because when both
limiting adjuncts exist at the one location there is no possibility of a
difference in what is to be limited. Then, for the pot etc. which is
produced from the tamas [aspect of the five elements] the concealing,
which is of the nature of tamas , is destroyed by that mental modification.
The reflection of consciousness within the mental modification, manifesting
when the concealing is destroyed, manifests in the form of the object since
it is non different from the consciousness [limited by the] object. This is
indeed said to be perceptual knowledge. It is exactly in the same manner
even in the case of internal perception such as "I am happy".
However, in the case of the direct apprehension of the Self which
is produced from the "great sayings" such as "you are That", because the
oneness of the individual soul and Brahman is concealed by Ignorance the
pervasion by the mental modification of the inner-organ having the form
"I am Brahman", which is produced by the sentence, is required for the
cessation of that Ignorance. Because oneself certainly has the nature of
being self evident the pervasion by the reflection of consciousness is
not required for that purpose.
comment
Sankara's works provide the foundation for the later elaboration of
^ 154
the Advaita theory of perception. In the Upadesasahasri and in the
155
Taittiriyopani s adbhasya Sankara enunciates the view that perception
occurs because the mind pervades the sense object by means of the
respective sense organ and transforms into the shape of the particular
object. The immediacy of perceptual experience is due to the modification
of the mind into the form of the object and the illumination of that
modification by the ever present consciousness.
This view is further developed in the Vedantaparibhas a. The author,
Dharmarajadhvarin, specifies that consciousness, though in reality
undivided, is apparently limited in a threefold manner: in the form of
the object (visayacaitanya ), in the form of the means of knowledge
156
67
In response to the question as to what is the defining feature of
perception, Dharmaraja firstly discusses the defining feature of a
perceptual cognition and then discusses what is the defining characteristic
with regard to the perception of an object. The criterion for a perceptual
cognition is the non-difference of the consciousness limited by a mental
modification in the form of the object from the consciousness limited
by the object, given that the object currently exists and is capable of
157
being apprehended. This means that for there to be perceptibility with
respect to a cognition it must have identity with the object of perception.
For example, in the perception of a pot the internal-organ becomes
externalized by means of the eye and assumes the form of the pot. This
mental modification is called a v rtti . When the mental modification has
taken on the form of the pot the limiting adjunct of consciousness in the
form of the pot and the limiting adjunct of consciousness in the form of
the mental modification occupy the one location and are therefore in
effect identical. The identity of the two limiting adjuncts is the
defining feature in respect of a perceptual cognition.
Dharmaraja considers that the defining characteristic for the
perception of an object is the absence of the object having a separate
158
existence to the consciousness limited by the cognizer. This means
that when the pot is cognized the mental modification in the form of
the pot connects the cognizer with the object. Both the pot and the
cognizer are limiting adjuncts of consciousness which is their common
substratum. So the existence of the pot is not separate from the
existence of the cognizer since they share the same substratum. The
author specifies that the object has no separate existence from
"consciousness limited by the cognizer" because in the case of inference
the internal-organ does not have contact with the object and so cannot
assume the form of the object. Thus the object is not connected with
the cognizer and although it has no existence apart from consciousness
which is its substratum, it cannot be said as having no separate
existence to that of consciousness qualified by the cognizer. Hence
the latter is the determining factor in respect of the cognition of an
object.
Abhyankar incorporates another factor in the explanation of
perception, the "reflection of consciousness" (cidabhasa) in the mental
159
modification. This is discussed in the Pancadasi. The reason for
the mention of the reflection of consciousness in the mental modification
68
is because the mind is not by nature conscious but is illumined by the
reflection of consciousness from the Self. The mental modification
(v rtti ) is a subtle material substance which is pervaded by the reflection
of consciousness. The mental modification does not have the capacity to
illumine the object, rather its illumining capacity is due to the
reflection of consciousness within it. The mental modification assumes
the form of the object and removes the concealing ignorance of the object
while the reflection of consciousness reveals the object. Because the
reflection of consciousness is what reveals, it is called the phala or
"result" and its pervasion of the object is called phalavyapti ♦ Apart
from the distinction between the function of the mental modification and
the reflection of consciousness, Abhyankar's explanation does not
substantially differ from that of the Vedantaparibha sa.
With regard to internal perception, the consciousness limited by the
emotion of happiness etc. and the consciousness limited by the mental
modification having that form occupy the one location and are not separate
from the consciousness limited by the cognizer. So the cognition "I am
happy" is perceptual knowledge.
The author now takes up the question of liberating knowledge arising
from the apprehension of the meaning of certain scriptual statements
such as the "great sentence": "you are That". Some Advaita authors,
notably Mandanamisra and Vacaspatimisra, maintain that verbal testimony
• •
can produce only mediate ( paroks a) knowledge which must be incessantly
contemplated in order to produce a mental impression which assists the
mind in producing immediate knowledge.
161
Sankara, however, states in
the Upadesasahasri^^ an d in the Brahmashtrabhasya^ ^ that the immediate
■ ■ ■ _ •
(aparok sa) knowledge of the Self as Brahman can arise at the time of
hearing the Upanisad texts, provided that the listener is endowed with
the necessary qualifications such as discrimination and dispassion etc.
mm
In the Brahmasutrabhasya , Sankara states:
164
repetition would be meaningless for one who can realize
the Self as Brahman after hearing "you are That" once
only. But for one who is unable, repetition is certainly
proper. 165
Like Sankara, his principal disciples who have left substantial writings:
Suresvara, Padmapada^ ^ and Totaka^^ uphold the view that verbal
testimony can produce immediate knowledge. Abhyankar’s expression:
"the direct apprehension of the Self which is produced from the great
*
sayings shows that he follows the view of Sankara and his disciples.
69
a view which became an important characteristic of the later Vivarana
, . 169
school.
In the case of perceptual knowledge arising from scriptural statements,
there is the requirement of the pervasion by a mental modification in the
manner of the apprehension "I am Brahman" in order to remove Ignorance.
However, a pervasion by the reflection of consciousness is not necessary
to manifest the object because the Self, which is the content of the
sentence such as "you are That", is of the nature of pure awareness.
1.45.
m f?TT^ I fcmt I
siRi*ften(2f ?tr I
I “ ” (^\o $ \ c i \s)
WTWR 1TR RI%RWR I
jrtstr ^ ^rRT l *r jrwr
srararaRRfc: ^ irr q^PRRik-
*nft#r \
$R $mi I (%§
R*W I “ ” ( Ro \ I C I \S )
1 “ RR ” ( Ro $ I * I X ) ^
im ^RmitqwTR^ I ?rt qm Rfeqq^ l
1.45. Perception is twofold, on account of the difference of determinate
(savikalpaka ) and indeterminate ( hirvikalpaka ). Vikalpa means relatedness.
The knowledge which apprehends relatedness such as "I know the pot" is
determinate, for there is the apprehension of a knowledge qualified by
the qualifying attribute in the form of the pot. The knowledge "I am
Brahman" which is produced by the great sentences such as "you are That"
is indeterminate. With regard to the totality of causes for perceptual
knowledge, perception is produced even from a word. In this very same
knowledge there is certainly the nature of being perceptual and the nature
of being produced from words on account of the difference of the respective
causes.
It should not be said: if perceptual knowledge is produced from a
word, how can it have an indeterminate nature since the knowledge produced
70
from a word apperehends the relation between the meanings of the words ?
[reason] There is certainly no rule that everywhere knowledge produced
from a word only apprehends the relation between the meanings of the words.
But there is a rule that [verbal knowledge] only relates to the object
of the speaker’s purport. In the case of "you"are That", Brahman, free
from distinction and relation, is alone the object of the purport of the
sacred text in agreement with that which precedes: "dear boy [in the
beginning this was] existence alone" (Ch, 6.2.1.). So it is established
that this [knowledge produced from the sacred text] is indeterminate.
comment
Determinate ( savikalpaka) perception apprehends the relation between
what is qualified ( vise s ya ) and the qualifying attribute ( vise sana) .
With regard to the statement "I know the pot", "I" is qualified by the
attribute of the pot. All perceptions other than those constituting
171
identity judgements come under the category of determinate.
Indeterminate ( nirvikalpaka ) perception is free from the qualified-
qualifying relation. With regard to statements like "this is that
Devadatta" or the Upanisad sentence "you are That", indeterminate
perception arises from a previous determinate perception and the negation
of the qualifying attributes brings about the apprehension of identity
characterizing indeterminate perception. For example, in the statement
"this is that Devadatta" (so’yam Devadattah ) "this" refers to Devadatta
qualified by the present time and place and "that" refers to Devadatta
qualified by a past time and place. There is the perception of a single
Devadatta due to the negation of the two sets of attributes relating to
the different times and places since these do not constitute the essential
part of the person. Thus the non-relational ( akandartha ) knowledge of £
identity is brought about by setting aside the non essential features
172
of the statement. With regard to the scriptural statement "you are
That", non-relational knowledge of identity arises in the same manner.
This statement will be explained in detail in the following section
dealing with verbal testimony.
173
In reply to the objection that verbal testimony cannot be
non-relational since it apprehends the relation between the meanings of
71
the words, Abhyankar states that verbal knowledge does not solely depend
upon the word meanings. For if that were the case, when a cricketer says
"bring me a bat" someone could conceivably bring a flying quadruped.
It is the speaker's intention which determines the meaning. Similarly,
Abhyankar argues that the intention of the sacred text indicates that
statements such as "you are That" have only a non-relational sense.
vkmh i w sv-wito wm
wmfi fFffi l
1.46. Inferential knowledge is. between the two, the pervaded and the
pervader. It is the knowledge of the pervader through what is pervaded.
For example [the knowledge] of fire through smoke. Or just as this
visible world is known to be false because it is different from Brahman.
The particular means for that [inferential knowledge] is inference.
comment
Inferential knowledge (anumiti) is acquired through inferring the
presence of what is to be proved ( Vyapaka , sadhya or major term) by means
of the observation of the instrument of proof ( vyapya , hetu or middle term)
which is present in the subject ( pak sa or minor term) where the major term
is to be proved. The necessary condition for inference is the previous
knowledge of the pervasion (vyapti ), or invariable concomitance, between
the middle and the major term. The standard illustration of an inference
is: there is fire on the hill. Because there is smoke. Wherever there is
175
smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen. Here, fire is to be proved and
smoke is the means of proof. The hill is the subject where the smoke is
present. Fire is called the pervader ( vyapaka ) because what is to be proved
must exist in all cases when the instrument of proof exists. Hence the
latter is said to be pervaded (vyapya ) by the former. The knowledge of
invariable concomitance between the pervaded and the pervader - wherever
there is smoke there is fire - coupled with the observation of smoke on
the hill constitutes the means for inferring the presence of fire on the
hill.
The Vedantaparibha sa defines invariable concomitance as the co-existence
of the major term with the middle term in all the locations where the middle
1.46.
i
72
term exists. The knowledge of invariable concomitance can be derived
by repeated observation or even by a single observation provided there
177
is no instance of inconstancy.
Abhyankar’s second example of inference: "the visible world..." is
__ — — 178
from the Vedantaparibhas a where it is elaborately treated.
1.47.
sjtrt wmm irh sfa-
%*riqMn JTOnR&n 1 l
wwr mm-
1.47. Having seen an ox in a forest and having known the similarity to
a cow there [in the ox], the similarity to the ox which is known in the
cow is knowledge based upon comparison. Because the knowledge of
similarity is only based upon comparison. The particular instrument for
that [knowledge], which is the knowledge of the similarity to a cow, is
comparison (upamana ).
This knowledge based upon comparison is not included in perception
because the cow is not in sense contact. Nor even is it knowledge based
upon inference. Because the similarity to the cow, which is the reason,
exists in the ox and the similarity to the ox, which is the thing to be
proved, exists in the cow. Thus there is no co-existence between the
reason and what is to be proved. And there is no requirement here of the
recollection of pervasion etc.
comment
Comparison ( upamana) is the particular instrument for acquiring
179
valid knowledge of similarity. For example, a person who owns a cow is
travelling through a forest where he sees a wild ox. He thinks "this
thing is similar to a cow" and then subsequently he thinks "my cow is
similar to this”. The first statement where he perceives the similarity
73
of the ox to the cow is a statement of comparison. Because of this
statement he acquires the resultant knowledge based upon the comparison,
i.e., "my cow is similar to this”.
Abhyankar maintains that knowledge acquired from comparison is not
180
perceptual because the cow is not in sense contact. Nor is it a matter
for inference because the similarity of the ox to the cow is the reason
(hetu) to infer the similarity of the cow to the ox (sadhya ) and the
locus of the reason is the ox while the locus of what is to be proved is
the cow. Thus the reason and what is to be proved by it are not co-existent
— 181
which is a criterion necessary to formulate a rule of pervasion ( vyapti ).
He also argues against inference on the grounds that the cognition "my cow
is similar to this" does not require the recollection of pervasion in the
manner: "what corresponds to the similarity belonging to a thing is similar
182
to that thing". The use of the word "et cetera" could refer to memory,
for although the cow is recollected in the judgement "this is similar to a
cow", the similarity is not recollected and so it is not a case of memory.
The author of the Vedantaparibha sa appears to accept the possibility
that inference could account for this knowledge but he argues that the
knowledge "my cow is similar to this" can be acquired without the
formation of an inference and consequently comparison is a separate means
of knowledge
1.48.
' Mil I
( m<> $ i c i \3 ) I
1.48. A sentence is a collection of words. The knowledge which is
produced from that is born of words. The particular instrument for that
[knowledge] is the word. In regard to that [verbal testimony], the Veda
has validity because it is composed by the Lord. At the beginning of
creation the Lord arranged the Veda which has the same sequence as the
sequence of the Veda existent in the previous creation-
74
The traditions, legendary histories etc. have validity in that they
are based upon the Veda. But there is no validity for what is opposed
to the meaning of the Veda. In respect of those [traditions and legendary
histories] which are not of contradictory meaning to it [i.e. the Veda],
but when the Veda text serving as their basis is unknown, their validity
is construed by inferring such a Vedic text.
When the purport is not logically possible, there is certainly
validity even in teaching another meaning by implication. Just as there
is [for the scriptural statement] "you are That" etc.
comment
Advaitins believe that the Lord is the revealer of the sacred texts
and, on that account, they seek to ensure the validity of the texts as
184
the source of trans-empirical knowledge. However, the Lord is not
the author of the content of the Veda. The Lord reveals the eternal
Vedic knowledge at the beginning of each cycle of creation.
185
The
Veda has an unbroken continuity in the sense that it is always the same
Veda which is revealed in each cosmic cycle.For the Advaitin, the
origin of the Vedic knowledge, like the origin of the individual soul,
the origin of the Lord or the origin of their material cause, maya ,
cannot be ascertained through speculation and for this reason they are
all said to be beginningless.
Words can reveal their meaning either through their primary expressive
— 187
power ( sakti ) or by implication ( lak sana). The "great sentences"
(mahavakya ) such as "you are That" ( tat tvam asi ) are interpreted as
revealing their meaning through implication. Advaita treatises delineate
188
three varieties of implication. The first is exclusive implication
(jahallak sana) which occurs through giving up the express meaning and
substituting an implied meaning. For example, in the expression "the
cowherd village is on the Ganges" the express meaning is unintelligible
and the sentence can only be understood by completely abandoning the
literal sense in favour of the implied meaning of "on the bank". The
second type is known as non-exclusive implication (ajahallaks ana). In
this case there is the cognition of an implied meaning without abandoning
the primary meaning of the sentence. For instance in the expression
75
"protect the curd from the crows" the primary sense is retained and the
implied meaning of "and anything else" is incorporated. The third type
is exclusive non-exclusive implication ( jahadaj ahallaks ana or bhagatyaga -
laks ana). Here, a word expressing something qualified gives up one
portion and refers to the other portion. For example, in the expression
"this is that Devadatta" the express meaning - the Devadatta qualified
by a past time and place is identical to the Devadatta qualified by the
present time and place - is unintelligible without giving up the contra¬
dictory factors relating to time and place and resorting to the implied
meaning of Devadatta as the unqualified substantive.
Later Advaita authors interpret the statement "you are That" by
means of exclusive non-exclusive implication.'*'^^ Sankara does not use
this term though his method of interpreting the sentence is in accord
with the latter type of implication. According to Sankara the word "you"
in the sentence primarily refers to the ego sense, the self-conscious
knower, and it is able to imply the true inner Self after there is the
exclusion of the ego portion which has been erroneously identified with
190 '
the Self. Sankara refers to the method of discriminating the Self
from the non-Self by the term of "continuity and discontinuity"
191
( anvayavyatireka ). In Advaita, the method of continuity and
discontinuity is especially used in the manner of distinguishing a
constant factor, the Self, from its association with other variable
conditions such as physical and mental states. This is done by means
of ascertaining the continued presence ( anvaya ) of the Self in the
absence ( vyatireka ) of the variable conditions. Sankara exemplifies
192
this method with reference to the state of deep sleep. During sleep
there is the negation of all objective conditions but there is no negation
of "Seeing" or awareness as such. What persists through the variable
states of waking, dream and sleep is awareness, the Self, and what is
discontinuous, such as knowership, is an extrinsic condition of the Self.
The discrimination between subject and object is also included
193
within the method of continuity and discontinuity. According to
this mode of reasoning, subject and object are mutually exclusive: the
subject cannot be objectified nor can the characteristics of the object
194
belong to the subject. Through the application of this principle
the body, senses and mental faculties are successively distinguished
from the Self because they are objects of the seer, the subject. Even
the subject, the "I", is said to have an objective portion ( idam amsa )
76
195
and a portion which is the pure subject (sist amsa) . The objective
portion is the ego, the self conception of "me", brought about by the
identification of awareness with the internal organ. The remaining
portion is the pure subject, awareness, which is the implied meaning of
the word "you" According to Sankara words cannot directly denote the
197
Self since it cannot be objectified. However, following the
indispensable discrimination of the Self by the method of continuity and
discontinuity, the Self can be implied through the word "you" because
198
the ego is not spacially separate from the Self.
- - 199
The word "That" denotes existence (sat ) associated with maya .
Sankara states that the verb "are" ( asi ) conveys the meaning of identity
between the words "you" and "That".^^ Thus there is a relation of
qualified and qualifier between the two words and their meanings: the
express meanings of the words "you" and "That" should be mutually
relatable. The express meaning of the word "you" is the individual who
is subject to sorrow and who is immediately present ( aparoks a) in
experience. The word "That" expresses what is free from sorrow and is
remote (parok sa). On account of their grammatical apposition the express
meaning of the two words is brought into opposition. Through the
implication of their essential identity in the common substratum of
Being, the word "you" gives up the meaning of sorrow which is contrary
to the meaning of the word "That" and "That" relinquishes the meaning
201
of remoteness contrary to the meaning of the word "you". Thus the
two words indicate an essential identity on account of their grammatical
apposition and qualifying each other they signify that the Self is free
from sorrow and what is denoted by the word "That" is not separate from
the Self.
Suresvara's explanation of the sentence in the Nai s kartnyasiddhi is
a detailed elaboration of Sankara’s method of instruction. Suresvara,
*
like Sankara, is emphatic that the comprehension of the import of the
sentence is contingent upon understanding the true meaning of the word
202
"you". For that purpose he too employs the method of continuity and
203
discontinuity and he argues that the Self can be implied through the
204
word "I" after negating the objective portion of the "I" notion.
Sureivara observes that when all the objective relations with the "I"
have been excluded it may seem as though the Self too has been given
205
up. Suresvara specifies that the function of discrimination is to
exclude what is not essential to the nature of the Self while the scope
77
of revelation through the sentence "you are That" is to positively reveal
the nature of the Self. Thus both discrimination and the mahavakya are
206 ~~
a necessity for the fruition of understanding.
Suresvara provides a technical analysis of the sentence meaning:
For the words, their meaning and the inner Self there
is [respectively] grammatical apposition, qualifier -
qualified relation and the connection of what is to
be indicated and the indication. 207
Firstly, there is grammatical apposition ( samanadhikaranya ) between the
word "you" and the word "That". Because of grammatical apposition the
meaning of the word "you" is qualified ( yisesya) by the meaning of the
word "That" (vises ana) and because of the contradictory attributes
the two words cannot denote identity according to their express meanings.
The word "you" expresses the individual possessing the characteristics
of limitation and sorrow. The word "That" expresses what is non-dual but
remote. Because of the grammatical apposition the word "you" is identical
209
to "That" and so the contradictory factors must be adventitious. By
resorting to implication the contradictory characteristics of the two
words are negated while their essential aspect is retained and in this
manner the identity of the two is implied in the common substratum of
-p . 210
Being - awareness.
1.49.
sprk%: I l
mhfo: w TT-Tf HTTOM
cphtc h ht l
i i% hft h ftwqfrr: w iht-
1.49. "Devadatta who is fat does not eat during the day." here, the
eating at night which is postulated for the logical possibility of
fatness is postulation. This is not understood through inference.
Because when a person who is fat and who does not eat by day is first
seen, there is no possibility of pervasion of co-presence and illustration.
78
Although the pervasion is possible: wherever there is the absence of
eating at night, there is the absence of fatness on account of the
co-ordinate relation with not eating by day, just as he does not eat by
day and at night, still, that [pervasion] is not between fatness and
eating at night, i.e. between the reason and what is to be proved, but
between their absence. Moreover, the requirement of the recollection
of pervasion etc. is also not seen here. Thus postulation must certainly
be established as another means of knowledge.
comment
Arthapatti means the postulation (apatti=kalpana) of some fact (artha)
*’ 211
in order to make an already ascertained fact logically possible. For
example, Devadatta is known to be fat but he is also known not to eat
during the day. The fact of his fatness and not eating in the day becomes
unintelligible if it is not postulated that he eats during the night.
Arthapatti rescues a known fact from seeming contradiction through
212
postulating the only other fact which can explain it.
Advaitins consider that only instances of pervasion of co-presence
(anvayavyapti , i.e. "where there is smoke there is fire") constitute a
213 -
valid inference. They argue that if the case of arthapatti is
formulated as an inference there will only be pervasion of co-absence
( vyatirekavyapti) between the absence of the major term and the absence
21A
of the middle term. Abhyankar has given an example of this. Advaitins
maintin that pervasion of co-absence is not a cause for inferential
215
knowledge. Rather, it is a case of postulation which forms a separate
means of knowledge. Importantly, Abhyankar mentions that in such instances
as "Devadatta is fat..." there is no requirement for the recollection of
pervasion and so it is not a matter of inference.
The Vedantaparibhas a delineates a twofold form of postulation, in
i> . i . — . i i \ » / —- .. . . \ 216
reference to what is seen (drst arthapatti ) or hear ( srutarthapatti ).
Advaitins utilize the latter type for the interpretation of the sacred
texts. For example, the text "the knower of the Self crosses sorrow"
(Ch. 7.1.3.) would be logically untenable if sorrow were not false, since
217 -*
only knowledge is specified as the means for its removal. Sankara
argues by srutarthapatti when he says that the sacred texts would not
have enjoined the knowledge of the oneness of Brahman if there had been
218
no superimposition of Ignorance upon Brahman.
79
1.50.
! RRF1FRTRR | ^ F3TSWRFFT
rhfj-
st^Fct: vnRT wti I m RF^ RF’RR I FFTHR-
FF^Mq#7FRFT | ^FTIRR ^ RrF-
fWiFTRrR I f#RTR 3FTFT RrR^Rl^lR^STR RFFIFIIRIFR^FF \
^WTFSpn#^ RRFIFRFTHTR FRF I
1.50. So too, non-cognition is also another means of knowledge. If a
pot were to be here on the ground, then it would be seen just like the
ground. In this manner the non-existence of a pot etc. is known because
of the non-cognition of the pot etc.. Here, the sense organ is not the
particular cause [for the knowledge of non-existence]. Because that is
absorbed in apprehending the location and because it [the sense organ]
has no connection with what is non-existent. Moreover, even if the
knowledge is accepted here as perceptual there is certainly no confusion
of the means of knowledge because there is the difference of the means
of knowledge for that [perceptual knowledge] - which is non-cognition -
from the sense organ.
comment
Non-cognition ( anupalabdhi ) is the particular means for apprehending
the non-existence of an object. Abhyankar specifies the criterion for
non-cognition to be considered as a means of knowledge: "if a pot were
to be here on the ground, then it would be seen just like the ground."
This means that only competent non-cognition ( yogyanupalabdhi) i.e., an
object which is not cognized would have been cognized if it were present,
is the valid means for the knowledge of non-existence. Competent non-
cognition excludes instances where something may or may not be present
but is unable to be perceived.
The cognition of the non-existence of a pot on the ground is
perceptual because its non-perception and the knowledge of Its non¬
existence are immediately experienced. However, the means for that
knowledge is not perception because the latter requires contact between
the sense organ and the sense object. In the case of the non-cognition
80
of a pot the sense of sight only contacts the bare ground. It cannot
come into contact with a pot which is not present. Therefore, although,
the knowledge is perceptual the means of knowledge must he separately
classified, hence non-cognition is treated as a distinct means of
knowledge.
1.51.
I U ^ff%^ | 3R TR r
M i sj?p«Ri I im
iirr^rr i siHPft:
m- wtr *rrj I
WT I I i%RI%qr^!RT-
I W^[R|i%iRRI ^ |^TJ I 51*
1.51. The worldly knowledge which is produced in this manner by the
means of knowledge possesses a location and an object. The internal-organ
manifests that [knowledge]. Because worldly knowledge is only a
modification of the internal-organ. For this reason the knowership there
[in respect of worldly knowledge] is for the internal-organ or for the
individual soul having that [internal-organ] as its limiting adjunct,
but not for the pure Self. For that [Self] has no possibility of
knowership since it has Knowledge as its essential nature. Even the
knowership appearing in the manner "I know" is not for the Self but it
is for the sense of "I". The sense of "I", however, is not the Self
but the I-notion which is included within the transformation of Ignorance.
The nature of the Self which appears in the I-notion has been superimposed,
it is not real. In the same manner, the nature of the Self which appears
in the mind-, in the senses, in the vital breath and in the body etc.,
has certainly been superimposed on account of error. Liberation is not
possible without the removal of such error and the removal of the error
is only through the knowledge of Brahman.
81
comment
According to Advaita, consciousness is of two types. The first is
consciousness in its essential nature, identical with the Self and Brahman
and manifest in relation to the mind as the unchanging witness of the
220
presence and absence of all mental states. This consciousness is not
opposed to Ignorance but illumines both knowledge and Ignorance. The
second type is consciousness reflected in and qualified by the internal
221
organ (v rttivisis t am caitanyam ). This consciousness manifests in two
forms: in the form of the subject (aharovrtti) or I-notion (ahahkara )
and in the form of the various mental modifications which are objects
. 222
( idamvrtti ) of the I-notion. It is the reflected consciousness which
is operative in all epistemological activities, whether relating to
sense objects or to spiritual matters. Because the gain of any knowledge
requires a knowing subject as the locus of knowledge and also the object
of knowledge which is revealed to the subject by the appropriate mental
223
modification.
Sankara states that the Self, as pure awareness, cannot possess the
quality of knowership. Nor does the intellect, insentient by nature,
224
intrinsically possess knowership. Knowership is the property of the
reflection of the Self in the intellect. The reflection of the Self,
which is the I-notion, acquires the status of a knower on account of
its identification with the attributes of the intellect, Sankara
attempts to illustrate the subtle relationship of the Self and its
reflection in the intellect through the example of a face reflected in
225
a mirror. The Self is compared to the face and the intellect to the
mirror. The reflection of the Self in the intellect is like the
reflection of the face in the mirror. Just as the reflection conforms
to the attributes of the mirror, so that a defect in the mirror appears
upon the reflection also, so too the reflection of the Self naturally
assumes the attribute of knowership on account of its conformity to the
intellect. Just as the reflected properties of the mirror may be
falsely ascribed to the face, similarly the Self is erroneously
considered to be a knower because it is not distinguished from its
227
reflection in the intellect.
From the preceding it is clear that even the sense of being "so
and so", i.e., the I-notion, is not the essential Self but is included
228
among the effects of Ignorance because it is the product of the Self
82
reflected in the intellect which is an effect of Ignorance. The Self,
however, is in no sense spacially remote from the I-notion but is its
locus and so the Self is the subject while the I-notion is its object.
Thus the "I" is a combination of the I-notion and the Self as such.
» 229
For this reason Sankara, Suresvara and other Advaita authors specify
that the object portion of the "IV should be distinguished through
discrimination from the remaining portion which is the real Self:
The learned should abandon the "this'-' portion in what
is called "I" as not the Self. ["I" in the sentence of
the sacred text] "I am Brahman" must be the remaining
portion in accordance with the above teaching. 23u
The origin of the mutual superimposition of the Self and the
231
intellect cannot be traced. The consequential effects of this
superimposition are the false ascription of the attributes of the body,
senses and mind upon the Self and the erroneous imputation of Selfhood
to the body etc. Because this superimposition is said to have Ignorance
as its fundamental cause, it can only be removed by the liberating
knowledge of the true nature of the Self.
The author now proceeds to state the indispensable pre-requisites
for such knowledge.
SRR’fadTMMSPdTd | dTdi ldRTTtf’dM | flTdddg-
^ ( ? ) ( 3 )
( y ) 55 ^ %Td I dWdRRid—
. drdd wqgei %iJqnijqssqqr I
i%rddr 11
di 11 ( do r u ) # 1
1 dWRRRdit dd: 1 m-
j fdTd^I |
=d RTFH ddifldld: WdRd | “ d Rl V3 R l ^
dRdfdg: ^rfdrfr ” (|o # I I )
“ ^dRdfd^ris^tdT mw. ” (H )
ftdFdT: N qfddlddRT | ^dT-
rid I ^ 3 fdT^i^RT lIRRTdRRTd I
83
1.52. The person eligible for the knowledge of Brahman is only such a one
who is endowed with the fourfold qualifications. Because there is no hope
of inquiry into Brahman in the absence of the accomplishment of the fourfold
means and because there is the sure expectation of the inquiry into Brahman
following that [gain of the fourfold means]. The fourfold qualifications
are: the discrimination between the permanent and the impermanent,
dispassion towards the enjoyment of the results [of action] here or
hereafter, the acquisition of the group of six beginning with control of
the mind and the desire for liberation. That has been told in the
Varahopanisad :
[Through a life of ethical activity] the fourfold means
such as dispassion should arise for people. [They are]:
the discrimination between the permanent and the
impermanent, dispassion [towards objects of enjoyment]
here and hereafter, the acquisition of the group of
six [values] beginning with control of the mind and
the desire for liberation. One should cultivate that. (Va.2.3.)
The group of six beginning with control of the mind are: the control
of the mind, control of the sense organs, renunciation, endurance, faith
and single pointed concentration of the mind. Control of the mind is
the cessation of the mind from worldly occupations. The control of the
sense organs is the restraint of the external senses. Renunciation is
the relinquishment of action. Endurance is bearing the opposites such
as heat and cold. Faith is the intellect having trust [in the teacher
and the scripture]. Single pointed concentration of the mind is the
abiding of the mind through giving up sleepiness, want of energy and
carelessness. The sacred texts, too, teach that control of the mind etc.
are the means for the direct apprehension of the Self:
84
Therefore, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn,
enduring and possessed of faith a person should see the Self
232
indeed in the self [the body]. (Brh.4.4.23.)
The person who knows is calm, self-controlled, withdrawn,
enduring, well-behaved and equal [to all]. (Sa.5)
These are the internal means. Whereas action is a means for knowledge
through purification of the mind and so it is an external means.
comment
In the Brahmasutrabha s ya Sankara states that possession of the
fourfold qualifications is a necessary pre-condition for the knowledge
233
of Brahman. Later Advaita treatises which elucidate some aspects
of the tradition ( prakaranagrantha ) generally commence with a
234
description of these fourfold means.
According to the Advaita conception of liberation, action ( karma )
has an important though limited function. Sankara is emphatic that
235
action can have no direct role in bringing about liberation. However,
actions in the form of duties, charity, the performance of permanent
236
rites such as agnihotra and the practice of austerity, undertaken
with the correct attitude, are accepted as a means to liberation in
237
so far as they prepare the mind to receive the teaching. The purpose
of action is to facilitate a proper mental disposition by removing
the "impurities" ( durita ) such as desire and aversion (raga , dves a) which
stand in the way of knowledge.
1.53.
i “ mm m
3
VWm IRT-
mi i zgmi, m i
85
R^qoj gf^ h^rr^?^ ||
f%Rt?r^Tqctr «fRRcqftq#iq %^r : |
^FcRffl^l^cO^ cRf^R qR[Rjpi$ (| |
1.53. However, the means which is more internal is the triad consisting
in hearing, thinking and meditation. For there is the sacred text:
"My dear, the Self should indeed be seen; it should be heard about,
thought about and meditated upon" (Brh. 2.4.5.). "Should be seen" means
it has to be made direct in the manner: "I am Brahman". The means for
that is hearing etc. which has been told by "it should be heard about"
etc. Hearing is the ascertainment of the purport of the Vedanta
sentences in regard to the non-dual Brahman. Thinking is the consideration
of what has been heard through reasonings of logical possibility.
Meditation is establishing a continuous flow of thoughts of the same
type through setting aside dissimilar thoughts. That has been told:
The wise say that hearing is determining the
signification of a word by means of reasoning.
Thinking is said to be determining the truth of
the thing by means of reasoning.
Those who are versed in the Vedas say that
meditation is where the mind has only pure
awareness remaining. This internal means
has thus been told. You should engage in
that for the knowledge of the Supreme Self. (S.S. 3.344-345.)
1 ' 54 ‘• a* * 'kfa
■ t ftwd i ^ w~sR2sr: w.m
^ % mm i&Tfafapt ^ 3 fT,
^ m y m-
86
tRftwr<R*P-RT %3vR s> ^TTRT ^T
^n^r: I to f| wi\m^ l ^ w%ti wm
fafta: ^tt%r <rafar to% Strong-
^ I ^RRKR^rR H
rfl TO^WRf
I h wii I #*-
“ wvm *’ ( bto q i <* i' \s ) i
SfRHamM TOTilMWT 3T <TFT 4tW*RR
" TO: TO ” ( %° 3 I <0 ^WTOITO t
tot 5T^«i+^ w ftf^d 0 v\ r) |m
*rercS ¥R*p: I tto : tor fro?t i
JRP^! wrt
1.54. In regard to the above, the doubt whether or not the Vedanta
sentences are the means of knowledge for the non-dual Brahman is removed
by hearing. Many doubts are removed by thinking. They are, for example:
is the world real or unreal? Does the Self consist of bliss or not?
Is the Self distinct from the body or not? Is the identity of the
individual soul with the supreme Self possible or not? Is Self-knowledge
the means of liberation or not? Even if it is the means for liberation,
is it the means for liberation through being combined with action or
on its own? Does the Self consist of Knowledge or does it have Knowledge
as its quality?
For what is known as "thinking" consists of reasoning. The idea
of reality in regard to the world is removed by reasoning: if the world
were real then there would be contradiction with the non-dual texts.
Reasoning is the means of knowledge about the Self being of the nature
of bliss: if the Self does not consist of bliss, no one would be engaged
to attain it. If the body alone is the Self, then because of the
absence of another birth the consequence would be the destruction of
what has been done and the arrival of what has not been done. If there
is difference between the individual soul and Brahman there would be
87
contradiction with the sacred texts such as "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.).
If Self-knowledge is not the means for liberation or if it is the means
for liberation combined with action, the conclusion would be absence of
validity for the sacred text: "there is no other path for going [beyond
death]" (Sv. 3.8.). If the Self has Knowledge as its quality, the sacred
text” "without quality" (Cu. 7.2.) would not agree. Thus such reasonings
should be properly investigated for oneself. By meditation the error
such as "I am Ignorant" is removed.
comment
In the Br hadaranyakopanis ad (2.4.5., 4.5.6.) the sage Yajnavalkya
teaches that the Self should be seen ( dra st avya ), it should be heard
about (srotavya ), thought about ( mantavya ) and meditated upon
(nididhyasitavya).
Abhyankar explains that "should be seen" means the Self is to be
directly apprehended and the principal means for that are hearing,
238
thinking and meditation. According to Sankara the nature of the Self
must firstly be heard from the sacred texts and the teacher. Then the
Self must be thought about or reflected upon, i.e., what has been heard
should be investigated by means of suitable reasoning. Then the Self
239 - .
should be meditated upon with certainty. Sankara states that when
these means become as one, i.e. when there is no separation between what
has been heard, reflected upon and ascertained to be true to one's
240
experience then the knowledge of Brahman is clear.
—
Sankara accepts the utility of the meditative practices (dhyana,
241
pranidhana) prescribed in the Yogasutras . However, he parts company
with the Yoga school by rejecting the view that the practice of yoga ,
without the Vedantic revelation, can lead to the ascertainment of the
truth. Sankara is emphatic that the knowledge of reality is only from
- 242
the Vedanta sentences" and he does not accept that yoga, independent
243
of Vedanta, can give liberation. In regard to the practice of
meditative absorption ( samadhi ), which is the aim of yoga discipline,
Sankara considers it a means for the clear ascertainment of the Self
244
which is known from the Upanisads. However, he does not consider that
meditative absorption is of itself a sufficient condition for knowledge:
88
Even in deep sleep and meditative absorption there
is the natural gain of non-distinction, however at
the time of waking [from sleep and absorption], there
is once again distinction just as before because
false knowledge has not been removed.
It is a misreading of Sankara to consider that hearing and reflection
are merely the preliminary stages to meditation. For Sankara accepts that
the mahavakyas can, in the case of highly qualified aspirants, bring about
246
immediate knowledge which requires no further fulfilment. In the
thought of Sankara, hearing the scriptures from a teacher, reflection
. 247
and meditation are all to be repeated as long as required and the
scope of the latter two is essentially to help the ascertainment that
the meaning of the Vedanta passages is true to experience.
Padmapada provides a more extensive definition of hearing,
reflection and meditation. He says hearing is inquiry into the Vedanta
248
passages for the knowledge of the Self. Reflection is the consideration
of illustrations, reasonings and descriptive statements contained in the
sacred texts and it is also the consideration of inferences not opposed
to the meaning of the texts. Meditation is the establishing of the mind
in the meaning of the Upanisad passages which have been supplemented
by reflection. "Seeing" or realization ( darsana ) means the experience
of the unity of consciousness which is free from the appearance of all
worldly phenomena, on account of being established in the meaning of
249
the Upanisad passages. In the view of Padmapada, the role of the
sacred texts is of primary importance for the knowledge of Brahman
while reflection and meditation are supportive.
This question, as to the relative importance of hearing, reflection
and meditation, is taken up by Padmapada's main commentator Prakasatman
who seeks to establish that hearing is the principal member (ahgl )
and the other two are auxiliaries (ahga ) of it. Prakasatman contends
that even if verbal testimony produces only mediate ( parok sa) knowledge
of Brahman which gains immediacy (aparoksata) on account of assistance
from reasoning and meditation, still, verbal testimony is primary
because the scope of the other two is to assist hearing. If it is
suggested that all three are of equal importance, Prakasatman disagrees
by arguing that verbal testimony must be the principal cause for the
knowledge of Brahman since it, as the means of knowledge ( praman a), is
in contiguity ("the Self should be seen, heard about..."} with what is
to be known, i.e. the Self ( prameya ). Again, if it is accepted that
89
verbal testimony produces Immediate knowledge which, however, remains
mediate on account of the unprepared nature of the mind, then reflection
and meditation are the auxiliaries to verbal testimony because they serve
to assist the result of verbal testimony in so far as they bring about
establishment in immediate knowledge by removing the obstructions
. . , 250
existing m the mind.
Prakasatman maintains that immediate knowledge is not possible
solely from meditation without verbal testimony because it would lack
validity since meditation is not a means of knowledge. If it is argued
that the immediate knowledge gained from meditation has the scriptural
knowledge of the Self and Brahman as its subject matter and acquires
validity on account of the connection with that, Prakasatman replies
that the validity of such meditative knowledge is dependent upon
ascertaining the truth of the subject matter which is itself dependent
upon another means of knowledge, i.e. verbal testimony. Therefore
extrinsic validity (paratah pramanya ) would be accepted in the case of
verbal testimony while the other means of knowledge are said to be
intrinsically valid ( svatah pramanya ). Prakasatman concludes that
reflection and meditation assist in bringing about the result of hearing
and hence they are its auxiliaries.
251
Vacaspatimisra, however, has a different interpretation regarding
the relative importance of hearing, reflection and meditation. He
considers that hearing and reflection give rise to meditation which
causes immediate knowledge after being practised with attention and
without interruption for a long time.
252
According to Vacaspati, verbal
253
testimony produces only mediate knowledge which gains immediacy
through a mental modification (vrtti) assisted by the mental impression
( samskara ) of non-duality acquired by repeated meditation
254
upon the meaning of the Vedanta passages.
As mentioned previously, Vacaspati adopts certain views of
Mandanamisra.
255
In this matter also he appears to follow Mandana who
maintains that repeated meditation (prasahkhyana ) is a necessary
256 —.
practice for the gain of immediate knowledge. Also, Vacaspati links
hearing, reflection and meditation with the Yoga term samyama which
incorporates the three stages of concentration (dharana), meditation
- - 257
( dhyana) and meditative absorption ( samadhi) . He equates hearing and
reflection with concentration, meditation upon the meaning of the Vedanta
90
passages ( nididhyasana) with yoga meditation ( dhyana ) and direct
apprehension of the Self (in the sentence "the Self is to be seen", etc.)
258 —
with meditative absorption. Along with Vacaspati's use of Yoga
terminology there would appear to be an acceptance of the soteriological
dimension embodied in those terms. This suggests a certain conceptual
eclecticism is operative in Vacaspati’s interpretation of the Vedanta
means to liberation.
The Vivaran a and Bhamati are in agreement regarding the fundamental
importance of the Upanisad sentences. They differ, however, concerning
the role of the Upanisads in the gaining of liberation. Padmapada and the
Vivarana maintain that the Upanisad passages can generate immediate
knowledge while according to Bhamati the texts produce only mediate
knowledge. The consequence of this difference is a dissimilarity in
attitude toward the gain of the knowledge of Brahman. In the view of
Padmapada and Vivaran a, the function of reflection and meditation is
negative in so far as their purpose is to remove the obstructions to
the clear apprehension of the Self which is revealed in the Upanisads.
For Bhamati , however, immediate apprehension must be produced through
the practice of meditation upon the meaning of the texts.
What has been discussed indicates that the Padmapada -Vivaran a
tradition accords more closely with the tenor of Sankara’s teaching
than the method laid down by Vacaspati.
1.55.
l m l
i wm.'m i
sirmuh^+i ir# i tot-
^ Ht«r+.H3PT: ^ (TR^T-
^ 1 1ifN} sTST-
TOf^RPTURT ^
^ | ^ cfRR TO |
^ i h i h ^ ftq-; | ^ w-
91
fwHpn: I trmtot?} i <rmft <rf%-
fi%: 5Rt^ i ff? mr$rifr n 3 €ww ^ri%
vm 1
1.55. When doubt and error have thus been removed by hearing etc. and
when there are no other obstacles then the immediate, true and certain
knowledge arises that "I am Brahman". Other obstacles are of three types
on account of the distinction of past, future and present [obstacles].
An obstacle from the past is the repeated remembering on account of
absorption in previously experienced sense objects. This can be prevented
in remembering the sense objects one must give up,like husk, the name and
form belonging there and take, like grain,the reality which exists within
that [name and form]. Here, giving up means not pondering. Taking means
pondering.
A future obstacle is the remainder of the action which has begun
to produce its effect. The remainder of action ceases only after
experiencing the result. In regard to that, if there is a remainder of
very strong self-interested action then it is an obstacle to knowledge.
If there is a remainder of weak self-interested action, even though it
brings about the general preservation of the body it is not an obstacle
to knowledge. In the same manner, the remainder of obligatory action,
whether producing a result or not producing a result, is not an obstacle
but indeed is favourable to the knowledge of reality by means of the
cessation of the liking for sinful actions. Even the desire for the
world of Brahma which arises for someone and which is attendant upon
particular meritorious actions that procure the world of Brahma is
certainly a future obstacle. However, the person who goes to the world
of Brahma is liberated along with Brahma. Though the person who is not
desirous of that does not wait for such a long time.
92
A present obstacle is of many types on account of the distinction
of attachment to sense objects, fallacious reasoning, dullness of the
intellect etc. In regard to that, attachment to sense objects can be
prevented by control of the mind etc. practised repeatedly. Fallacious
reasonings can be prevented by hearing etc. ['i.e. hearing, reflection
and meditation] practised repeatedly. Food that has the qualities of
raj as and tamas must be given up for preventing dullness of the
intellect. Nevertheless the cessation of those [obstructions] would
be only by degrees or in another birth. However, even in that birth
[the cessation] is through the grace of the teacher etc.
comment
Hearing, reflection and meditation have been told as the direct
means for the knowledge of Brahman. Of these three, hearing is the
principal member since verbal testimony is considered to be a means of
knowledge. If there is the correct operation of the means of knowledge
supported by reflection and meditation the immediate knowledge of
Brahman must occur. If this is not the case, Advaitins postulate the
existence of obstacles which hinder the realization. Suresvara states
that such obstructions may either be from the past, the future or the
259
present.
In the Upadesasahasrx , Sankara teaches a form of meditation called
parisahkhyana for the purpose of removing obstructions such as the
260
influence of the sense objects upon the self. This meditation is
based upon the distinction between the subject, the Self, and objects,
i.e. everything else. Its method is to contemplate the Self as
intrinsically unaffected by sound, touch, form, taste and smell because
the Self is unable to be objectified by any of them.
It may be asked in what way parisahkhyana meditation differs from
^ 2 61
prasahkhyana meditation which Sankara rejects. The aim of
prasahkhyana is to produce Self-knowledge on account of the repeated
meditation upon the meaning of the Upanisad passages. Parisahkhyana
meditation, however, has no such aim. It is practised in order to
clearly appreciate the knowledge which has already been gained through
hearing but which has not been fully received in understanding and
93
experience. At the conclusion of the comment upon the previous section
it was mentioned that there is a difference between the production of
knowledge from meditation and the use of meditation to remove obstructions
preventing the clear appreciation of what is already known through
hearing. Parisahkhyana meditation exemplifies the latter approach.
Two commentators upon the Upadesasahasri , Anandagiri and Ramatirtha,
explain parisahkhyana in terms of removing the obstacles to clear
knowledge. Ramatirtha says:
.... if the knowledge on the part of some, though they
have knowledge, is not steady like a lamp in a
windless place on account of the strong mental
impression of difference, then for the firmness
of their knowledge what is known as parisahkhyana
is about to be explained
1.56.
SFWjm ^T'-r^ ^ d1 \Pn-
^ €rt-
1 ^wq ^ rt -
rT * TT^nr: ,? f%n wMwi-
^T ( V&m HfdT Hc*lf RRRT-
tWT I CRT ^TFRT%%-
wsfrvm 3tft
wmm 1 m
3TT#T R^TRRTWTT
1.56. Thus when there is the absence of any obstacle and when Ignorance
is removed by the unimpeded direct apprehension in the manner: "I am
Brahman" then the person desirous of liberation remains as Brahman,
undivided, of a single nature, existence, awareness and bliss.
For example, Karna, though born into a royal family, was brought
up ever since birth only in a hunter's family. He considered himself to
be Radheya due to ignorance characterised by the error brought about by
94
belonging to that [hunting community] and dwelling together etc. and he
did not experience his nature as the son of Kunti even though existing
as self-established. Then, deprived of the good fortune resulting from
being born of Kunti, everywhere he gained many types of sorrow
characterised by various sorts of curses, disrespect, etc. At one time
the Lord Sun caused him to recall his own nature by imparting the
instruction: "Karna, you are born of Kunti, you are not Radheya".
On account of that recollection, when there was the cessation of being
a hunter, being Radheya etc., which was manufactured by ignorance, he
gave up the sorrow caused by being a hunter etc. and gained the good
fortune which resulted from being born of Kunti.
So too, even Brahman, its own nature being concealed by the
ignorance which belongs to it and which is established as beginningless,
has gained the state of an individual soul. And being deprived of the
self-established experience of the nature of being eternal, unsurpassed
bliss, [Brahman] transmigrates. That transmigrating Brahman, when at
some time its Ignorance which was the criterion for the state of being
an individual soul etc. is removed through the knowledge about itself
[a knowledge] produced by a teacher and a scripture superimposed through
its own Ignorance, then it remains in its nature of unsurpassed bliss
which is eternally established.
comment
Sankara also narrates this story in his commentary on the
B rhadaranyakopanisad 2.1.20. (p. 738).
1.57.
I* ^ ^ | i pfa i ;
^fWR qijfl vIRllcf |
|| ( ) 51% |
95
*r 3^3 il (*ro. 3 \ )
i%w #pwfl #i<tt 1 *t—
T% ^T *?4 ^I8Jk 4 sF5n%<j*?: I
afo% *rj 5^: ^rr 4 ( sRn%tR: it ( stt^o ^o ) 51% I
1.57. This liberation is even for one who is living. Because there is
nothing to contradict it. This is indeed liberation while living. It has
been mentioned in the Varahopanisad :
At which time the Yogi knows his own Self to be the
whole, beginning from that time he would be liberated
while living. (Vara. 2.42.)
Similarly, the state of the person who is liberated while living has been
described in detail in the sacred texts such as:
The person whose radiance of mind does not rise up
in happiness or diminish in sorrow, who remains in
the state he happens to be in, he is said to be
liberated while living. (Vara. 4.22.)
And in the Atmopani s ad :
This person who is the best of the knowers of
Brahman is directly Siva himself. The best among
the knowers of Brahman has accomplished his purpose,
263
while living he is always liberated. (Atma. 20.)
1.58.
3 wrwr m
\ mvm ” ( 4r° « i a o)
Ww l m
<iq: I
A vAH l
96
r mm q*4 qq: \
I ^ #RT# 5TT^ |
q^Rf^Fcf SR: 1 ( Ifto 3 ! ^ )
r\ a • 0 <a ^ |
RT^FTf f^TRTT ^IhN^Tq^qi-
* W% I 3|^T—
fftRT SRT <Tr5rRST «R #l^Rf qq^ 1
^rr qqpqt=q srr%rtq^R| n # i
^TT #^OTT W^RT^TI R Jn^n^f
i m r ^fq:—
3tfrr %i^TRlqK^iOi% qqq: i
fapP3RiR qjfflq ^^3^11 ( WRo ^ I
<tct dWTO vM\ ftf-
t^t qK^WiT^p^wl^fiqt vm i m r fRt—
^[fefq&cR^q %qq[ |nR%q?qiRR qqj# qqq |
^ wiq Pro qg- r 4 q<^cT:wR q^jq || ^i% |
1.58. There are five aims of the state of liberation while living:
the protection of knowledge, austerity, the absence of disagreement,
the cessation of sorrow and the manifestation of happiness. Protection
of knowledge is the non-origination once again of doubt and contrary
views on the part of a person who has gained the immediate apprehension
of Brahman. In the existence of a doubt, that [protection of knowledge]
is necessary for preventing the loss which is incurred based on that
[doubt] because it is said: "the doubting self is ruined" (G.4.40.) and
that [protection of knowledge] is very easily gained in the state of
liberation while living.
Also, in that state there is the concentration of the mind upon a
single object because of the non-arising of all thoughts. That alone is
austerity, for there is the statement: "the highest austerity is the
concentration of the mind and the senses" (Mbh. Sa. 250.4.). The welfare
of the world is produced by that, for there is the statement: "whatever
97
a great person does, that indeed the other people do" (G.3.21.).
Also, in the state of not being engaged in contemplation, even
when a reproach has been made by someone there is no disagreement on
the part of a person who is liberated while living because there is no
appearance of a mental modification of that type. That has been told:
Having known completion in the truth we are
certainly joyful. We can only grieve for
others, we do not dispute with those who
are deluded.
So too, even while he experiences the result of action which has
begun to operate, the person liberated while living has complete
cessation of sorrow since error has been removed and because his mind
has only the form of the Self. Accordingly, there is the sacred text:
If a person should know the Self as "I am this",
then desiring what and for the desire of whom
s t
would he worry about the body ? (Sa. 22.)
So too, in the state of liberation while living there is the
manifestation of happiness due to the experience of the perfect bliss
of Brahman on account of the complete cessation of the concealing
caused by Ignorance through the practice of the Yoga of knowledge.
Accordingly there is the sacred text:
The happiness that must be for a mind which has
been placed in the Self and whose impurities have
been dispelled by meditative absorption cannot be
described through speech. At that time, that
[happiness] is apprehended for oneself by the
inner-organ. (Maitri. 6.54.)
1.59.
H!WRTO*TmT ^Rn% i pr-
5T‘W^ tfl^Fjpr jpjfa % |
tfw: qreqqfrq wq 5 ^4 n% ii
31 % qrfcr sTR?ra jm; 11 ( gfoo y^ )
cqqcqf qjRSSIcf^ |
frqsfrSS^ qq^S^^ffqq || ( q%o ^ ) |R |
5%t sqf% qqfr ^3 1
fl^qRTlfrfrtfr q%q qqfrcfqq^ II ( 3Tf#o $ | ^ ) ^ \
PMi^nfwrwi ^ R^mts^rtvnq: 1 ^m-
qfrq^^sftr riq Tprf q \
fr**3[3R%Sffr HrqqkqRfq jfcf I
3Tftqqr i^qr w^KRT q: qjfaqfr ||
( fro go ^ I U I R,y ) I
1.59. Then, upon the decease of the body on account of the completion
of the results of action which had begun to operate, liberation free
from the body follows. That also has been told in the sacred text:
They become liberated while living until the
destruction of the result of action which had
begun to operate. Then, when the result of action
which has begun to operate has reached its end in
the course of time, they attain my liberation
free from the body. As to that there is no doubt. (Mukti.43.)
Having given up the state of being liberated
while living when his body has been overcome
by time, he enters the state of being liberated free
from the body like air enters the state of not
moving. (Mukti. 76.)
Also in the Atmopani s ad :
99
Just as when a pot is destroyed the space [within
the pot] itself becomes space alone, in the same
manner, upon the dissolution of the limiting
adjunct the knower of Brahman himself becomes
Brahman alone. (Atma. 1.22.)
Because the reflection [of the Self] which is based upon Ignorance
is completely absent in liberation [free from the body] there is not
even a trace of I-ness there. Because I-ness is a particular
transformation of Ignorance. In the same manner, the difference
between the individual soul and Brahman also, which is based upon
Ignorance, most certainly does not appear there. That has been told:
When the Ignorance which produces division has
passed into final destruction, who will make a
distinction of one’s Self from Brahman which
does not exist [after its destruction]? (Vis. 6.7.94.)
1.60.
H spr ^ 3T I i1rt~
i (g° 3 u 1 ^) |t%-
1.60. Because liberation is merely remaining in one's own nature, at
that time there is neither happiness nor sadness. For something else,
which is the cause of happiness and sadness, does not exist since the
previously mentioned threefold difference is absent there [in liberation
265
free from the body]. And because experience is not possible due to
the destruction of the inner-organ which is the limiting adjunct
[bringing about] the state of the experiencer.
100
Therefore, liberation, which is characterised as the state of
being Brahman and which is taught by the sacred text: "the knower of
266
Brahman becomes Brahman indeed" (Mu. 3.2.9.) is thus established.
1.61.
3m %3TCT% 'S?*,
*R vcc ) tfqRR I
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VF& m ) ^rrr pmm qr^Niwvm I ^ 3 4 w-
terfR (r^\x) qfrftR 5 *R^-
^TTRT^Tqf I WSRRTRTgR ( ) qKR% $R~
TgT^F sqi?n^qd[r ^ ’ prT I
rTrft ^R^FIT J^TOTTO^^TfR^^rJ-
wfanmqRMM 1 $1 h m ft<-
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1.61. The illustrious Sankaracarya appeared in the year 710 [788 of the
Christian era] in the era of Salivahana. When he unfolded everywhere
the teaching of the non-duality of the Self the other views had, for
the most part, little currency. No one who laid claim to another view
dared to dispute before the feet of the illustrious teacher which
possessed great power. In a very short time, having travelled just
about everywhere accompanied by a group of pupils and having established
centres of religious life in the four directions he appointed students
in various places who were proficient in communicating the teaching of
the non-duality of the Self. And having reached completion in what was
to be accomplished in his own incarnation, the feet of the teacher
gained their own nature in the year 742 [820 of the Christian era] in
the era of Salivahana.
101
However, others say the birth of the illustrious Sahkaracarya was
on the fifth day of the bright half of the month in April-May in the era
of Yudhisthira measured as 2631. Accordingly, they say the teacher went
to the nature of light on the day of the full moon in the bright half of
the month in October-November in the era of Yudhisthira measured as 2663.
Thereafter his group of pupils, even immersed in the deep darkness
of delusion, through the assistance of the light of knowledge acquired
by the grace of the teacher's feet, like a light when the sun has set,
was able to destroy the mass of the darkness of Ignorance which had
entered the mind of the multitudes of living beings under the influence
of action. The teaching of the non-duality of the Self grew to have
unshaken prevalence just about everywhere. This very teaching of the
non-duality of the Self is celebrated in the world as the teaching of
maya .
102
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE; ADVAITAMATAM,
1. B.S.g. 2.1.6. p.360, line 7f.
2. V.P. p.113.
3. Sankara is without equivocation with, regard to the necessity of
Vedic revelation for the knowledge of reality;
B.S.6. 1.1.2. p.50, line 3 and p. 51, line 1* 1.1.3. p.58, line 2;
1.1.4. p.65, line 2f; 2.1.3. p.354, line 10; 2.1.6. p.360, line 7f;
2.1.11. p.368, line 7 and p.369, line 6 ; 2.1.14. p.379, line 6 and
p.380, line 2f ; 2.1.27. p.400, line 13f ; 2.1.31. p.404, line 8 ;
2.2.1. p.412, line 6f ; 2.3.1. p.499, line 5f ; 4.4.8. p.897, line 7.
Brh.$. intro, p.607, line 9f; 4.4.20. p.928, line 7.
Mu.3. 1.1.5. p.144, line 25f; 1.1.6. p.145, line 7.
Ma.3. 4,99. p.256, line 10,
G.g. 18.66. p.294, line 22f.
tr. 1 .17.8. 1 .18.216, 217.
4. vede purvottarakan d ayoh kramen a dharmabrahnian J vi s ayah •. •
tadubhayajnanam vedasya sak g at prayo.janam .
5. B.S.g. 1.1.7. p.111, line If. Also, BrhJ. 2.1.20. p.743, line 4f.
6. Brh.3. 2.1.20. p.743, line 4f ; 3.5.1. p.811, line 12f.
7. Brh. 4.4.19.
8. U. 1.18.7, 8, 183. Brh. 3.3.1. p.802, line 22f.
9• vyavaharikapramanyamatram ... na-advaitagamena badhyate , tu tattvikam
pramanyam , Advaitasiddhi , quoted in W, Halbfass, Studies in Kumarila
and Sankara . Reinbek. 1983. p-78, note 118.
10. Sankara states that ultimately all differences created by Ignorance
are to be negated, cf., B.S.Jj. 1.1.4. p.79, line If. He says that
the presentation of sagun a statements in the sruti are sometimes
specifically intended for negation while on other occasions they
are for the purpose of meditation, cf., B.S.$. 3.2.14. p,643, line4f;
3.2.15. p .643, line 12f ; 3.2.21. p.647, line 12f.
11. B.S.S. 1.1.12. p.116, line 8f.
12. G.£?. 13.13. p.204, line 3. S. Kuppuswami Sastri (ed) Brahmasiddhi by
Acharya Man d anamisra . 2 e ^ ed. Delhi. 1984. p.26, line 22. The V.P.
also utilizes this method, cf. , p.133f.
13. adhyaropah -vastunyavastvaropah . Cited in Gaurlsankara (ed), Sarva-
tantrasiddhantapadarthalak ga nasamgrahah , Kasi. Samvat 2016. p.15.
14. B.S, 1.1.8. p.112, line 10; 1.1.12. p.121, line 6f.
Brh.$. 4.4.25. p.938, line 25f.
15.
103
16. Aindra is the name of a pre-PaninTyan grammatical treatise and it
is also the name of a school of grammar based upon that text. The
work is not available. Cf., K.V. Abhyankar and J.M. Shukla, A
Dictionary of Sanskrit Grammar . Baroda. 1977. p.102.
17. Pratisakhya are treatises on Vedic grammar dealing specifically with
euphonic changes based upon sandhi . Originally, each Vedic recension
possessed such a treatise, ibid . , p.267f.
18. Dvadasadhyayl . The name of the sutra work by Jaimini consisting of
twe1ve chapt e r s.
19. S. Tapasyananda (trans) ^arikaradigvi.jaya of Madhava-Vidyaranya .
Madras. 1978. p.15. N. Veezhinathan (ed) 5rl garikaravijaya of
Anantanandagiri . Madras. 1971. p.7.
20. Halbfass, op-cit ., p.70,, considers that in relation to Sankara :
"it is... impossible to understand his thought in its philosophical
as well as its historical dimensions without fully recognizing and
respecting its fundamental commitment to the Vedic revelation".
21 .
B.S.S.
3.2.11 . p.641 ,
line
2f.
22.
B.S.S.
3.2.14. p.643,
line
6f.
23.
B.S.g.
3.2.15. p.643,
line
13f.
24.
Brh.S.
3.8.12. p.832,
line
13f.
25.
B.S .£>. 3.2.12. p.642 ,
line 13f.
line
9; 3.2.14. p.643, line 12;
3.2.21 . p.647
26.
B.S.S.
3.2.12. p.642,
line
6f.
27.
Brh. 2
.3.6.
28.
B.S.g.
3.2.12. p.642,
line
6f.
29.
As an
illustration of
this
point there is the case of
the
" apacchedanyaya " referred to by Jaimini, cf., J.S. 6.5.54., which
states that where there is a relation of earlier and later the
earlier is weaker. In Paniniya grammar too there is the rule:
" viprati s edhe param karyam " P.S. 1.4.2., which means that in the
case of a conflict of rules of equal applicability the subsequent
operation is to be performed. These illustrations do not constitute
a proof on their own, rather they exemplify the logical priority of
the subsequent over the preceding. .
30. B.S.g. 4.3.14. p.884, line 10.
31. ibid
32.
33.
34 .
B.S.3. 2.1,11. p.366, line If.
B.S.S. 2.1.6. p.361, line 2.
Halbfass, op-cit .. p.49.
104
35. In refuting other schools of thought, cf. , B.S.Js. 2.2.1. p.412,
line If. In determining scriptural purport, the use of reason is
demonstrated through the importance of the sa dlingas : the
beginning ( upakrama ) and the conclusion ( upasamhara ) being in
harmony, the use of repetition ( abhyasa ), originality ( apurvata ),
the result ( phala ), the use of eulogy ( arthavada ) and logical
demonstration ( upapatti ), cf., Vs. p.12, line 11.
36. Sankara discusses the method of discriminating the invariable Self
from its limiting conditions in B.S.£. 2.1.6. p.361, line 2f.
Advaitins use the method of anvayavyatireka in two ways. The first
follows the mode of the Naiyayika where anvaya and vyatireka
establish the invariable concomitance in presence and absence between
the reason ( hetu ) and the thing to be proved ( sadhya ). Cf., X.
Athalye (ed), Tarka-Sangraha of Annambhat ta. Poona. 1974. p.40 , 281f.
The author of the PancadasI uses anvayavyatireka in this manner in
4.32. The second mode of usage is to distinguish the invariable from
the variable; X is and X is, X is not and X is. This usage is found
in PancadasI 1.37-42. The Advaitins utilize this latter method to
discriminate the Self from adventitious conditions. In N.S. 2.1.,
Suresvara states that the meaning of the word "you” ( tvam ) must be
correctly understood in order to comprehend the mahavakya .
37. Brh. 4.3.23.
38. Pr.£). 6.2. p.133, line 15f. Also, N.S. 2.83, 97.
39. Sankara uses the word "dgsi" in the sense of awareness. Cf., U. 1.10.
Also, 1.12.vs.6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 15. 1.13.vs.8, 9, 1.14.vs.44, 49.
1.15.vs.18. 1.17.vs.29, 35, 39. 1 .18.vs.26, 83, 84, 97, 202.
40. "The mental modes which assume different forms are, indeed, pervaded
at the beginning and end, and also in the middle, by the one
undifferentiated consciousness which experiences none separate from
it." R. Balasubramanian (ed. and trans.). The Taittiriyopani g ad-
bha s ya-vartika of Suresvara . Madras. Rev, ed. 1984. 2.123. Also, 2.
94, 411 , 666.
41. V.P. p.12. I have followed the rendering by Madhavananda here. S.
Madhavananda (trans.), Vedanta-Paribha ga. Calcutta. 1942. Rev, 2 n< ^ ed.
1972. p.1 3.
42. ibid .
43. ibid ., p.8.
44. ibid ., p.115.
45. D.V. Gokhale (ed.), ^ri ^ankaracarya's Upadesasahasrl with the gloss
Padayo.janika by Ramatlrtha . Bombay. 1917. p.148f.
46. Tai. 2.1 .1 .
47. Ramatlrtha's gloss, op-cit .. p.150.
48. The concept of " samanya" is a category in the system of Nyaya-Vaisefika
where it is divided into higher and lower with reference to its
extensiveness. The highest samanya is existence ( satta ). Abhyankar
utilizes the concept of samanya to the advantage of Advaita. Cf.,
105
T.S. p.5, 89f.
49. B.S.S. 2.3.9. p.514, line 3f. Brh.3. 2.4.9. p.762, line Ilf.
50. P.D. 2.20.
51. B.S.3. 1.3.1. p.206, line 4f.
52. R.D. Earmarkar (ed. and trans.), .^rTbha s ya of Ramanuja . Part One.
Poona. 1959. Para.50. p.93.
53. Cf., Snandagiri on Mundaka 1 .1 .9. S. Subramanyasastri (ed.),
Upani s adbha s yam . Vol 1. Varanasi. 1979. p.134,
54. Brh.. 3.8.12. p.832, line 13f. B.S.g. 2.1.14. p.382, line 2f ;
4.3.9. p.881 , line 6f.
55. B.S.S. 3.2.16. p.643, line 19. Also, B.S.g. 3.2.18. p.644, line 16.
MS.6. 3.33. p.222, line 9; 3.35. p.223, line 5f. Brh.6. 2.1.20.
p.739, line 5f. U. 1.18.vs.50, 66.
56. Ke, 1.6. p,22. Sankara clearly states that the Self does not become
known as an object, cf., Brh.3. 4.4.6. p.919, line 19f. U. 1.14.vs.
17; 1.15 .vs .39.
57. This view is put forward by the Bhatta school of the Purvamimamsa ,
cf., the Candrika of Jnanottama. M. Hiriyanna (ed.), The Nai s karmya-
siddhi of Suresvara with the Candrika of Jnanottama . Poona. 4^ ed.
1980. p.66, line 20.
58. ibid ., 2.25. p.67.
59. It appears that Abhyankar is following the Madhyandina recension.
60. sadhyabhavahetvabhavayor vyaptir vyatirekavyaptih ( Nyayabodhini ),
T.S. p.41 , line 1 4.
61 . V.P. p.37.
62. Sarvatantra . op-cit ., p.153.
63. Tai.$. 2.1. p.283, line 8f.
64. V.P. p.37.
65. Sarvatantra , op-cit ., p.235.
66. Sankara clearly indicates his acceptance of the apparent transformation
of Brahman into the form of the world. Cf., B,S.£>. 2.1.14. p.380f,
line 10f; 2.1.27. p.400, line 6 and p.401, line 5fj 2.1,28. p.401f,
line 15f.
67. Ch. 6.2.1. Also, Tai.S. 2.1. p.283, line 27f.
68. G.g. 13.14. p.205, line If.
69. ibid . , 2.16. p.14, line 22f.
70. B.S.g. 3.2.21. p. 646, line lOf.
106
71. V.P. p.3, 5, 35. Tai.S. 2.1. p.283, line 8f. In B.S.l 3.2.4.
p.626, line 15, Sankara mentions sublation as the criterion of
falsity: vaitathyam badhvamanatvad ityabhiprayah .
72. V.P. p.5. B.S.3. 1.1.4. p.99, line 3f ; 2.1.14. p.377, line 6.
73. JirI,B.Para.44.p.78.
74. Communication by E. Thangaswami. Also,-ef,, E. Thangaswami, Advaita-
Vedanta Literature. A Bibliographical Survey . Madras. 1980. p.viii.
75. ibid., p.xii.
76. Communication by E. Thangaswami.
77. B.S. ( Bhamatl ) 3.2.9. p.637, line 26f.
78. tattyam iti bimbasthaniyabrahmasvarupata pratibimbasthaniyasya
.1 ivasva upadisyate . "The reality, i.e. the nature of Brahman which
represents the original, is taught for the individual soul who
represents the reflection," Pancapadika . Cf., S. EamasastrT (ed.),
Pancapadika with two commentaries and Pancapadikavivarana with two
commentaries . Madras Govt. Oriental Series CLV, p,127»
79. P.C. Divanji (ed. and trans.) Siddhantabindu of Madhusudana with the
commentary of Puru s ottama . Baroda. 1933. p.28.
80. In B.S.Iis. 3.2.34. p.663, line 10f,, Sankara employs illustrations
of both reflection and limitation.
81. B.S.6. 1.2.20. p.186, line 9f. Also, B.S.3. 2.1.22. p.394, line 17f;
3.2.34. p.663, line 10f; 3.2.35. p.663, line 17f.
82. Ch.£. 6.8.1. p.521, line 25f.
83. B.S.S. 2.3.46. p.557, line 10f ; 3.2.20. p.645, line 13f.
84. B.S.S. 2.3.50. p.561, line 2f. U. 1.18.vs.43, 63, 87.
85. EamasastrT, op-cit ., p.130.
86. B.S. (Bhamatl ) 1.1.3. p.57, line 23f., (.. . anadyavidyopadhanalabdha —
sarvasakti.-jnanasyapi paramatmanah . ..).
87. S.B. p.29.
88. ibid ., p.26f.
89. The commentary SubodhinT states that Ignorance is single. Cf.,
G.A. Jacob (ed.), Yedantasara of Sadananda with the commentaries of
N rsirr'ihasarasvatT and EamatTrtha . Varanasi.6^ ed.~~1975. P.8, line
26.
90. However he also accepts that the Lord is the pure consciousness. Cf.,
N. Veezhinathan (ed. and trans.), The Sank s epasariraka of
Sarva.jnatman . Madras. 1972. 2.176.
9! . ibid ,, 2.190.
107
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100 .
101 .
102 .
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110 .
111 .
ibid . , 1 .20, 319.
ibid ., 2.192.
S.B. p.28.
Vivaran a cited in Ramasastrl, op-cit ,, p.129.
ibid . , p.1 30.
ibid . , p.129, ( brahmaivavidyapratibimbatam iti vadamah ).
S.B. p.29.
S.is. intro, p.109.
B.S.3. 2.1.14. p.377, line 3f. Devaraja rightly states that:
"Sankara, in fact, is a realist in epistemology". Cf., N.K.
Devaraja, An Introduction to Sankara's Theory of Knowledge . Delhi.
2 nd ed. 1972. p.11 .
B.S.£. 2.3.50. p.561, line 3.
S.B. p.29.
Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar (ed. with original commentary),
Siddhantabindu by Madhusudanasarasvatl . A commentary on the
Dasasloki of 8arikaracarya . Poona.ed. 1962. p.47.
Ramasastrl, op-cit . , p.131, (... ekajIvavadinam ist asiddhikaranam ...).
Sj. 2.1 28f.
The subtle body is said to be the "beginningless limiting adjunct
of the Self" ( anadir upadhir atmanah ), cf,, S. Madhavananda (trans.),
Vivekacudamani of Sankaracarya . Calcutta. 9^ ed. 1974. p.35.
The subtle body is also said to "persist until liberation"
( mok g aparyantam sthayi ), cf., V.P. p.123.
B.S.3. 2.3.30. p.539, line 14f.
B.S .l§. 2.3.31 . p.541 , line 3f.
Brh.B.V. 1.4,102. yaya yaya bhavet pumsam vyutpattih pratyagatmani ./
sa saiva prakriya jneya sadhvi sa ca vyavasthita/ /
Suresvara uses the expression "primary Ignorance" ( avid.ya .. . maul! ),
Brh.B.V. 1.2.136. Cited in Ramasastrl, op-cit ., p.53.
Padmapada interprets Sankara's expression: mi thya j nananim.it tah
(B.S.Es. p.9, line 2.) as a bahuvrihi compound containing the
karmadharaya compound: mithya meaning "indeterminable" and: ajSana
which refers to a positive entity. The compound is understood in
the sense that there is an indeterminable power known as ajnana
which is the material cause ( nimittah ) of worldly dealings
( lokavyavahara ); mithya ca : tad ' ajnanam a a, mithyajnanam . mithya-
iti-anirvacaniyata-ucyate . a.jnanam iti ca jadatmika-avidyasaktih ,
jnanaparyudasena-ucyate . tan nimittah tad upadana iti-arthah .
ibid ., p.1 8 .
108
112. S.6. 1.320, 322. 2.190, 191 . 3.94, 105, 108, 109.
113. Ramasastri, op-cit ., p.1 30., line 28f,
114. Cf., introductory verse to the BhamatT , B.S.3. p.1.
115. Ramasastri, op-cit ., p.2l , line 19f.
116. Cf., S. SaccidanandendrasarasvatT, Pancapadikaprasthanam .
Holenarsipur. 1966, Also, Vit^halasastri, Mulavidya-
bha s yavartikaviruddha . Holenarsipur. 1975.
117. B.S.g. p.1 9, line 2.
118. B.S.3. 2.1.31. p.404, line 10- 2.1.33. p.406, line 8.
119. B.S.g. 2.1.22. p.395, line 3f ; 2.2.2. p.419, line 9; 2.3.40. p.547,
line 7; 3.2.6. p.629, line 3; 3.2.11. p.641, line 6- 3.2.15. p.643,
line 16,
120. G.&. 13.2. p.192, line If.
121. Isa. Introduction, p.2, line 3f.
122. B.S.g. 1.4.3. p.297, line 5f.
123. ibid., line 6f.
124. ibid . , p.298, line 1.
125. S.g.1.20.
126. D.H.H. Ingall's, "Sankara on the Question; Whose is Avidya?"
Philosophy East and West , vol 3 (1953) no.1. p.69-72.
127. V.P. p.124.
128. Ts. p.5, line 24f.
129. V.P. p.126.
130. ibid . , p.120.
131. In Mu.^. 2.1.3. p.156, line If, Sankara mentions the five elements
and their respective qualities. Mayeda is of the opinion that
Sankara accepted the paneTkaran a rather than the trivytkaran a, cf.,
introduction to U. p.27.
132. V.P. p.122. Vs. p.6, line 8f. However, S. Dasgupta in his A History
of Indian Philosophy .Vol 2. Delhi. 1975. p.74 (note), mentions that
Vacaspati prefers the trivrtkaran a.
133. Vs. p.5, line 1 , specifies that the nature of the mind is a
modification of the internal-organ having the form of vacillation.
134. PancTkaranam of ^ankaracarya with Varttika . (translator unknown).
Calcutta. 2 nd ed. 1972. p.31 .
135.
V.P. p.122. Vs. p.5, line 12.
136 .
109
p.3, line 18.
137. ibid . , p.5, line 4f.
138. B.S.3. ( adhyasabha s ya ) p.25, line If. Also, cf., U. 1.12.vs.16, 17.
139. S.S. 3.113, 114.
140. Tai.3. 2.5.1. p.294, line 15f. B.S.g.* 1 .1 .19. p.125, line 12f•
3.3.12. p.692, line 7f.
141. Ma.S. 1.7. p. 1 87, line 16f.
142. ibid ., line 18.
143. Tai.g. 2.1.1. p.283, line 8f. Also, ef., Tai.S. 1.11.4. p.276, line
19f. Brh.^. 2.4.12. p.766, line 14f. Gj. 2.16. p.14, line 23f.
144. V.P. p.3. B.S. ( Bhamatl ) 1.1.4, p.65, line 27, ( abadhitanadhigata-
asandigdabodha.janakatvam hi pramanatvam , pramananam tacca svata
ity upapaditam ). Also, cf.. P.D. 3.29.
145. Sankara's purvapaksin cites an amusing verse illustrating what is
meant by "unreal", cf., Tai.Js. 2.1.1. p.284, line 6f.
146. Y.P. p.36f.
147. Kena.£. 1.4. p.20, line 24f. Brh.3. 4,4.6. p.919, line 20f. B.S.6.
2.3.7. p.508, line 3f. U. 1.14.vs.17; 1.15.vs.39. S.S. 1 .285.
Tai.B.V. 2.666.
148. B.S.3. 2.1.14. p.378, line 3f.
149. ibid., p.379, line If.
150. Brh.3. 1.4.10. p.669, line 25f.
151. ibid ., p,670, line lOf.
152. V.P. p.5.
153. ibid . , p.176, note 3.
1 54. U. 1 .1 4.vs .3 , 4.
155. Tai.S. 2.1.1. p.284, line 25f.
156. V.P. p.6,
157. ibid ., p.20.
158. ibid . , p.25.
159. P.D. 8.vs.1-16.
160. V.P. p. 1 4.
161. B.S. ( Bhamatl ) 1,1.1. p.31, line 26 (na ca-esa sak g atkaro ...).
Regarding the means to realization, cf., 1.1.4. p.70, line 21f.
110
162. U. 1 .18.vs.188, 189.
163. B.S.Jd. 4.1.2. p.829, line If.
164. ibid ., 1,1.1, p.36, line 3f.
165. ibid . , 4,1.2. p.829, line If.
166. N.S. 3.22, 67. Suresvara also cites Sankara on this matter (U. 1.18.
188-90.) in N.S. 4.31-33.
167. D. Venkataramiah (trans.), The Pancapadika of Padmapada . Baroda.
p.290f., 307f.
168. ^rutisarasamuddharanam of ^ri Totakacarva with the commentary of
£rl Sacchidananda Yogi . Srirangam. (no date) Verses 93-106.
169. Ramasastri, op-cit ., p.118, line 21f. Also, cf., S.S. Suryanarayana
Sastri and S. Sen (trans.), The Vivaranaprameyasangraha of
BharatTtxrtha . Andhra Univ. Series. 1941. 1.CLXII. Also, V.P. p.28.
170. Abhyankar's explanation follows that of the V.P. and his expression
is identical to that of the commentator ^ivadatta. Cf,, Vedanta—
paribha s a with the commentary Arthadipika by ^ivadatta . Varanasi.
1968. p.32, line 20f.
171. D.M. Datta, The Six ¥ays of Knowing . 2 n< ^ ed. Calcutta. 1972. p.101.
172. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja (ed. and trans.),
The Bharoati of Vacaspati on Sankara's Brahmasutrabha s ya (catussutrl) .
Madras. 1933. Introduction, p.xxi f.
173. V.P. p.28.
174. Madhavananda gives this example, op-cit , . p.36, note 2.
175. According to V.P. p.57, three members are sufficient to form an
inference instead of the five members required by the Naiyayikas.
Also, a negative instance is unnecessary since only pervasion in
co-presence is accepted, cf., V.P. p.55f.
176. V.P. p.55. Also, cf., Datta, op-cit ., p.205.
177. V.P. p.55.
178. ibid . , p.57f.
179. The Advaita usage of upamana follows that of the Bhatta school of
the Mimamsa and differs from the Nyaya school. For an explanation
of the latter view, cf., T.S. p.49f, 327f.
180. V.P. p,62.
181. Cf., the definition of vyapti in V.P. p.55.
182. V.P. p.63. Also, cf., Madhavananda, op-cit ., p.84.
V.P. p.63f.
183.
Ill
184. B.S.S. 1.1.3. p.55, line 9f.
185. B.S. ( Ratnaprabha ) 1.1.3. p.55, line 23f. ( yad va yatha ...).
ibid ., ( Bharoatl ) p.57 , line 23f. ( vaiyasikam tu ... ) .
186. The Veda has a relative eternity ( pr avahanityata ) which means that
the same Veda is revealed by the Lord in each cycle of creation.
Only Brahman has unchanging eternity ( kutasthanityata ). Abhyankar ,
like the author of the V.P. p.87, uses the word "same" ( samana )
which could mean either identical or similar. The author of the
Ratnaprabha p.55, line 23f., maintains that the Veda is identical
in each cycle. In the Bhamati p.57, line 18f, Vacaspati presents
the analogy of a dancer who repeats the same dance as the instructor
but does not repeat the identical movements. In this manner, the
Veda is the same but not identical in each cycle.
187. V.P. p.69.
188. V.P. p.73. Vs. p.10, line 17f. Also, R.D. Karmarkar (ed. and trans.),
Vedantakalpalatika . Poona. 1962. p.78f.
189. Vs. p.10, line 5. P.D. 1.43 . 7.74.
190. The Self is able to be implied through the word "I" which directly
denotes the ego. Cf., U. 1.18.28, 29, 58. For an explanation of
the discrimination between the Self and the objective attributes
considered to be the Self, cf., B.S.3, ( adhyasabha s ya ) p.4, line If.
U. 1 .18.64, 65.
191 . U. 1 .18.96, 189.
■192. ibid ., 1 .18.97.
193. Suresvara refers to the discrimination between subject and object
as "another example of continuity and discontinuity" N.S. 4.26.,
prose portion. Snandagiri and Ramatirtha, commenting upon U. 1.18.
96., illustrate continuity and discontinuity with reference to
subject-object relation.
194. B.S.3. ( adhyasabha g ya ) p.4, line If.
195. U. 1.6.6.
196. ibid . , 1.18.94, 101.
197. ibid ., 1.18.24.
198. ibid , , 1 .18.101 , 110,
199. The Ch. 6,3.3. : "That [existence] perceived" ( tad aik g ata ),
indicates that the pure Existence ( sat ) referred to in 6.3.1, has
the power of creation. For this reason, later Advaitins specifically
interpret the word "That" in the sentence "you are That" as
primarily signifying the Lord, cf., V.P. p.74 ; Vs. p.9, line 9; P.D.
1 .44. Such an interpretation makes the use of jahadajahallak sapa
more explicit since both the adjuncts i.e.the nature of being an
individual soul and the nature of being the Lord, are given up
through the implication of their identity in awareness. Sankara and
112
Suresvara, however, do not appear to specify the word "That" as
expressly signifying the Lord.
200. U 1.18.194.
201. ibid . , 1.18.169, 170, 195.
202. ibid . , 1.18. 90, 180, 193. N.S, 2.1. 4.21.
203. N.S. 3.28., (prose), 54., (prose), 64., (prose). 4.9., (prose),
26., (prose).
204. ibid . . 3.98, 100, 102.
205. ibid . . 4.9f. Also, 3.5, 113.
206. ibid ., 3.5, 33, 34, 113. 4.18.
207. ibid., 3.3.
208. ibid . , 3.26.
^09. ibid . , 3.78., (prose), 79.
210. ibid. , 3.75-80.
211. V.P. p.90. Dharmaraja alternatively interprets arthapatti as a
bahuvrxhi compound referring to the reason for the postulation, i.e.
fatness.
212. Datta, op-cit . , p.243.
213. V.P. p.55.
214. Datta, op-cit ., p.238.
215. V.P. p.56.
21 6. ibid . , p.90.
21 7. ibid . , p.91.
218. Brh.£>. 1.4.10. p.670, line If.
219. V.P. p.97f. Datta, op-cit ., p.168.
220. P.D. Ch. 10.
221. V.P. p.8. See comment to 1.10.
222. P.D. 6.70, 71. Also, ^rutisara , op-cit . , verse 14,
223. Cf., comment to 1.44.
224. U 1.18.54. Intellect ( buddhi ) is used here in the same sense as
internal-organ ( antahkaran a).
225. ibid ., 1.18.43.
113
226. ibid ,, 1.18.53.
227. ibid . , 1.18.63, 64.
228. G. 13.5.
229. S.3. 1.27, 159. P.D. 7.8.
230. U. 1.6.6.
231. B.S.fS. ( adhyasabhas.ya ) p.25, line 3.
232. The Kanva recension differs from the above. Cf. , Brh, 4.4.23. p.936.
233. B.S.g. 1.1.1. p.36, line 3f.
234. Ys. p.1, line 21f. Yiveka., verses 18-27, S. Vimuktananda (trans.)
Aparok s anubhuti . Calcutta. 1977. Verses 3-10.
235. B.S.S. 1.1.4. p.74, line 2f. Brh.3. 3.1.1. p.798, line 20f. Tai.S.
1.11. p.276, line 4f. G.g. 18.66. p.288, line 25f.
236. B.S.g. 4.1.18. p.853, line 20f. U. 1.17.22. G.6. 18.5, 6, 7. p.258,
line 5f.
237. B.S.S. 4.1.18. p.853, line 20f. Tai.g. 1.11. p.278, line If. G.3.
18.5. p.258, line 6f.
238. Cf., Tai.g. 1.11. p.279, line 14f.
239. Brh.g. 2.4.5. p.760, line 19f; 4.5.6. p.941, line 22f. Ke.g. 2.1.
p.25, line 14f, Sankara explains the word " nididhyasana " as "the
desire to meditate with certainty", B^h.kS. 2,4.4. p.759, line 16.
240. Brh,3. 2,4.5. p.760, line 20f. When Sankara says: "not otherwise,
by mere hearing" (p.760, line 21.), it must mean hearing which is
unsupported by inquiry, i.e. the discrimination of the Self from
the non-Self through the method of anvayavyatireka etcas mentioned
in U. 1 .18.96, 176, 178, 179, 180, 189. 8ahkara states in B.S.Sj.
4.1.2. p.829, line If, p.830, line 5f. , and in U. 1.18.188, 189.,
that direct knowledge can be gained through hearing the Vedanta
texts.
241. B.S.g. 1.4.1. p.295, line 10; 3.2.24. p.657, line 15. Mu.6. 3.1.
p.164, line 24f; 3.2. p.166, line 3f.
242. B.S.d. 2.1.3. p.354, line 10.
243. B.S.g. 2.1.3. p.353, line 7f. B ¥ h.3. 1.4.7. p.663, line 7f. Ma.S.
3.39. p.224, line 24.
244. B.S.g. 2.3.39. p.545, line 10. G.£. 2.39. p.27, line 16. In the
Gitabha s ya ( ibid ., p.27, line 16.), Sankara states that both the
performance of action ( karmayoga ) and the practice of samadhi
( samadhiyoga ) are yoga . Here, Sankara places the practice of
meditation on the same level as karmayoga , i.e. as secondary means
to knowledge.
114
245. B.S.g. 2,1.9. p.365, line 5f.
246. B.S,6. 4.1.2. p.830, line 5f. U. 1.18.174, 188, 199.
247. B.S.g. 4.1.1. p.826, line 7f; 4.1.2. p.829, line 16f.
248. Ramasastri, op-cit ., p.122, line 28f. Venkatararaiah, op-cit ., p.313f.
249. Ramasastri, op-cit .. p,123, line 4.
250. ibid ., p.125, line If.
251. ibid., p.125, line 21f.
252. B.S. ( Bhamati ) 3.4.26. p.801, line 26f.
253. ibid ., 1.1,1, p.31, line 25 (na ca-esa sak g atkaro ...).
254. ibid . . 1.1.1, p,32, line 6f. 1.1.4. p.70, line 21f,
255. See comment to 1.27.
256. R. Balasubramanian, Advaita Vedanta , Madras. 1976. p.218.
257. T.S. 3.4.
258. B.S. ( Bhamati ) 2.3.39. p.545, line 28f.
259. T.M.P. Mahadevan (ed, and trans.), The Sarobandha-Yartika of
Suresvaracarya . Madras. 1972. p.148, verse 294.
260. U. 3.3. p.251f.
261. ibid., 1.18.9-18., is the objection. The reply is from verse 19f.
262. Grokhale, op-cit . . p.96, line 14f,
263. This verse could not be located.
264. This verse could not be located under the given reference. However
it occurs in the Brh., cf., Brh. 4.4.12.
265. See text 1.13., and comment.
266. The Mu. text is: brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati (Mu. 3.2.9.).
267. A number of mnemonics have been cited in the text with reference to
Sankara's dates. The first is kha (space) = 0, indu (moon) = 1,
haya (horse) = 7 on account of the seven horses of the sun. The
second mnemonic is pak ga (half) = a symbolical expression for the
number 2, veda (the Veda) = 4, r§i. (sage) = 7 which is given as a
traditional number. The third mnemonic is sasin (moon) =.1, agni
(fire) = 3 because of the three types of sacrificial fire, rasa
(taste) = 6 on account of the six types of tastes, yugma (pair) =
2. The fourth mnemonic contains symbols previously mentioned.
115
2 #1 •
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-2.1 . Then after three hundred years plus an additional seven,
Ramanujacarya appeared in the era measured as 1049 [112T of the Christian
era]. Not tolerating the teaching of maya , his activity was towards the
refutation of the teaching of maya. This was made evident, because having
delineated in various places the view of the exponents of maya in works
such as the ^rTbha sya which he composed, he certainly showed his
displeasure there. However the learned should clearly determine to what
extent his effort was successful.
Raraanujacarya was born in the village of Bhutapuri in the region
known as Tricanapalli, of Kantimati and the Dravida brahman a whose
respected name was Kesavabhatta and who was born in the lineage of
2
Harita. 1 The tradition about him is that he was an incarnation of £esa.
The tree of Visistadvaita teaching was made into an immediate
cause through the initial effort produced by the Vr tti [i.e. commentary]
of Baudhayana. It sprouted into the commentary written by Dramidacarya
and the vartika composed by Tankacarya. It blossomed into books such as
116
Siddhitraya prepared by Yamunacarya etc. and it bore fruit through
the Vedarthasangraha etc. written by Ramanuja,
In the Yedarthasangraha the meaning of the sacred texts has been
ascertained by Ramanujacarya according to Visistadvaita, Even so,
thinking that the view of the people would be: "this teaching of
Visistadvaita is not in agreement with the author of the Brahmasutra " ,
for the refutation of that [view] he composed the treatise ^ribha s ya
which took the form of an explanation of the Brahmasutra . In that
[treatise] the Brahmasutras were explained according to the teaching of
Visistadvaita. It is well known that Ramanuja composed other works also,
beginning with Vedantasara , VedantadTpa , a commentary upon the Gita,
Nityaradhanavidhi and ^rlgadya ,
2 . 2 .
2 . 2 .
2.3.
2 i3 .
wW'TRyrym rwrerlmmw i
^ffkmrrn ^ n
^rlmat Ramanujacarya, the exponent of Visistadvaita,
brought about a union of the three systems [Upanisads,
Bhagavadglta and Brahmasutra ] without having recourse
to maya . 3.
spr
Wmh. '|pijqTO7rHT8W: i
arJsypff KRTaiPmr Rn^s^mr
to* ii» ii
Now, the teaching of Ramanuja is shown for easy understanding.
In the sacred text, the statements pertaining to
freedom from qualities are always meant for
117
discarding qualities that must be given up. The
expressions relating to the possession of
qualities have a clear meaning, because they
communicate that Brahman possesses auspicious
qualities. The sacred texts dealing with non¬
duality refer to what is qualified.' An
expression of difference has its basis in a
determined form. The view here belonging to
Ramanuja has been placed upon the entire
sacred texts. 4.
comment
Ramanuja, like Sankara, considers that the role of the Vedie
scripture is to reveal truths which cannot be known either through
perception or perceptually based means of knowledge such as inference.^
In his commentary upon Brahmasutra 1.1 .3., Ramanuja argues against the
followers of Nyaya who maintain that the existence of God can be
demonstrated through inference based upon consideration of the world
as an effect. 4 In contrast to this, Ramanuja asserts that both the
existence and nature of God are knowable only through scriptural
5
testimony. Reason cannot, of itself, generate conclusive proof in the
domain of metaphysics^ and its legitimate function is supportive: to
assist in elucidating scriptural purport and to demonstrate that the
ascertained purport is alone logically possible.
Ramanuja recognizes two basic categories of Upani^ad texts: those
which teach a distinction between the individual soul and Brahman and
T
passages which teach their unity. This contradiction strikes at the
root of the validity of the Veda as a means of knowledge and
consequently the mutual concord ( samanvaya ) of all the Upani^ad texts
is a matter of fundamental importance. Ramanuja states that; "when there
is contradiction between two equally valid texts, their scope must be
discerned through non-contradiction."® Ramanuja rejects Sankara's
method of interpretation,^ for he considers it ridiculous that the
sacred texts should firstly teach that all plurality is connected to
Brahman and then subsequently negate its own teaching Ramanuja
attempts to bring about the mutual concord of all the Upani§ad texts
by interpreting them in accordance with passages which denote a
qualified relation between the self and Brahman, analogous to the
118
relation between body and soul.
The body-soul relation ( sarlrasariribhava ) is the primary conceptual
model for Ramanuja's interpretation of the Upanijjads. He relies
particularly upon the section of the B rhadaranyaka known as the
Antaryamibrahman a;
He who dwelling in the earth is different from the
earth...whose body is the earth, who being within
controls the earth...He who dwelling in the self
is different from the self...whose body is the
11
self, who being within controls the self... .
Ramanuja maintains that Brahman is the Self of the whole universe
comprising all souls and matter and all sentient and insentient things
are-the modes.of Brahman and constitute His body. Ramanuja defines this
body-soul relation as:
...the relation between the substratum and the
dependent entity which is incapable of existing
separately., the relation of controller and
controlled and the relation of principal and
• 12
subsidiary.
With respect to this position, Ramanuja explains that there is no
contradiction between passages which teach that Brahman is free from
qualities ( nirgun a) and passages expressing possession of qualities
( sagun a). He considers that nirgun a statements mean only that Brahman
is free from qualities which must be given up ( heyagun a)^ ^ and, on the
basis of the analogy of body and soul, he argues that Brahman is untainted
by the defects of the souls and matter just as the soul is untouched by
the defects of the body .15 holds that sagun a passages should be
accepted just as they are.^ Texts indicating non—duality are to be
interpreted in a qualified sense because the individual souls and matter,
which constitute the body of Brahman, possess the relationship of
qualifying attributes ( visc sana) to a substantive ( visegya )Just as
attributes inhere in their substantive and are incapable of being
established independently of it, in the same manner, the souls and matter
exist in Brahman as attributes to a substantive and they have no separate
existence from Brahman. Passages signifying duality can be explained on
the basis of the inherent distinction between body and soul. The souls
18
and matter, as the body of Brahman, are essentially other than Brahman.
When Ramanuja's opponent ( purvapak s in ) inquires whether Ramanuja
holds the position of a dualist, non-dualist, or accepts both duality and
non-duality simultaneously, he replies that all these views are valid
119
since they can all be found in the Veda.^ Ramanuja then proceeds to
bring them into mutual concord by showing their correspondence to a
particular feature of the body-soul model. Non-difference is established
because Brahman alone exists, having everything as His body. Difference
is established since the Lord, souls and matter are mutually distinct
in essence and in attributes. Difference and non-difference is also
established because Brahman, though one, exists as many in so far as
He has all things as His attributes.
Thus we can see that Ramanuja seeks to explain all the Upanigad
texts on the basis of the analogy of body and soul, This analogy
provides the fundamental model for the Visi§|advaita conception of
the relationship between the Lord, souls and matter: Brahman alone
exists (advaita), but Brahman is qualified ( visi g tasya ) by all sentient
and insentient things which are dependent upon Brahman and exist in an
20 _ _
attributive relation to Brahman, According to Ramanuja:
In explaining identity through the relation of
self and body, all the sacred texts are properly
demonstrated... .
2.4.
'{pT^rf f ° 3 l vs j
3 ) ^ r ft^tRtSRTJo q ^TRRW-0 ’ ( f o \ |
V l RR) m3 RtR RtfW. f^Pti * ( I l )
n’ (%* \ i) # i * ^ 4toT-
m i ?rrr
(5° VWV \ I 3 i ^ )
(sr® # I » l r\ )
^ m ( jfto ? » | R )
| H f| PTR PR^ I *T 3T PPffa
l 5 %wtrt jp&ftrjR: l piw ^ l
2.4.
An object which is established by a means of knowledge is called
120
by the word "real”. That reality is threefold, due to the distinction
of the inert, the individual souls and the Lord. The inert is well known
to be the entire world composed of the five elements and consisting of
the physical body etc. That is indeed the means for experience. Vith
regard to that [physical body etc.], the individual self is completely
distinct in essence and in attributes and is the inner controller of
that [body etc,]. That [individual self] is of three kinds: bound, freed
and eternal [i.e. eternally freed]. The Lord is the inner controller of
even the individual soul. This [Lord] is completely distinct with regard
to the individual soul due to being free from all qualities which must
be abandoned and on account of being absolutely auspicious. The Lord
pervades the categories i.e. the individual souls and the inert things
in all their conditions. Having become the inner controller of the inert
objects and the individual souls, He is their ruler. Accordingly, there
are the sacred texts; "He who dwelling in the earth is other than the
earth,..who being within controls the earth" (Brh.3.7.3.), "He who
dwelling in the self is other than the self...who being within controls
the self" (Brh,3.7.22.) , "Narayana exists, having pervaded all that is
within and without" (M.Na.13.5.), "The Lord of matter and of the souls,
the Lord of the qualities" (^v,6.16.).
It should not be thought that this distinction between the
individual soul and the Lord is brought about by a limiting adjunct,
[reason] Because even in the state of liberation, the individual soul,
who is free from the limiting adjunct consisting of all ignorance, is
taught as being different with regard to the Lord in the sacred texts;
"Then the one who knows, having shaken off good and evil and being
without taint, attains the highest similarity" (Mu.3.1.3.), in the
[Brahma ] sutras ; "And on account of the designation that it is to be
approached by the released" (B.S,1,3.2.) and in the Gita ; "Having
121
resorted to this knowledge, they reach an equality of attributes with
me" (G.14.2.). [Comment upon words in the preceding quotations]: there
is certainly no "similarity" ( samyam ) of oneself with oneself. Nor can
oneself "be approached" ( upasrpya ) by oneself. " Muktopasrpya " means that
it is to be approached by the liberated. ¥hich is to say that it is to
be gained by the liberated.
2.5.
#: to#ti
2.5. Again, according to another mode, reality is twofold: substance
and quality. The nature of a substance is being a material cause, or
being the locus of qualities, or existing in another place with respect
to its locus, or being the locus of the states of contraction and
expansion. Substance is sixfold: the Lord, the individual soul, the
"eternal manifestation", Knowledge, matter and time.
comment
With regard to the definition of substance ( dravya ), the statement
"existing in another place with respect to its locus" means that a
substance, unlike a quality, is able to be separated from its locus.
For example, a book is a substance since it can exist separately from
its locus such as a table. However the colour of the book cannot be
separated from the book and hence it is a quality (guna).
The expression "according to another mode" refers to the exposition
of Visistadvaita as presented in the TatTndramatadTpika .^ Abhyankar
follows this text closely in his description of the Visistadvaita
system. The fundamental schema of Visistadvaita, as delineated in the
YatTndramatadTpika . is as follows:
122
Everything can be divided, firstly, into a twofold
category: means of knowledge and object of knowledge.
means of knowledge ( praman a) object of knowledge ( prameya )
1.perception.
2.inference. {“
3.scripture.
substance ( dravya ) non-substance ( adravya )
sattva , rajas . tamas ,
* ““ sound, touch, colour, taste,
smell, conjunction and
potentiality.
inert (jada) non-inert ( ajad a)
1. matter. _ L _
2. time. j
external ( parak )
1 . nityavibhuti ;
2. attributive-
consciousness ,
internal ( pratyak )
1 .the soul. Three classes: bound, freed
and eternally free.
2.the Lord.. There are five manifestations:
Para, Vyuha, Vibhava, Antaryamin and
Area.
Abhyankar now proceeds to explain each of the six substances.
2 ‘ 6, f*rr. qwrffl l
| qft TOT
I I <TT
[j mtfam I I
^ viwire:, m I ,
°fT l ^ ^qpTR-
I *r:
3T I fW |iHW%TfWT^ I ^*F$-
3 ^frf^rat: I | j
<j ; TO snftref %m*u m: l m 1
123
^ m 'i%RRtsN x&m i w-
^r wr=[ww mra# l ^rm^Ff ^
*RRi
2.6. The Lord is the supreme Self, who can be denoted by the word
Brahman. He is the supporter of all and the agent of all. The group of
four substances: the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation",
matter and time are the Lord's body. Moreover the group of three: the
[Lord's] essential nature, Knowledge and body are certainly invariably
concomitant with the Lord,
The Lord exists in a fivefold way, due to the distinction of
Para, Vyuha, Vibhava, Antaryamin and Arcavatara, In regard to that
[fivefold distinction], the Para dwells in Vaikuntha enjoying along with
k>rl and accompanied by the eternally [liberated] souls such as Ananta
and Garuda. This [Para] is indeed what is to be gained by the liberated.
The Para himself, abiding for the purpose of worship in a fourfold
manner due to the distinction of Vasudeva, Sankarsana, Pradyumna and
Aniruddha, is called the Vyuha. The activity of that [Vyuha] is indeed
creating the world, assistance to the worshipper and protecting the
transmigrating soul.
In regard to that [Vyuha], Vasudeva is replete with the six
qualities. The six qualities are; Knowledge, potency, strength, lordship,
valour and splendour. Vhat is called Knowledge is a particular quality
which is self-effulgent and which illuminates all objects at all times.
Potency is the state of being the material cause of the world, or the
capacity for accomplishing the unaccomplished. Strength is the absence
of fatigue arising out of being the cause of the world, or it is the
capacity to support all things. Lordship is independent agentship, or
the capacity to control all souls and inert things. Valour is the
124
absence of a change in essential nature, even though being the material
cause of the world. Splendour is the absence of dependence upon an
assistant, or it is the capacity to subdue another. Among Sankarsana,
Pradyumna and Aniruddha, there is an abundance of Knowledge and strength
in Sankarsana. There is an abundance of lordship and valour in Pradyumna
and there is [abundance] of potency and splendour in Aniruddha.
The Vibhava are the [ten incarnations] such as the fish and the
tortoise. The Antaryamin abides in the region of the heart of every
living being and can be contemplated in their own hearts by Yogis. This
[Antaryamin], though existing with the individual soul, is not tainted
by the defects belonging to the soul. The Arcavatara accepts for its
body an object such as an image fashioned by a devotee, it is a
particular image existing in temples etc., enduring all and depending
upon the worshipper for baths etc. Among the four commencing with the
Vyuha, only the Para exists with the possession of his potency at one
place and the possession of his essential nature elsewhere. This
"possession" is the existing in completeness at one place and as a part
elsewhere,
comment
Visistadvaita teaching incorporates aspects of the Pancaratra
23
tradition. In the body of texts known by that name, the Lord is
described as manifesting in a fivefold way; (l) as the Supreme (Para)
possessing a divine form and dwelling with ^rl, his sakti ; (2) as his
four emanations (Vyuha) i.e. Vasudeva, Sankarsana, Pradyumna and
Aniruddha; (3) in the form of incarnations (Vibhava); (4) as the soul's
inner controller (Antaryamin) and (5) as incarnate in images used for
worship (Arcavatara)
A distinctive feature of the Pancaratra system is its conception
of a progressive emanation of the Para in the form of the Vyuha, The
Vyuha is none other than the Para and possesses the same six qualities,
though Sankarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha each highlight two of those
25
six qualities. The Para is called Vasudeva at the time he is about
to commence the creation of a new cosmic cycle. Sankarsana originates
from Vasudeva and has the twofold function of revealing the scriptures
125
and the destruction of the world. Pradyumna is an emanation from
Sarikar^ana and possesses the dual function of revealing spiritual
practice and also creation. Aniruddha proceeds from Pradyumna and has
the two functions of bringing about the result of spiritual practice
26
and the sustaining of the universe.
The orthodoxy of the Pancaratra system has been vigorously upheld
by Visistadvaita authors. 1 Ramanuja, however, makes only one reference
to the Pancaratra . in his commentary on Brahmasutra 2.2.39-42 where he
OQ
seeks to prove that its doctrines are not in conflict with the Veda.
Abhyankar 1 s explanation of each of the six qualities accords with
the traditional interpretations given in the Lak s mT Tantra and the
/ ^ 29
Visistadvaita text Tattvatraya .
2.7.
1 s&Sf: *wq tern
w: I
^refqrqTwn qw^Fwreqfci I w vmm
sq^*Rj i
2.7. The attributes which determine the essential nature of the
supreme Self are existence, Knowledge, bliss, purity etc. These persist
in all meditations. That means these attributes form the object of
devotional meditation in all the meditations, Vhen the essential nature
is determined by the attributes mentioned, attributes such as Knowledge,
strength etc, are the distinguishing features of that [essential nature].
Attributes such as excellence of disposition etc, are extensions of the
attributes such as Knowledge etc. Attributes such as omniscience,
omnipotence etc. are useful for the creation of the world. Affection,
excellence of disposition, easiness of attainment etc, are useful for
providing refuge [to devotees], Worshippers resort to the supreme Self
only having perceived [the qualities of] affection etc. Attributes such
as compassion are useful for protecting the devotee.
126
' comment
Visistadvaitins make a twofold distinction with regard to the
Lord's attributes. Firstly, the attributes which constitute the essential
nature (svarupa ) of the Lord and secondly, all other attributes
characterizing the nature ( svabhava ) of the Lord.^
In ^rlbhasya 3.3.13., Ramanuja delineates two categories of
attributes. The essential nature of Brahman - is derived from the (Jpanisad
texts: "Brahman is real, Knowledge and limitless" (Tai.2.1.) and
"Brahman is bliss" (Tai.3.6.). Ramanuja considers that these statements
reveal the essence of Brahman's nature. In addition to these, Ramanuja
specifies the additional attribute of purity ( amalatva ) and thus five
attributes constitute the essential nature.
According to Ramanuja, the distinction between the two categories
is made on the basis that the attributes which make up the essential
nature are inherently connected with the very idea of Brahman. Vhereas
the other attributes are not necessarily inherent to the conception of
32
Brahman. For this reason, the essential attributes are included in
all meditations. The other attributes, though in no sense separate from
Brahman, are only emphasized through certain functions and relations
such as omniscience with regard to the creation of the world and
compassion etc. in relation to the devotee.
’STNtrPT I ^ fMV'Ti
%'l ^ I * wrrcfa: I
i ^ vrfi #it R^ri: I
2.8. The individual soul is different in each body, the size of an
atom, self-effulgent and eternal. Its agentship is dependent upon the
Lord. That [soul] is of three types, due to the distinction of the
bound, liberated and eternally [freed]. The transmigratory souls,
beginning from the god Brahma down to a clump of grass, are bound. The
souls which have relinquished their subtle bodies and dwell in Vaikuntha
due to their worship of the supreme Self are liberated. Their
experience of Brahman is indeed endless, it has no final limit.
127
The group of eight qualities which have disappeared in the bound state
become manifest in the liberated state. The group of eight qualities
are the non-material sound, touch, form, taste, smell, potency,
Knowledge and bliss. The eternally [liberated] souls are Ananta, Garuda,
Visvaksena etc.
comment
In the following verse, Xamunacarya presents six defining
characteristics of the individual soul:
The self is different from the body, sense organs,
mind, vital breath and intellect. It does not
require another means [for its manifestation]. It
is eternal, all pervasive, different in each
body and blissful by nature.^3
(1 ) The author of the YatihdramatadTpika seeks to demonstrate the
essential distinction of the self from the body etc through the
discrimination of subject and object, similar to the method employed
by the Advaitin. He considers that the body cannot be the self because
the statement such as "my body" reveals a relationship of possessor
and possessed. In a similar manner, the statement "I see with the eye"
indicates difference between the subject and object since there is a
knower, known relation between the self and the attribute of seeing.
Similarly, the cognition "I know by the mind" denotes a distinction
between the self and its instrument of knowledge. So too, the
expression "my vital breath" reveals a relation of subject and object
through the inherent difference of possessor and possessed. Even the
statement "I know" distinguishes the self from its attribute,
awareness.
(2) Not requiring another means for its manifestation means that
the soul is by nature self-effulgent, for consciousness is its intrinsic
attribute.The soul is inherently a knowing subject possessing
35
agentship. However, as Abhyankar points out, the souls agentship is
dependent upon the Lord. This means that the soul exercises free will
over all actions only because the Lord, who is the inner-controller,
permits freedom of action to the soul.
(3) The soul is eternal, for the scriptures reveal that it is
q rj
without birth ( aja ) and constant ( nitya ). '
(4) The soul is all pervasive by means of its attributive
consciousness ( dharmabhuta.jnana ). However, in essence the soul is the
size of an atom (anu) and it enters into the body of a god, human
39
being or animal on account of its connection with beginningless karma .
128
(5) Though all souls share the same nature, 4 ^ they are different
in each body. 44 Their uniqueness, however, is so subtle that it cannot
42
be expressed and can only be known by the soul itself.
(6) The soul is by nature blissful^ and pure. 44 The sorrows of
transmigratory existence are brought about due to the soul's connection
with karma, 4 ^
In addition, Ramanuja specifies another important characteristic
of the soul i.e, its utter dependence upon the Lord who is the Self of
the soul, its inner controller and sustainer. 4 ^
2,9# ' wiTOsfr I ^ ^
i Tir^fr * font I
qrKRRf gr&Rf ^ l
2.9. What is known as the "eternal manifestation" ( nityavibhuti ) is
a particular location which is self-effulgent and composed of pure
sattva . This pure sattva is of the nature of a substance, it is distinct
from the quality sattva and is the locus of the quality sattva . This
particular location means it is limited in the lower regions but it is
without limitation in the higher regions. This is the place of
enjoyment for the supreme Self, the liberated and the eternally
[liberated] souls,
comment
The "eternal manifestation" ( nityavibhuti ) is considered to be a
special substance (see comment to 2.5.) which is by nature self-effulgent
( svayamprakasa ). Its effulgence, like that of consciousness, is only
for the sake of someone else i.e. the Lord and the souls. 4 ^ Nityavibhuti
is composed of pure sattva ( suddhasattva ) which means sattva free from
any contact with rajas or tamas and hence it is bereft of any
48
imperfection.
The Lord utilizes this substance nityavibhuti in order to provide
a location, objects and means of enjoyment for Himself, the liberated
and the eternally liberated souls. 4 ^ His divine form, the bodies of the
two classes of liberated souls and the celestial abodes such as Vaikuptha
are all made from nityavibhuti .50
129
2 * 10 * HR |T^H ^ HRR Wmi f%I
^ I ^ hr jjomroft *Rfa l
m: 1 f%qtR i w fiwr
JRTHRWR HfqgupjHT ^ ^ l
hr ^hrihr^ I ^ %q<? HR3q i ?r .g jpr: 1
rhwU i ?pr 3 *jt
*q$q *ri*pfir afr«r: ^ w |
HH^*qTRW£T HR RR3 JTORR I *FP£T ^R 3 RR RT-
RR R J^RHE *RR I HW 3 ^ Wl'TO ftRRt R sffaRf
^RTR%Rq ^ 3 q^lfq MlR | H^Rf ^RRf RfRfr^T
*RR I qftRTRRRT 3 TORRfe%T *RTH HRRRRRf f
<R HR ftrRH I HR^R^ HR HRR ^FR-
fW^RRlRRqtRTRR: I #fiRR$H-
^HRRRR? 1 TT #HRR RTRIR^t 3 R£Rl I RRfjPfHRT-
RR HRR ^RRTf?WR rt?ri^r wt ^r:hritrr-
rrh =q mR% i wrat:—
btbwkr^ wow st*frr^ t
3R<4 ^ 3°R ^ 11 1
2*10. Knowledge means awareness. That means it illumines the object.
That [Knowledge] always possesses an object, it is self-effulgent and
all pervasive. This [Knowledge], while remaining a substance, also has
the nature of a quality. Because its operation is necessarily as one
or the other for the individual soul and the Lord. For example the
effulgence of a light, though it is a substance, is a quality of the
light. It is like that.
However the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the
individual soul and the Lord is different from this. That is solely a
substance, not a quality. Because the individual soul and the Lord are
solely substances. In that regard, just as; "a light shines only for
itself, the effulgence is for itself and for another", so too, the
Knowledge which is the essential nature of the individual soul and the
Lord shines only for itself.
However the Knowledge which is a quality shines for itself and
for another. The Knowledge which is a quality is always fully manifest
130
for the Lord and the eternally [liberated] souls and is never concealed.
Whereas for the bound souls it is partially manifest. But following the
gain of liberation it becomes entirely manifest, like manhood in the
state of youth. That [attributive Knowledge] is certainly eternal. But
an expression such as: ''Knowledge has been produced, Knowledge has
vanished” can be justified by accepting that there is a state of
contraction and expansion for Knowledge. At the time of perception of
an object such as a pot, this Knowledge which is located in the
individual self does out by means of the sense organ and comes into
immediate contact with the object such as pot. Because this Knowledge,
even though a quality of the self, is accepted as a substance, the
motion elsewhere from its own locus and the possession of the activity of
going out etc. is not contradicted. That has been told by Yamunacarya :
Knowledge can be both a substance and a quality.
Because a mental modification exists elsewhere
51
than its locus and has conjunction with the locus.
comment
According to Visistadvaita, the meaning of the word "I” ( ahamartha )
directly denotes the self which is revealed by the first person in
statements such as "I know” etc. The self has awareness as its
nature ( cidrupa )-^ which means that it possesses self-effulgence
( svayamprakasata ).^ Ramanuja, following Yamuna, defines self-effulgence
as: "illuminating solely through its own existence for its own locus".55
This means that the self is manifest to itself through its own being
independent of any factor.5^ Though the self intrinsically possesses
consciousness it is not mere consciousness as the Advaitins maintain.
For Visistadvaitins, the self is an eternal, self-effulgent, knowing
subject,
While the self is always manifest to itself as "I", it is only
revealed in relation to objects through the presence of its attributive
consciousness ( dharmabhutajnana ). This is an intrinsic attribute of the
self who is its witness. Ramanuja and Yamuna define consciousness as
"the manifesting of an object through its own existence for its own
This statement differs from the above definition regarding
locus”
131
the self-effulgent nature of the self because in the latter the self
only illumines itself for itself. Attributive consciousness, however,
manifests the object to the self.
The attributive consciousness is by nature all pervasive when it
is unobstructed by the effects of karma . In the case of the Lord, the
liberated and the eternally liberated souls.it is all pervasive, whereas
for the bound souls it is in a contracted state. All mental states:
happiness, sadness, memory etc. are particular modes of attributive
consciousness. According to Visi^tadvaita, attributive consciousness
is both a quality and a substance. It is a quality because it
depends upon the self which is independently existent. Yet it is
also a substance because it can go beyond its substrate, ' Ramanuja
seeks to illustrate this through the example of a light and its quality
of effulgenceThe light's effulgence is dependent upon the substance
light, yet the effulgence is a substance in its own right because it
can leave its locus in illumining objects and since it possesses the
quality of colour. Analogous to this, Ramanuja considers that the
self, like the light, is self-effulgent and, just as the light manifests
objects through its effulgence, so too, the attributive consciousness
manifests objects to the self.
It may be useful to briefly contrast the fundamental distinction
between the Advaita and the Visi§tadvaita concept of self. In the view
of Advaita,^ the empirical self, denoted by the word "I", is composed
of two aspects; an objective portion ( yu s madartha ) containing any
predicative conception of "I" as "such and such". The remaining portion
is the pure subject ( anidamamsa ), awareness, which is the essential
Self. In Yisis^advaita, the conception of the self is just the reverse.
The inner self is the knower who is directly expressed by the word "I".
Awareness is external ( parak ) to the "I" and exists in an attributive
relation, qualifying the self. Visi§tadvaita does not admit the
Advaitins pure consciousness. The self is the empirical "I" who
possesses attributive consciousness as an intrinsic quality.
The Yisi§tadvaita conception of the self will be critically
examined in the following chapter.
2.11
R*mr% I
132
^ l i ^ a i fcre; tt^h
I 3 F#* ^I^lf^qHri^T-
r: iTPrni#ire^n^T-
m*
mt I smft
f^WlUS*ftP§W4| ^3[*N2f% %v^T^n^TIFT I *W“
^>r^rf^RR^^T j*rtfa5 ^m{ | X&i I
q 2 §r m * r : ^cfct I
NliiPi^lf
?f 1 *RJ
^TtF^RSJFFf I
mm$ #n<rete^r mm I
q%f^nftr mm l ^n^r
*r mmm mm \ snroi^ft qwr^fa 3R*r
ftf^trI 'rssHTPrf^rmf qtwFfa mm i ^%r
mmtft mtfk mmmm l -<Hmfuim^qr^Rwr-
mk ^f^rr^t mx l m\fo m
rnfa sp^i 5 R*rfo 1 q^w^rPr I
mmm ^#r sRrorriswft sk -
mrnrn mmmi jfwjtf * %m i
5TT^?^%n l^i^Fl^ i
2.11. The primary material possesses a group of three qualities in the
form of sattva , rajas and tamas . It is eternal and consists of twenty-
four principles. This [primary material] is designated by the word
" maya" because it brings about the manifold creation. So too, it is
designated by the word " avidya " since it obstructs knowledge and by the
word " akgara" because it is eternal. This is indeed the primary material
for the whole world.
The twenty-four principles are; prak r ti , mahat , ahankara , manas ,
the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action, the five
subtle elements and the five gross elements. In respect of the primary
material composed of the three qualities, the state of being on the
verge of becoming the effect because of the inequilibrium of the
qualities, which is dependent upon the will of the Lord, is expressed
by the word 11 avyakta " , The principle known as mahat is produced from
133
that avyakta « The principle mahat is a technical name for the genus
intellect. That [mahat] is threefold: possessed of sattva , rajas and
tamas . The ahankara is produced from the principle mahat . This
1~ahankara ] produces the false presumption that the body is the self
etc. This is also threefold, due to the distinction of possessing sattva ,
raj as and tamas . The eleven organs: the group of six organs of knowledge
and the group of five organs of action are produced from the ahankara
possessed of sattva assisted by the ahankara possesses of raj as .
The organs of knowledge are sixfold, due to the distinction of
mind, the sense of hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch. Among these
six, the mind is the internal organ. The five beginning with the sense
of hearing are external organs. In respect of that [i.e. the organs of
knowledge], the mind is the cause of volition, memory etc. and it is
the instrumental cause for the activity of the external senses among
the sense objects. This mind is indeed the cause of bondage when in the
state of attachment to sense objects like sound etc. But when it
becomes attached to the object in the form of the self, having
relinquished the [attachment to] external objects such as sound etc.,
then that very [mind] is the cause for liberation. The five organs
known as the sense of hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch apprehend
respectively sound, form, smell, taste and touch. The organ of touch
and the organ of sight are suitable even in apprehending substances. The
five great elements beginning with space are, respectively, the supporters
of the five sense organs known as the ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose.
The sense organs, having dependence on the body, are like jewels upon
an ornament.
The five organs of action are; the organ of speech, hands, feet,
anus and organ of generation. These respectively produce the effects
consisting of speaking, taking, walking, evacuation and pleasure.
The five great elements are known as: space, air, fire, water
134
and earth. These same elements, existing in a subtle state prior [to
the effect], are called by the word " tanmatra 11 : sound -tanmatra , touch-
tanmatra , form -tanmatra , taste -tanmatra and sme11-tanmatra, Like the
transformation of milk through an embryonic stage prior to the state
of being curd.
comment
The Visistadvaita description of prak r ti follows the model given
in the Sankhyakarika . They differ, however, in some respects:
according to Visistadvaita, prakrti is the locus of sattva , rajas and
69
tamas whereas in Sankhya they constitute the very substance itself.
In Visistadvaita, prakrti does not extend into the divine regions which
are composed of nityavibhuti , pure sattva . Also, for Visistadvaitins,
the evolution of prakr ti depends upon the will of the Lord whereas in
Sankhya it is an independent principle.
2 . 12 .
^ 1 i
tfrrh, I i I i
I 1 ¥fSr
ttrr %i% 5qg?qs$ i op-n i ^q-
%q^R I %q^ I
n^RRi^f^qsR fiit ffrqq; I q^ ^ srrN
q^{ l <rt qret
^q^rf lN*r SR^qfeqrfa ^ ^qfeqw* tfqsqr sK^qfeq-
wftt ^ I ^ *pi^TRf si^Rf q2?Rf
q^qRR^q^PRi ^ qq q 3 jfii
>?foFq^ 1 qq^^i^qRFiqfTO 1 * 3
%wmR!^^kiqW*TJ 1 qm^T^cfRf q^rqqtor
( 1 ° ?« ) qW l
2,12. There is more than one teaching about the origination of the
elements and the tanmatras . In regard to that, one [view] is that the
five tanmatras are produced from the ahankara possessed of tamas and
the five elements are produced from them [the tanmatras i.e# the subtle
135
elements] in due order. A second [view] is that the sound-tanmatra is
produced from the ahankara possessed of tamas . Space originates from
the sound -tanmatra . Touch -tanmatra is produced from space. Air
originates from touch -tanmatra . Form -tanmatra is produced from air.
Fire originates from form-tanmatra. Taste tanmatra is produced from
fire. Water originates from taste -tanmatra . Smell -tanmatra is produced
from water. Earth originates from smell -tanmatra . A third [view] is
that so un d -tanmatra is produced from the ahankara possessed of tamas .
Both space and touch -tanmatra are produced from sound -tanmatra .
Similarly, air and form -tanmatra are produced from touch -tanmatra . Fire
and taste -tanmatra are produced from form -tanmatra . Water and smell-
tanmatra are produced from taste -tanmatra . Earth is produced from
smell -tanmatra .
Among the five elements beginning with space, there is a
preponderance for each one successively of the five qualities beginning
with sound. So [the quality] sound is in space. Sound and touch are in
air. Sound, touch and form are in fire. Sound, touch, form and taste
are in water. Sound, touch, form, taste and smell are in earth. Here,
there is certainly a distinction of the five qualities beginning with
sound from the sound etc which are the essential nature of the five
tanmatras : sound-tanmatra, touch-tanmatra etc. It should not be
mistaken that there is no distinction because of identity in name.
What is known as the origination of the effects beginning with
mahat is only the cause changing into another state, not the
commencement of a new effect like it is for the Naiyayikas . The
procedure for the fivefold division and combination of the five great
elements should be understood as before (see 1.37. and comment).
2 ‘ 13 ' i s ^ i wit
yr-
I
136
^Tfrd^TT^cfim: | f^T*.
I ^bm qnwr I 3
ft^qm*qqR^qriq q^^wfR?qqq ^ qrcqfq 1 *
I qiftft q^n^ 1 3^ ^ rf^qr: s%r *$
^n% l
2.13. Time is a particular substance which is inert and all pervasive.
It is of two types: divided and undivided. The divided time consists
_ _ _ _ 70
of nime sa, kastha, kala , muhurta etc. and it is non—eternal, This
[divided time] is the cause of the designation "simultaneous”,
"quickly" etc. and it is the cause of the designation "past" etc. The
undivided time, however, is eternal. The Lord, in the supreme location,
the world of Vaikuntha, brings about the creation etc. while being
dependent upon time. Because the origination of the class of each
modification is certainly restricted to a particular time in the manner
that: "the appearance of flowers is only in the spring." The Lord
produces all effects only in accordance with the limitation of time
which He has willed. This alone is the independence of time here [in
respect of the creation]. Whereas in Vaikuntha, though time exists
there on account of being all pervasive, it is certainly dependent
upon the Lord's will and in no way has independence. For there is the
declaration: "time is certainly not the Lord there." For this reason,
the Lord at all times creates everything there [in Vaikuntha]
spontaneously.
2 ’ 14 ' q*?J j
for: sreq; 1^ j
1 qr^T ^ HTWTrq l
137
'2.14. Among these six substances that have been mentioned: the Lord,
the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation", Knowledge, primary
matter and time; the group of four beginning with the Lord are not
inert. The pair; primary matter and time, are inert. The pair; the Lord
and the individual soul, are said to be "internal". The pair; the
"eternal manifestation" and Knowledge, are said to be "external".
The nature of being internal means illumining for oneself. The nature
of being external means illumining only for another.
comment
This statement summarizes the preceding discussion of substance
( dravya ). The nature of "illumining for oneself" and "illumining only
for another" has been mentioned in the comment to 2.10., in respect
of the nature of the self and its attributive consciousness.
The author now explains the Visistadvaita category of non¬
substance ( adravya ).
2.15. I
j
l m \m %i% 1 rmx
13ft I sw %%
i v*m ^ I
3°n:
l mm I
3 ^ I wn-
I ^vffrrxnt tftt&wi
•2.15. The qualities are tenfold, due to the distinction of sattva .
raj as . tamas, sound, touch, colour, taste, smell, conjunction and
potentiality. The group of three qualities; sattva , rajas and tamas ,
are not perceptible to the senses and are to be inferred through their
respective effects. The quality sattva produces the illumination [of
objects], happiness, lightness etc. in its locus. That sattva is of
two types: pure and mixed. Pure fsattva ] is untouched by rajas and
138
iamas . It is located in two types of substance; it exists in the world
of Vaikup^ha and in the supreme Lord on account of His connection with
the world of Vaikuntha. Mixed fsattva ] is in contact with rajas and
tamas . This is also located in two types of substance; it is located
in the primary material which is composed of the three qualities and in
the individual soul on account of its connection with the primary
matter. The group of three qualities beginning with sattva which have
just been mentioned are certainly distinct from sattva etc. which
constitute the essence of the primary matter. The quality rajas produces
desire, greed and activity etc, in its locus. The quality tamas produces
delusion, carelessness and inactivity etc, in its locus. The two types
of qualities; rajas and tamas . exist in the primary matter and in the
individual soul on account of its connection with that [primary matter].
The quality sattva is in the form of correct knowledge , it is
the cause of happiness etc. and it bestows liberation. The quality rajas
is in the form of desire etc., it is the cause of attachment to action,
sorrow etc. and it bestows heaven etc. The quality tamas is in the form
71
of ignorance, it is the cause of laziness etc. and it bestows hell.
wzi I s ^ I mu \
I th: i s ^ l i
I tR RFRHWTM ^ l
2.16. Sound is able to be apprehended by the faculty of hearing and
it exists in the five elements. Touch can only be apprehended by the
sense of touch and it exists in earth, water, fire and air. Colour can
only be apprehended by the faculty of sight and it exists in earth,
139
water and fire. Taste can be apprehended by the sense of taste and it
exists in earth and water. Smell can be apprehended by the sense of
72
smell and it exists only in earth.
This group of eight; sattva , ra.jas and taroas and sound, touch
form, taste and smell is each twofold; as the material cause of the five
great elements and not as being their material cause. The first can be
expressed by the word "substance" and is included only among the
substances. In that regard, sattva , raj as and tamas are indeed the parts
of the primary material. Whereas the group of five commencing with sound
is a modification of the primary matter, it is included within the
twenty-four principles and can be expressed by the word " tanmatra " .
However the last is located in the five great elements and has been
told here as expressible by the word "quality".
comment
Abhyankar makes the additional specification that the eight
qualities beginning with sattva are not only the qualities of prakrti
but are also constitutive of the substance itself,
2.17. . _
mm: i m
tasf I t I
2.17. Conjunction is the cause of knowledge as conjoined [i.e. knowledge
that this or that are conjoined]. It is a universal quality existing in
the six substances. Its condition does not pervade [the whole substance]
and it is non-eternal. There is certainly conjunction even for all
pervasive [substances], because there is nothing which invalidates it. 7 ^
comment
Conjunction ( samyoga ) is a temporary connection between two
things which can exist separately. It does not pervade the whole
substance ( avyapyavrtti ) which means that the conjunction is only
between the parts which are in contact. For example a book can be in
conjunction with the table, but it is only in contact with a part
140
of the table. Nyaya—Vaise^ika does not accept conjunction, between all
, _ . 74
pervasive substances, whereas the Visistadvaitins accept it.
Conjunction is different from the other Nyaya-Vaisesika category
of relation called "inherence" ( samavaya ). In the former, the relation
is between two substances and is temporary ( anitya ) whereas samavaya
is an eternal relation ( nityasambandha which pervades the whole
entity, Samavaya exists in these five relations: the product and its
parts, a quality and its possessor, motion and the possessor of the
movement, the individual and its class character and particularity and
an eternal substance. Samavaya is eternal in the sense that it
cannot be produced or destroyed without the production or the destruction
of the whole entity.^®
2.18. Potentiality brings about the causality on the part of all
causes. Potentiality is also a universal quality existing in the six
substances. This [potentiality] is non-eternal and can be inferred
79
through its effect.
comment
Potentiality ( sakti ) is a principle which brings about causal
efficacy. The Mlmamsakas seek to prove its existence through postulation:
even though there is no defective nature in the cause, in the presence
of an obstructing factor it does not produce its effect and this can
80
only be explained by assuming that a potentiality exists in all causes.
' 2,1 9.
% I ft
I rTPI #TO^-
Rfrarwd i ^fq rr-
- 2.19. [objection] How are there only ten qualities? Because there
exists the quality known as Knowledge, which is located in the
141
substances in the form of the individual soul and the Lord, and which
is other than those [ten].
[reply] No, because this Knowledge has already been mentioned
in the enumeration of substances. Since that [Knowledge] is the locus
of the states of contraction and expansion, therefore its nature as a
substance has been very clearly demonstrated. There is the apprehension
as a quality because that [Knowledge], though existing as a substance,
is located in the individual soul and the Lord and because its nature
is always dependent upon another. In the same manner, the apprehension
as a quality should be understood [for light] since light, though it
is a substance being included within the substance fire, has a nature
which is always dependent upon another fire other than itself.
2 - 20 ' sfret remain 1
( f° 3 i V9 I ^ ) TO TOR 3 ! V3 I 3 )
I TO ^ TOWC *T TO ^ITOTW ! RT7TOTT-
ft
rttto mi tottotor 1 rtto
TOTOT I TO STOfit ^TO |
Jto ft mvk to totototow toto 1 ^ 5 <tto: totor-
to tor rtrr I to f^r: qTOTOTORRTO I rrrr
tort i rrrrrr^ \ §*tt: ^ 3
tom 1 rrrIrto ^rfni to^ tot TOft i
to g to 3 1
2.20. The group of four.* the individual soul, the "eternal manifestation",
primary matter and time are the body of the Lord. For there is the
sacred text, such as; "whose body is the self" (Brh. 3.7.22,), "whose
body is the earth" (Brh. 3.7.3.). The one who has a body is the self
of that body. Indeed the two words "self" and "body" signify the
possession of a relation like the words master and servant : the
self's body, the body's self. [The etymology of the word] self (atma)
is "it goes" ( atati ) in the sense that "it pervades" ( vyapnoti ). What
142
is pervaded by a thing is the body of that. Indeed the entire world,
together with the individual soul, is pervaded by the Lord in the form
of the inner controller. But there is no other thing which, having
become the inner controller, pervades that [Lord], Therefore the Lord
is called by the word "supreme Self", There is no such supremacy in
regard to the individual soul, for the Lord is the inner controller
of the individual soul. The Lord is solely the self and does not exist
as the body of anyone. Whereas the individual soul is the body of the
Lord and is the self of the inert matter. The inert matter, however,
is only a body and does not exist as the self of anyone.
comment
As mentioned, the body-soul analogy between the souls, matter and
the Lord forms the dominant model in Ramanuja's teaching. See comment
to 2.3. Also, cf. Ramanuja's defence of this model in ^rlbhasya 2.1.9.
■ 2.21
RKTS? rwfq H sqqflTT RR RR 1
rt?£RT l rwotcit q
TRWmfPT q q?-
^7^ | qqr q RTRRqfR qqitfiqrr&qidi-
qm i rrt q torhi-
? I $ O ) I m
qtf$q*q#T ^qq^q^q qqq^qqq RTqqTqqiqPfqf
RTRltiRT RT1 m ^ I flWlt ^ ( 5 [t> I
? I RR) ^qrfr i qqi
^q q qrRRR^wqqq i%
wsm m qqm qTRRqfq wm&n I m q
qqqq rasft I
2.21 . Even though there is a common designation observed in the world
on account of the identity of the body and the embodied, in the manner
that; "I am a man", "I am white", "I am fat" etc., nonetheless, that
designation is only figurative. Because the self, which has a close
connection to the body, is in reality different with regard to the body.
The body of the supreme Self, in the form of the individual
143
soul, belongs to the same class [as the Lord] on account of being
sentient and in the form of the inert material it belongs to a
different class on account of being insentient. So a difference is
established in the supreme Self because of what belongs to the same
class and because of what belongs to a different class. Accordingly,
there is the sacred text: "the one God rules over the perishable and
the self" (£v»1.10.). Here, because the inert matter and the individual
soul, which can be expressed by the words "perishable" and "self",
are taught as being controlled and because the supreme Self, who can
be expressed by the word "God", is taught as their controller, the
difference of the supreme Self from these two is very clear. The
author of the sutras has also told the difference between the individual
soul and the Lord: "But [Brahman] is additional, on account of the
declaration of difference" (B.S.2,1.22.) etc.
So too, the group of six qualities; Knowledge, potency, strength,
lordship, valour and splendour are not included within the essential
nature of the supreme Self but are located in the supreme Self, thus the
supreme Self is certainly different from that [group of six qualities]
also. So a difference is established in the supreme Self from what belongs
to itself. Accordingly, a threefold difference in the form of difference
belonging to one's own class, difference belonging to another class and
difference belonging to oneself is established in the supreme Self.
2.22, ^ % Rff (|o HI ^ I O # graff-
m # 1 %
wrrt \m ^ ht wmi
144
2.22. [objection] According to this manner [of explanation] the sacred
text; "He desired, 'let me be many, let me be born' " (Tai.2.6.1.) is
contradicted. Because there, the resolve of the supreme Self is seen;
I will become many. But it is not that having indicated something other
than Himself, that [other thing] would become many. Also, the absence
of difference of the world from the supreme Self is established by the
rule concerning the non-difference of cause and effect. But upon the
acceptance of the difference which has been mentioned, the contradiction
with this sacred text is clear.
[reply] True. The resolve for becoming many; "let me become
many" is certainly not directly, but by means of the body. Thus that
resolve refers to the manner of becoming many; for what abides in a
single form, having as its body the subtle sentient and insentient
things which are incapable of division into name and form, and [then]
having as its body the sentient and insentient things which have
become divided into name and form. Through accepting the purport of the
sacred text, thus there is no contradiction.
comment
According to Visistadvaita, Brahman is eternally qualified by
individual souls ( jTva ) and primary matter ( prakrti ) which have a
dependent existence upon Brahman as attributes to a substantive or as
a body to a self.
At the time of periodic cosmic dissolution ( pralaya ) the souls and
primary matter remain in a subtle, almost undifferentiated condition in
Brahman, Brahman exists in the state of being the cause ( karanavastha )
when He is qualified in this manner. At the time of creation, Brahman
does not transform Himself into the world nor does He undergo any
essential change. Brahman causes the ever existent primary matter to
evolve from its subtle condition into the physical world and He causes
the bound souls to assume appropriate bodies in accordance with their
karma . Brahman exists in the state of being the effect ( karyavastha )
81
when qualified by souls and matter in their manifest condition.
This view avoids the difficulty inherent in Brahman directly
becoming the material cause of the world. For if that were the case,
145
Brahman would be subject to change and the unwelcome consequence of
non-eternity. However the Upanisad text such as: “let me become many”
(Tai.2.6.1.) reveals that Brahman is both the efficient and the
material cause and the task for Ramanuja is to reconcile the
immutability of Brahman with the teaching that the efficient and the
material cause are not distinct. He seeks to do this through the
explanation that Brahman is the efficient cause when qualified by souls
and matter in their subtle condition and Brahman is also the material
cause when qualified by souls and matter in a manifest condition. Thus
one unchanging Brahman exists in two states, both as cause and as the
effect or material cause, depending upon whether He is qualified by
His attributes, souls and matter, in their subtle or gross state. This
teaching is summarized in the YatTndramatadTpika ;
The traditional teaching of the Visis^advaita Vedantins
is that Brahman is the cause [of the world] being
qualified by the sentient and insentient in their
subtle state and Brahman is the effect being qualified
by the sentient and insentient in their gross state.
Thus the effect is non-different from the cause,
2.23.
W sm pi i m ^ wl (^ i
's I' ?) # ^ fkwm I ffw! I?
hft m wtfl l
l srsfr-
i
VC * «\ w
nr ht m Hi%qr |
2,23. [objection] Difference is negated in the sacred text; "Vhen he
makes just the smallest difference in this, then there is fear for him"
(Tai.2.7.1.). Because the meaning of that is; he who thinks there is
even a slight difference in this Brahman, there is fear for him.
[reply] No. For there is ignorance of the meaning of the
sacred text. Because there, the word " antara " expresses an interval. The
meaning is: there is fear when there is an interval, a break, in the
worship of Brahman. This meaning has been ascertained due to the
1 46
augmenting by the saying of the great sage:
When Vasudeva is not contemplated upon for
a short time, or even for an instant, that
is a loss, that is a great defect, that is
error and that is an altered condition.
comment
Ramanuja interprets this Taittirlya text in this manner in &rl -
bhasya 1 .1 .1 . Para.51 .p.99.
2.24,
Wll^( $ I ^ n ) I
f%RrT-
ttor I rW^rttot toI-
wt mvn w>w<m
W I ^ WSFRRRrfi TO HN-
TO I
2.24, Non-duality cannot be established even by the sacred text:
"one alone, without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.). Because there, an efficient
cause of the world other than Brahman is negated by the word "one". The
state of multiplicity which belongs to the effect could be imagined in
Brahman, the cause, in accordance with the effect. The word "alone"
is for the removal of that [wrong supposition], A material cause of
the world other than Brahman is negated by this: "without a second",
comment
In ^ribhasya 1 .1 .1 . Para.49.p.91 ., 1.1.2. Para.86.p.1 97., and in
Tedarthasangraha Para,16,p.80., Para.33.p.90,, Ramanuja interprets "one
alone" as referring to the material cause and "without a second" as
denoting the absence of another efficient cause.
2 - 25 ' % tor fro (|o * m? I ??■)' i
3 TOt flfan tofr l
W t c- KI RRTO I W* ft ^ I #
147
WR ( fo V I « |
^n: l
2.25. This is the meaning of the sacred text: "there is no diversity
whatsoever here" (Brh.4.4,19.)* There is no such thing whatsoever
which is different from Brahman, for which Brahman is not the cause
and also the inner controller. But the negation of the world, which
is the effect of Brahman, is not taught because causality in respect
of the world has been taught in the sacred text itself. Also, the
sacred texts: "where there is duality, as it were..." (B^h.2.4.1 4.),
"He who sees diversity, as it were, here..." (Brh.4.4,19.) etc. are to
be construed in just the same manner.
comment
Ramanuja maintains that throughout all the sacred texts; "no
word is seen anywhere expressing a negation of the fact that Brahman
possesses distinction". Accordingly, he interprets Brh.4.4.19. as
84
denying any diversity which does not have Brahman as its Self.
2 26 a
WSfPT VWm RHROTrm, qOTRtqHtmf
sr mkwt ^ I itwr m ( to )
# trhrrhi Rk; qfiqr%n i m ft i ssft fossft qr-
OTHH: Hid'd
I*TT H 3 Rq-
RT^Rt 3WTHRT
fterfi I I
HHl dT ^TTH iJHTR STRR (to 3 I?|? )
Ridded | HdT ^
r\ f\ y
I cfHHFTHRdrH-
i m ^ srirnTsft
3 r % ddfd, qq q sfTdHr
qpftq ^tr( i ^ h hthithh: qfd^rqR rksr \
■2.26. Because this supreme Self is the locus of the causality in
148
respect of the world and of the attributes such as omniscience which
are applicable for causality, therefore, He certainly possesses
distinction. Distinctions such as "reality" have been taught even in
the sacred texts "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1 ,).
To explain. In the sentence "real, Knowledge...", the words beginning
with "real" are seen to have grammatical apposition, just as here;
"Devadatta has an umbrella, ear-rings and clothes". Grammatical
apposition is the use of words, which have different reasons for their
employment, in respect of one and the same object. So Brahman is
established as possessing distinction because attributes such as reality,
which are the reason for the use of the words "real" etc., are not able
to be denied as belonging to Brahman. This is correct.
Brahman being the cause of the world is established without any
contention in sacred texts such as; "from which these beings are born"
(Tai.3.1 ,1 .) , Accordingly, a special capacity applicable for producing
the effect in the form of the world must necessarily be acknowledged
there [in the cause. Brahman]. Because in the world, a potter and a
weaver etc. who produce the effects such as pots and cloth are seen to
possess the special capacity applicable for the production of the
respective effects. So Brahman too is inferred to have a special
capacity through which He is the material cause of the creation by
means of a body in the form of the subtle sentient and insentient
things. And through which [special capacity] He creates for people in
the state of dream, for a mere instant, objects such as elephants
which can be experienced only by the respective person and which last
for a particular time. Thus the supreme Self has been established as
possessing distinction.
comment
Ramanuja cites the following definition of grammatical apposition
( samanadhikaranya ), it is: "the application of words, having different
85
reasons for their use, to one and the same object". For example in
149
the sentence: "Devadatta ( Devadatta h) has an umbrella ( chatri ), ear¬
rings (kun dalx ) and clothes ( vasasvi )" , Devadatta is the one
substantive qualified by three words employed adjectivally, each
denoting a particular distinguishing attribute which is the reason
for its usage ( pravrttiniroitta ). According to Ramanuja, the function
of words placed in grammatical apposition is to show that an
independent substantive exists in a qualified manner, possessing the
distinguishing features expressed by the other words which share the
same case relation as the substantive and hence qualify it adjectivally
Ramanuja interprets the sentence; "Brahman is real, Knowledge,
limitless" (Tai.2*1.1.) in the same manner as the sentence referring
to Devadatta is to be understood i.e. Brahman is the independent
substantive who possesses the attributes of reality, Knowledge and
limitlessness. According to Visistadvaita, Brahman must possess the
above attributes since they are the reason for the usage of the words
"real" etc.
Ramanuja considers that the sentence: "Brahman is real, Knowledge,
limitless" constitutes a definition of Brahman and so serves to
distinguish Brahman from all other thingsThe word "real" signifies
that Brahman possesses unconditioned existence and this distinguishes
Brahman from change, inert matter and the souls which are connected
with matter. The word "Knowledge" denotes that Brahman has the nature
of uncontracted awareness. This distinguishes Brahman from the
liberated souls whose attributive consciousness ( dharmabhutajnana ) is
sometimes in a contracted state. The word "limitless" communicates
that Brahman is free from any limitation: relating to space, time, or
, . , 88
objects,
The Advaita interpretation of this passage, together with a more
detailed discussion of grammatical apposition, will be presented in the
following chapter.
As Abhyankar mentions, according to Visistadvaita the Lord is the
creator of dream events:
in dream, the Lord creates, in accord with the merit
or demerit of living beings, objects of a special nature
which can be experienced only by the respective person
and which last for a certain time.89
86
2.27. h ^ ^ * 3 I §ct-
150
3 i 5), ^rto srt
\ tr f| I strrtr-
shto *ref it?n,wwi-
TO'*R: ^rgoicq mt- <RqR j 3Rf ^ q^R^cflRTO TR
WcTRc?* I W || ^
f^rilvidr^J RRR I ^f
i ^uqr^ql gqng *rafq qr-
*fTRR ^ ^Tfq <RTft % RWRPT<RTT*f rfpRT-
R3q&% I f% 5 % yfrtzm *r <r m$m: I itr^rI^^-
g<qq|mq ^ i fq; § sr^mT
to fqro q^nq wqt^qfwrwq £rt ^vt
smre qwqiR-rm: j mraTOi^’TT w^rrt rrr ^ R?
f^ROTraj: i %qRRTfq¥r q#Ri: I qsfq ^t^rrrtcrrrI
Rq^rRi: I wngqRRRf ^ %sfq g<ni frr%TRRRft
A 5°IT ^RR^T TRR Rqf^nRRI STIR sRT TR^TR I
2.27. That supreme Self certainly possesses qualities, He is not
free from qualities. Because causality in respect of the world is all
the more impossible in that which is free from qualities. Some
qualities are connected with the cognition of the essential nature.
For instance bliss, existence, etc. which are taught in sacred texts
such as: "Brahman is bliss" (Tai.3.6.), "Brahman is existence,
Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.). Because these [qualities] are
applicable in the very ascertainment of the essential nature of
Brahman. For what is indeed being distinguished by qualities such as
bliss etc. is Brahman, and therefore those [qualities] are included in
the essential nature of Brahman. For this reason, these are recognised
at the very time of the cognition of the essential nature of the
object [i.e. Brahman], Just as in the world when some person is seen,
at that very time the qualities of being small, being tall etc. are
recognised as belonging to that person. Because these are included in
the essential nature, they persist in all meditations.
Whereas qualities such as compassion, even though they never
deviate from the supreme Self, still because they are not included in
151
the essential nature they do not persist in all meditations. However
they are certainly to be conceived where they are mentioned, Even the
group of six qualities; Knowledge, potency, strength, lordship, valour
and splendour are, just like compassion etc,, not included in the
essential nature of Brahman. However they are eternally connected to
Brahman. At no time does Brahman remain without connection to those
[qualities] and they do not remain even an instant without connection
to Brahman.
Whereas qualities belonging to Brahman such as joy being the
head^ are not eternally connected to Brahman but are imagined in a
particular meditation. Those too are to be conceived in that very
meditation where they are mentioned. Where no particular qualities are
specified in a meditation, the qualities included in the essential
nature of Brahman are certainly to be conceived in that [meditation]
as well. Thus in all meditations Brahman is to be found only as
possessing qualities.
m (\o \3 qwfpTT | m
(#il?IH) I#? 3 ^ I ^ ^
mmm ( v\o c \ i \ \ ^ ^ sw: i
2.28, The sacred text; "free from qualities” (Cu.7.2.) is to be
thought of in connection with the meaning; free from qualities which
are to be given up. The qualities which are to be given up are sin,
old age, death, sorrow, hunger, thirst etc. For this reason, those
[qualities] have been specifically negated in the Chandogya ; "free
from sin, free from old age" (Ch.8.1,5.). And subsequent to that,
auspicious qualities are told; "whose desire is true, whose resolve is
152
true'* (Ch.8.1,5.). Indeed this sacred text: "whose desire is true"
is contradicted if there is the negation of all qualities. Therefore
in accordance with that [sacred text], the only meaning which can be
accepted for the sacred text: "free from qualities" is: free from the
qualities which are to be given up,
comment
See comment to 2.3.
3TRRRRRT *pT 1R I * R RfR^R: ( f ° * I
V I H 1 <R WUWW’JJR* Wm
i itr l
%rsr; ( f o ^ I V? I ?^ ) 5T5T ( fo 31^1*0
T%RR 5RRT7RR *T#R I RfFTTRX WR
^ I » I ) ^RT^RPT 5^7J
y£ff% rurr srsm: *r#R l
ftm^%R3T|R tr^Rr^%TT
i i 3 ^tr^ m (%o ^ i ^ i
f) srir rrr: ( %o ^ i c i ^ ) ^wrRRm^sft
I RRR*R fRRRRTRR[ I W&1 IRfeRFRTTK-
rr*r i % ^iRR^^qrRRn??^ rr^rr far
*R RRRt R RTRR I fat RfR liH]pF*RRfa I
(fawwft far f^TRTF^TT^( f ° HI tfl ?» ) *
#Tt ( fo V | 3 Uo ) tr ft SET ( Sfo » I <) JRTR-
I ^pfrirrft liter tr (wo h j 3 i )
I RVRRR $: I fRT*R JR I
2.29. Knowledge is also only a quality of the self. It should not be
said: if Knowledge is a quality of the self, then there is contradiction
with the sacred text: "a mass of consciousness" (Brh .2.4.1 2 .) .
[reason] Because there, the Knowledge which is the essential nature
of the supreme Self is being specified. The Knowledge which is the
essential nature of the self is accepted by us as being different
from the Knowledge which is a quality of the self. Consciousness is
recognized as identical with Brahman in the sacred texts such as:
"a mass of consciousness" (Brh,2.4,12.) , "Brahman is consciousness
153
and bliss" (Brh*3 .9.28.), The difference of consciousness from Brahman
is recognized in the sacred texts such as; "by what, my dear, can one
know the knower?" (Brh.2.4,1 4.), "this Being indeed knows". The
acceptance of two types of Knowledge is certainly more correct for the
establishment of the two types of sacred texts. The sacred text is
explained in a twofold manner even in regard to bliss, on account of
this; "bliss is Brahman" (Tai.3.6,1.) and "the bliss of Brahman" (Tai.
2.8.4.), This is because bliss is not different from Knowledge. For a
pleasing state of consciousness is said by the word "bliss".
The self is not established as a knower according to the view
of those who do not accept Knowledge which is a quality as being
different from Knowledge which is the essential nature of the self.
For knowership means just being the locus of the quality of Knowledge.
Knowership has certainly been established in the sacred texts, such as:
"by what, my dear, can one know the knower?" (Brh,2.4,14.), "for the
knower's function of knowing is not lost" (Brh.4.3.30.), "this is
indeed the seer" (Fr.4.9.), It has been told by the author of the
sutras also; "For this very reason, [the soul] is a knower" (B.S.2.3.19.).
A knower ( jna h) means that "one knows" ( janati ), which means being the
locus of Knowledge.
comment
When Brahman is defined as "consciousness and bliss" (B^h.3.9.28.),
these are not two different attributes. Brahman has consciousness as
Q1
His essence and that consciousness is of the nature of bliss. 7 Since
consciousness is both the essential nature of Brahman and His attribute,
bliss is also the essence and the attribute of Brahman. See ^ribhagya
1 .1 .1 , Para.51 ,p.9T♦
The statement that the knower is "the locus of ihe quality of
Knowledge" indicates that the self, though a knower by nature, is free
from change. All modifications are through the knower*s attributive
consciousness. See ^rlbhasya 1 .1 .1 . Para.40.p.69f.
154
2. 30 . I | R ft Trqwft
3T t’T^T HR> fw^ | sTFI^WT^^T ITjpi
^?*RTsffiri% mmw l srtft %f2ri%-
#^MH : 4dpMpd
q^c^fr #r: I <t*tt i
^ R f%^TF? «TN% ! f% ^
wiM troww ^hwi^wt fwrm #rw^-
*R§ qyn^w qftqr^ srfxn ^ptrt l f
2.-30, The supreme Self is certainly an object of knowledge. Because
there is nothing to invalidate it. The supreme Self being of the nature
of Knowledge or being a knower is not at variance with being knowable.
Because the individual self, the "I”, who is of the nature of Knowledge
and a knower, has the experience of being an object of mental
perception. By observing the signs of motion etc. in. a body, people
infer an individual soul who is its inner controller. So the nature of
being an object of inference cannot be avoided. Thus nothing
invalidating is seen in regard to the supreme Self being an object of
His own perception and in being the object of perception and inference
belonging to the liberated souls and those whose liberation is eternally
accomplished. Moreover, if the supreme Self is not an object of
knowledge, why would the sacred text have commenced to teach about the
supreme Self in the Upanisads? Because there is an even greater
impossibility of being understood through the scripture.
2.31
5T T TORt
SPRTTT H ^ H ) STdfRTRTW
# I ffi wz&r r *rp
R'i ( Ro 3° % I H I
*T R WTRiRt
script nVif^jsv. w
155
2.31 . It should not be said that if the supreme Self is an object of
knowledge, there is contradiction with the sacred text: ''That which one
does not think with the mind" (Ke.1.6.) because there would be the
necessity of being understood by the mind, [reason] Because there is
no contradiction on account of the acceptance of the purport of the
sacred text by supplying [the word] "entirely" in the sacred text:
"That which i.e. Brahman, one does not think in its entirety with the
mind". For this reason, the injunction about the knowledge which has
Brahman as its object: "know that alone to be Brahman" (Ke.1 .6.) is
correct.
Also, the statement that Brahman is inconceivable: "This one is
unmanifest, unthinkable,,." (G.2.25.), "This one is unmanifest, ageless,
unthinkable, unborn, changeless" (Vis,P.6.5.66.) etc. should be
understood as intending inconceivability in its entirety.
It should not be said that upon the acceptance that the supreme
Self is an object of knowledge, there would be the result that the
supreme Self is inert, on account of the inference: the supreme Self
is inert. Because of being an object of knowledge, like a pot. [reason]
Because the reason i.e. being an object of knowledge, is not the
determining factor. For some favourable logic based upon the relation
of cause and effect or upon the relation of universal and particular etc.
is not observed in the formation of the invariable concomitance:
whatever is an object of knowledge is inert.
comment
Passages such as Ke.1 .6. are to be interpreted in the manner that
Brahman is unable to be comprehended in His entirety by the mind. The
word "entirely" ( sakalyena ) is used by Rangaramanuja in his commentary
92
upon this verse in the Kenopani s ad .
The formation of a rule of invariable concomitance requires a
necessary relationship between the factors concerned. For example in the
case of fire and smoke there is the relation of cause and effect. But
there is no cause-effect relation between being an object of knowledge
and being inert. Nor can the reason in the syllogism be established on
the basis of universal ( samanya ) and particular ( vise sa) as for example
between the universal "humanity" and the particular of being an
individual member of the human race, so that one could formulate the
rule; without the universal there is no particular.
2 ' 32 ' i ^ ^
m ^ <tpt ^ i v wmti
R mwi I ^ yfar
TO13R: W 5TTT I ^4
tpt <?fpnmsn mm-
nrqifqq: trtrprptpi l 3Rm%%PT 3 qw-
rr ^fRR^rr ^ #r. l
2,32. That supreme Self is eternally unchangeable. Unchangeable is
said to be; always existing in the very same form.
[objection] The established position is that the supreme Self
is indeed the material cause and the efficient cause of the world.
The nature of being a material cause is possible only for a substance
capable of modification like clay etc. Hence if the supreme Self
possesses modification, how is it unchangeable?
[reply] No. The supreme Self is not directly the material
cause of the world, but by means of a body. The subtle body of the
supreme Self, which can be expressed by the word "primary material"
( pradhana ). transforms into the form of the physical world. So
therefore the essential nature of the supreme Self, who is the inner
controller of the body, has no loss of its unchangeable nature even
though the subtle body of the supreme Self undergoes transformation
into a physical form. But there is no fault even though the supreme
157
Self who is qualified by a body possesses modification in the manner
described»
2.33. WrFm ( mo £ I A9 ) ^
qeqqRR Cfo ^ I V I V) R
TORir nfaiR * 3 I
mrc<$ * tTT^r sgajfaftfc 3TlpffR I
mmU s^rq|nw i srrf: %s^t
sTRT JTRTRSR Wq: ^vRH^f ^
i?i^tsr|cr^im 4 -
^ut i \^q l tT rr r ^ ^ ^m-
<TM^ I sfRFff Mf | TOH^T-
jqppp* I 3 ?T sfcpTTO
I 1% 5 qgtqisq
^TRTFT I
2.33. The teaching of identity of the individual souls and the inert
objects with Brahman through sacred texts such as: "you are That"
(Ch.6.8.7.) and "all this which is, is this Self" (Brh.2.4.6.) is only
figurative, being based upon the relation of a body and its possessor,
but it is not a fact. A statement of non-duality is to be thought of
as having the intended meaning: the supreme Self who is qualified by
a body is one alone. The purport is that there is no such thing
different from Brahman which is not the body of Brahman. This very
non-duality of what is qualified ( Visi s tSdvaita ) is called the non¬
duality of the possessor of modes. Because the boundless individual
souls and inert objects are the modes of Brahman and even though they
are manifold and even though they are different from Brahman, Brahman
who is the possessor of the modes and qualified by them is one.
This is the intended meaning of the expression; "the identity
Tmmt srrt I
?MWf: I €ht:
*i^rt iw ^ 1 g
158
of individual souls'*. Tlie individual souls are, in reality, mutually
different. However the expression "the identity of individual souls"
is because even though they are different they belong to the same
class in having Knowledge as their essential nature. Identity means
similarity. Just as here; "that and this grain of rice are indeed
identical", "that herb and this herb are indeed identical" here also
[in regard to individual souls] the word "identical" has the meaning of
"similar". This is certainly the purport of even the expression: "the
non-duality of souls". Because even though the souls are mutually
different, the mode to which they belong is identical. This is said
to be the non-duality of the modes.
The statements which reject the difference among individual
souls do not reject the real difference belonging to the soul. However
the difference based upon the difference of bodies has been imposed
upon the souls and has the form: "this is a man", "this is an animal",
[the statements rejecting difference] should be understood as rejecting
that [imposed difference].
2.34
^ | rw g * I m
i (% ^ I <t*it ^wn^MwiR-
2.34. The diversity of happiness and sadness etc, is logically
possible only because the individual soul is different in each body
159
Moreover, if there is one individual soul, an object experienced by
Devadatta would be recollected by Yajnadatta also. If there is no
recollection [by Yajnadatta] because of the loss of the mental
impression, then there should be no recollection for Devadatta also.
If [it is objected] the mental impression belonging to Devadatta is
not lost, [it is replied] in the view that there is one individual
soul it is not possible to say; "the mental impression of one person
is lost and for another it is not lost".
Furthermore, if there is one individual soul, the distinction
that someone is bound, someone is freed, someone is a student and
someone is a teacher is not established. And the inequality of
creation with the difference of gods, men, animals etc. is not
logically possible. But it is not that the creation is unequal because
of the difference of karma . because in the view that there is one
individual soul the rule is not possible that: "this is the karma of
one person and not of another person". In the same manner, even the
difference of internal organs [i.e, minds] is not the determining
factor for the inequality of happiness and sadness etc., because in
the view that there is one individual soul even this rule is not
possible; "this internal organ is only for one person and not for
another". Moreover, the minuteness of the individual soul will be told.
So the connection with endless bodies is all the more impossible for
one minute individual soul. The difference of individual souls is
proved by inference also; the self of Devadatta is different from the
self of Yajnadatta. Because of the absence of recognition of the
happiness etc. experienced by Yajnadatta.
2 ' 35 * TOMI slHh’Jb-h HR *T
snwrcrsiT 1 hr ^
^ i =r ft
160
jrMtt i ?wt wm
4 <frsre 4 i
2*35. It was said that the supreme Self has Knowledge as His quality.
That Knowledge is not of the nature of mere existence. For mere
existence is mere "is-ness". And in the knowledge: "the pot is" etc.,
the "is-ness" of that [pot] is an object just like the pot etc. The
distinction between subject and object is certainly well known in
the world. For nobody believes that an object such as a pot is of
the nature of Knowledge. Accordingly, the difference of Knowledge,
the subject, from the object in the form of "is-ness" must necessarily
be accepted.
comment
The Advaitin maintains that pure awareness is identical to pure
existence and constitutes the nature of Brahman. The Visistadvaitin,
however, considers that there is neither pure awareness nor pure
93
existence. Awareness is always in relation to a knowing subject
and refers to some object. Since "is-ness" too is an object of
awareness it cannot be identical to awareness,
2 ' 36 ' vgs ^ I qr-
sr-TRTK#: ^4 I
vmm * 5 w-
j jfvn4 ^ ^nfwwpr l
I h 4 T‘. TO%-
C Ci
ifozm *mi w^Trru. t ft to-
qfoippjjrcqr *\mx *r mwx f™^-
i
2.36. The physical world and the subtle world which is the cause of
that [physical world] always constitute the body of the supreme
Self. It has been mentioned that the supreme Self is the material
161
cause of the world, though only by means of a subtle body, not
directly. Directly, however, the material cause of the world is only
the subtle world which is the body of the supreme Self and which
consists of primary matter etc. The primary matter etc. changes only
because of the connection with what is sentient, in the form of the
inner controller, not independently. The primary matter is composed
of the three qualities and even though it can be expressed by the
words " avidya " and " maya " it is not indeterminable. Because the two
words " avidya " and " maya " are not employed in the manner of being
indeterminable in regard to an object in the form of the primary
matter. But the reason for their usage was certainly mentioned
previously (2.11.). Therefore, though the world is a modification of
the primary matter, this is certainly real and the falsity of the
world, as being an appearance, should not be imagined. Furthermore,
because this world which is a modification of primary matter cannot
be sublated even by the opinion of a person who has knowledge, its
falsity is no way logically possible.
2.37.
? I I I <
tot
wi dwm d| to
qftomwR: feqqifqqq d§ ftt jrt^t
(do r i q)
q%pr ft i m
FTTM% TTTOTRdR ^fa$TTT ^5^-
2*37. This teaching of modification is understood from the sutra ;
"On account of modification" (B.S.1 .4.27.) to be the accepted view of
the author of the Brahmasutra . Because that sutra was composed for the
removal of the doubt: it is not logically possible that the supreme
Brahman, who is by nature free from all defects and who consists
162
solely of unsurpassed knowledge and bliss , becomes manifold in the
form of the manifest world which is the location of endless wrong
human endeavours and hence the sacred text which makes known the
resolve to become many: "He desired, 'let me become many, let me be
born' « (Tai.2.6.) is contradicted. The purport of the sutra is that
Brahman, who has an extremely subtle body in the state of cosmic
dissolution, resolves: "I shall have as a body the manifest world
consisting of the material sentient and insentient entities, just as
before" and He transforms Himself into a material form by means of a
body. Thus the supreme Self does not have even a whiff of wrong human
endeavour.
2 - 38 . ^ ^ WU HTOt ^
l rTrqrri 3 * 1
drlfRIWI: Hl%R
i 1 mm l mmft
3TT^r4|(^f| S^RWH: I * ^TR^TH I
%RddNt^RRRf | cR ft vft% HdTCd I sfldRT 3tR
I mm mvj wt (
3 l H I ^ ^ ( fo mo 1\ vs 1 ^ mi
#fte (m° \\ I ?H ) \%Ri
(«ft» ?ci^) wnmt
dTWHR? Sfrni2^ig;| TO^ ?£> ^ I 3 I )
?T% *|3RRff |"
2,38. [objection] If the manifest world is real, the cognition of
that [world as real] is not an error and there would be no destruction
of that [cognition] by the knowledge of reality,
[reply] That is the desirable conclusion. However the knowledge
of reality is not without use. Since an error that the body is the
self and the error of independence etc, exists, therefore that
163
[knowledge of reality] is necessary for the purpose of removing
that [error] and for the purpose of the ascertainment of the essential
nature of the self. To explain. Although the body has connection with
the self, since it is not the self the cognition of selfhood there
in the form: "I am a man", "I am a god" is certainly an error. This
is said to be the error that the body is the self. For the error
that the body is the self is the cognition of selfhood in the body
which is not the self. However the cognition of being a body in
regard to the self which is not the body is not the error that the
body is the self. Because in regard to the individual self, the nature
of being the body of the supreme Self certainly exists as a reality.
Rather, that [i.e. seeing oneself as the body of the supreme Self] is
certainly necessary since it is included in the knowledge of reality.
For due to that, the error of independence is removed in respect of
the individual soul. The agentship of various actions on the part of
the individual soul is certainly dependent upon the supreme Self who
has entered within that [soul].
For the sacred texts and the tradition teach very clearly that
the supreme Self, after entering within the individual soul, does
the controlling of that [soul]: "the ruler who has entered within"
(Tai.S.3.11.2.) , "He who dwells in the self" (Brh.3 .7.22.), "I am
seated in the heart of all" (G.15*15.), "Arjuna, the Lord dwells in
the heart of all beings" (G.18.61..), This is certainly the accepted
view of the author of the sutras as well, who composed the sutra ;
"But that [agentship] is from the Highest, on account of the sacred
text" (B.S.2.3.40.).
r&\ ’srOiwr ^ f§fw: i
sfaRi ^ hw* sttwrw: I
trqf |
164
I fl&TT WT^^fdH^FT sfcl^T : 5f^FT 3T * WM-
55 ^ i ^ |Cr# ^tf^^ 5 tott-
Ti^m §W. q^d ?TFW j ^ ^
f^rarci ^ 3 ^2^^ Or^pt^ [
2.39. Even the modification which continually occurs for inert
objects such as milk is certainly dependent upon the Lord who is the
inner-controller. The modification of the body is twofold. One occurs
for the living body due to the difference of stages such as childhood
etc. The other occurs for that same body after death. This
[modification], though of two types, is certainly dependent upon the
Lord. Even though the first occurs due to the connection with the
individual soul, it is not dependent upon the individual soul. Because
such modification is an object of the Lord's will only due to the
connection with the individual soul. An individual soul or an inert
object has no independence at all distinct from the supreme Self.
When the error that the body is the self and the error of
independence has been removed by the knowledge of reality a person
engages in the adoration etc. of the Lord who is independent, not
otherwise. So only the error that the body is the self etc. is able
to be removed by the knowledge of reality. But the reality of the
manifest world is not able to be removed. Because the entire manifest
world, which is a modification of the primary matter, is real.
2 ’ 40 ■ ifWrf t mv *
sffiW 5 HHqft i mi
| qstnf k ^Rr
nqqf mm 1i%
s
165
^ ssti cift i
^rRIrqT *FPlta flrSPRP&ftafa. | t£#t
T^TdJ STcnTOTRf | ‘ Ty%-
rfTf^mn^if^: * fi% *ra*rc^S i^R3fftsr*n 5
•2.40. Even the silver which is perceived in a pearl-oyster is
recognized as certainly real. Because cognition of what is not real
is impossible. Otherwise, why is it that silver alone is recognized
in the pearl-oyster and not a pot or a cloth etc.? It is not possible
that; "silver is recognized on account of similarity". Because the
similarity of the pearl-oyster to silver would produce the recollection
of silver by means of recalling to memory the mental impression of
silver. But it would not produce the perception of silver.
However the existence of silver in the pearl-oyster is in this
manner: because all the five elements such as earth exist everywhere
[i.e. in each other] due to their fivefold combination, therefore
silver, which is fire, exists partially in earth which is in the form
of the pearl-oyster. Moreover according to the method which has been
told: "whatever possesses a part of a substance is similar to it"^ 4 the
existence of itself partially in a thing similar to it is unavoidable.
The existence even of a snake etc. perceived upon a rope etc. is to
be understood in just the same manner. However the expression: "the
cognition of silver etc. in a pearl-oyster etc. is error" is because
the portion of silver is minute with regard to the portion of pearl-
oyster. But it is not because the silver, even partially, does not
exist.
2 * 41# sRTmRt
j\wm wr 1 w
mm srefaft n?n wwpii <sm$-
3*PPTFri ftw*: m ifrfWT mm JMi [
166
^ ?TRR | tf^i ^
^#q*nn: fvi%nnft ^ ^ I *t ^ \ ^ipww-
JT^n^i^: q^rqi ^n^:^qn%T: wm tr [ $ q^_
^??S^A^Pl?^ to ^ 3r fcraifa wrsrf^m-
<reTOrofaR[% ^nrc^R^r <?fa: l ^
g^tf^ I ^T?tfRf gtTi qTRrrFFf RijtR
WWrfT^ | 1R m iWT^ SRTT%H^ ^
2.41. Even the redness perceived in a crystal situated close to a
red flower is certainly real. Just as the real sensation of heat
belonging to the substance fire which has entered into water appears
in the water, due to the inherence in what is conjoined, so that:
"the water is hot", in just the same manner, the real redness existing
in the lustre of a red flower which is in contact with a crystal
appears in the crystal so that; "the crystal is red". This does not
result in the unreality of the object. Though the lustre of the red
flower is diffused in all directions, because the crystal is a
transparent substance it is clearly perceived there alone and not
elsewhere.
Even the yellow colour perceived in the cognition; "the conch
shell is yellow" is certainly real. That [yellow colour] belongs to
the substance bile. [The perception of the yellow conch shell is]
because the rays of the eyes, which are connected to the substance
bile located within the eyes of the person seeing, have conjunction
with the conch shell.
Even the objects such as elephants and horses etc. seen in
dream are certainly real, as they are produced by the Lord. Although
those objects are experienced only by the person who sees them and not
by others and in that same way are destroyed in an instant, still there
167
is no defect because the Lord, who has inconceivable power, possesses
the capacity to produce such objects.
Even the face perceived in a mirror is certainly real. Because
the rays of the eyes which have struck the mirror are reversed from
it and are connected with one's own face. Thus there is the
apprehension,i.e. the cognition, everywhere of an object which is
certainly real. There is nowhere cognition of the unreal. This is
indeed designated as: "the apprehension of the real."
c omme nt
The Visigtadvaita tradition upholds the view that; "all cognition
is true to its object.This means all knowledge is intrinsically
valid since it always has, as its object, something which really
exists. Such a position is called; "the apprehension of the real"
( satkhyati ) or "the apprehension of the object as it is"
( yatharthakhyati )
If all cognition is true to its object, the possibility of
error would seem to be precluded. Ramanuja, however, does not deny
the fact of perceptual error for he considers that; "the existence
[of one thing] in another manner must be accepted."^ His use of the
expression "in another manner" ( anyatha ) suggests that Ramanuja's
position is in accord with the Naiyayika explanation of error as;
"the apprehension in another manner" ( anyathakhyati ). However the
similarity is only in so far as Ramanuja agrees with the Naiyayikas'
that one thing, such as a pearl-oyster, can appear in another manner
in the form of a piece of silver. He accepts anyathakhyati to this
extent, but he does not consider that the object of error, such as the
silver, is something illusory. In accordance with satkhyati . Ramanuja
maintains that all, even erroneous, cognition has a real entity for
its object.
On account of the threefold combination of the elements described
in Chandogya 6.3.3. or the fivefold combination enumerated in
Taittiriya 2.1. (see text 1.37), each element contains lesser portions
of the other elements. Vhen a pearl-oyster is seen as silver, the
perception is true because real silver is perceived. This is because
minute portions of silver, which are of the nature of the element fire
or light ( tejas ), actually exist in the pearl-oyster which is of the
nature of the element earth. Due to an ocular defect the predominant
shell portion is not recognised and only the minute silver is seen.
168
Thus there is error in so far as the pearl-oyster is apprehended as
silver, however the cognition of silver is not illusory since it is
real silver that is perceived. In the case of the erroneous perception
of two moons, Ramanuja explains that the visual apparatus of the eye
becomes divided through such causes as cataract or by pressure of the
finger upon the eye. One apparatus apprehends the moon in its own
location. The other moves at a tangent and apprehends a place near the
moon and also the moon disassociated from its actual location.
Because there is a real division of the visual apparatus, there is a
real twofold apprehension and on account of the reality of the two
apprehensions the double aspect of the object, the moon, is also
98
real. While there is error because the moon appears double, the
second moon is not illusory because it is the real moon which is
being cognized.
Although Ramanuja accepts that objects appear in a different
manner, he does not make an ontological distinction between a valid
9&
and an erroneous cognition. 7 The object perceived m each case is
real. Visi§tadvaitins, however, explain that knowledge is valid when
,100
it is: "in accord with practical life as it really is.’ Thus while
all knowledge is true since it has a real object, valid knowledge
must accord with the ordinary relations of life.
^qr-
I
2.42. Because the manifest world is certainly real, therefore the
scripture too, which is included within that [world] is real. The
knowledge produced by that [scripture] is called "true knowledge".
Because otherwise even the knowledge which is produced from an unreal
scripture is unreal and thus that it [the scripture] is a means for
liberation would be difficult to demonstrate. For there is no
satisfaction through sweets which are [merely] hoped for, nor is an
action such as bathing accomplished with mirage water.
169
2.43.
rr twtrr fmi^T m m irftw^tt l
W'W ^ l ^ ^^fnrrw^i i
%m\ ^raf^wpn f^MtfRigqRii^^R: I
^mn RWRrirRRRi^ I
SRR#T£S^K^^lR mmi OT&RR wt I #* ^m-
mV*l\ I <R5RT fR ^ JR^fq^pft I RTWT ^RW^WW
ifn^TT^T I W RRR ^HM*TT7RT%^R*R m
m#F^ ITRR M ^TW R^qfwrwr |
2.43. Thus everywhere, the cognition which arises about an existing
object is produced by the group of three means of knowledge. The group
of three means of knowledge are; perception, inference and verbal
testimony. In regard to these, perception is the instrument of valid
knowledge which causes direct apprehension. Valid knowledge is the
knowledge which is in accord with practical life as it really is.
There is the exclusion of inference etc. by distinguishing valid
[perceptual] knowledge as; "causing direct apprehension". Because
in the case of inference etc., valid knowledge does not cause direct
apprehension. The sense organ is the instrument of valid knowledge in
regard to the perceptual knowledge of a pot etc. which is in contact
with the sense organ. That is indeed the means of knowledge through
perception. The knowledge produced by that is called "perception".
It is figurative that Knowledge, which is eternal, can be
produced by a sense organ. Just as the birth of an eternal soul is
figurative on account of its connection with a body, so too, the
production of Knowledge is figurative when its expansion occurs due
to the connection with a sense object,
comment
The definition of valid knowledge ( prama ) as; "knowledge which
is in accord with practical life as it really is" can be found in the
YatTndraroatadlpika , Para.7.p.5. This is the definition given by
Vedanta Desika in his work; Nyayaparisuddhi
170
2.44.
TOT I i wt hrhr *pr-
w w qq tot #sq toto to* i
jpragfar: 3R
Ft"
R^lffqRTO ^ TOT% I qR5^PTORRWT R^RRRift-
I Tt^TTORITR 5 RTOTOTR t TORrfqRT-
WWJ!^ mRTTOT TOT ^RTTOfTOTORRT ^WITO, I 'TR*
RTRri^%RTfR MqqR^RRVqRqrort tot IMfeWrot
%qnq#& fqf%sqw^r ^ q toiMrjt l TOTmrorR wvm-
Rq j TOTORSRTNfei ^towtoThtor %q^rm: %q<?R%qf
^ W I RIRITORT I TO TOjTTOt HgSTO I ffTO
to R]pR I cr: tottot tor i trrp-TO: rr* 3 f^RT q
^tr tot to l w^m\ qTO^qqqrofVRRW^ i ^fsrt-
TOTT^S* TOR: RTORWT %R flr^qrj | ?R STOTtf TOS/TO^'
RT* TRTO RTTOTO | ^TOFPJRTRTOf^ § RfTRTOTOR: I TO3R-
%% :TO J|qi^RRTRRRR I
2.44. Perception is twofold, due to the distinction between being
indeterminate and being determinate. The knowledge of an object
distinguished by its qualities, configuration etc., which occurs
firstly, is indeterminate. The configuration is the particular
arrangement of the component parts. For example, when a cow is first
seen there is the knowledge: "this is a cow". Because here, even
though there is knowledge of the object cow, distinguished by cowness
which has the form of a particular arrangement of the component
parts, the persisting form of cowness is not recognized in the manner
that: "this cowness is common to another individual cow". Therefore,
because a determination in the manner of a persisting form is not
perceived here, it is called "indeterminate". Whereas the knowledge of
a second [cow] etc. is "determinate". Because there [in determinate
perception], cowness is known as having a persisting form so that
[one knows]; "the cowness which is in this manner is common to
another individual cow".
However the definition of indeterminate told by the Naiyayikas
171
is not correct: "indeterminate knowledge does not apprehend an
attribute, substantive, or a relation [between attribute and substantive],
it is bereft of the connection with name, class etc#". Because such
a type of knowledge does not exist anywhere. The perception of a mere
class or a mere individual is not possible, because a class, in the
form of the configuration, and an individual, are to be known through
the same causal apparatus.
The self is united with the mind. The mind is united with the
sense organ. The sense organ is united with the object. Prom that,
there is perceptual knowledge. Perception never takes place without
the connection between the sense organ and the object. Because, as a
rule, the sense organs bring about the illumination of attainable
objects. The connection between the sense organ and the object is
twofold: conjunction and dependence upon what is conjoined [with the
sense organ]. In regard to those, the connection between the sense
organ and an object in regard to the perception of a substance is
"conjunction". Whereas in regard to the perception of qualities etc,
located in the substance, [the connection] has the form of "dependence
upon what is conjoined". Because qualities etc, depend upon a
substance which is conjoined with the sense organ.
comment
Ramanuja’s explanation of indeterminate ( nirvikalpaka ) and
determinate ( savikalpaka ) perception follows that of the Mlmamsa school
1 OP
of Prabhakara. The first instant when an object is perceived is said
to be "indeterminate". At that time, the specific features of the
object and its generic character are perceived, however the generic
character is not recognized as common to all other individuals of the
same class. The perception of another cow at a later time is
called "determinate" because there is the recognition that the generic
character i.e, the "cowness" of the cow perceived firstly, is common
to all cows.
Indeterminate perception does not apprehend the mere generic
character, or as the Naiyayikas and Bha-tta Mimamsakas maintain, the
mere individual (vyakti) possessing specific features and a generic
172
character which has not yet been discriminated.103 Prabhakara and
Ramanuja maintain that all cognition apprehends the individual
qualified by the relation with the specific features and the generic
character.
According to Ramanuja, the generic character ( jati ) is nothing
but the configuration ( samsthana ) of the object,The configuration
is "the particular arrangement of the component parts". For example
the generic character of cowness is the configuration common to all
cows such as having a certain type of dewlap and other common features.
2.45
%fd ! f^TRf
mb i 1
^ | C j vs ) |TR 5 gT^-
^ I
2,45. Again, according to another mode, perception is twofold;
ancient and recent. The first occurs for the eternal souls [i.e, the
eternally liberated souls], the liberated souls and the Lord. Whereas
the "recent" occurs for people such as us who are in dependence upon
the sense organs. However the "recent" which is not dependent upon the
sense organs is twofold; self-accomplished and divine. "Self-accomplished"
is for Yogis, whereas the "divine" is for the Lord's devotees and is
produced through the grace of the Lord.
The knowledge produced by a sentence such as; "you are the
tenth", "you are That" (Ch,6.8.7*) etc. is only verbal knowledge, not
perception. Because that [knowledge] cannot be produced from
the cause which has been told, as it is being produced from the
respective words,
comment
Sankara considers that verbal testimony can produce the immediate
( aparok sa) knowledge of Brahman free from distinction (see comment to 1.
48, and 1.53.). Ramanuja disagrees and argues that a sentence cannot
173
denote anything free from distinction since it consists of a number of
words, each of which conveys a particular meaning. See ^ribhasya 1.1 .1 .
Para.28.p.46.
2.46.
I qfffqpjqn^q qlcrqffcrr ypvt * ^ *
qtfR I i
^ w^TFfkH q^fra^rR
^F,\ =q | |
qfepw %qmrq^fwTR f^qrroqrR =r qrrfqqq^r mq I
qwr: q^ i ^ i q^famfr-
Rq qrqRTTqiqRqq qwfepT#n^RTg; l qq ^Rqq qrro^r
f^nRwft ^ttth: l r ftfrqr I R^rarq^
RRi^iWq'q ^f® ^nfRRqsqifq: i w qr ^rrt %fq-
qTRm i ttirrw qpr Rim^qr^q^mq; i
w ’fts^fq: 7T h% I ww ^ f|i¥?R#qTqr^qt
-RWI | I W STST ^qRT t
3R q- q-qrq q^cqfq ^ wifq fwg-
qrfRr ^qqfcT i %q^rf^Ft 313^ rn 1 qrqqt wr
qmfRTT^qrfr 3 RqqRRmrRRTRq ^p-qw^ qqwqrft-
l
<? <? ,
2-.46. Inferential knowledge is the knowledge of the pervader from the
knowledge of the pervaded as being pervaded. Inference is the means
for that [inferential knowledge]. Here [in the inference]; "the hill
is possessed of fire, because of smoke", because the smoke existing
on the hill is remembered as being pervaded by fire in the manner;
"smoke is pervaded by fire" , the knowledge of fire which is the
pervader of that [smoke] arises. That is indeed inferential knowledge.
The means for that is the knowledge of the invariable concomitance of
smoke with fire and the knowledge of [smoke] existing in the subject
[i.e. on the hill]. That is indeed inference.
When, after the knowledge of the invariable concomitance and the
attribute [i.e. the existence of smoke] on the subject [the hill], the
174
inferential knowledge arises, no requirement whatsoever is seen for
the subsumptive reflection of the sign in the form of the knowledge of
the attribute existing in the subject qualified by invariable concomitance,
which is accepted by the Naiyayikas in between [(a) the knowledge of
concomitance and the knowledge of the attribute in the subject and (b)
inferential knowledge]. Because subsumptive reflection is not the
determining factor since the sequence relates to the apprehension: firstly
there is the perception of smoke on the hill, then there is the knowledge
that smoke is pervaded by fire and subsequently there is inferential
knowledge,
Invariable concomitance is the invariable relation in the manner:
where there is smoke there is fire. That [concomitance] is twofold due to
the distinction between co-presence and co-absence. Pervasion of co¬
presence is the invariable concomitance which occurs by the affirmation
of what is to be proved upon the affirmation of the ground [i.e, the
reason]. For instance: whatever has smoke has fire. Pervasion of co¬
absence is the invariable concomitance which occurs by the negation of
the ground upon the negation of what is to be proved. For instance:
what has no fire has no smoke. So because two types of invariable con-
concomitance exist, smoke is a reason which possesses co-presence and
co-absence.
Some types of reason have only co-presence. For instance: Brahman
can be expressed by a word, because it is a thing, like a pot. Here,
any illustration of the pervasion of co-absence : what cannot be
expressed by a word is also not an object, is impossible.
A reason which has only co-absence is not seen anywhere. Because
in a case such as; the earth possesses smell on account of being earth,
there is no possibility of pervasion in co-absence since what is to be
proved i.e. the possession of smell, is not known anywhere else and so the
invariable concomitance of its absence is difficult to be apprehended.
175
comment
The technicalities of inference are explained in Athalye's Ed, of
Tarkasangraha . Also, cf. Kuppuswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic .
2/47.
7T I <PT qTT%
W f Sf | M d q M h Hd ^WRTfJ I %
i sn%>
mmv I ^T-
mvmmw n mkm ur i mt i
ftiRp i m^idTf^Rf i
2.47. Inference is of two types due to the distinction of being for
oneself and being for another person. With regard to those two, the
Naiyayikas [consider] that a sentence communicating an inference, in
respect of inference for another person, is endowed with five members:
the proposition, reason, illustration, application and conclusion. Those
members can be understood from the books of the logicians. The MImamsakas
teach three members: the proposition, reason and illustration. The
Buddhists teach two members; the illustration and the application. In
reality, however, there is no rule about the number of members. Because
people of slow intellect require five members. For people of sharp
intellect, [the inference] is accomplished by only three members.
Whereas for people of sharper intellect, by only two members.
2 ' 48 * cT?%R I WrRR RI^T-
3TWT1 I AhIHF^ R*RR I
SR I| H ^ ^TSTRRIt^ R
^ mm s i ft «pf*
|TPR i
mm \ wfk jrw i
J
176
HRfW. I
: fcm * W% \ m r&
%SW°Ti it I I
3 n^i<q sp?a% % nr irmi% nra^i: 11 I
2,48. Verbal knowledge is knowledge whose meaning is produced from
1 05
a sentence different from what is uttered by an untrustworthy person.
The means for that [knowledge] is a word having the form of that type
of sentence. The Veda is not uttered by a trustworthy person since it
is not composed by the Lord, because it has no personal origin.
Therefore having not said: uttered by a trustworthy person, it was
said: different from what is uttered by an untrustworthy person. The
Veda is not uttered by an untrustworthy person, therefore it is
certainly a means of knowledge.
Manusmrti , Bharata etc. are a means of knowledge on account of
being different from what is uttered by an untrustworthy person, for
they are uttered by trustworthy persons such as Manu etc. In regard
to those texts, the whole Veda is the means of knowledge. Because
invalidity is known from the defect of the agent or from the validity
of a sublating knowledge. There is no possibility of a defect on the
part of the agent because the Veda has no agent as it is eternal. Nor
is there a sublating knowledge anywhere which is a means of knowledge
for a meaning which has been taught by the Veda. The traditions etc.
which teach a meaning contrary to the Veda have no validity in that
portion. However there is certainly validity in the other portion.
The scripture known as the ^rx Pancaratra has validity in its
entirety because there is no contradiction to the Veda anywhere. There
is not even the possibility of a defect of the agent in it, on
account of the expression: "Narayana himself is the teacher of the
entire Pancaratra". Hence it has been told in the Varahapuran a:
177
In the want of the Veda mantras , those people
will gain Me who act according to the practice
communicated by the Pancaratra .
!5T wr: q&wqiq*: I qsmraqiqq;: I sttttc-
Wftfqqiq% I siTTr-W^WF-
^ i wftqfar I qq
p i srrcwt mi t-
vrn I qq I qqwifqqf: ^[Tf^ I
qqqqrfa Piqq mqqmRpqr^ I WtM; 2p?:Hm ft qq: I h
^ wq^q: Turrit: qpm qfqqrqq l q^qw qq
wi qfqqrqq I
2,49. The prior part of the Veda teaches about ritual action. The
latter part teaches about Brahman, The prior section teaches the action
of worshiping. The latter section teaches about the object of worship.
In the prior part there is an investigation of action. In regard to
that, there is a sutra work of Jaimini consisting of twelve chapters. In
the latter part there is the investigation about Brahman, In regard to
that, there is a sutra work of Vyasa consisting of four chapters. Both
investigations being united, there is a single scripture. Because even
in both places, only dharma is being taught. For dharma is the supra-
mundane means of liberation. That [dharma ] taught by the prior part is
action etc. which has the nature of something to be accomplished.
Whereas the dharma taught by the latter part is of the nature of Brahman
which is already an existing fact [not to be accomplished].
2.50.
qm * q i ftrqqqq'H: pqqr pn qW
qrq qfqqiprm i pqqj q^iT qraqTftqsq qRqqrpqfq^ftft f f%:
vmm l qqr TfifTq'r ?iqq q^qq-
spq m l qqr q^qqm («q° $ I
c \ ^?qq snqqiqqqq
qqmftwq s^ott \ q qqq ^i^qq I qmtftq
q^qr qfq ip^qiq f^qqqq qwpqiq-
^
^N^wte^iWt ^ l
178
2.50. A sentence is of two types; scriptural and secular. This
[sentence], of both types, communicates its meaning through a primary
or secondary denotation. If the purport is not logically possible
when the meaning is communicated through the primary denotation, then
the secondary denotation must be accepted.^^ For example, the implied
meaning of the word "Ganges" here; "the cowherd village is on the
Ganges" is "on the bank". Similarly, the implied meaning of the word
"That" which denotes Brahman here; "you are That" (Ch.6.8,7.) is in
107
the sense of "the body of Brahman". Implication is everywhere only
"exclusive implication". In the case of the sentence; "the insects
are entering, the curd must be protected from the crows", when there
is the implied meaning of the word insect in the sense of "like an
insect" and the implied meaning of the word crow in the sense of
"spoiling of the curd" there is certainly the relinquishment of its
own meaning in an implied sense. Because even if there is the entry
of an insect or a crow, which is the literal meaning, there is no
entry in a manner which is restricted to the literal meaning.
comment
Ramanuja employs two principles in interpreting the sentence;
"you are That" ( tat tvam asi ). The first is according to his conception
of the meaning of words. The other relates to the rule of grammatical
apposition ( samanadhikaranya ) (see comment to 2.26.). Ramanuja
maintains that all words finally denote the supreme Self because He
has all souls and matter as His body. Just as the word "man" really
denotes the indwelling soul, so too even the word "I” ultimately
1 Oft
expresses the supreme Self who is the indweller of the soul. In the
sentence; "you are That", the word "That" denotes Brahman who is the
cause of the world and the possessor of all auspicious qualities. The
word "you" also expresses Brahman, who has as His body the individual
109
soul possessed of a body. Because both the words "you" and "That"
refer to Brahman, Ramanuja considers that his interpretation
179
agrees with the principle whereby grammatical apposition is meant
to express a single object existing in a twofold manner
2.51 .
v-ri^ I I
: *pr *r*n *tttot to
srt Rt iirntro-
vmi wi 'mft <ftt
1 TOT ^
~ ■: 1 totto: i
d mm-
m ^ TO#f 3 Pi R
2,51. There is the inclusion of the group of three means of knowledge:
comparison, postulation and non-cognition, in the three which have
been told. To explain. Some person who does not know about an ox hears
a statement from a forester that a cow is just like an ox and having
gone to the forest he remembers the meaning of the statement. When he
sees an object distinguished'by the similarity to a cow, there arises
the knowledge of the object distinguished by the similarity to a cow,
assisted by the recollection of the meaning of that statement. That
[knowledge] is called comparison. It is included within perception,
because it is of the nature of recollection. It is included in
inference, because it depends upon the apprehension of invariable
concomitance. It is included within verbal testimony, since it is
produced by a statement. Knowledge which consists of recollection is
only a variety of perception.
2.52, ^r?rnn%sn^qq7^Hr{|^ viiMHKwife w %rs-
<?tTO RTOR'T'mHR <fH7^ TTT%-
totofuto i to j
smfaitR iptrqr- FFTfa: I ft
i —
180
?FT I 3TR’TTTOT S7 TFT^T I I I q^ff-
^t: vm I q*q-
3 «reqi*pmfa\« ^n% I <T»JTSft-
^rrni^K ir <t^5j i <rt ^qt^rq^rHi^n-’
2,52. 'Postulation is the supposition of a Pact which logically
establishes itself due to a fact being [otherwise] not logically possible.
For example, if fatness is observed in Davadatta who does not eat by day,
since thereby fatness is not logically possible, there is the supposition
of the fact of eating at night which logically establishes itself. This
[postulation] is included within inference. Because that which makes
[something else] logically possible i.e. eating at night etc., is seen to
be indeed the pervader of the fatness etc, which is to be made logically
possible: "wherever there is fatness co-ordinate with not eating during
the day, there is eating during the night". Hence it is said:
There is no unintelligibility for what is not
controlled [i.e. pervaded]. Nor does a non¬
controller [i.e. non-pervader] make [something]
logically possible (Nya.Ku.3.19,).
"Vhat is not controlled" ( aniyamya ) means what is not pervaded. Intellig¬
ibility means logical possibility, "Unintelligibility" ( ayukti ) means
there is no logical possibility. If there is no logical possibility of the
postulating factor [e,g. fatness] in the absence of the thing to be
postulated [i.e. eating at night], then that [postulating factor] becomes
the postulator for that thing [which is to be postulated i.e. eating at
night]. But if the postulating factor is not pervaded [i.e. fatness is not
pervaded by eating at night], then that [postulating factor] certainly has
no logical impossibility even in the absence of a thing to be postulated.
Similarly, a "non-controller" ( aniyantr ) i.e. a non-pervader, does not
make [the postulating factor] logically possible. That is the sense. Thus
the establishment is only through inference, because the thing to be made
181
logically possible and what makes [it] logically possible necessarily
have a pervaded-pervader relation. So postulation should not be admitted
as separate.
2 . 53 . i ft
* -*rm I m % ^ ^rniRt 1
<rc rvm h w$k. i
sr^q^R tmixrrr- T% g f| I &
I rR *fTTO I
TOPT^TRt #T I I ?$$$ ^KW^Wn^N
^ I
2.53. So too, non-cognition is included within perception. Because
through the means of knowledge known as non-cognition there is everywhere
the apprehension of only non-existence, not of existence. For example,
the non-existence of a man in the house is known through the absence of
cognition of a man in the house. Non-existence, however, is not some
category different from existence. Rather, it is only the nature of
another existence. For instance, the non-existence of a man in the house
is the nature of only the house. "Only the house" means the empty house
and that is an existent entity cognized only through perception. Similarly,
the prior non-existence of a pot is only clay and the destruction of the
pot is only the pieces. The difference of a pot from cloth etc. is only
the particular arrangement of the component parts.
2.54.
TOT Is
M 5THifa m *r mrwrt-
rT«irM%FTr m
m h™-
1 <rfssrt m ^ I « I H )
fi wfti TO dm. r ^ ^ sTRT-
m ^ 1 srnwi
182
<rr^r sn^Fflqqi^ i q?rr r| 5 ^rt—^ (^ Q .
v I U I v )> ,$® r i n> ? '
5^ : > ^ ^ *pj <rarft ( m* v j l %),
(*° $ IA) I. *$%ra
Cl
^ 3fRii% 3^raq^( iff® ^ i J
^ l iter ^ %o ^ \ 3 i ^ ^
HTfc* RT^[ I
2.54-. The knowledge of seen and unseen objects arising through the
three means of knowledge which have been mentioned is, in reality,
located in the individual soul as a quality of the soul. It is not
possible to say that this knowledge produced by a means of knowledge is
[already] referred to by the Knowledge which is the essential nature of
the soul. Because there is the experience of that knowledge [arising
from a means of knowledge] as separate from the individual soul in the
mental perception: "I know", "knowledge has arisen in me". Similarly,
when the knowledge relating to what is favourable or unfavourable is
inferred in Davadatta etc, due to the brightness of countenance or by a
troubled countenance, or by movement in such a manner, then too, the
knowledge which is to be proved is inferred as indeed separate from the
subject, Devadatta etc., as it is located in that [subject i.e. Devadatta],
Similarly, the vision of the supreme Self etc., which is a particular
knowledge taught in the sacred texts such as: "my dear, the Self should
indeed be seen" (Brh.2.4.5.), is taught as certainly separate from the
individual soul who is the seer. Because the agent certainly does not
become the action anywhere.
It should not be said that the individual soul, being only of the
nature of Knowledge, appears as a locus of Knowledge due to error.
[reason] Because a sublating knowledge in the manner that: "I am not
the locus of Knowledge, but only of the nature of Knowledge" is not seen
at any time. Furthermore, the knowership of the individual soul, which
183
is established by the sacred texts etc., is logically demonstrated
because Knowledge is certainly separate from the individual soul as it
is located in that [soul]. For instance there are the sacred texts:
"then he knows" (Ch.8,12.4.), "the one who knows [Brahman] situated in
the intellect" (Tai.2.1.1.) , "this person indeed knows", "the one who
sees, does not see death" (Ch.7.26.2.), "Thus indeed...for the all
seeing person" (Pr.6.5.). There is also the tradition: "He who is
undeluded knows me thus, the Highest Person" (G.15.19.)* The knowership
of the individual soul is established [by the words]: "for this very
reason [the soul] is a knower" (B.S.2.3.19.) and this is in agreement
with the essence of the sutras.
comment
See 2.10, and following comment.
2.55.
I 3TF*R ^ | n*fT ff I
PW
Ck,
sr ^ R?n-
(?tfo H I H ) l ^11^3 * mrM’Cf l
OTPrft I 3TWHFTT RST
^ I 3R ^ 7 ( sftwm I f% 5 tRqFtFTtsft |
^RTt ( m° $ r 3 r ^
R 1 IR ), ^
(ifto vs i ^ 1 ; 3TFTFfh%
'2.55. It should not be said that the Knowledge in the cognition: "I
know" appears as located in the I-notion, but it is not located in the
self, [reason] Because the self alone is the meaning of the word "I"
there [in the sentence: "I know"]. To explain. Though the two, the
I-notion and I-ness, are referred to by the word "I", they are mutually
distinct. In regard to those two, the I-notion is another name for
pride and it is a particular modification of the mind. This is
184
certainly to be given up by a person who desires liberation because
it is contrary to knowledge. This very I-notion has been told here in
the Gita : "The great elements, the I-notion..." (Gr. 13.5.) as being
included within the field [i.e. the non-self].
However "I-ness" is not contrary to knowledge. The word "I",
which directly denotes this [I-ness], refers to the essential nature
of the self. This I-ness exists indeed everywhere: in waking, in dream,
in deep sleep and in liberation. This exists not only just for the
individual soul, but also for the supreme Self. Because the use of the
word "I" which shows the essential nature of His own self can be seen
in the sacred text here; "I, [having entered] these three deities..."
(Ch.6.3.2,), in regard to the resolve of the supreme Self, prior to
the origination of the world, relating to the origination of the world.
The use of the word "I" in that manner is seen in the Gita also: "Never
did I [not exist]" (G.2.12.), "I am [the source and dissolution] of
the entire [world]" (G.7.6.). So the word "I" in the cognition: "I
know" points out the essential nature of the self. Thus it is
established that Knowledge is indeed located in the self but it is
not located in the I-notion.
2 - 56 * l <$WT
ipiT m q sfcr-
wwiqqfq i ft 5 w fmq qrcrfq-
ni ,
^ 53 : 1 m ftwrofa m &&
-qrfq 1 srftr i sfte qq
5 q l !
^ snrosiq \
Hint qfc: q mm s ( %o hick) %\h r
qr °n (|® « I v \ 2 % )^qiqn£q-
>#^qq qq1 iq#nq
185
^ HTOim 3 * i creft-
<rc%: l
2.56. The Knowledge which is a quality of the individual self does
not pervade only its locus, like colour etc. Just as the qualities of
a light [i.e. a lamp flame] such as colour, sensation, number,
dimension etc. occur only as the essential nature of the light,
Knowledge does not exist in that manner i.e. only as the essential
nature of the soul. But just as the lustre of a light, though
existing with dependence upon the light, pervades the entire house
which is the location of the light, so too, even though Knowledge
exists with dependence upon the individual soul it pervades the whole
body which is the location of the soul.
It should not be thought that the individual soul itself
pervades the whole body, [reason] Because that [soul] is of a minute
size. Accordingly, there is the sacred text; "...for [the soul] is
seen to be even less, merely the point of an awl" ($v.5.8.).
The individual soul is to be known as a part of
the hundredth part of the point of a hair
divided a hundredfold. And that [soul] is
capable of limitlessness, (^v.5.8.9.)
Also, the sacred text concerning the departure [of the soul]: "the
self departs from the eye or the head" (Brh.4.4.2.) agrees for this
very reason. The author of the sutras has also demonstrated that the
individual soul is certainly of a minute nature, through sutras such
as: "On account of [its] departure, moving and returning" (B.S.2.3.20).
It need not be doubted that if the individual soul is minute, the
experience of happiness etc. pervading the body is impossible, [reason]
Because that [experience] is logically possible even through the
pervasion by the attributive consciousness.
186
2;57.
mi m q£*n fqqqq^q # i qt
qnfeqq^rsrq qira qtwq^nqf iqq;%q qqm i m~
^ I ^:4 ft qq qq: qf^-qq I sq-
qqqtqr qqpiqrtr^^q fm fq^TjpmqRi qn^%r<*?qq
qqf¥. i cm ^Tqmr qqpkwq qiMiqTq
qn%RR^qd™: qqqfafaiqqq !{?m I ^T ^ 5 ^-
qqr^r q cr^q- 'bM ftfMtra t m q
qq? t qrqmr vvk #rq qqqqip «?ta: #q% ( ^t®
cm l) q&qr q^tRqqftqr q ^ <rm qim%-
?rii%q^(|o q l U X X^i q^qt^ q?qm (^o y>i?$R),
* ^TT^qqfq ( ^to \s 1 qn I q) ^qif^qfqq qunTqtq q^qqc?q
rcqq q m qfqqqTqlqTifiqtmqqq ^^m 1 wnfrq^qqfq-
fqRqqqt q %w tfm%qqiTH: qq?q fnwq^qif%-
Wi I qR qfr?qsq qfqi^Fqjq^q qqq^q qjqq-
qfa: l m q ^rq#TT^%qqqq wqq*F%nq^cr I
2-,57. This Knowledge which is a quality of the individual soul has
a contracted nature in the state of bondage because of karma . It
becomes expanded in the state of liberation when there is dissolution
of the bondage characterized by karma by reaching the supreme light.
Therefore, effort must necessarily be applied for that end [liberation].
In regard to that, the sequence has been indicated in this
manner; at first, subsequent to investiture with the sacred thread,
there is the undertaking of studying the Veda along with its auxiliaries
in accordance with the injunction; "one should study one's own
portion". Then, having understood the meaning of the Veda in a general
way, he undertakes listening to the Purvamlmamsa for the ascertainment
of that [meaning]. Then he ascertains; "the nature of action is like
this and its result is of this type". Having observed there in the
sacred texts that the result of actions is insignificant and
transient: "just as here, the world which is acquired by work
perishes, in just the same way there in the other world, the world
which is acquired by merit perishes" (Ch.8.1.6.) etc. So too, having
187
observed in the sacred texts that the result of the knowledge of
Brahman is not insignificant and is permanent: "the knower of Brahman
attains the highest" (Tai.2.1.1.)» "the one who sees, does not see
death" (Ch .7 .26.2.) , "he becomes self-sovereign" (Ch.7.25.2.) etc.,
he undertakes listening to the Uttaramxmamsa for the ascertainment of
that [Brahman].
Not only is there no attainment of what is desired i.e,
liberation, from work which is performed with the intention of a
result such as heaven, on the contrary, there is the attainment of
what is not desired i.e. the contraction of Knowledge. Therefore,
giving up such work, the supreme Person should be worshipped with
a mind endowed with devotion. [The soul] who is accepted by Him as
His own enjoys limitless enjoyments along with Him,
2,:)8 ' ^ i
. I ^ wr HTqfa fat *rr-
^ Tl’Trfa ( $ | l V | R )
qKqfa i
2.58. This state is not for one who is living. Because as long as
this body which is acquired by karma exists, the happiness and sadness
which are to be experienced by it are not to be avoided. And because
divine enjoyment is not possible through that ordinary body. Moreover
the sacred text: "there is a delay for him only so long as he is not
liberated [from the body], then he will attain" (Ch.6.14.2.) excludes
liberation while living by saying that the liberation of a person who
possesses knowledge, who remains in the knowledge of the real, depends
only upon the fall of the body.
188
f?fT qRq^TRTgtfTTRt
Ufa: qRTRR qTqT^^TTfWqrqT^q^WT'-
HtMi^WRriV
ffaft TO# I ^1 g^PR HRIRferR mm\ ^RRTRFif-
q#r jfiww pqrcWnqfa: i
%qr ^irRr^TRTf HRmf ( qgo y|£ )
*\ *\ ... *S
W SOTtf JRrqHqqi%31% I %^TH-
qqRR^^Tt 4ifc(^ri%i^r %qrct ^r%^rr?hrt<t i tigxfc ww-
tIhtrih—
fer *r cf Rr4 h#h rwrt: i sr I
grtt #^<TRTRRRqmf% ^ q | I 3^*-
pipi? ^fRRRTqiRRM^ mgqqTT^r ir i R^giRisRqfr q
f| %R q^oRf RHI ( R° 3° R I ?tf I
R\3 ) fT% I
hwrr qiRit ^ Hc=rr isrhrhrcr^r i ( %o { \ \ )
^wf^qpTRN m^RRf I qT^*IT R qH^TR-
qmwrr I q h ^ttr^ (s?t° <: t \\\ i ) ^ 5 ^? hr}
3 ^t| rqqmtqqr^ 1 sRiffa: ^r n (qo^o y 1 v I rr ) fft
sRt^4ot RrRq qfwRRtTFrm I
2.59. After the fall of this body, the liberated soul assumes a
divine body and he remains experiencing the supreme Self as He is:
bereft of even a speck of blemish, endowed with boundless happiness,
consisting of all auspicious qualities together with possessing
great power and he experiences countless divine enjoyments which are
willed by the supreme Self and he thinks that: "I am the servant of
the supreme Self” .
[objection] If the liberated soul is a servant of the supreme
Self, the happiness of liberation would not be a human goal because
sorrow cannot be avoided in service. And there is no logical
possibility of activity on the part of the people for liberation,
on account of what has been said by the tradition: "service has been
called the condition of a dog, therefore one should avoid it" (Manu.
4.6.).
189
[reply] That is not so. Because there is not even a trace of
sorrow when service has been brought about by the love between both
the one to be served and the servant. Hence it has been told in the
Faramasamhita : "my servants are always free from affliction".
There is no identity of the individual self and the supreme Self
in liberation. Because there is no possibility of non-difference for two
[things] which are distinct. The difference between the individual self
and the supreme Self, while in the state of bondage, has certainly been
demonstrated before . In the Vis nupuran a too, it is said that non¬
difference is impossible: "because one substance does not become [another]
substance" (Vis,P.2.1 4.27•). And because difference has been established
in the state of liberation as well, on account of the sacred text;
"knowing the self and the Mover to be separate, then being blessed by
Him, he [the self] attains immortality" (^v.1-,6,). And the state of
liberation is free from a final limit with regard to time. Because by
the sacred text: "he does not return again" (Ch.8.15.1.) it is made
known that the liberated soul has no further return to worldly existence.
This very thing has certainly been taught by the Brahmasutra : "non¬
return according to scripture" (B,S.4.4.22.).
i i to ft i
TO |
[front TOkmn ^
l I wk cfTT^T-
KT^mrwiT ^ \ tnt ron^rt l froTOm: TOnreh: i
WSTOnt I WT ^
190
w snsrwm I ^r
^TTRTTtF^ f%3 *TTO^FTr^^T qigwf^T^ ( <£<> VR l V* ) I.
(^ ^IH)I ^rq^T^T^T
I qnrct fcqt fqf%-
ten wx$ *r ( f° ? l.M 3. >
-2,60. Thus the categories have been taught according to the view of
Ramanuja. With regard to those, there are categories which appear to
be different and which are also accepted as different categories by
the logicians. In reality, they are not different but are included in
what has already been told. To explain. There is the inclusion of
earth, water, fire, air, space and mind in the primary matter since
they have their basis in the primary matter. Darkness, however, is
not different as it is only earth. There is the inclusion of the
directions such as east, south etc. in space, because east etc. have
the nature of being different parts of space distinguished according
to the connection with the sun. Disjunction is only the absence of
conjunction. Separateness is also the same. Number, size, fluidity
and viscidity are the nature of their respective locations. Remoteness
and proximity, which are brought about by location, are the
characteristics of location. Remoteness and proximity, which are
brought about by time, are the characteristics of time.
Merit is the love of the Lord. Demerit is the absence of such
love. Love is only a particular type of Knowledge. Intelligence,
happiness, sadness, desire, aversion, effort and reminiscent impression
are only particular types of Knowledge, Speed is a particular type of
action. Elasticity is a particular type of conjunction. There is the
inclusion of upward motion, downward motion, contraction and expansion
within motion. And motion is only a particular type of conjunction.
Weight is a particular type of potency.
The generic attribute of potness etc. are the particulars of
191
the respective forms. Attributes such as being knowable, spaciousness,
Lordship, being Devadatta etc. are the characteristics of the locus.
It was demonstrated previously that non-existence is not [something]
different, but is only another form of existence (2.53.). So too,
the inclusion of the means of knowledge as well, such as comparison
etc., has been mentioned previously (2.51, 52, 53.).
The qualities of the individual self such as desire, anger etc.
are only particular states of the attributive consciousness of the
individual self. But the sacred text: "desire, resolve, doubt, faith,
lack of faith, steadiness, unsteadiness, shyness, intelligence and
fear; all these are just the mind" (Brh.1.5.3.) must be understood as
figurative because desire etc. necessarily accompany the mind.
comment
In this manner, the Visi§j>advaitins subsume the nine substances
and twenty-four qualities enumerated by Nyaya-Vaisesika (cf. Athalye's
edition of Tarka-Samgraha , p.73f.) into their own schema. See comment
to 2.5. Also, cf. Yatlndramatadlpika , Para.17 and 18. p.151f. The
mention of darkness (tamas ) is with reference to the Bhatta school of
MImamsa which holds that darkness is a substance.
192
T fcffi p fo f ^ I 5B ^T <
'*<4 *J <?<J RKI -<H «ld TT^(W-M%-
z?m~
\ ^ri *n*#F-
N^l
Tim^’TFrf
^ 5 1
The teaching of ^ri Jsankaracarya and Ramanujacarya has been
explained. Nov, these two types of teachings are concisely told for
the ease of understanding the principal conclusions set out here.
The teaching of the exponents
of non-duality, who follow the
views derived from Sankara:
(1 ) Reality is one alone, it is
the Self. There is nothing
other.
m i ^^^mfnTR^T-
I ;
(2) Anything at all other than
the Self is not real: whether
it belongs to the same class
as the Self, to a different
class from the Self or is
located in the Self. The Self
is indeed bereft of the
threefold difference: internal
The teaching of the exponents of the
non-duality of what has been qualified,
which belongs to Ramanuja:
(1) The Self is one alone, qualified
by a body consisting of the sentient
and the insentient. But there is
nothing other than that [Self] and His
body.
mm ^^TT*fr
(2) The Self is different from the
individual souls, who belong to the
same class as Himself on account of
being sentient. The Self is different
from the inert primary matter etc. which
belongs to a different class on account
of being insentient and the Self is
different from the qualities which
193
division, having something produce what is good and which
belonging to the same class or belong to Himself,
something belonging to a different
class .
3 h I fswr-
* wm i
(3) The Self is free from
distinction. It cannot be said in
any way that it is "such and
such".
mi\ ftr'Tt !
TOT I
(3) The Self possesses distinction.
Endowed with such distinctions as
omniscience, eternity, pervasiveness
etc., it is able to be expressed
by words such as: "all knowing",
"eternal", "pervasive" etc.
srfcrl
A
(4) For this very reason, that
[Self] is free from qualities.
Even the qualities which produce
what is good do not exist there
[in the Self] in reality.
3 ITTTO^i: 1
(5) A quality, even in the form
of Knowledge, does not exist
there [in the Self]. That [Self]
(4) The Self is by nature the locus
of many groups of qualities which
produce what is good, such as being
free from sin etc. Qualities which
are to be given up do not exist
there [in the Self].
fa i
(5) Though that [Self] is Knowledge
by its very nature, it is the locus of
the quality of Knowledge. The
194
is itself of the very nature of Knowledge which is a quality is
Knowledge. indeed different from the Knowledge
which characterizes the essential
nature.
5 ^ ^ fTf^ i j
I j^TcT ^ ^ H RITRR -Wl^T t j
(6) For this very reason,
knowership does not exist there
[in the Self] in reality. However
an expression relating to
knowership is figurative.
(6) Therefore, in reality there
is certainly knowership for that
[Self]. For this very reason, He
is designated to be a "knower".
ns ^ I rtr-| m&m hftrfr i ?pt^t-
t^R^TTc*Rt <RT-
ki
(7) That [Self] is also not an
object of knowledge. Because
having one's own locus and one's
own object in oneself is
impossible .
C HTHRHT #T
fttT. I WfT%#T4 I
(8) The supreme Self is
unchangeably eternal in its own
nature. And in that very nature it
(7) That [Self] is certainly also
an object of knowledge. Since the
Knowledge which is a quality is
different from the Self, therefore
it is possible to have the locus of
that [Knowledge which is a quality]
and its object in the Self.
I
(8) The supreme Self is
unchangeably eternal in His own
nature. But He is eternal while
tjnRRr*Ti
3 <ir
195
is without a second. undergoing transformation; as
qualified by a body consisting of
the sentient and insentient. [The
supreme Self] is without a second
only in a manner which is qualified.
(9) For this very reason, it is
said that Brahman is "non-dual".
j 1 f%
;g i
fall I
(9) Brahman is non-dual, but it is
not non-duality of the modes but
rather non-duality of the possessor
of the modes. Because even though
the individual souls and inert
objects, which are the modes of
Brahman, are many, Brahman who
possesses the modes is one.
W(m ^15^ ^ i
^ I
(10) Because the supreme Self is
of the nature of pure existence,
Knowledge which is non-different
from that [supreme Self] is also
only of the nature of existence.
It does not have existence as its
(10) That Knowledge which is a
quality is not of the nature of
pure existence, but has existence
as its object.
object.
196
? ? 'twwt ^ qFftqTTwH- l
^ vfiqTqtf | #3Riff ^gRT^ rfWT T%T
^ 5 ^TcRtIM FTR^- f^N^N^q qfqqqq; I I
qjqqqrq^l
(11) The supreme Self alone is (ll) The supreme Self is indeed
the Lord, having maya as its the Lord. The class of individual
limiting adjunct and [the supreme souls and the class of inert
Self] is the individual soul, objects, which are His body, are
having avidya as its limiting certainly different from that
adjunct. What is inert exists [Lord]. Thus reality is threefold;
only in appearance and is the sentient, the insentient and
certainly false. Thus reality is the Lord.
one alone.
fw m r%j-
q qrqRq^%qr,HT- qfR# wm from: I
(12) The power of the supreme (12) The primary matter ( pradhana ),
Self, which has three qualities which consists of three qualities
and can be expressed by the words and which is different in reality
ajnana etc., though it is non- from the supreme Self, is the
different from the supreme Self primary material of the world.
it is as though different. The
supreme Self, conditioned by that
[power], is the primary material
of the world,
^ -wm-
m i m mfe?: i qf v*m I www -j
q^: l
197
(13) This world appears just in
the supreme Self on account of
Ignorance. This is the teaching
of apparent transformation.
?» fa
5RTR*fa * 5 i
(14) This world which is an
apparent transformation of the
supreme Self and exists only in
appearance is certainly false.
It is not real.
\\ fa RrpTfifafa
mm I
(15) This world which appears
due to the defect of Ignorance
is inexplicable. Thus there is
the apprehension of the
inexplicable.
(13) Only the primary matter
transforms itself into the form of
the world, on account of the
presence of the Lord who is the
inner-controller. This is the
teaching of real transformation.
JTWR'TRWWT fa
* ©v
fa sr 3 l
(14) This world which is a
transformation of primary matter is
certainly real. It is not false.
m? mrnmi 1
(15) In reality, the world is
recognised as certainly real. Thus
everywhere there is the apprehension
of the real
^ fafa-
(16) The objects which appear in
the case of silver upon a pearl-
oyster and in dream etc. are
certainly inexplicable.
^Tvbt' J 1 , i'P-R> Rlfal ^
wrc ottr 1
(16) In the case of silver upon a
pearl-oyster and in dream etc. the
objects are recognised as certainly
real.
198
TOW
m i rnmq TOqiFrcro
(17) Even the scripture is indeed
unreal, because it is included
within the world. Still, it is
certainly the means for the
knowledge of reality, like an
object belonging to a dream.
TOW *T?TOT?q TO TO-
tototwtto-
WWiq I
(17) Because the scripture is indeed
real, it is the means for the
knowledge of reality. Because the
production of what is real from
what is unreal is impossible.
\C TOIW^TOTTH 3WITH
Wk
(18) The means of knowledge,
which are the instruments for
the knowledge of a thing, are
six: perception, inference,
comparison, verbal testimony,
postulation and non-cognition.
WTO *FfH wht:-
(19) Where knowledge arises by
the means of knowledge, the
internal-organ manifests the
knowledge.
TOHWHTWTH WTTOT
(18) The means of knowledge,
which are the instruments for
the knowledge of a thing, are
three: perception, inference and
verbal testimony.
WFTOWH fR ^ ^
TORgiT I
(19) The knowledge which arises
by the means of knowledge is in
reality located in the individual
soul.
5 0 TOTWRi TOTOTORf #• TOHRT WTTCTTOTIJ TOTW-
TORR $TTO¥- WOJcTT #TT ^ fTTTOW
TO TO TO^TOTTOH^ljlTRgTO^H iR
199
(20) Even the individual souls, (20) Even the individual souls,
who are noh-different from the who are the body of the supreme
supreme Self, are of the nature Self and who are different from
of Knowledge just like the the supreme Self, have Knowledge
supreme Self but they are not, as their essential nature and
in reality, the locus of Knowledge as a quality. Thus they
Knowledge, Knowership, however, have knowership in reality,
has the internal-organ as its
adjunct,
sfRTM l t% ihw: I
'TtSfTO |
(21) The sense of "I" which (21) The sense of "I" which is the
appears as the locus of Knowledge locus of Knowledge is most certainly
is not the individual self but the individual soul. However the
the I—notion which is a mode of I—notion, which is different from
the internal-organ. that [sense of "I"], is not the
locus of Knowledge.
I | sffaVsj: |
(22) The individual soul is (22) The individual soul is minute,
pervasive.
^5 I I
(23) That [individual soul] (23) That [individual soul]
pervades in all the limbs of pervades in all the limbs of
the body by its very nature. the body by means of Knowledge»
200
va mwm ^ I
(24) The individual soul, who
has Brahman as its very nature,
is thus only one. Whereas the
multiplicity of souls pertains
to a limiting adjunct.
m-\
1WTTW I |
(25) There is the commencement
of the inquiry into Brahman
following the accomplishment
of the fourfold means.
(26) Verbal testimony also
produces perceptual knowledge
in the presence of the totality
of causes for perception.
(27) The cessation of ignorance
is indeed immediate upon the
direct apprehension of the
essential nature of the Self
through the "great statements"
(24) The individual souls are
in reality manifold. But the non-
duality of souls is the non-duality
of the mode.
I
(25) There is the commencement
of the inquiry into Brahman
following the knowledge of the
nature of works.
(26) The knowledge arising from
verbal testimony is only mediate,
never perceptual.
(27) The supreme Self is pleased
by the strength of meditation
which is produced by the "great
statements" etc.
etc.
201
f%wfrwr^sfi ^ ^Wr
5^: l !ii%: l
(28) Upon the immediate
apprehension of the Self which
is beyond pleasure and pain
there is liberation for one
who is living, even though the
earthly body exists.
(28) There is never liberation
for one who is living. Because
the experience of pleasure and
pain is inevitable as long as the
earthly body exists.
’TTUFtRT *r?
i
(29) When there is
relinquishment of the body upon
the destruction of the actions
which have produced their results
there is abiding in one's own
nature.
(29) When there is
relinquishment of the earthly
body upon the destruction of the
actions which have produced their
results, there is the utmost
similarity with the supreme Self
due to the acquisition of a
divine body.
(30) This is liberation free from
the body.
(31 ) In liberation [which is free
from the body] there is no
"I-ness".
^30) This alone is liberation,
(31 ) "I-ness" certainly exists
even in liberation
202
3 P , p?T ij l
(32) In liberation there is no (32) The difference between the
difference between the individual individual soul and Brahman
soul and Brahman. certainly exists even in liberation.
^RRf I \wh i
(33) In this state there is no (33) An abundance of pleasure is
pain, not even slightly, nor is experienced in this state,
there pleasure. unconnected with even a trace of
pain.
203
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO; VI £> ISTXDVAITAMATAM .
1. The name of the author of a code of law, Cf., Apte, p,1755»
2, £esa, or Ananta, is the name of the serpent upon which Visnu
reclines, Cf,, Yamunacarya's Stotraratna , vs, 38-40.
3.
£rT.B. 1.1,3, Para.87. p.200; 2.1,12, Para.258. p.577.
4.
ibid., 1,1.3. Para,93. p.209ff.
5.
ibid., 1.1,3, Para,87. p.200, Para.94, 95. p.213.
6.
ibid,, 2.1.12. Para.258. p,577.
7.
ibid., 2.3.42, Para,353. p.745: 2.3.45. Para.355. P.748.
8.
Ved.S, Para.87. p.123.
9.
See comment to 1 ,9.
10.
£rI.B. 1,1.1, Para,51 . p.98; 3.2.21. Para,407. p,821 . Ved.S,
p.93.
11.
B ? h. 3,7.3, 22. Cf., grl.B. 1.1.13. Para.134. p.285f.
12.
Ved.S. Para.76. p.114.
13.
£rT.B, 1.1,1. Para.50, p.93f.
1 4.
ibid.
15.
ibid., 1.4,27. Para.243. p,55l; 2.1.14. Para.261. p.580.
Ved
.S. p.93.
16,
Ved.S. Para.84. p,121f (sarvaprakara.., )
17.
3rI.B. 2.3.45. Para.355. p.748.
18,
ibid,, 1,1,1, Para,57. p,116. Ved.S, Para,85. p.122.
19,
Ved.S, Para.85. p,122.
20 ,
£rx.B, 2,3.45. Para,355, p,748. The term "Visiftadvaita"
can
be
resolved in two ways, (l ) visi s fasya advaitam i.e. the non-duality
( advaita ) of Brahman who is qualified ( visi sta) by all sentient
and insentient things, (2) visi s fayor advaitam i.e. there is
non-duality between two qualified Brahman's ; Brahman in the
causal state qualified by all sentient and insentient things in
their subtle condition, and Brahman in the state of effect
qualified by all sentient and insentient things in their gross
condition. This means that there is non-duality of Brahman
qualified by both states. Cf,, V. Varadachari, "Antiquity of the
term Visistadvaita" The Adyar Library Bulletin, vol. xxvi, parts
3-4, 1962. p,177ff. Also l&rldharasastrT Pa^hak, Kenopanisat
with the commentaries of ^ankaracarya , Rangaramanu.ja and the
commentary BalabodhinT . Poona, 1919. Introduction, p.15»
21, $rT.B, 1.4.22, Para,235. p.533.
22. YatT, p.2ff.
204
23, Cf. J. van Buitenen, Yamuna's Agama Pramanyam or Treatise on the
validity of Pancaratra . Madras. 1971. Also, V. Neevel, Yamuna 1 s
Vedanta and Pancaratra : integrating the classical and the
popular . Harvard. 1977.
24. YatT. p.2ff.
25 • ibid . , p.1 35.
26. P, Otto Schrader, Introduction to the Pancaratra and the
Ahirbudhnya Samhita , Madras, 1916, Second Ed. 1973. p.42ff. Also,
S. Gupta, "The Caturvyuha and the Visakha-Yupa in the Pancaratra"
in The Adyar Library Bulletin , vol. xxxv. Parts 3-4. Dec. 1971 .
p.192f.
27. Cf., van Buitenen, op-cit , Vedanta Desika has also written a work
on the Pancaratra called Pancaratrarak sa.
28. Ramanuja states that the Pancaratra literature was composed by
the Lord Himself, &rT,B. 2.2.42. Para.326. p.700.
29. Schrader, op-cit ,, p.38,
30. Cf., YatT, Para.15. p.132.
31. ibid . Also, J.B. CarmAn, The Theology of Ramanuja. An essay in
Interreligious Understanding . New Haven. 1974. p.88ff.
32. 3rT.B. 3.3.13. Para.426. p.857,
33. S ,T. vs , 3 , p.10.
34. S.T. p .42 , line 9ff. ^rT.B. 2.3.29. Para.346. p.731 .
35. S.T. p.38, line 1. &rI.B. 2.3.31. Para.347. p.733; 2.3.33. Para.
349. p.736.
36. Ved.S. Para,90. p.1 25.
37. Cf., Katha. 1 .2.18.
38. 3rT.B. 2.3.20. Para.342. p.727.
39.
40.
41 .
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
ibid ., 1.1.1. Para.58. p.1 22. Ved.S, Para.5. p.74.
^ri.B. 2.3.43. Para.354, p.747; 2.3.47. Para,356, p,750. Ved.S,
Para.5. p.74.
Jiri.B. 2,3.47.Para.356. p.750; 2.3.48, Para.356, p.750.
Ved.S. Para.5. p.74.
ibid .
Ved.S. Para.79. p.116, Ramanuja cites Vis.P.
^rT.B. 1,1,1. Para.58. p.122. Ved.S. Para.78, p,116.
kjri.B. 1,1.13. Para.135. p.290. Ved.S. Para.7. p,11 4; Para.143.
205
p.171f.
47. YatT. Para.1. p.79.
48. ibid ., Para,2. p.79f.
49. ibid . , Para.3. p.80.
50. ibid ., Para.3f. p.80f.
51 . This verse has not been located in the Siddhitrayam .
52. JsrT.B. 1.1.1, Para.37. p.62 (verses)f. S.T. p.39» line 1 and 6.
53. ^rT.B. 1.1.1. Para.38. p.65. S.T. p.62, final line.
54. JsrT.B. 1,1.1. Para.38. p.65.
55. ibid ., 1.1,1. Para,36. p.60. S.T. p.31 , line 16.
56. S.T, p.62, line 8f.
57. £rI.B. 1.1.1. Para.36. p.61 ,
58. ibid ., 1 .1 ,1 . Para.36. p.60. Also , p.61 . S .T. p.31 , line 15 .
59. Ved.S. Para.43. p.98.
60. YatT. Para.13. p.9l . S.T. p.56, line 5f,
61. £>rx.B, 1,1.1. Para.38. p,64, YatT. Para.9. P*89.
62. S.T. p.32, line 16f ; p.39, line 7; p.62, line 8ff.
63. S'rT.B. 2.3.26. Para.344, p.730.
64. ibid., 1,1,1. Para.38. p.64,
65. ibid . •
66. See comment to 1.51. Also, cf, Ramanuja's accurate presentation
of the Advaita view in ^rT.B. 1,1.1, Para.37. p.62 ( purvapak sa).
Also, S.T. p.39, final line.
67. This section largely follows the more lengthy exposition in the
YatT, p,53ff.
68. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Ed. & trans.), The Sankhyakarika of
Tsvara K rsna. Madras. 1973. p.xxxii.
69. ibid ., p.37. However it must be said that according to Abhyankar's
later explanation, the three qualities are both the constituents
and the attributes of prakrti .
70. Por an elaboration of this topic, cf. YatT. p,75ff. For an
explanation of these divisions of time, cf. ibid ., notes to
p.187.
71. This explanation is largely based upon the YatT, p,l41ff.
206
72. ibid .. p.144ff.
73. In the T.S, (Athalye's Ed.) section 27, p.18, conjunction is
defined as the "cause of the common designation of two things
being joined" (samyuktavyavaharahetu ) which is, in effect, the
same as the Visistadvaita definition: samyuktapratyayanimittam
samyogah . Cf. Xatl. Para.14, p.148,
74. T.S. p.164. Tati. Para.15. p,150.
75. Visistadvaita does not accept the category of samavaya , Instead,
they maintain that the perception of a quality in its locus is
"dependence in what is conjoined with the sense organ". XatT.
Para.15. p.10.
76. T.S. Para,79. p.61 .
77. ibid ., p.96.
78. ibid ., p.97.
79. Xatl. Para.16. p.150.
80. S. Kuppuswami Sastri , A Primer of Indian Logic . According to
Annambhat t a's Tarkasamgraha . Madras, Third Ed. 1961. p.7f (part 111).
81. Ved.S. Para.78, p.113. 3rT,B. 1.1.1. Para.77. p.178 ; 2.1.15. Para.
283. p.615.
82. XatT. Para.1l, p.130,
83. Ved.S, Para.39. p.94.
84. ibid .
85. £rT.B. 1.1,1. Para,48. p.90. Also, cf. the Kasikavrtti on the
As tadhyayT 2.1.49.
86. &rT.B, 1 .1 .1 . Para.48. p.90. Ved.S, Para.37. p.93.
87. £r!.B. 1.1.2. Para.86. p,198.
88. ibid ,
89. ibid ., 1.1.1. Para,66. p.145. Also, 3.2.3. Para.395. p.80l; 3,2.5.
Para,396, p,803.
90. Cf,, Tai .2.5 .1 .
91. 3rT.B, 1.1.1. Para.51 . p.97.
92. Cf,, the commentary of Rangaramanuja in Pathak, op-cit ., p.16. See
fn. 20.
93. 3rT.B. 1.1.1. Para.28. p.45; Para.30. p.51 .
94. ibid ., 1,1.1, Para,66. (verse) p.1 44,
95.
ibid., Para.66. p.143. Sudarsana Suri, in commenting upon this
207
section, states that Nathamuni, Yamuna etc. held this view.
96. The YatT, Para.24. p.14, refers to this view as satkhyati .
Sudarsana calls it yatharthakhyati .
97. £rI.B. 1.1.1, Para.65. p.141.
98. i6id ., Para,67. p.148f. Also, YatT. Para.33. p.17.
99. N.S. Anantharangachar, The Philosophy of Sadhana in Visi s tadvaita .
Mysore. 1967. p.250.
100. YatT, Para.7. p.5.
101. Anantharangachar, op-cit .. p,248.
102. Kuppuswami Sastri, op-cit ., p,168. For an explanation of
Prabhakara's view, cf., G. Jha, The Prabhakara School of Purva
MI mamsa . Delhi, (reprint) 1978. p.37ff.
103. G.P. Bhatt, Epistemology of the Bha t ta School of Purva MTmarosa .
Varanasi. 1962. p.194. Also, YatT. Para.38. p.19. T.S. p.215.
104. ^rT.B. 1.1,1. Para.30, p.51 .
105. Cf., YatT. Para.1. p.38. The same definition has been given by
Vedanta Desika in his Nyayaparisuddhi , cf., Anantharangachar,
op-cit ., p.278.
106. The YatT. Para.47. p.48, makes a subdivision within secondary
denotation; implication ( lak sana) and figurative expression
(gaunT).
107. Abhyankar states that Visistadvaitins interpret the sentence: "you
are That” ( tat tvam asi ) by resorting to "exclusive implication"
( .jahallak sana). He says the word "That", which directly expresses
Brahman, has the implied meaning through "exclusive implication"
in the sense of the "body of Brahman". According to Abhyankar,
the sentence means; "you" ( tvam ) i.e. the individual soul "are"
( asi ) "That" ( tat ) i.e. body of Brahman. This explanation does
not seem to be correct. In the view of Visistadvaita there is no
use of implication in the sentence: "you are That", They interpret
the sentence in the following manner; the word "That" denotes the
omniscient Brahman who is the cause of the world. The word "you"
makes known -just through its express meaning- the supreme Self
qualified by the individual soul because the word "you" directly
expresses the supreme Self qualified by a body in the form of the
individual soul. The word "are" ( asi ) has the meaning of "is" ( asti ) .
108. Ved.S. Para.108. p.138; Para.75. p.113. ^rx.B. 1.1.13. Para.134.
p.287.
109. &rT.B, 1,1.1. Para.72 p.163; 1.1.13. Para,134. p.288. Ved.S,
Para,20. p,82,
110. JsrT.B. 1.1.1. Para.72. p.163. Ved.S. Para.20. p.83.
208
3.1 .
FrtatqqrpRrr w \ w qrcrro
Mfa^wrrw^ ^ im w i
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WWT W ($oo) 5TT%^T-
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^TKf^ISS^rfT q^ftcTT—‘ WTR^rsq^T-
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q^rwiFm mmK wmri^ra i
3-. 1. The teaching of the exponents of maya and of the exponents of
Visi§tadvaita has been explained. It should not be mistaken that this
teaching of maya was produced by 3ri ^ahkaracarya through his own
imagination as [something] that was indeed quite new. [reason] Because
Ramanujacarya, though not tolerating the teaching of maya . has accepted
that this teaching of miya existed even prior to the author of the sutras .
Accordingly, in the ^rlbha g ya (Para.159. p.335.), a prima facie view was
shown to have been aimed at in the mind by the author of the sutras who
composed the sutra presenting the established conclusion: "Everywhere,
because there is taught what is known" (B.S.1.2.1.) [by the statement]:
this individual self, which is itself Brahman as its
nature is unlimited, exists as a god, animal, human
being or a plant due to beginningless Ignorance.
Similarly, in that same place (jS$ri. B. Para. 205 .p.473.) a doubt was shown
to have been admitted by the author of the sutras since it is to be
removed by this sutra : "On account of difference in deep sleep and
departing" (B.S.1 .3.43.) [the doubt is expressed by the words]:
there is certainly no other Self which is a different
entity from the Self within; because of the teaching
209
of identity and because of the negation of duality.
Because the inner-Self, in its pure state, is
designated as the "supreme Self", the "supreme
Brahman" and the "supreme Lord".
Thus it is established that this teaching of maya existed even prior
to the author of the sutras.
3,2 ‘ ant g * l
I ^5^2? i tfT^RT-
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‘<#FR?r fan; rwg^fcFrfr ^r-
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tamn i
3.2. However it should not be supposed that this teaching of maya
was not accepted by the author of the Brahmasutras . Because there is
mention of the teaching of maya in the sacred text itself: "one should
know that the primary matter is maya and that the great Lord is the
possessor of maya " (^v<.4.10.). And the teaching of maya has been
very clearly mentioned by the author of the sutras in the sutra :
" maya and the possessor of maya " (B.S.Si.1,1.2.) in the
Siddhantadarsanam J It should not be said that the real primary matter
alone can be expressed by the word maya , since it brings about the
creation of diverse objects, [reason] Because the word maya is well
210
known as having the meaning of "indeterminable". And because of the
contradiction with the sacred text referred to by the Niranjanabha s ya :
"in it [Brahman] the primary matter was indeterminable, possessing the
qualities red, white and black and having the qualities in equilibrium,
just like water, silver, a man or a streak etc. upon a desert, a pearl-
oyster, a post or a crystal etc.". So because maya is indeterminable [as
real or unreal], Brahman is established as the material cause of the
world which [i.e. the material cause] is in the form of a false appearance
This teaching of a false appearance has been very clearly told by the
author of the sutras . Accordingly, there is the sutra ; "Possessing real
transformation and false appearance" (B.S.Si.1.1.7.). This is the meaning:
a material cause is of two types: possessing real transformation and
possessing a false appearance. In regard to those two, clay etc. possesses
real transformation in the production of a pot etc. Whereas a pearl-oyster
etc. possesses a false appearance in the case of silver upon a pearl-
oyster etc. Real transformation is the attainment of another state by
abandoning the previous state. False appearance is that [attainment of
another state] without abandoning that [previous state].^ So in the
production of the manifest world, primary matter ( prak r ti ) possesses real
transformation whereas the supreme Being ( puru sa) possesses false
appearance.
3 ' 3 ' pq P sror% i I
I it
I m-
i px4 ^
( Wo p 3 q 0 3 ) ^ } f%rp
I pr* nr qft^rrqf^h: | ^
I ^331% qr g ttph; | ^
HWRTU% FfWRtim tr^
211
rv C
mfowKT I d ^ fFT^T
?%r^ ww g^fdcr
I ^ ffT^iqm %v{ | fe^T |^WI ^TWT-
3.3. The very supreme Being who is the material cause through false
appearance is designated by the word Brahman, Brahman has the sense of
"expanding". Expanding means pervading. Because the material cause
certainly pervades the entire class of effects. But what has been
stated (£ri. B. Para.2,p.3.):
Everywhere, the word Brahman [is understood] as being
connected to the quality of greatness. Where greatness
has unlimited pre-eminence in essential nature and
through qualities, that is the primary meaning of
this [word Brahman],
That is not so. Because Brahman who is free from qualities has no
possibility of the greatness which is brought about by qualities.
[objection] But we accept that Brahman is indeed the possessor
of qualities.
[reply] Greatness is a particular type of transformation. The
greatness which has unlimited pre-eminence is certainly the supreme
greatness. That is possible only in the essential nature, but not in
respect of qualities. Because there is no possibility of greatness in
qualities. Even the Vaise^ikas certainly do not accept qualities
within qualities. If [you object] that qualities are possible by means
of dependence upon qualities also, then [our reply is] that there is
the termination [of such a regress] only in the greatness belonging
to the essential nature of that [Brahman], Thus the statement: "and
through qualities" does not establish a special meaning.
It should not be said: because the followers of Ramanuja accept
Knowledge, though a quality located in Brahman, as a substance, there
212
is the possibility of greatness there [in Knowledge], [reason] Because
even so, there is the same situation on account of the incongruity of
the plural number: "through qualities", [objection] Suppose the
greatness [in respect of qualities] is only the nature of what is
worshipped, [reply] No, because such greatness is unknown in the world.
comment
Abhyankar argues that the explanation of the word "greatness"
(b rhattva ) refers only to the essential nature and not to qualities,
because there is no possibility of greatness in qualities. For example,
the colour blue is a quality but it has no "greatness" of its own. Also,
the mention of qualities does not establish anything new because
qualities refer to their locus and when the locus i.e. Brahman is
established as possessing greatness in its essential nature there is no
need to mention qualities separately.
rtw I ^f^RTTwr^: i ( ^ ww
W/T RRR q 5 imv. I l
f%T% i *(% gMWIT I
3.4. For the etymology of the word Brahman must be stated only in
accordance with the root brh the meaning of which is well known in the
world, because there is the maxim: "a word which can possess a meaning
that is understood in the world communicates [such a meaning] in the Veda
also". But a usage that is [only] met with occasionally does not
establish the intended meaning,
"Where greatness has unlimited pre-eminence, that is the primary
meaning of this [word Brahman]" is also incorrect. Because the portion
213
"unlimited pre-eminence" is not included in determining the capacity [of
the word "greatness"]. Because the reason for the usage of words which
express qualities is only the respective quality in general. But "pre¬
eminence" etc. are not included there [in the reason for the usage of
the word]. Even though the greatness in elephants and palaces etc. does
not have pre-eminence like [it has] in space, expressions such as: "the
great elephant", "the great palace" are accepted by all as only primary,
not as figurative. Thus it is established that Brahman has the sense of
"expanding".
The said Brahman, as the material cause of the false appearance of
the world, is indeed designated by the word "Self". This [Brahman] alone
is the one reality. There is nothing other than that [Brahman], There
is liberation upon the knowledge of this very Self.
c omment
Expressions such as; "unlimited pre-eminence" are not included in
the reason for the usage of the word "greatness", because the word
"greatness" alone has been told and there is no need to add these
adjectives to it. The etymological meaning is sufficient of itself.
3.5.
^ i |
srwmn tfa hww ii h ii
3.5-. What kind of liberation? That is told:
Liberation, which is continuance free from a body,
must take place from the knowledge of the Self.
That very [liberation] has been called in the
sacred text by the word "immortal" etc. 5.
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3.6. All happiness arising in the state of possessing a body is
certainly connected with unhappiness. Even though some, such as the sons
of kings etc., are seen to enjoy pre-eminent happiness, still, there is
no such happiness anywhere which is not unconnected with even a trace of
unhappiness. Even if there is no unhappiness anywhere today, the
unhappiness brought about by seeing the future state is certainly
inevitable everywhere. Even in heaven it is just the same. Because
thinking about the unhappiness produced by the inevitable death of the
body exists everywhere for those who keep in mind that the body has a
nature which is decaying day and night. There is no possibility of
unhappiness, even slightly, in a state where there is no body. Because the
experience of unhappiness is dependent upon a body. And on account of the
sacred text; "pleasure and pain do not touch the one who is indeed
bodiless" (Ch.8.12.1.).
Even though the sensation of pleasure does not exist in that
state, still, there is no fault. Because with regard to the happiness
which is connected to unhappiness, where there is no
unhappiness, even slightly, the absence of that type of happiness is
also to be desired* Because even the absence of nectar is preferable
■with regard to nectar which has been defiled by a drop of poison. The
bodiless state is established only from the validity of the sacred
text which has been cited (Ch.8.12.1.) and so it cannot be disputed
there [in the text] by a follower of the Mlmarasakas or by anyone else.
This very state is called by the word liberation. Only one who has
gained the state of liberation is liberated. Whereas even one who
enjoys the happiness of heaven is not said to be "liberated”. Apd only
the one who is liberated is referred to by the word immortal in the
sacred text; "the one who knows That in this manner becomes immortal
here" (lbr.Fu.6). Because the one who is liberated is bodiless and only
the one who is bodiless is immortal. Because death is certain if the
body exists.
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216
3.7. There is a popular statement; "the limit of fear is death". But
liberation is made known by the sacred text to be the total absence of
fear; "he certainly becomes the fearless Brahman" (Brh.4.4.25.). There
is the possibility of fear in some manner if the appearance of a
connection to a second object exists. Thus the absence of the cognition
of a connection to a second object there [in liberation] must necessarily
be stated. That cognition is twofold; according to his own view on the
part of one who is liberated and according to the view of others. And
liberation is twofold: liberation free from the body and liberation while
living. The absence of the cognition of a connection to a second object is
threefold: (1 ) on account of the absence of a second object anywhere,
(2) even if an object exists somewhere, on account of the absence of a
connection to it, (3) even if the connection to it exists somewhere, on
account of the absence of the cognition of that [connection]. Thus there
are twelve modes due to joining each of the two types of cognition;
according to his own view and according to the view of others, in a
fourfold division on account of their having a twofold nature due to the
distinction between the state of liberation while living and liberation
free from the body, and then each one [among those four] in a threefold
manner on account of the threefold absence of the object, the connection
[to the object] and the cognition [of the connection to the object]. With
regard to those, it is being investigated: are they actually possible or
are they not?
Among those, a second object certainly does not exist according
to the view of the one liberated in the state of liberation free from
the body. So how can there be a connection to that and how can there
be the cognition of a connection to it? However according to the view
of another [one who is not liberated] the absence of a second object
is utterly impossible. Because it is certainly accepted by all that
just as transmigratory existence is beginningless so also it is endless.
217
Whereas the view that there is liberation of all is not accepted by
anyone. So even though some such as &uka, Vamadeva, etc. are in the state
of liberation free from the body, because innumerable bound souls still
exist, a second object necessarily exists according to the view of those
[bound souls]. Nevertheless, the connection with that second object is
impossible for one who is liberated free from the body, so how can the
liberated soul be recognized as having a connection with a second object,
even according to the view of another bound soul? Just as a face does not
appear in the form of a reflection when there is no mirror, so too, in
liberation free from the body there is no appearance of oneself or of
another in the form of an individual soul which is a really existing
reflection, because of the absence of a limiting adjunct such as the
intellect which represents the mirror. Therefore how could there be the
cognition of a connection to a second object?
comment
The "twelve modes" can be represented as follows:
1. absence of a
second object.
liberation free from the body -ref. to liberated soul
and to another.
liberation while living -ref. to liberated soul and
to another.
2. absence of a
connection to a
second object.
liberation free from the body -ref. to liberated soul
and to another.
liberation while living -ref. to liberated soul
and to another.
3. absence of a
cognition of a
connection to a
second object.
liberation free from the body -ref. to liberated soul
and to another.
liberation while living -ref, to liberated soul
and to another.
sfrwr
;wgr% : fa I rt#r ^n^id
218
. ... A i„i , _ . .O *"S . /N
cRTTl W STntTnt q>#riR
i#r: l <r w q#faRf qp: qM^Rp*qrft mi
TR^g^T wn
c _$. &
q snM^^qur qR
<RT #RR^Tl
W ^TR[: 'T^ft ^T??f RJCfm^R 15 # ‘ $
jRRR^wJiRTf^n #q§?q m&fo <rt #r ^:#r qfaft^g-
m I f#p 5 9fTRR ^ RRRctW^TRR^IRTf^ fifTTR
sqp qr l *rt qr q*KF?%qT #Ru%qq *pir#i# Rqfc#R
q?p * 5? qraf^p ? #q qftf# t w wHi(#q t*qW~
qnrM# <FR^ f? qRf#(qR IIRTTRI^R « WJ f%
fqRw p f#if qp% tT^n q#iqfqpT imr-
fwr #p f-^rprqq qRTRqMRp r q^R[ *
qftRRp: ? #q STR^qM#^ # #Rq, qR,
q^qq * qM%Rpj » P HRHvqm
wr# # f% f#pqrqiRqq i%qr
f^nfqmrqqfqR f# q^ q# l !
3.8. Whereas in the state of liberation while living, the appearance
of even a liberated soul in the form of an individual soul who is a
reflection cannot be avoided, because of the existence of a limiting
adjunct such as the intellect which represents the mirror. A second
object certainly exists, so the connection to that also cannot indeed
be avoided. Because one who is liberated while living appears as an
individual soul even to himself and because the connection to a
second object exists, even though the cognition of that [connection to
a second object] also cannot indeed be avoided according to the view
of the one who is liberated and according to the view of another,
still, an investigation has to be made as to: "what is the nature of
that cognition?".
In regard to that, just as for bound souls an individual soul
does not appear in the form of a reflection, though existing as a
reflection in reality, but only in the form of a mere individual soul,
for one who is liberated while living it is not like that. Just as a
bird such as a sparrow, though seeing its own reflection in a mirror
219
does not know that "this is a reflection" and goes toward it with the
idea that there is another sparrow, similarly, a bound soul, though
himself the nature of a reflection, does not know that "I am a
reflection" and transacts in the world with the idea that there is
another self with regard to himself. And in respect of the Self, which
is the original [i.e. not a reflection], not knowing that "this is
the original" he worships it or disregards it with the idea that there
is another Self there [with regard to himself].
Just as a man etc., who is superior in knowledge with regard to
a sparrow etc., sees his own reflection in a mirror and knows "this
is a reflection" and seeing in the reflection the colour black, white
etc., and the particular characteristics of the form such as length,
because the knowledge exists that "this is a reflection" he begins to
do the investigation: "do the attributes perceived there [in the
reflection] belong to the original [i.e. the face] or do they belong
to the mirror?" Similarly, one who is liberated while living, who is
superior in knowledge with regard to a bound soul, sees himself to
be a reflection of the supreme Self in the limiting adjunct of the
intellect etc. and knows "this individual soul is a reflection" and
seeing in the individual soul who is a reflection: consciousness,
I-ness, action and experiences of happiness and unhappiness etc.,
because the knowledge exists that "this individual soul is a reflection"
he begins to do the investigation: "among consciousness, I-ness, action,
happiness and unhappiness etc. which are perceived there [in the
individual soul], what belongs to the supreme Self who is the original
and what belongs to the limiting adjunct such as the intellect?"
3 ' 9 '
^ wq qnnaw: ||
i w ^ irf%rqnr%qR-
220
*1% 7 W^f * sqpnt ?RT ^Fgx^t W&m l^tr WfTOW
?iWpw *& ^Tits^fxi
=f ^ i w m®tr4 ft-
*#s 3 p hm ^t: fret jt^t: Frm-
qfcn&ni? <re ^fej ^ ^sra
fft d>4T5R44lM^5^: ^4hR 3R WRpT^FT 3RTR l
<RFT 43J #fl 4F*WT 'T^^W-TFT
fP?[fefTTT |4T f^KTW I <TrqiR*tft ’TFRFTtf ^
*Fp: l w t tstr h: I H^wn^Kt^tw WwW
f^qr^Wd tir^KHKiiV^Ml tM-
t^Tf^n yxm Tr%fcr
i fftfaR
#Fp^rnf ^wf\ <p^ i
^frr TTt?rpr^qrR^ i c^f^rTO ff *?m (?o go ^ j %) ^
3.9.- In regard to that [investigation], their conformity is to be
understood in this manner:
I—ness is from the I—notion, action is due to
sattva etc., so too, happiness and unhappiness
are on account of the mind and consciousness
is from the supreme Self.
Just as a person, though seeing blackness and crookedness somewhere in
his own reflection in a mirror, is not troubled, knowing: "the blackness
and crookedness do not belong to the original [the face] because they
are absent there, but they belong to the mirror", in the same way, the
one who is liberated while living is not troubled, perceiving that indeed
everything else which is different from consciousness persists in the
individual soul who is a reflection, because the original has the nature
of pure consciousness free from distinction.
Just as boys at some time due to ignorance might be mistaken
thinking that the blackness seen in a reflection, although it persisted
[on iy] in the mirror, persisted in the original [the face], and for the
221
removal of that [mistake] an adult person, though not mistaken himself,
cleans the mirror and the reason for that is: "the boys too, having
cleaned the mirror in this way, can remove their mistake". In the same
manner, a liberated person such as Janaka performs the correct action
without attributing the result [to himself]. This is the reason for it:
"the other bound souls too, having performed the correct action in this
way without attributing the result [to themselves] can remove their own
error through purification of the mind",
Also, as long as the knowledge of reality is mediate, a person is
not liberated while living. That [person is liberated while living] only
when the knowledge is perceptual. Even after the direct apprehension of
one's own essential nature the reflection cannot indeed be avoided,
because the limiting adjuncts such as the intellect exist in accordance
with prior mental impressions up until the time of death due to the
existence of the karma which has begun to produce its result ( prarabdha-
karma ). Like the blackness in the mirror is in the reflection, the I-
ness belonging to the I-notion also certainly appears. Thus an expression
preceded by the sense of "I" is seen somewhere even for a person who is
liberated while living. On account of this, what Ramanuja has said:
"there is certainly no liberation while living" is rejected. Also because
the state of liberation while living is taught very clearly by the word
"here" in the sacred text; "the one who knows That in this manner becomes
immortal here" (Nr,Pu.1.6.).
comment
For Ramanuja's view see ^rlbha s ya 1.1,4. Para,105. p.228f,
3.10. m ^m l h
wrfn dff ^ sRtft i m q^m ^ r * mkzw
gtTSR £ q^> (|o ^ | | |
222
#^ 3^*3 wtt qq l
3 *&&& I 33 [ht tx w i ^ q ftm-fra^:-
q l iftgtm* <rcm q i mmft ©U
1^q | qiq PTSTTRITT^ I qq
^q^fo tM qqyRr i fttfHr 3 ^n^%q fmwq qroTT^q;^ 1 m
qtqqjqqq q qqqfq 1 1 rp-j q tsfqq qqqfcqqfi%i-
*n^[ I ft#? q ^ ?|T #*H WT\j %RRTRT JT% |WT f^T-
q ™ 3 J ^5 I #RpRq qqmq 1
%f^t* *mq flfqq a^ra fRFq^r 1 qqf^p::*n:
^ iifqq^ 1 f%j%aA ^4^1% m3 q qqqq 1 w iq^qf Rqmq-
qreqqt 1 qqqq% m3 wr% R3 mqq q fqqq: \
w mqqiRq qraRfran^q; t $zm ^k4 #Fqq^q qqmq 1
qm^Hq qqqrq qqrq ^mq^mq^q 1 qqft mi ^fiq'kqfqqRr-
^qrqq qqRRqiq q qqfq 1 qqr q qrRqq> prms^fiqq^q
f% 3 q^ qpRT pqq | qqt qtmqqq iqq^qqq qq| £g-
mqpqq 1
3.10. Now, does one who is liberated perform action or not? If he
sees something then he acts, if he does not see then he does not act.
Then does he see or does he not see? The one who is liberated free from
the body does not see anything at all. That has been told: "but when
everything has become the Self for this one [the knower of Brahman],
then what would one see and through what?" (Byh.2.4.14.). Whereas the
one who is liberated while living certainly does not see anything while
in meditative absorption but at another time it looks like he is
seeing. He performs action at that time.
Action is twofold: with the intellect and without the intellect.
With the intellect is twofold: for the sake of oneself and for the sake
of another. For the sake of oneself is also twofold; for the sake of
the maintenance of the body and for the sake of the attainment of
what is much more exalted. The first is going about for food etc.
because of the affliction of hunger. That is possible for one who is
liberated while living. The second, however, consists of sacrifices
etc. performed with the aim of heaven etc. That is impossible for one
223
who is liberated while living, due to the fact of being free from
desire. For the sake of another is twofold: the first consists of the
service of others etc. The second is performing action with the idea;
"the people too, seeing the action done by me, will act in the same way".
This is indeed said to be for the sake of the welfare of the world.
Though twofold, this is possible for one who is liberated while living.
Performing action, this [liberated person] looks like he is doing it for
his own sake, according to some ignorant people. But this is a different
thing.
Without the intellect is twofold. Some action is not able to be
known at the time of the action. For instance the moving etc. of the
hands and feet during sleep. Some [action], however, is able to be known
at the time of the action but there is no rule that it is indeed known.
For instance inhalation and exhalation etc. for just keeping alive. This
twofold group is also possible for one who is liberated while living.
Whatever action is possible, all that is only in the state of coming out
of meditative absorption. That [whatever actions he does] also does not
become [a means] for bondage in transmigratory existence because there is
no false presumption that; "I am doing". So the one who is liberated
while living certainly does not perform action like another bound soul,
but it is just that "action takes place". Because though it has been done
by the one liberated while living it is certainly not done, though seen
it is certainly not seen.
c o lament
The state of "aetionlessness" is mentioned in the G-Tta , cf, 4.18., 5
8, 9, 13., 13.29. An interesting exposition upon liberation while living
( jivanmukti ) can be found in Paneadasi ch,7.
3,11 * |
224
3.11 . The knowledge of the true nature of the Self is the means for
such liberation, not anything else. Because there is the sacred text:
"having known That one alone, he goes beyond death" (kjv.3.8.). Also,
because in the same passage there is the very clear negation of another
means of liberation, by this; "there is no other path for going [beyond
death]" (gv.3.8.).
3 * 12 l ^ i
i rft^r m
fWTT^rm I m I HRitiHfwf vtpt w
11%5 twww i I <rar ^
tTrTO fm: I rirff WR Rf^t-
ht-rtir't *mt sfreRf <r*tw % ir i
I f% ^ ^ WnfRRf
ml hrt?r4<t ^1% rr i
T|TT'TRTTR
eiwrpTRR I tr
#f: i rj Irt-
^RfrRT^Rftsm i mv*m ft rtrrtto i
3 ^ HR<| R3Tf* I HR R HRTWTRrJIR WWlf^R
*?tw*rth: wmrk wmw&i I h^ r Iri h
tdTRtTRR: l
3.12. [objection] The conclusion that liberation is only from the
knowledge of reality is granted. But is that reality, through the
knowledge of which there is liberation, knowable or not? In the first case,
if it is knowable, there is duality even in the state of liberation
because the relation of subject and object exists and so there is just the
same situation [i.e. duality]. In the last case, the knowledge of reality
is difficult to demonstrate.
[re ply] Here, some construe in this manner: the word " tattva.jnana"
is not a determinative compound where the first member is in the
genitive case (gag thTtatpuru ga), but it is an appositional compound
225
( karmadharaya ), in accordance with economy of expression due to the
4
maxim: "the chief who is a Nifada". So the sense is that Knowledge is
reality and liberation is from that [Knowledge], The meaning is that
Knowledge, which is the nature of reality i.e. the source of everything,
is in the form of awareness free from distinction and that alone is the
fundamental nature of all the individual souls. Hence liberation is
through the attainment of that [Knowledge which is the fundamental nature]
[objection] Even if that is the case, there is the relation of the
attainment and what is to be attained in regard to liberation and so there
is the occurrence of duality. Moreover, if that [Knowledge] is the
fundamental nature of individual souls then it is certainly always
attained, so how is the attainment of that [Knowledge which is the
fundamental nature] being described in regard to the state of liberation?
[reply] No, because the defect, though twofold, does not exist
because this: "attainment of the fundamental nature" has its final
conclusion in the meaning: "the non-cognition of what is other than the
fundamental nature". In reality, however, only the meaning produced by
the genitive tatpuru ga firstly occurs to the mind and so there is no
fault even in the acceptance of that,
[objection] There is the occurrence of duality, since the relation
of subject and object exists even in the state of liberation.
[reply] You are confused. For the existence of the cause at a time
prior to the effect is a necessity. But at the time of the effect there
can be no insisting: "that [cause] must either exist or not". Accordingly,
knowledge which has reality as its object is the cause of liberation and ,
so the existence of that [cause i.e. knowledge having reality as its
object] prior to the state of liberation is a necessity. Then [subsequent
to the knowledge of reality], the occurrence of duality is not a defect
because the appearance of duality is admitted.
226
m Rtritr rrt trrrt »&$rot rrctrr r%rr; I rtrt t|
2%i l m r mm rr m - \
^rrtrr^rr I rtrrtr m \-
mmww mm- xm: i rttr* rr ^ i ot-
rrr ^ rrrtrrtr: I r% r rrtr: r%ot: I
RRT R ROT! RRTRnRfa % RRRTRRTR
rr I rr rrr rrr mm p^Ri%RiR'iRRrRf r*stft r^rrtrsfs-
RR^RR R^RRTRRPJR^R BROTI tFRRRRRRRR RrR fTR^RfotfR-
RTRRTRR t f% R RRR IR£TRRR RRIR ( R° R* $ ) fTRRTR-
S^R * RRR^TRFRtR*. > 5?R1R ^f% RRTRT £3RR I RRT R RtR|TTRT-
5% f?RR RtR#T RRRWtR RvR RMRt^^RlRRTRRR I RR-
=srr i rrr r?r otr # rrtrt: i rot r rtrir rrrr; i rrrt-
$R R ^R ROTR I ^tr: h rr H^R RvRRR! |
3.13. Then in what manner is the knowledge of reality the cause for
liberation? In this manner: liberation means freedom. In regard to the
determination: that [freedom] is from what?, it is gained only from
the meaning that because liberation is the opposite of bondage, due to
which there is bondage, liberation is from that. This bondage is the
bondage due to transmigratory existence. Transmigratory existence
comprises this whole world, animate and inanimate. Liberation from that
[transmigratory existence] has to be demonstrated. Moreover,
transmigratory existence is based upon action. And so liberation from
action too, certainly has to be demonstrated. Thus in the expectation;
"the reality of what must be known for the sake of liberation?", because
liberation is the opposite of bondage, it has to be demonstrated that
the reality of transmigratory existence which is the means of bondage
and the reality of action which is the basis of that [transmigratory
existence] must be known.
Furthermore, even the popular expression observed in the world:
"liberation is from the knowledge of the Self", has its basis in the
227
sacred text: "the one who knows That in this maimer becomes immortal
here" (Nf .Pu.1 .6.). So it also must be definitely demonstrated that
the reality to be understood by the word "reality" here: "liberation
is from the knowledge of reality" is only the nature of the Self.
Therefore it is said that "reality", "truth" and "absolute truth" are
synonyms. The cause is the reality of the effect and the supreme Self
alone is the cause of everything. Therefore, that [supreme Self] alone
is the reality of everything.
3.14.
si* qrf wi wfor wm i \ <q%q
wiw rf fa#q m w
q%q qwqRnqsmR qqqq%Rqqrq r
Sirfw ( ^To ^ | ? ) $r^:qq | 3R
q£ q? JR 1TR q
qqft sr: qri qzwdifcfc fwRT ^rrqqiRq q ^r: I qfc<RjqT%q
q^t f| T%rqt qqiqq | q> ^ q?> jr WR d^M[%^ J R i
qj qq ^ ?FT WR qfpRR^R I RRS sTR R1R^[ 1
qqfr q^iR ^ qf ^qq qqnq q qf?mqq; I
rtwr q qTRMqqTRq | 3 q qqr i
w m r^ttr: l qf 3 qftq^q p ;qg#?RTTR^!rR
fRRdraiK^ rmi rpr i
3.14. Nov, how is the cause the reality of the effect? That is being
told. It is stated in the sacred text : "just as through a single ball
of clay which is known in reality to consist of clay, all that is
made of clay such as pots, dishes and pitchers etc. would be known,
so too, through the one supreme Self which is known, the entire world
is known". In regard to this, [if it is objected] even if the knowledge
of the ball of clay has arisen, there is no knowledge that "this is a
pot" when the pot is not seen^, therefore how could the pots and
dishes etc. be known?, [our reply is] still, this is not a defect.
Because a pot certainly becomes known through the knowledge of the
ball of clay. In regard to a pot, the knowledge that "this is a pot"
228
is called "knowledge" ( jnana ). In regard to the same pot, the knowledge
that "this is clay" is called "knowledge" (vijnana). Vi jnana means a
particular knowledge. Though when the knowledge of the pot has arisen
it is possible to do an action such as fetching water, still, that is
not vi.jnana . The particularity in knowledge is the bringing about of
a particular action by keen observation. But the fetching of water
etc. is not like that. For instance, when a tree is known, there is
rest below it. But when that tree is known to be a certain type of
medicinal plant, a particular action is performed such as the removal
of sickness.
comment
The Advaitin maintains that when the material cause is known, all
its effects are as good as known. Abhyankar raises the objection that
even if the material cause is known how can there be knowledge of all
the unseen effects? He answers this by distinguishing between two
types of knowledge: jnana or the ordinary knowledge such as "this is
a pot" and vi.jnana which is a particular knowledge such as the
apprehension that all the products of clay, seen or unseen, must be
nothing but clay in a particular form.
Advaitins generally use the words jnana and vi.jnana as synonyms,
however where they occur together as in Gita 3.41; 6.8 and 7.2, they
7
are distinguished in a manner similar to Abhyankar's division.
qk ^ mrjtrt wfr l w t m
m l ^ fmt &
i qk mtygn wff ^ l m
l 1 s mxm <rpr 1 (1 1 W l ?)
warn I % <Rm: l
^ i I w fmw
mm I *r 3 l mm ^
RiwT|*'^iw^rf4 §I%^r4t mm l
-m. ^ wqm wmr m mik
229
W^fc+.l Ti sIFr^K ^ I HF£Tf W
^ I ^ ^pfc^r ^ r%^r |
;
3.15. That which is the principal part of a thing is alone the reality-
in regard to that thing. In regard to a pot, the part which is the
essence is only the clay. For example, A small bamboo box is made for
the purpose of safe-keeping jewels etc. and in regard to that, when
the upper part of the receptacle is removed from the lower part of the
receptacle the jewel is seen. But the small bamboo box is [just] a
type of cane. Similarly, the pot is [like] the bamboo box which consists
of name and form and just as in the case of the cane, when there is
the separation of name and form the mere clay alone is seen in regard
ft
to the pot. Therefore, the part which is the essence in regard to the
pot is only the clay. In the same way, even in regard to clay etc. the
part which is the essence is indeed the cause of that [clay etc.]. The
sacred text too, communicates this very thing: "what is within those two
is Brahman" (Ch.8.14.1.)By this [word] "those two" there is the
recollection of the previously mentioned name and form.
Although doing an action such as cleansing a vessel with a pot,
like with clay, is ridiculous to people, still those people are
certainly ignorant in that matter. Because the principal action is only
being done with a form of clay. For that is always able to be done,
whether the pot is destroyed or not destroyed, full or partly full,
containing holes or without holes, new or old. But not fetching water
etc. In another case, in regard to the twitching of the eye, doing the
work of gold, in the form of connecting the gold to the eye, even with
a golden ring belonging to the finger, is not to be ridiculed. The
pre-eminent greatness of holy people who look equally on a jewel or
a clod of earth, a snake or a garland is described in various places
and that [greatness] is only based upon the knowledge of reality,
which is their respective cause. Because holy people transact only
230
vith their vision in the cause of those things. So it is established
that the cause is the reality of the effect.
comment
The illustrations of cleansing the vessel with a clay pot, instead
of with just clay, and touching the gold-ring to the eye are meant to
show that because the material cause is the reality of the effect, the
effect can be utilized for the sake of the cause.
3 . 16 .
wm qqq i qq<j qsmqq *r$qrer: ^ 1
vm, \ q qfqq q uq q ftqsqfqi qqT q
^qwq^qrRqf irRsfq mrm <wn-
qnm qprcqq qt^rmfo: I f% q qrcr: qq%q
HTRq: I q^TRRT^sfq q;qr<?TTJ?#JT qqR-
^ t qns qiqsfq fiqq i qqpmr qfq-
qwiqfq^ m\ qrqqrqf ftqrerNq qpqq wq^qq l q|qnj-
1 q f*pff q qiqvrm q i
crw^rs^||’ (qMro^ro)
ffqiqm q ttWRiCm ^r^qoT qq^qq^q Frqiqpti qf^tgqqfq-
Mr %Rqq. i Mwi ft q ^qiqqw miq^q : i
fqqrer; qpqq'r^ qm l iRq qrqqtq: qrrqqn^^FRT^ ht-
Rq qq 1 q ft q^qq qimqnq% m fqqs qw^r
qi qqqifq qqrqqqR rwigwr qt i^qf ^mfsRRqt ^qqq I
^q q tqqrwcqinqqq qqm I qqqqqwqq^q if q^q q?qq i
qqfq qroifFR q^t q fqqsqfq qqrfq qfwm% qm q^qqq
q qqMqftqq qsqriffq iiqn%mrT qjqqrq qq |
qiq qq ft qrcr: I
3.16. [objection] Granted, the reality of the effect is its material
cause. But by the knowledge of that [reality being the material cause],
how can there be the destruction of the effect? Because a pot is not
destroyed by the knowledge of the clay. Accordingly, even upon the
knowledge of the Self which is the reality of transmigratory existence,
being the seed of transmigratory existence, how is there logical
possibility of liberation since transmigratory existence still exists?
Furthermore, destruction possesses continuation indeed everywhere.
Because even upon the destruction of a pot etc. its continuation is
231
seen in the form of pieces etc. Even when a log of wood is burnt the
ashes and charcoal etc. are seen. Through these illustrations it can be
inferred that even the destruction occurring instantly for a drop of
water which has fallen on heated iron certainly possesses continuation.
Hence it has been told;
the nature of water does not differ in a drop
of water and in the ocean. Even when a drop is
evaporated from iron, its continuation is in
the ocean.
So liberation is all the more logically untenable because even upon
the destruction of transmigratory existence its continuation exists
in the form of its seed.
[reply] It is not so. Because the destruction of transmigratory
existence is not in the maimer of a separation of the component parts
like the destruction of a pot etc. It is granted that destruction of
that type possesses continuation. But the destruction of an object
existing only in appearance, which takes place through knowledge, is
certainly without continuation. Because when a snake which exists only
in appearance is destroyed by the knowledge of the rope, the continuation
even slightly, of some part of the snake -whether internal or external,
in its own form or in another form- is not seen on the rope. This
destruction is only through the knowledge of reality. Because the reality
of a snake existing only in appearance is just the rope. Although the
pot is not destroyed by the knowledge of clay, still, destruction has
certainly almost happened from the knowledge; "this is only the
existence of clay, the existence of the pot is not different from that".
Because destruction is only the absence of the cognition of having a
separate existence.
wn Rift ?mr:
232
TRR | SxRRrt ft
^ Hli? W^<RT%: | ^ *RWRT
(^ I I H ) w r#? qnTr%H i ^ fr^rr wrirr
^ tfwl 3nww ^prirt^^rt ^htrrrsto pw-
<TRRqR R iraip |r %m RR-
RTRR I <Tc[Rt R 3RTR f% URTUR RRR ^RRmRRPR^ I R !
IRT R M rfitw l sqqRfaR^ I ir^r r rr^r trr-
rr f^TT^nr rrrwjr itcrr l rrrr Rt^r; li H ll
3.17. [objection] Upon the destruction of a pot, continuation is seen
in the form of clay, so destruction possesses continuation. Similarly,
upon the destruction of a snake existing only in appearance,
continuation is seen in the form of rope, so destruction certainly
possesses continuation there also,
[reply] Let it be so. Because when the destruction of
transmigratory existence is accepted as possessing continuation in the
manner mentioned, although the continuation of that [transmigratory
existence] exists in the form of the Self, there is no logical
impossibility whatsoever in regard to liberation. This very point has
been taught by the sacred text; "all this which is, is this Self" (Brh.
2.4.6.).
In this way, by the knowledge of reality, when it is understood
that a mere effect everywhere in transmigratory existence has no separate
existence with regard to the existence of the cause, the existence of
Ignorance -which is the primary cause- remains. And so far, the threefold
factor of knower, knowledge and the thing to be known remains. Following
that, upon the investigation: "what is the reality even with regard to
that [threefold factor]?", mere Knowledge remains, but not the knower,
nor an object to be known, nor even Ignorance. This will be demonstrated
later on. And this very Knowledge; free from distinction, without an
object and a locus, is the nature of Brahman. This is indeed
liberation
233
’ 1 I <r €tsi%-
mmw ^ ^ mwti ^ga:^ i
zm ^f^rsr n \ 11
3.18. An investigation about Brahman must be undertaken for bringing
about the knowledge of Brahman which is the means of liberation. If
it is asked: "who is the qualified person with regard to that
[investigation]?", it is said:
The desire to know Brahman is of use, like
a boat upon the ocean of transmigratory
existence, only for the one who has gained
the fourfold means. 6.
3.19.
( ^° ^° ? I ! I O P ^ ^TH-
ssTRtmrfwCr nrcfe: | wiWRT ^
l
ROI^ Wd I
3.-19. The fourfold means have been previously explained (1.52.). The
word "then" in the sutra : "Then, therefore the desire to know Brahman"
(B.S.1.1.1.) has the meaning of "immediate succession". The desire to
know Brahman, on account of the strength of compatibility of meaning,
requires a pre-requisite, the word "then" communicates the immediate
succession to that [pre-requisite]. The pre-requisite is only the
fourfold means which have been told. Because when that sutra is studied
as a detached subject, the pre-requisite implied by "immediate
succession", which is taught by the word "then", is to be ascertained
only from the strength of the compatibility of meaning,
comment
Both Sankara and Ramanuja interpret the word "then" ( atha ) in the
234
sense of: "immediate succession" ( anantarya )J 0 Immediate succession
pre-supposes a prior event, so the sutra ; "Then, therefore the desire
to know Brahman" indicates that the desire to know Brahman will arise
as a consequence of the gain of a prior condition, Sankara considers
the prior condition to be the attainment of the fourfold qualifications
( sadhanacatu st aya ) , but not the study of the ritual portion of the
Veda which forms the subject matter of Jaimini's sutras »•These sutras
elucidate dharma and so have a different subject matter and result
from the sutras of Badarayapa which inquire into the nature of Brahman. 11
Ramanuja maintains that the sutra works of Jaimini and Badarayapa
constitute a single scripture and just as the Veda is a single sacred
text possessing two sections, dealing with action and knowledge, so
too there is one scripture of Vedic analysis ( mimamsa ) which treats of
each of these two sections, 1 ^ Accordingly, Ramanuja holds that the
study of the ritual portion of the Veda, as embodied in the sutras
of ‘the Purvamlmamsa . must be the pre-requisite to enter into the
inquiry concerning Brahman.
. *
3 ' 20> ^ l
w *
( 1° R Ro ) |
mm? iroiWR^ I tart^rw
i 3rrc#usTSff 3 mzj mi l mv.
#>TT^ ( *{o 3 qo ? ) J73T%: I H ^7-
mm i
^ufjRTrf I
3.20. [objection] How is this [ sutra ] said to be studied as a detached -
subject? Because the prior and later mimamsa , being combined, is a
single scripture. The author of the V rtti 13 . too, has said that the
karma and brahmamlmamsa constitute a single scripture, by saying: "this
[treatise] dealing with the embodied soul is connected with the sixteen
chapters belonging to Jaimini, thus there is establishment of a single
235
scripture" (£5rT.B. Para.3. p.4.). It has been told in the same manner
in the ^rlbha s ya also. The word lak gana here [in the above quotation]:
"go dasalak ga nena " signifies a chapter. Together with the Sankar s akan da.
[the treatise] belonging to Jaimini consists of sixteen chapters.
The nature of being a single scripture is correct, because
1 4
dharma alone is being taught even in both places. Pharma which
consists of action etc and is of the nature of what is to be accomplished
is taught in the prior mimamsa . Whereas in the later mimamsa , the
dharma is accomplished and is of the nature of Brahman. The particular
connection of the two [types of dharma ] has been explained in the
^rlbha g ya (iSsrl.B. Para.4,5. p.5f). That is as follows: having
understood at first glance that actions produce results such as heaven,
because one's own portion [of the Veda] has been apprehended according
to the injunction of study: "one's own portion has to be learnt", a
person naturally applies himself to hearing to the prior mlmamsa for
the ascertainment of the particular nature and mode of those [Vedic
passages]. There [in the Veda], having ascertained that actions have
an impermanent result and because it is understood at first glance,
in the passages of the Upanisads which form a part of one's own
portion, that the knowledge of Brahman has a result which is permanent,
he applies himself to hearing the later mimamsa for the ascertainment
of that [result]. Accordingly, the nature of being a single scripture
is correct.
-3.21
qr^TT^r l i
t% 3 I I
toh wt: I f%
ifRiffr^r trfttprf'TCrat TO I
236
rim m w ^qra#m^r s^TFfw^i^Ri rnmrn
v ? w^t*
3.21. [reply] As to this, it is said: the nature of being a single
scripture is impossible here. Because there is a difference of authors
of the sutras : Jaimini is the author of the prior mlmamsa sutras and
Badarayana is the author of the later mlmamsa sutras . Not only is
there a difference of authors of the sutras , but the subject matter
to be taught is different. The subject matter to be taught in the
prior mlmamsa is action. Whereas in the later mlmamsa it is knowledge.
And a mutual opposition is seen between these two: action and
knowledge. Because action is all the more impossible in regard to the
knowledge of the oneness of the Self. Moreover, the subject matter
to be taught in the later mlmamsa is certainly not accepted by Jaimini.
Because the view of Jaimini is that the attainment of heaven etc. is
alone the ultimate human goal. Furthermore, what is the one form which
persists in the twofold mlmamsa and is the determining factor for a
single scripture? If [you say] it is the nature of being an
investigation, [our reply] is that grammar, logic etc. should also
constitute a single scripture. Accordingly, just as there is a
difference among scriptures such as grammar and logic on account of
the difference of the subject matter to be taught, so too the
difference between the prior and later mlmamsa is also certainly
correct.
N r mr sRf: |
?T ^ 1 % tTftWR || ( Jfo tfUTo )
237
w<nqqm%: i wwn f^qw’rfa: i \% ^ mAt
mA $Stata?y+iuWHq<n^ l ^^n^tsqf mi (^o
? I ? I r ) # if ^qrf^ I ^{
*T mm I W Wrtff ^T l%3f
fg^^^ferNK’ 1 ! qfesm fq ^ l qrn ^
'KW4 m mmm
# q frqfa m*^ i q*?^Rw ^wmfcnni?q *rci%£<q-
fqqrnwiw (s° $vs) toj;—* fqftt
qqtffaiHT %wm ’^i ^ qmi#t
3*nw*n qr^q; I ^m'nfq *miwqr
Tr^rS^^ltqTIrJ I vfai ^f|7T^Tx^nh%
qqq^q qM^q Hidqfq qarare: \
sqi^q ifadsiift STiwi^nf; q^r if ll
%m q^wfiqfaqn% wm l
3.22. [objection] Then there is a single scripture because dharma
alone is being taught even in both places.
[reply] No, because Brahman does not have the characteristic
of dharma . However the use of the word dharma in regard to the supreme
Self, £rl Kr§na, here;
The sages who know the Veda and the. people who
know the Self say that Krsna is the great Self,
the eternal dharma (Mbh . 5.3 .86.22 . )^
is figurative because he is the instigator of dharma . For the
supposition of another direct meaning is incorrect since there is no
ample usage. Because a usage that is met with occasionally has logical
possibility only by implication. Otherwise implication has no scope.
Furthermore, Brahman having the characteristic of dharma is
certainly not accepted by the author of the prior mimamsa sutras .
Because the definition of dharma taught by Jaimini is: " dharma is a
thing characterized by a scriptural injunction" (J.S.1.1.2.) and that
238
is all the more impossible in regard to Brahman. If a single scripture
would have been agreeable to Jaimini on account of there being [a
single] investigation of dharma , then because of that difference
between "accomplished" and "to be accomplished" a definition of
dharma should have been made which was common to both types of dharma .
So where a single scripture is not accepted by the very author of the
scripture, when others make a proclamation there, even many times;
"the scripture is one, the scripture‘is one" it does not prove
anything. Having kept in mind that very meaning of the word dharma
taught by Jaimini, it is said in the Vivaranaprameyasangraha ; "if
there could be an injunction in the Yedanta [ie., Upani§ads], then only
one investigation about dharma , consisting of sixteen chapters, should
follow."
It should not be said that there is a single scripture because
the name " mimamsa " is just one. [reason] Because although the name
"grammar" is one, there is a difference between [the grammatical
treatises] Aindra , Candra etc. On account of this, what has been said
by the author of the Vr tti ; "this [treatise] dealing with the embodied
soul is connected with the sixteen chapters belonging to Jaimini, thus
there is establishment of a single scripture" is rejected. For this
very reason, the enumeration in the ^astra sat kasankalana agrees with
the difference between the prior and later mimamsa :
They say that the scriptures are only six: of
Kapila, Kanada, Gautama, Patanjali, Vyasa and
of Jaimini also.
comment
Advaitins conclude that the Purvarnimamsa of Jaimini and the
Uttararoimamsa of Badarayana are different scriptures because (1) the
qualified person ( adhikarin ) is different in each case. For the
Purvamimamsa , the qualified person is one who is desirous of performing
ritual actions and seeks bo attain results-'such as heaven, kith regard
to the UttaramTmamsa , the qualified person is free from other desires
on account of the desire for liberation. (2) There is a difference of
239
subject matter ( vi s aya ). In the PurYamimamsa the subject matter is
dharma which is something to be accomplished and which is characterized
by the performance of rituals such as Jyoti s toma . In the Uttaramimamsa
the subject matter is Brahman which is already accomplished and which
cannot be enjoined. This difference is clearly evident in the first
sutra of each treatise; "Then, therefore the desire to know dharma"
and "Then, therefore the desire to know Brahman", (3) There is a
difference of result ( prayojana ). With regard to the Purvamimamsa ,
the result is the knowledge of what is to be done, or the gain of
heaven etc. through the performance of the rituals. For the
Uttaramimamsa , however, the result is the knowledge of Brahman which
is liberation.^
3.23.
Fmvx i w. i
sqpsft i rtf
sI5I#fIHTT ( 3° ^ ? I ? I ? ) I
t
3.23. The investigation of the particular connection has no result.
Because connection is not the determining factor for a single
scripture. What is it then? It supports a single scripture. Because
when a single scripture has been ascertained through another means of
knowledge, then if there is the objection; "how can there be a single
scripture without a connection?", the investigation of the particular
connection is useful for the removal of that [objection]. So when the
difference of scripture is established, this [sutra ]; "Then, therefore
the desire to know Brahman" (B.S.1,1.1.) is established as being
studied as a detached subject. Accordingly, having perceived that the
desire to know Brahman will occur subsequent to the pre-requisite
implied by "immediate succession" which is to be taught by the word
"then", something conformable to that [desire to know Brahman] is to
be ascertained only from the strength of compatibility of meaning.
240
3 . 24 . ^ ^ m %?[— ;
mv&i qfc sm I ^VrY^^t
hpjwrth l fsn^inr #t si^t (|* y I tf I V() fm
^<TRR
d 'ffitr ^Rrf dd ^idrndRRd i
ik^
3^r ^frTcT ^<pfm*j x I w dwddsr ( g-o ^o ? |
^1 H ) ^ ^ '-*'K g IkRTdi mIMK 4 d f ?fFR%r df^T^RTKd!'-
^nW* ^tr^tt $rm
^i
3.24. [objection] Why is knowledge of action not taken to be the
pre-requisite, as it is also understood on account of the strength
of compatibility of meaning ?
[reply] This would be so, if liberation could result from
knowledge combined with action. But that is not the case. For action
and knowledge have no possibility of combination on account of their
opposition. Even in the sacred text: "they desire to know through
sacrifices, charity..." (Brh.4.4.22.), because of the use of the
desiderative affix ( san ) the actions such as sacrifice are recognized
as the means for the desire of Self-knowledge, not as the means of
knowledge. There is never a means of liberation which depends upon a
time subsequent to knowledge.
But the investigation of the chanting of the Veda etc. in
respect of the desire to know Brahman is done as something incidental,
not as primary. The knowledge of action cannot be assumed to be the
pre-requisite [just] because that [investigation of chanting etc.] is
in accordance with it [the desire to know Brahman]. Just as in the
sutra ; "Or [the world must originate from Brahman] like the great and
long..." (B.S.2.2.11.) , the mention of the size such as great and long
is on account of being an illustration about the origination of an
effect different from the cause. So the knowledge of the Vaise§ika
scripture is not assumed to be the pre-requisite because this much
[big and long triads being produced from minute and short dyads] is
in accordance with that [the production of an effect different from
the cause]. It is like that [with regard to the mention of chanting
etc and the pre-requisite of the knowledge of ritual action].
■3.25.
\wa\
m I ^3r ^ wpi-
l fa ^
;qW£fa qrW. I <fa faT^a
mm * 3 l I rfarfa
wfafaTRR: toi[I <*t% m fgRR 1
urt-
W ( #Ro <Jo ? qo ^ jpfa RW ^TlfaRfaq
q# *r rw I ^Ripnfatgfa r*ri
^ =rfa%R?m $ m^iRffafarr! r ifatnpr-
miW^nfai ritrt ^ RTfaqqwnfan mmt
q&R*. rtrI <n^ifa^farrR: I ffa
* RfadRqTftq iq,^wsq^RtRT HRRqiRffaiqR ’ ^m?r
qttipWR qtfafaiqqRfa sifafawt »T
^qi^fanq 1 spot g ttrewifrH qrfafarqRf sqi^fa I
<p-n RRtpRRtqrRf ^fafarq^N q^iRWRfa I h ^ ;
RnqRiiTOi tr 1
3.25. But what has been said (£>rT,B.Para.2.p.2.);
For the person who has studied the Veda along with
its auxilaries and along with what is at its head
[the Upani§ads] and whose desire for liberation has
arisen due to the knowledge that mere action has a
result which is trifling and transient, the
desire for the knowledge of Brahman -the result
of which is limitless and permanent- is sure to
follow immediately afterwards.
242
In regard to that, it is said: "immediate succession", which is to be
taught by the word "then", is ascertained in regard to the desire to
know Brahman. His [Ramanuja's] statement is meant to show the
pre-requisite to that [immediate succession]. And in the sutra (B.S.
1.1.1.), the author of the sutras has shown that the thing which will
occur subsequently is the desire to know Brahman. And because that
[desire to know Brahman] is associated with "immediate succession",
which is to be taught by the word "then" which is connected to itself
[i.e. the meaning of "immediate succession"], the postulation of a
pre-requisite has to be made. And what is the invariable cause of that
[effect] is alone able to be postulated by that [effect], but not
what has deviated. The knowledge of ritual action has certainly
deviated, because the desire to know Brahman is possible even without
the knowledge of ritual action. And because in the world it is seen
to be the case.
Although an invariable rule is made known by the text:
whose desire for liberation has arisen due to the
knowledge that mere action has a result which is
trifling and transient, the desire for the
knowledge of Brahman -the result of which is
limitless and permanent- is sure to follow
immediately afterwards
nonetheless, that invariable rule is not applicable to the topic.
Because the desire to know Brahman would be established subsequent to
such a rule, but such a rule is not established prior to the desire
to know Brahman. If the author of the sutras would have specified such
a rule here and because of that [rule] the postulation of the desire
to know Brahman, which would occur subsequently as it is connected
with itself [i.e. the rule], could have been made then there would have
been application for such an invariable rule, but it is not in the
topic xmder consideration.
243
Furthermore, without the desire for liberation, the knowledge
of such ritual action does not bring about the desire to know Brahman.
This has certainly been accepted even by you who have said: "whose
desire for liberation has arisen due to the knowledge that mere action
has a result which is trifling and transient". But without the
knowledge of such ritual action, the desire for liberation certainly
brings about that [desire to know Brahman]. So by continuity and
discontinuity, only the desire for liberation is understood to be the
pre-requisite. And that is certainly included within the fourfold
means told by us.
$rTp$ i m
ft ^ I 1%W
3.26. But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.b.p.T.):
[objection by Advaitin] Because a sentence supported
by reasoning is what determines the meaning, a
meaning, though understood at first glance, is not
above doubt and error. Therefore an
investigation of the Vedanta sentences has to be
done for the ascertainment of that [meaning],
[reply] You should see that an investigation of
dharma, too, has to be undertaken in just the same
way.
In regard to that, it is said: although by this example the necessity of
244
an investigation of dharma is arrived at, still, that the investigation
of dharma has necessarily to be undertaken prior to the investigation
of the Vedanta sentences is certainly not established. Indeed, when that
is not established, the postulation of it as the pre-requisite is
certainly difficult to be achieved.
Moreover, because of the idea that ritual action has a transient
result, the investigation of ritual action is not a necessity and
indifference to it arises for people. Among those, if someone has the
idea that the knowledge of Brahman has a permanent result, then to
ascertain that [result] the undertaking of an investigation about Brahman
is possible even though such a person has not studied the prior mimamsa
scripture. Therefore it is established that the fourfold means are
alone the pre-requisite.
3.27.
^ wm graritar&ra&RH 11% 5
c i l
3.27. Following the acquisition of the fourfold means, knowledge arises
from the "great statements" etc. If the knowledge is merely verbal then
it does not remove Ignorance. But the perception of the Self arising
from the "great statements" etc. removes Ignorance. But the mixture of
what is verbal and what is perceptual, which are two classes pervaded by
knowledge, does not lead to a defect. Because even though there is the
mixture in the locus [knowledge] there is no mixture of the attributes
[perception and verbal testimony]. Even a sentence is certainly the cause
of perceptual knowledge, just as in the case of "you are the tenth" etc.
c orament
There is an unstated objection here. Perceptual knowledge reveals
245
an object directly, such as the perception of a book. However verbal
knowledge produces only indirect knowledge, such as the book is over
there on the table. If you say that verbal testimony gives direct
knowledge then there would be confusion of the two means of knowledge.
Abhyankar answers by saying that all varieties of knowledge such
as perceptual knowledge, verbal testimony, inferential knowledge etc. are
pervaded ( vyapya ) by knowledge which is the pervader ( vyapaka ). Though
they all share the common locus ( upadheya ) of knowledge, there is no
mixture of the attributes ( upadhi )i«e. the varieties of knowledge. Just
as, for example, individuals retain their separate characteristics
while sharing the common locus of humanity. So while knowledge is
common to all types of knowledge, each particular type remains
separate and thus there is no confusion between perceptual knowledge
and verbal testimony.
Advaitins consider that verbal testimony can generate mediate
or perceptual i.e. direct knowledge depending on whether the thing to
be denoted is remote ( parok sa) or immediate ( aparok sa). In the case
of the statement "heaven exists", verbal testimony can only produce
mediate knowledge since heaven is something remote. However if the
thing to be revealed is immediate to experience, then verbal testimony
can give direct knowledge. In the case of the boy who was seeking the
tenth member of his group, having forgotten to count himself while he
was counting the other nine, the statement that: "you are the tenth"
18
should cause direct knowledge. In the same way, Advaitins maintain
that the "great sentences" of the Upanisads have the capacity to
generate immediate knowledge because Brahman is the very essence of
the individual. 1 ^
3.28. qfRFRT-
^tt i I ^ wM
R l l H l * ^ wr ^
246
* (4m-
qo \s q 0 \c) ^5% %ni[^! hr hr <r \k\-
fRRvPlR frw I HT^TRTf^RS^ HRS^q:
H?HRT^%: RRTH I HTflHFRIT^R^qRHH^ft
RR^RT^rqrj; I <R g HHHR
^TFT W<T | f
3.28. This very perceptual knowledge of the Self which arises from
the "great statements" etc. is enjoined by this sacred text; "the Self,
my dear, should be seen" (Brh.2.4.5.). "Should be seen" means that it
should be made directly evident. With regard to the expectation that:
"should be seen" has been said, but how should it be seen?", listening
etc. is enjoined as the means for seeing: "it should be heard, thought
about and meditated upon" (Brh.2.4.5.). It should not be said: listening
is the means for verbal knowledge it is not a means for "seeing", so
how can there be the prescription of listening as the means of
"seeing"? [reason] Because what you have just said is immediately
after [what we have shown]: "even a sentence is certainly the cause
of perceptual knowledge" (3. 27.). On account of this, [the following
, _ -.20
statement in the onbha s ya , Para.12. p.12j is refuted:
the knowledge intended to be enjoined by the Vedanta
sentences for the removal of Ignorance is not merely
the knowledge of the meaning of the sentences,
because that is accomplished just from the sentence
even without an injunction and because there is no
perception of the removal of Ignorance merely by
that [knowledge of the meaning].
Because an injunction is necessary for the sake of engaging in listening,
though when the sentence is heard there is no requirement of an
injunction to inderstand its meaning. However we also certainly accept
that there is no removal of Ignorance by merely verbal knowledge which
247
is not possessed of immediacy.
Haring raised the doubt: when the mental impression of difference
has not been dispelled, there is no production of knowledge from the
"great sentences" etc. which removes Ignorance. What has been said [by
way of reply] (^rl.B.Para.l2.p,12.); "because there is no logical
possibility of the non-production of knowledge when the means [for its
production] are present" is accepted as the desired conclusion. But when
knowledge has arisen, there is no rule that liberation free from the body
takes place immediately. Because the knowledge of difference continues
to persist until the completion of the experience of the result of action
which has begun to operate ( prarabdhakarma ) which is not destroyed even
by knowledge. Just like the knowledge of a second moon persists if the
defect of the eye is not eliminated, even upon the ascertainment from
the statements of competent people etc. that there is a single moon.
But that knowledge of difference, though remaining, does not lead to
bondage because its root [i.e. Ignorance] has been cut.
3.29.
zm MTdT 7T TOT I TOHFTF fWT
RRTT H|l%: >’■ (
lo \B qo rT^T ! m HfRTWH RT
•r %i%: 1 i% 3 ftfRTRW I
^ fI i ^
#RRTT UR ^ faqTOTOqftqTOTO I
( »4tor<> ?<> mo « ) I ^ft ur*n
5 f WH f% 5 ^HTT-
ur %^tirrrr *R*it rjhi w spA vm 5^:-
HfRFTFW HRf?r I ‘
RT^ I TR%; ? (#tno .«jo C qo 9, )
w-
mm
248
3.29. But what has been said ($rl.B.Para.1 2.p.13.):
It is not possible for you to say that the knowledge
of difference persists because of a beginningless
mental impression ( vasana ) even when there is
knowledge of the meaning of the [Upanisad]
sentences. Because the mental impression, which is
also the means for the knowledge of difference,
ceases just by the rise of knowledge since it is
false. If there is no cessation of that [mental
impression of difference], which is something false,
even upon the production of knowledge, then there
would be no cessation of this mental impression at
any time because there is no other removing agency.
That is not correct. The cessation of the mental impression of
difference is through knowledge and that cessation does not take place
completely at the same time as knowledge. But there is commencement
of the cessation at the same time as knowledge. Following that, there
is no increase of the mental impression of difference nor even does it
remain as before since it is without a cause.. Rather, wasting away
gradually, it completely disappears of its own accord. It does not
require another removing agent which is something different.
But what has been said (j§rT.B.Para.12.p.1 3);
that the knowledge of difference, the effect of the
mental impression, has its basis removed and then
still persists is a puerile statement.
That only seems like a puerile statement. Because just as a tree whose
root has been cut does not become withered at the very same time as
249
the cutting but the commencement of withering certainly occurs at the
time of cutting and then, after some time, it becomes completely
withered and dried and incapable of sprouting again, it is similar
here [with regard to the removal of the knowledge of difference]
because there is nothing to negate its acceptance.
But what has been said (^rT.B.Para.12.p,13.):
because the mental impression of difference is
immeasurable as it has accumulated from
beginningless time, and because the
contemplation contrary to it is insignificant,
there is no logical possibility of its removal
by this [contemplation].
That is questionable. Because even a small lamp brought into some
underground room etc. instantly removes the darkness even though it
pervades the underground room and even though it has been present
there a long time, similarly, there is the possibility of the removal
of the mental impression of difference. Thus it is established that
there is cessation of Ignorance on account of the direct apprehension
of the Self brought about by the "great sentences" etc.
3 ‘ 30 ' w l mm-
RWRifa ( c I
arii*RrransRi^- vs I ? ) frwFW
^ ) rtrt 1° H l v? I
H ) HRTWTR RWTR
I xhm fwm ( f° v l v I R? )
I fR I ^TR-
RWIRR RFR (3«3RI3) ^TCRR^W ( |o $ I I
) mwo ( wo ^ I V I H )
W/R ‘ WTWWTWIIRTRVw RRRRR'^IRWRW |TR ^JRWmfw-
3TRFI sn’TRT^fT^ I
250
3.30. The direct apprehension of the Self brought about by the
"great statements” etc. is due to the continuous contemplation of the
Self. This direct apprehension is taught by words such as: "he
understands", "having understood" and "should be seen" in the sacred
texts such as; "having found out, he understands" (Ch.8.7.1.), "having
understood that [Self] he is freed from the jaws of death" (Katha.3.
15.), "the Self, my dear, should be seen" (Brh.2.4.5.). It is the same
here also: "having known, he should bring about wisdom" (Brh.4.4.21.).
Knowledge which brings about the completion of the desire to know the
Self is said by the word "wisdom"The meaning is: [wisdom] makes
the direct apprehension of the Self steady. The continuous
contemplation of the Self which is the means for that [steady knowledge]
is said by words such as; "you should meditate" etc. in the sacred
texts such as; "meditate upon the Self as Ora" (Mu.2.2,6.), "contemplate
upon the Self [as your own ] world" (Brh.l .4.1 5 .), "the Self...should
be meditated upon" (Brh.2.4,5.). This is indeed told by the sutra also:
"repetition [is necessary] since [the texts] instruct repeatedly"
(B.S.4.1 .1 ,). Thus the syntactical unity of these sacred texts is
properly obtained. On account of this, [the statement in the ^rxbha s ya ,
Para.12-p.13.] is refuted:
the knowledge intended to be enjoined by the Vedanta
sentences can be expressed by such words as
"meditation", "contemplation" etc. and is certainly
different from the knowledge of the meaning of the
sentences.
Because the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence, which has
acquired immediacy, was previously mentioned as the means for liberation
251
c'omment
The production of direct knowledge through "continuous
contemplation" is in accord with the views of Vacaspatimisra as
expressed in the BhamatX , see comment to 1 ,54.
3.31 .
3 I lc l ?) w ^ ^ mm
M ( ^T° 3 I I 3 ) * ( #^T° %° % I H ) f^TT^rfc ?l^qg-
4^g<mR-
W& Wt mzm i f% ^r wrot^r
# fro i
3.31. But what has been said (jjrl.B.Fara.13.p.1 5.):
this knowledge intended to be enjoined as the means
for liberation is understood to be contemplation.
Because the verbal roots vid and upas are seen in
the beginning and at the conclusion to be used
without distinction; "contemplate upon the mind as
Brahman" (Ch.3.18.1.), "the one who knows in this
manner shines and warms with glory, fame and divine
splendour" (Ch.3.18.3.). Etc.
In regard to that, it is said in this manner: it is true that an identity
of meaning between vid and upas is necessary for the syntactical unity of
the beginning and the conclusion. But that [identity of meaning] is
established either because knowledge ( vid ) has the meaning of
contemplation or even because contemplation ( upas ) has the meaning of
knowledge. Hence for this [proposition]: "knowledge is understood to be
contemplation", this reason: "because the verbal roots vid and upas are
seen in the beginning and at the conclusion to be used without
distinction" is not possible. Furthermore, what is known as contemplation
is only knowledge which is repeated, not anything else. But in accordance
252
with that [meaning of unis ana] , we also certainly accept that vid has
the meaning of knowledge which is repeated.
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3.32. The continuous contemplation told in the sacred texts by words
such as: "you should meditate" (Mu,2.2.6.) is said to be 'steady
remembrance". Because meditation, which is the meaning of the verbal
root dhyai in accordance with the meaning of the root; "dhyai. in the
sense of thinking", is in the form of a continuity of remembrance
uninterrupted like the flow of oil. What has been said: steady
remembrance. Upon the gain of remembrance there is the release of all
knots" (Ch.7.26.2.) must be thus: steady remembrance is the means for
the release of all knots through the direct apprehension of the Self
which is to be produced by itself [i.e. by steady remembrance].
Because only the direct apprehension of the Self is heard as the means
for the release of the knots, by this [statement]: "when that One is
seen" occurring in the sacred text:
When that One who is high and low is seen, the
253
knot of the heart is untied, all doubts are
dispelled and his actions are destroyed (Mu.2.2,8.).
But what has been said (&ri.B,Para.14,p.16) is that steady remembrance
is of the nature of "seeing" in accordance with the sacred text:
"[the knot of the heart] is untied" (Mu.2.2.8.):
and that remembrance has the same form as "seeing".
That is not so. Because when there is no syntactical unity in the manner
previously mentioned, the supposition that remembrance is of the nature
of "seeing" is not correct. And what has been said as a support in
that matter (&ri.B.Para.1 4.p.1 6.):
remembrance is of the nature of "seeing" because
of the intensity of contemplation.
That is also not the case. Because "seeing" there [in regard to
remembrance] has the nature of being a semblance of "seeing". Moreover,
in regard to.the existence of the means of "seeing", even if the
"seeing" is real, steady remembrance would be a cause of "seeing" by
giving assistance to the causes of "seeing", but it is not of the nature
of "seeing". Furthermore, in regard to the existence of the means of
seeing, it is a great wonder that verbal knowledge, which is produced
by the "great sentences" etc. and which is certainly a mode of
experience, is not accepted as perceptual experience by you who accept
22
that remembrance, though different from experience, is a perceptual
experience.
3.33. qyr < TT-f
eTwft q qq?TT q |
srtWiWT tott <rjjr
$fq» ( I *qq-
* ^qfq fqftRfi > I
3.33. But what has been said ($rI.B.Para.15.p.17.):
254
In this manner [the sacred text] distinguishes
remembrance, which has acquired the status of
direct perception, as the means of liberation:
"this Self cannot be gained by exposition, nor
by intelligence, nor through much hearing.
Whom this [Self] chooses, by him it can be
gained. This Self reveals its own form to him"
(Katha.2.23.).
That is questionable. Because the statement: " [the sacred text]
distinguishes remembrance" is inaccurate since there is no mention of
remembrance in this text.
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*Ti%5IsSP?: M^fTST^ ^1% ( *k° 3 I <: )
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mi cTwr *r ^ ( *t 1 o ? ? i )
imr mmrnj i
mi s?i ^ qidi i (jfro {{ i w )
3¥f: *r qi: «n*f ssqwpqqr i (jfto ) *
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-3.34. But what has been said (£rl.B.Para.15,p.18,):
Steady remembrance of this kind is expressed by
the word devotion. Because the word devotion
(bhakti) is a synonym for contemplation
( upasana ). For this very reason, it is expressed by
255
the sacred texts and the tradition in this way:
"Having known Him alone, one passes beyond
death" (£v.3.8,), "The one who knows Him in this
manner becomes immortal here" (Nr.Pu.l .6.), "there
is no other path for going [beyond death]" (£v.3.8.),
"Not by Vedas, nor by austerity, nor by charity, nor
by sacrifice can I [be seen]" (G.11.53.), "But by
undivided devotion, 0 Arjuna destroyer of your
enemy, I can, in this form, be known and seen in
reality and entered into" (Or.11.54.), "But that
supreme Person, 0 son of Prtha, can be gained by
undivided devotion" (G.8.22.).
That is not correct. Because "steady remembrance of this kind" means
remembrance which has acquired the status of direct perception ( supra .
y.33. &ri.B,). But that [remembrance which has acquired the status of
direct perception] is not devotion. Because there is contradiction
with the Gita passage which you have just cited: "But by undivided
devotion". There, devotion is pointed out as the means for knowledge,
for seeing in reality and entry. But if only remembrance which has
acquired the status of direct perception is devotion, because that
[remembrance] is of the nature of "seeing" there is no possibility of
it being the means for "seeing". Then if [you ask] "what is devotion?"
[our reply is] understand it to be a mental modification having the
form of a particular type of love.
Furthermore, what is the meaning of this: "For this very reason
( supra .) which you mentioned? Is it because only steady remembrance is
expressed by the word devotion, or because only the word devotion is a
synonym for contemplation? Even both ways, the mention of the sacred
texts: "Having known Him alone" etc. is not applicable for proving
them since there is no allusion to devotion in [these] sacred texts.
3.35.
256
* ^ro
wi?pw^ ^RHi«nwSf^ to-
> ( wm* $<> nu)
fTR mi n wM fc^rfe <rtr^%—an
^SST^HTOTO <F.m-
^HTOrWR 3T ^TTTONj; I TO.* I TOtf-
RTTOt^TO r tfT?TOiWT rn^PTT^TrKRR^ dreWTR?5TOI3dr
^TOIw3*>$^to wm\ I m ^trrn ^kro*m?3<n-
vffrt Ft^RTO^ITO^ ITR^ffc M* HWfh% %*f | to
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to ^teTO^rmTORTR RTcTO^ronx: !%g strrr to
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f%R - ^I^TTR ^km^fafd I ^ ^FRHTSTRdTOTO
%TOTff%: ftr^T I
3.35. But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.16.p.18.):
because knowledge -which is in the form of meditation,
being performed daily, whose excellence is kindled
through repetition and which continues until death -
is the means for the attainment of Brahman, for the
production of that [knowledge] all the actions
relating to the stages of life are to be performed
as long as one lives.
In regard to that, it is said: the knowledge which is the means for
the attainment of Brahman is said to be continued until death, is
that [continuation] necessary everywhere or occasionally? Not the
first, because there is the possibility of the direct apprehension of
the non-dual Self even prior to death and since, following such
direct apprehension, difference does not exist in reality according
to the vision of that person who has such knowledge, therefore the
knowledge mentioned is not possible, [if you say] Because the limiting
adjuncts such as body, mind etc. exist even at that time [after the
257
direct apprehension of the Self], the knowledge, having the person
possessing knowledge as its agent, is possible according to the vision
of other bound souls, [we reply] No. Because that [knowledge] would
relate to a time subsequent to the attainment of Brahman and so it is
not the means for the attainment of Brahman. However in the case of
the last [alternative], it is certainly the desired conclusion.
Because obstructions exist for a person there is no direct apprehension
of the Self in this birth, therefore the repetition of knowledge is
necessary for him until death in another birth. This has been told:
"Until the moment of death, because it is seen there also [in the
scripture]" (B.S.4.1 .12.). The meaning is that knowledge [ie.,
meditation] is seen to exist for someone until the time of death or
even in another birth following that, because the repetition of
knowledge is necessary until the direct apprehension of the Self just
as the threshing of grain is necessary until the disappearance of the
husk. Alternatively, that sutra does not refer to Self-knowledge but
is to be understood as referring to another knowledge whose result is
[worldly] prosperity. Thus the repetition of knowledge until the
direct apprehension of the Self has been established.
3 ' 36 ' OTR&rctot ^ i ^ I f%
fwpf ^ rfarcr HTw um m l
I f o v I » I ^ )
\ ^ 31^3 3 )
5HCT HRWRlWlR cRT. |
3.36. After the direct apprehension [of the Self] the [prescribed]
action has no use whatsoever. Not only is it of no use, but there is
certainly no possibility of action because difference does not appear
258
to be real at that time. And action which, according to the view of
the people, is being done for the sake of the welfare of the world
does not impart anything special to knowledge or to liberation which
is the result of that [knowledge]. Whereas in the state of the bound
[souls], action is useful for the production of knowledge through the
desire for Self-knowledge due to the purification of the mind. This
has certainly been told by the sutra also: "But Agnihotra etc. are
certainly for that result, for it is seen to be so [in the Upani§ads]"
(B.S.4.1.1 6.). The meaning of that [ sutra ] is: "certainly for that
result" means certainly for the result known as knowledge. "For it is
seen" to be so in the sacred text: "they desire to know through
sacrifice..." (Brh.4,4.22.). This is certainly the purport of the
sutra ; "Also on account of co-operativeness" (B.S.3.4.33.) as well.
The meaning of that [sutra ] is; "And" (ca) has the sense of "also".
"Also on account of co-operativeness" to knowledge ie., the obligatory
actions are to be performed also on account of being means to
knowledge through purification of the mind.
3 * 37 • m ( «ffaT° V, 1
1 tri-
33nRT7TR Rf^RTTR,
WTRSPcpfe I 3RBT-
qrW^TFTK, ^ l
3.37. The sevenfold means beginning with discrimination which have been
mentioned (JsrT.B.Para .16 .p.1 9.) are included, according to suitability,
in the means such as the "fourfold means" accepted by us. There is the
inclusion of freeness of mind (vimoka), in the form of absence of
attachment to desires, in control of the mind ( sama ). There is the
inclusion of repetition ( abhyasa ) in meditation ( nididhyasana )♦ There
is the inclusion of non-dejection ( anavasada ), in the form of an absence
259
of dejection, in single pointed concentration of mind (samadhana).
Non-exultation ( anuddhar ga), in the form of absence of excessive
satisfaction, is also included in single pointed concentration of mind.
And because purification of the mind is a means for knowledge, on
account of that [purification of mind], the postulation of
discrimination (viveka) in the form of purification of the body which
is a means for itself [purification of mind] and the postulation of
ritual action ( kriya ) in the form of the performance of the five
great sacrifices etc. and the postulation of virtues ( kalyan a) such
as truth, straightforwardness etc. is certainly feasible.
3 ‘ 38 * ^ ^
/ _* r\
rs r-v rs
\9 ) ^ t m i-
ft ^ ^ i ft 3 m mmti mmm 1 mm-
mrrewftr:’ ^Trfnwr^ I m ^ P a nW^
3.38. Thus for a person who is possessed of the means, the performance
of stipulated actions produces the desire for Self-knowledge through
the purification of the mind. But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.17.p.21 .)
Thus what has been said is that there is the production
of knowledge only through the performance of actions
stipulated according to the stages of life, on the part
of a person who observes the prescribed rules.
That is not so. Because the performance of [ritual] actions, which is
based upon the appearance of duality, has no possibility of use in any
manner whatsoever for the production of knowledge of the oneness of the
Self which is the means of liberation. According to your view, that of
an exponent of Visi§tadvaita, even though action in the form of
260
contemplation upon the Self is the means for Self-knowledge, stipulated
action such as Agnihotra etc. is possible to be a means for Self-
knowledge only through purification of the mind. Thus the statement:
"there is the production of knowledge only through the performance of
actions stipulated according to the stages of life" is certainly
questionable. So even though action is a means for the knowledge of
the oneness of the Self through purification of the mind, because it
is not directly the means for that [knowledge], knowledge does not
have action as a component, even less is [knowledge] combined with
action.
3.39.
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3.39. [objection] The combination of knowledge and action is indicated
by the word "together" ( saha ) in the sacred text;
He who knows both knowledge and non-knowledge
together, having crossed over death through
261
non-knowledge, attains the immortal through
knowledge (Isa.11,).
Because action is referred to by the word "non-knowledge".
[reply] Tou are mistaken. For there is no word "together" here.
Because here, the pair of words; "sa" and "ha" is alone correct.
Because the word yat in; "He who knows [both] these" invariably
requires the word tat ♦ [if you say] Even in the absence of the word
"together" , the combination is certainly made known by the twofold
occurrence of the word "and", [we reply] The combination of knowledge
and action which is made known by the word "together" or by the
twofold occurrence of the word "and" is only in knowledge. Because there
is the specification; "He who knows [both] of these". But [the
combination] of those two is not for producing a result. And even in
knowledge their combination only occurs for someone by chance. Because
there is the specification; "He who knows". But there is no rule that:
knowledge for all people is only through combination.
The purport of the sacred text is that he who truly knows this
pair accomplishes their respective effects by this twofold means. In
regard to those two, [ritual] action is the means of crossing over
death. Knowledge is the means for the attainment of the immortal. .
Impurities of the mind such as desire etc. are understood by the word
"death" as they lead to death. This is what has been told; having
removed the impurities of the mind such as desires etc. through,,
[performing] the stipulated action without attachment to the result,
having purified the mind and become qualified for liberation, he
gains liberation through knowledge. So this sacred text does not
prove the combination of knowledge and action. On the contrary, it is
understood from this passage of the sacred texts that the use of
action is only for the purification of the mind.
3.40.
sr§n%raraHrc erg HRfTRW il (r%o g® )
zmrii JWf %wm | tFrtwi: $ ^rm
^^rpit ^ l mm ^#wn r ^ %m& w-
qR l h^fftc
# #*FT | f% ^ ^rFRfsft ^cTRFT fqr^faTRR
^PTRT qfl%: tfwffarfa l
3.40, [objection] Then for what purpose did Janaka, who possessed
knowledge, perform action? -
He who had recourse to knowledge, even though
abiding in the knowledge of Brahman, he
performed many sacrifices to cross over
death by non-knowledge (Vis.P.6.6.1 2),
[reply] Janaka’s impurities of mind were nearly all previously
burnt by knowledge. Still, those that remained were like cooled
charcoal and he performed action such as sacrifice to put an end even
to those. That is the purport.^ By this it is made known that such
impurities of the mind too are impediments. Moreover it is also to be
understood that undertaking action is possible even for one who
possesses knowledge; for the steadfastness of his purity of mind or
for the welfare of the world.
.3.41 .
* i
£rar[%Rrrcf h qtf- *rro<jo^c[oH)^f^
^ % rM toi5
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^IlfcM ppil^TJ fk^RR
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I
263
3.41. But what has been said. (£>ri.B.Para.18.p.22f.) :
The discrimination between what is permanent and what
is impermanent etc. will not be accomplished without
the study of the mimaits a . Because the nature of [ritual]
action, its result, its constancy or inconstancy, the
permanence of the self etc. is difficult to be understood
without the ascertainment of the particular result,
means, procedure and qualified person.
That is not so. Because a person who has heard from his teacher etc.
about the permanency or the impermanency etc. of a thing and on account
of trust considers that it is indeed ascertained, has the possibility
of being endowed with the "fourfold means" even without the ascertainment
of the nature of action etc. and even without the study of the mima&sa
written by Jaimini. And because in the world such people are seen to
have the desire for Self-knowledge. For what does trust not accomplish?
For example, for a person who has heard from his teacher etc. that*,
"action such as sacrifice is the means to heaven etc.", even his
performance of the action is observed by people as done without study
of the ml mails a on account of his trust there [in the words of the
teacher].
3.42.
- I ft m-
R%TRR WCt ( |0 v I I ^ ) fRTfr
\W(W\ m RR I ^T#Tf fwro ft *
^r^ciT vr i m- ^
fwi p
i swot
264
fipnwg l ‘ w ^
*pt^ i ih ^ tn#n* ( %°X\ v°
< ) frW^ I
3.42, [objection] Even upon the accomplishment of the fourfold means
in the manner mentioned, the fourfold means will not become the means
for the desire to know Brahman without the study of the mimamsa .
Because one who has studied the mlmamsa and who understands the things
which bring about the employment [i.e, the use of a certain thing
such as a mantra for a certain purpose] i.e. the means of knowledge
23
such as direct scriptural statement, inferential signs etc. is able
to undertake the employment of [the values] such as control of the
mind etc. in [the sacred texts] such as: "Therefore he who knows
as such, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, enduring
and concentrated, should see the Self in the self" (Brh.4.4.23.) for
the apprehension of the Self. But another person [who has not studied
the mlmamsa] is not able to do that.
[reply] It is not so. Because direct scriptural statement etc.
which bring about the employment [of a certain thing for a certain
purpose] are not taught as something new by Jaimini. But only what is
established in the world is being referred to. Otherwise, in the case
of [a statement] such as: "bring the horse", the horse being the
ancillary of bringing would not be understood even by one who has
heard this sentence because he has not studied the mlmamsa that the
horse is ancillary to bringing since an accusative is stated. Hence
there would be much confusion. Accordingly, the employment is only
established by the nature of the signification of the word. So one who is
proficient [i.e. one who knows the connection of a word and its
meaning] is able to know that the fourfold means are the means for the
desire to know, even without study of the mlmamsa written by Jaimini.
On account of this, [the statement in the ^ri.B.Para.l 8,p,23]:
265
That these [the fourfold means] are the means has to
be determined from their employment. The employment
[has to be determined] from direct scriptural
statement, inferential signs etc. and that is
contained in the third [chapter of the Purvamlmaihsa]
is refuted.
I * (f ° v I « r
'<\)W mw<$-
^ 1 % I
sdim RRRch 11HVMdrJ'RHqft fof
I l wdt-
^R * w, J ^q- 1 mm ^rt?w^ v T*if*r: >
1 f%q[ ‘ JT^^tTPT WTR3FT > ( 5 & ? I 3 J U )'
wtri l ^ ^Mpn^iNr -
m^rm 1 ^frnir^ \ wif^
3.43. [objection] In the same way, could there be knowledge of the Self
from the teacher etc. even without the study of the later mimaihsa ?
[reply] Certainly. On account of this, the mimaihs a of action
written by Jaimini is not necessarily the pre-requisite with regard to
the desire for Self-knowledge. It should not be said; how can control of
the mind etc. be understood as the means for the desire to know? Because
having referred to Self-knowledge by this: "he who knows as such" in the
sacred text: "Therefore he who knows as such" (Brh.4.4.23.), it is
subsequently said that one should directly apprehend the Self by the
means such as control of the mind etc. [reason] Because even in the
statement in the sacred text cited i.e. that control of the mind etc. are
the means for the direct apprehension of the Self, they are not rejected
as means for the desire to know. [The statement] "having referred to
266
Self-knowledge" is also not correct. Because the word "as such" ( evam )
calls to mind what was previously said, therefore the meaning of this:
"he who knows as such" is knowing at first glance [i.e. in a general
way] that the Self is free from the connection to action and its result.
Furthermore, control of the mind etc. is very clearly mentioned
as the prior condition to listening [to the teaching], in the sacred
text: "[to him who approaches properly], whose mind is calm and who is
possessed of tranquility" (Mu.1.2.13.). For that reason, those
[fourfold means] are established as the pre-requisite with regard to
Self-inquiry. Self-inquiry is in the form of listening etc. Control of
the mind etc. are certainly necessary at the time of listening etc. and
even after that. But that is another thing.
3.44.
<jo n n ^3 to l trarft
I
wtaft qrgps ($ II
3.44. But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.l8,p.23.):^
The contemplations upon the Udgitha etc. are admitted
by all to be dependent upon the understanding of the
nature of [ritual] action.
That is granted. Still, how is the prior mimartisa written by Jaimini
necessarily the pre-requisite with regard to Self-inquiry? Because an
understanding of the nature of [ritual] action, in a general way, is
possible even without that [Purvamimahsa]. And because the investigation
of the Udgitha [i.e. the chanting of the Veda] is incidental it cannot
determine the pre-requisite, so what has been previously mentioned too
(3.24.) is not to be forgotten.
267
3.45.
agfaparaf
I m ^ mm-
i m ^r mm i
3TR5?r nrmr mm mmmtrmr i
fRfflt'-ffiM*?: PTf?RT: ATTIN^: II » II
3.45. The one who has acquired the fourfold means has been shown to he
qualified for the desire to know Brahman. And by that person, Self-
knowledge is to be accomplished for the attainment of liberation. With
regard to that, if [you ask]: "what is the nature of the Self?", it is
told:
The Self has been taught as being free from
distinction, maya is said to be its power.
The individual soul must be a reflection in
that [ maya] , the Lord is considered to possess
a limiting adjunct. 7.
comment
The author states the view of the Vivaran a with regard to the
nature of the soul and the Lord. See 1.32. and comment.
Abhyankar now commences the examination of Ramanuja’s Mahasiddhanta .
3.46/
0 R ) 3^ I SRFIRI
RWITRTO ^ m i mb
^TPTN smrmnRPJTf
rtwwra: l mm
i <t*?t m i m
m (%3 i ^ ^ ^
I $\wi
qpRraw: mm \
3.46. The conclusion of the exponents of maya is that the supreme Self
is free from distinction. But what has been said (3rx.B.Para.28.p.45.):
The exponents of a thing free from distinction are
268
not able to say that "this is the means of knowledge"
in regard to a thing free from distinction. Because
all means of knowledge have as their object a thing
possessing distinction.
In regard to that, it is said: are the means of knowledge accepted as
being the object of another means of knowledge or not? In the first
case, even those other means of knowledge must be said as the object
of another means of knowledge and so there is an infinite regress. In
the latter case, the means of knowledge would not have the nature of
being a means of knowledge since they are not the object of another
means of knowledge. If that is the case, there would be the failure
of ordinary relations.
[objection] Suppose the means of knowledge have no invalidity,
but are certainly established as the nature of being a means of
knowledge. And for that purpose there is no requirement of another
means of knowledge, but like a light is self-luminous, the means of
knowledge are certainly themselves a means of knowledge.
[reply] Then why is the supreme Self, who is the support of all
the means of knowledge, not accepted as having self-validity?
comment
Against Ramanuja's objection that there is no means of knowledge
(perception, inference or verbal testimony) for an entity free from
distinction, Abhyankar raises the question: does a means of knowledge
need to be verified by another means of knowledge or is it intrinsically
valid? If a means of knowledge like perception requires demonstration
by'another means of proof such as inference, then the validity of the
inference would also need to be demonstrated by yet another means of
proof etc. However if a means of knowledge is not demonstrated by
another means of knowledge then on what grounds can we say that it is
a means of knowledge? For example if, as Vedantins accept, the visual
sense organ operating through the material eye is of a subtle nature
and hence unknown, then how does one know that it exists? It can be
proved to exist since it is the object of inference: the visual sense
exists because it illumines an object and whatever illumines an object
must exist.
The Visigtadvaitin responds by stating that knowledge should be
accepted as intrinsically valid and a means of knowledge does not
require verification from another source of knowledge. The Advaitin
accepts this, since it is his own position, and argues that if a
means of knowledge is inherently valid, the existence of Brahman is
all the more validated since Brahman is by nature self-evident
( svayamprakasa ) awareness without which there could be no operation
of a means of knowledge.
This is an initial argument. Strictly speaking it does not answer
Ramanuja's objection that a means of knowledge does not apprehend
anything which is free from distinction. Abhyankar now addresses this
point.
f% * to
tot * m mwR i < *m-
TOi%fro mm* *i mx**\ rsft tor > ( ft* 3°
) ?i% l mfo*\ mm* wur f*m
* 1 * * jtwr I 3 w totottot
TO TJ5T
| * &TOITSJ[*iFTR TO |
tt to tot ** mm ^ 5 -
^ urn * ‘to: touV (to \ 1 c ) 1
mm* totto cr zrftm tototo*p? mi Afiii
m i tot:'
( f° v 1 # j l
3,47. Furthermore, the means of knowledge do not reveal the supreme
Brahman as their object. That has been told in the Vis nupuran a ;
, The means of knowledge, on the part of those who
possess the means of knowledge, are not capable
of the determination of Brahman the abode of all
power... (Vis.P.6. 8 .57•).
The meaning of that is; maninam are those who possess the means of
knowledge, manani are the means of knowledge, nig thayai means for
determination, na prabhavanti signifies that they [the means of
270
knowledge] are not capable. But because the means of knowledge have
gained existence [from Brahman], therefore, while remaining at a
distance, they indirectly indicate as their own root cause that there
must be something which is the support of all empirical transactions
consisting of the means of knowledge and objects of knowledge etc.
That [i.e. the sacred texts] are certainly not invalid merely because
of this. Just like a light, which has the capacity to illuminate a
thing possessing colour, while itself remaining at a distance
indicates that darkness also has [black] colour. It is similar to that.
Accordingly, it is said in the sacred text: "beyond darkness" (k§v,3.8.).
And just as the light of a firefly is unable to illumine the sun, so
too, even the sun which illumines everything is unable to illumine
the supreme Brahman. With the same purport as this it is said in the
sacred text; "light of lights" (Brh.4,4.16.).
comment
Ramanuja argues that all means of knowledge only make known an
object which possesses distinguishing characteristics. Perception
reveals its object as possessing the attributes of colour etc. Because
inference is based upon perceptual data, it too can only give
knowledge of a thing possessing distinction. Verbal testimony is
derived from words which can denote either a class concept ( jati ) such
as the word "cow", or a quality (gupa) like "white or blue", or an
action ( kriya ) such as "moving", or a name ( satnjna i.e. as revealing
a substance, svarupa ) like "Devadatta"So verbal testimony too is
incapable of denoting something free from distinction.
Advaitins accept that words cannot communicate an entity which
is free from distinction through: their primary expressive power
( sakti ). The texts such as; "from which [Brahman] words return..."
(Tai.2.9.) also convey this meaning. However apart from the primary
expressive power, words can also communicate through a secondary or
implied signification ( lak sana). Advaitins consider that Brahman, free
from distinction, can be directly revealed through certain Upani§ad
statements which function by way of implication, subsequent to the
establishment in the texts of the necessary context for the implication
to be understood. For example the "great sentence": "you are That"
(Ch.6.8.7.) communicates by means of an implied signification (see
comment to 1.48.
271
Similarly, the scriptural statement defining the nature of
Brahman; "Brahman is real, Knowledge and limitless" ( satyam ,-jnanam
anantam brahma .,Tai.2.1.) conveys its meaning through implication. 2 ^
The words "real" ( satyam ) and "Knowledge" ( .jnanam ) are in grammatical
apposition ( samanadhikaranya ) with the word "limitless" ( anantam ).
Because of such apposition, the words "real" and "Knowledge" relinquish
the limited meanings generally associated with these words while still
retaining their root sense ( satya from as "to be" and ,1 nana from ,jna
"to know"). So the word "real" in association with the word "limitless"
cannot signify something finite and hence it implies only the root
meaning free of all limitations i»e. existence per se ( sanmatra ). So
too the word "Knowledge" directly denotes mental states which are an
29
attribute of the intellect, but on account of apposition with the
word "limitless" it gives up this limited meaning and implies only
the root sense of the verb free from any other ascription, i.e.
awareness per se ( cinmatra ). Thus the nature of Brahman is implied,
but not directly denoted, by the sentence; " satyam jnanam anantam
brahma
3.48,
ftterwfc *Tfq^ c | ^ m
'sfNr:
wm qrm \
I qg WTT J ^q q
3 rerpr wmi I qqq ftrc;-
i qr^q^q ft ^*rq^qfqq*q
qqp^qT^roqq, \ ^r. q
=q q^qq \ fsiqq^fMqq&iql-
3.48. The supreme Brahman possesses a power which is non-different from
itself and it is the locus of that power which is non-different with
regard to itself. [Brahman] is one, in the form of existence, free from
qualities and free from distinction and is unable to be stated as "such
272
and such" because its power has not been manifested. At the time of
creation, that power, which has been manifested depending upon its own
locus, becomes as though different like bubbles from water. For this
reason, the individual soul who is reflected in that [power] considers
the Self to be different from the supreme Self, even though [the supreme
Self] is himself. In the same manner, he considers the world, which is
the transformation of such a power, to be different from the supreme
Self. Brahman, possessing the power which has been manifested, can be
expressed by the word Lord. On account of the manifested power, this
Lord is superimposed as possessing quality and distinction.
[objection] One thinks: why has this [Lord] been superimposed by
the power? This [Lord] alone must be principal. There is nothing
different from Him which is free from quality and free from distinction.
For the accomplishment of the origination, sustenance and dissolution of
the world is only through Him.
[reply] No. Because the essential nature of the supreme Self can
be understood only through the sacred texts and it has to be accepted
only according to the sacred texts. In the sacred text, at some place
the freedom from qualities is stated and at some [other] place the
possession of qualities is stated. The way that has been told is certainly
more correct for adherence to the two types of sacred texts,
comment
See comment to 1.9.
3 ' 49 ' ^ 1
wm 'mmm ?j^rt r¥t: i wm ^ mfH’iferr-
i ftt ^ i <trrr:
RPTRR I f% HHMRH | TRRRT
tjpfT HlKRT^RT ^TR'r W[$\VA 1^3^-
5^irI wrt <RTf*TR^R: l w ^ siw#
m r^^trrr ymh I
273
3.49. [objection] The purport of the sacred texts [teaching] freedom
from qualities must be in the absence of qualities which are to be
abandoned.
[reply] No. Because the word "quality" which is used in a
universal and primary sense has no authority to be used in a restricted
meaning. Moreover, the negation of qualities in the supreme Self is
taught by the sacred texts [denoting] freedom from qualities. And because
negation is preceded by attainment, the attainment of qualities in the
supreme Self has to be stated. That [attainment] is not through perception,
because the supreme Self is not an object of perception. But it is
through inference. Having known the supreme Self to be the agent of the
creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world, due to that reason,
the inference of qualities such as omniscience which are useful for
creation etc. is possible there [in the supreme Self]. But there is no
possibility of an inference there [in the supreme Self], in any manner
whatsoever, of qualities which are to be abandoned. So because there is
no attainment of qualities which are to be abandoned, how can the purport
of the sacred texts [denoting] freedom from qualities be supposed to
refer to their negation?
3.50.
^ PWWpH ^ STTo l RK ) I
mm fwr: sr
3-.50. Furthermore, freedom from distinction is certainly established
even by inference which is based upon the pervasion: any distinction has
the nature of the universal. Just as a pot, earthenware dish etc. has the
nature of clay which is their universal. That has been told by the
venerable Vyasa: "inference is entirely used up in comprehending the mere
universal, it has no capacity to ascertain a distinction" (X.S.B.1.25.).
274
3,51 * rh i^kiT% < wr ittot m J
(r | y ) 7f^ ^m^7TR* | 3 ^?tt w^prrt-
ym rr. I ^ ^
^RT 3RFRSRR* ^<RRRR ^ d^fMdl^qWM ^FR*U
l *piRRR*RTRR RPRH RRT'
1 W%WT ^R( qTfRfRR^RR *R
# SRmRT #ni l W WWf ^mW^tr?
*R3 ^r%r ^PR^"TRT%SR <TRRR ^Rl^t *R<J I <R ^
WtTRR WRRl|^mi^5 ^RR
rru RlmRinm s^rrtrr qw^^t hrrr l * ii#fi
wm iW: hr Mr M ? # rrtMt i hrrr:
WtR’PTRRSM tRRf.cTRT^ | OTTO I
W ‘w wrritRitrrr rthrr rr hhh^ r##r&*
I ^ % 3R jfsifMrrt: *t my rrr:’ (<R R\
c ) ^r4 w^rt: R^prpRra I h-tri-
HRR ^RR^MmRI 3RgRT<RM *RR sfcRR$
w?^i 1 3 thjr s^rhirrM f^n m h
*rr ^qfq^ ^rRq; I
3.51. There is harmony with the sacred text; "from which [Brahman]
words return along with the mind, having not reached" (Tai.2.4.) only
because of the acceptance of Brahman as pure and free from distinction.
Otherwise, because Brahman possesses qualities it is therefore an
object of speech and because the followers of Ramanuja accept it in
that manner there would be incongruity with that [text].
It should not be said that the purport of that sacred text is
the absence of being an object of speech in totality, for there is the
absence of being "just so much" since the qualities are innumerable,
[reason] Because there is the consequence of the loss of self-evidence
of the word "having not reached". But the explanation; "having not
reached the limit of qualities" is artificial because of the acceptance
of the need to supply an ellipsis. And because in the expectation of a
grammatical object for this [word] "having not reached", there is the
attainment through contiguity only of what has been specified by the
275
word "-which" i.e. "from which" ( yatah ) since it is the limit for the
return of speech.
It should not be said that in the expectation of a grammatical
object for this [word] "having not reached", there can be the
postulation only of the supreme Self who is distinguished by all
qualities and who is specified by the word "which". In regard to that,
the absence of attainment of the agency of speech is negated in the
supreme Self who is the substantive and it is negated even in the
qualities which are the distinguishing attributes of that [supreme Self]
and it will terminate in the attribute of an attribute i.e. in the
totality belonging to the qualities. For there is the maxim: when the
substantive is negated, the positive statement and the negation terminate
in the distinguishing attribute.[reason] Because the supreme Self, as
distinguished by all qualities, is not relevant to the topic there. And
because the final explanation through the maxim which was stated is a
last resort. On account of this, [the explanation]: "from which ( yatah )
means from the bliss of Brahman, there is the return of speech and mind
having not reached ( aprapya ) the limit of that [bliss of Brahman]" is
32
refuted. And because the bliss of Brahman is accepted as an object of
speech by the sacred text itself: "the bliss of Prajapati one hundred
[times] is one [measure of the] bliss of Brahman" (Tai.2.8.). And
because human bliss is experienced by individual souls, therefore the
bliss of Brahman is able to be conceived by the mind by way of
multiplication hundreds of times higher and higher. But Brahman free
from qualities cannot be conceived by the mind, for there is no
experience anywhere in the world of a thing free from qualities.
3.52.
( \° 'S ) ^PT I
#^3 srmTRR l ft 3 I stw
276
^3^1 1 'THT * ?fcf ^T%: FRtft ^TTn%4^^r
m m$m n ^ ti
3.52. It should not be said that the sacred text [denoting] the
return of speech is inconsistent since even Brahman free from
distinction, which you accept, is taught by the sacred texts "free
from qualities" (Cu.7.). [reason] Because the meaning of this; "words
return" is that words are unable to teach by way of a positive
statement. But the sacred text: "free from qualities” does not teach
[that Brahman] is "like this" but it negates qualities entirely. This
must necessarily be understood. Otherwise the sacred text; "words
return", itself teaching Brahman in a form while it is not an object
of speech, would be contradicted like the statement "I am mute". 7.
3.53.
to : > ( u)
Rmrt HRnpr: n < n
3.53. Although it has been said (^ri.B.Para.28.p,45.):
The tenet relating to their own school, that an
entity free from distinction is established by
one's own experience, is also refuted. Because
there is only the experience of what possesses
distinction with the self as the witness.
With regard to that, it is said;
Universal knowledge is not free from distinction,
because it is knowledge. Scripture must be the
means of knowledge for what is free from
distinction. That [scripture] too is of an
ordinary nature.8.
277
3 * 54 * qr^wwrft-
i f%g
5f4 i'^'i ^TSq^Td ^ I
*rt *ft fam: s ^ ^rnTF^f^J, w v«i<i m kmRkm i^~ 1
wr *rfwi ^ l r^wqmsrcr ^twR Rnf-
TTPRRT^ 1 H3^^TT ^JT^PT flWFTH I IFT ft mm
w\$i m i cRfqsTwq prppt vr ^ M
^ I ^Mrfq ^|4 *TTCFT^W ^ '#W^ *T TW^ I 'PFfPG
mm mz?m\ I nf^rrc fMt^^^^^RR^’qrqrq;t
3.54. ¥e do not deny the experience possessing distinction, which is
.of an ordinary nature such as "I saw this", as it is included within
the world which is a modification of the power of the supreme Self,
But because a distinction has the nature of the universal, it is most
strange that you deny the experience free from distinction which has
the nature of being the basis of the experience of an ordinary nature
possessing distinction. The pervasion is everywhere certainly without
deviation; any distinction has the nature of the universal. Just as
a pot, earthenware dish etc. has the nature of clay which is their
universal.
Ordinary knowledge is a particular mental modification and its
special nature is that it possesses a locus, an object and is
determinate. With regard to that, the universal possesses a locus,
an object and is indeterminate. With regard to that, the universal is
without an object and possesses a locus. Because knowledge depends
firstly upon a location and then upon an object. Even with regard to
that, the universal is without a locus. And here, knowledge just has
the nature of being knowledge.[as such]. Even with regard to that,
the universal is in the form of existence and it is where even
knowledge as such does not exist. The conclusion based just upon this
278
is that awareness is indeed existence.33 This experience free from
distinction is well known in the "fourth state".
comment
Abhyankar attempts to demonstrate that knowledge ( dhi ), which is
a particular mental modification, has its substratum in awareness
( anubhuti ) which is free from distinction ( nirvise ga) and of the
nature of existence ( sadrupa ). He enumerates five "stages", each of
greater universality than the preceding.
(1) ordinary knowledge which possesses a locus ( asraya ), an object
( vi g aya ) and is of a determinate nature ( savikalpaka ). For example
the knowledge relating to Brahman possessing qualities ( saguqabrahman )
possesses a locus i.e. the thinker and an object i.e. Brahman
with qualities. It is determinate since there is knowledge of the
relation of attribute and substantive ( vise ga navise s yabhava )♦
(2) With regard to that, the universal possesses a locus and an object
but is indeterminate. For instance the knowledge relating to Brahman
free from qualities ( nirgunabrahman ) possesses a locus i.e. the thinker
and an object i.e. Brahman. It is indeterminate because Brahman is
without quality and so there is no attribute-substantive relation.
(3) The third stage possesses a locus but has no object. In the
cognition: "I have knowledge" ( dhTroan ) the "I" is the locus but there
is no object of: knowledge,
(4) The universal with reference to that is just that knowledge as
such exists,
(5) Finally, the absolute universal is in the form of self-evident
existence. Because the mental modification has entirely resolved
(as in deep sleep) even knowledge as such does not appear. The
conclusion is that mere awareness which is of the nature of existence
remains as the substratum of all mental activity.
With regard to the "fourth state", see comment to 1.40.
'3-55. ^
rs ^ " V .
RIWTW?
WTW: RRTCRW BRTT
<To \9 ) } prof % iwmv I W
HR WlR ?$> 3TTO I I m R Rfft’Tig-
279
mm* ^ sn% ^
TOisn ^ sR^mr i wiwl
^'I^R^^TRTl^ ^( qio ^0^ )
< ^qfWt 5^r ^^%^TPm^R3PF^ci * ^rR’fl 1
It^ij
3,55. What has been said (^ri.B.Para,28.p.45.):^
an experience free from distinction, which is
distinguished from what possesses distinction
by some semblance of reasoning, has to be
distinguished by natural distinctions peculiar
to itself which are different from existence.
So the possession of distinction certainly
remains due to natural distinctions peculiar
to itself which are different from existence
and which are the reason for distinguishing.
That too is questionable. Because distinguishing means separating. Like
[separating] an animal from a bird. That [separating] is due to the
nature of being an animal or due to the absence of wings. For there
is no royal decree that distinguishing is only through some nature
which exists. In regard to that [distinguishing of an animal], an
animal cannot be said to possess distinction due to the absence of
wings. That [possession of distinction] is due to the nature of being
an animal. This is another matter. Thus in separating an experience
free from distinction due to the absence of a distinction, how does
the possession of distinction occur? When air which has no form is
distinguished due to the absence of form with regard to fire, water
and food, even a child does not believe that there is the possession
of form there [in air] due to the very absence of form. But if the
possession of a distinction is accepted even due to the absence of
distinction, then in the occurrence of what is non-existent becoming
280
existent, there would certainly be loss of the essential nature. For
this reason, the venerable Vyasa has said in the commentary upon the
Togasutras ; " 'the puru ga has the attribute of not being born', the
mere absence of the attribute of being born is understood. Not an
attribute connected to the puru ga 1 ' (T.S.I.9.).
c omment
The purport of the argument is that distinguishing between things
can be brought about either through the presence of an attribute or
through the absence of an attribute. Hence a cow can be distinguished
from a bird due to the absence of having wings. However an entity
cannot be said to possess a distinction merely on the ground that it
does not possess an attribute.
3.56.
3/Ttrc R%q FtRRFRTRR; I HR R W
TRT^RR iRRT: f^>4W5TRtWRR
RRRT Pftfa fRHHPIRFRTR RmRR H Rm
r q Pm
*t mNr: fmh I m h rsR:
Hfr°T l ^ ^ hrw
C C
I f%g STSRRRqRJJ I HR RRRRRqfq qRRTRRT-
! rr * Ptr ft r?4 h rrr i r f ( rrr ^
) w I r rrr pRRRRqRK l
W fRiRRRRRR RRq; i ‘rrr »( r ) ( hr
rr¥t r^r qqrq^ j
•3.56, It should not be said that because awareness free from
distinction is accepted by the exponents of maya as having the
distinction of being the material cause, a distinction in the form of
the distinction of being the material cause cannot be avoided, [reason]
Because there is the fault of infinite regressj if the distinction of
being the material cause is a distinction, then once again such a
281
distinction which is the nature of being the material cause is [yet]
another distinction. And so, like in the view of Ramanuja, although
Brahman possesses distinction it has to be accepted that the possession
of distinction is not a distinction in order to avoid the infinite
regress: if the possession of distinction i.s itself a distinction, the
possession of such a distinction is [yet] another distinction, in just
the same way, according to the view of the exponents of ma.ya as well,
the distinction of being the material cause is accepted as not being
a distinction.
If [you say] that the possession of distinction is not a
distinction, but it is merely the absence of being devoid of distinction,
[we say] that you must accept that the distinction of being the material
cause too is merely the absence of not being the substratum of the
distinctions which appear. Thus the quality of being knowledge is not a
positive attribute, but it is merely the absence of being inert.
Similarly, self—luminosity too is merely the absence of being illumined
by another. Due to this, the establishing of the possession of
distinction (Sri,B.Para.28»p.46,): "because knowledge has the quality
of being knowledge and the quality of self-luminosity" is refuted. In
the same way, it is to be understood that the quality of being eternal
is merely the absence of destruction. The quality of being one is merely
the absence of a second. The scripture, such as: "free from qualities”
(Cu,7»2»), "without taint" (^v.6,19.) is the means of knowledge for an
entity free from distinction,
comment
The purport of the discussion about the distinction of being the
material cause, is that if the nature of being the material cause is
considered to be a distinction, then there should be a cause for that
distinction and again a cause for that distinction and so there is no
finality.
282
3 * 57 * * 3RFT 3 Ppm R I FFTP
RR*! JTJ%: ! ^fq^^PT^m f| I ^RiR^5ftT^%
q?FR I I
q^wwi FiqmqiRimn%R
?r: ? ( '4toT<> T°
.,^<s q-o ^ ) \<^ jpfof^hre^pr:
5RIHf- RR RT^Rt
^ ^fr^r ftfag&r f%ft-
qfcf’RT^ RcR rTR HTR*TT | o*TT f| I ^FTpW%'TIRR%
qqnTT I rh f| $T%f|frpRR qftqi^TRr I
RT ^tTJP^^R I R ^T%47Rff^T ^rf%-
'tf°TW I W1 RRTT fr?F<F R Sf^eFTFRRRFI-
q^qftr q mf rpr I <r rpHH ‘ %3j
rnp^RR q^wqfqf^q^fq ^r) Rswm r^^pt »
#T3 *r q*mq mp% I w
( \s u ) ftrfr; ( %o ^ i ^ ) (*£T<A)3 I
l\ ) fFH% I ^PT ^ ^^TTfrqT 3R* fqfq%q RT I
fR§FTKFRFR-FRIF ^RTfRTtT^ I -cWI RF 3Rt faft-
tq qR q totrr wra c^*Fr<Fm: qfcpRf^
3RFR I W * w qr ^TTT% ^crrfa 3fRR ’ ( %® 3 \ l I O
fftt? i www wto rYrr
fprr ftMwr Rsrcr *rrtr *tfr
%e?t^frTT qtRq; i ^RFpqrfr i ^ qwwRp
«te»(|o v u rr)^ ^fr fr qRqRn^ licil
3,57. But what is being taught by this text (&rT.B.Para.28.p,46.):
Verbal testimony, especially, has the capacity of
denoting only an entity possessing distinction.
Because it functions through words and sentences.
Now a word is due to the connection of the stem and
the affix. Since the stem and the affix have a
difference in meaning, the imparting of a
qualified meaning on the part of the word itself
cannot be avoided. And the difference among words
is based upon the difference of meanings. Because
a sentence is a collection of words, it denotes a
283
particular combination of the meanings of several
words and therefore has no capacity for teaching
about an entity free from distinction. [Hence]
verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge for
an entity free from distinction
is that an entity which is free from distinction does not have verbal
testimony as its means of knowledge. That is when a word undertakes
to teach about something through primary signification, by way of a
positive statement and from essential definition. Not otherwise.
To explain. A word is seen to have many ways of teaching a
meaning. Because a word teaches a meaning at some place by way of a
positive statement and somewhere [else] by way of negation. So too,
somewhere by way of an essential definition and somewhere [else]
through an incidental definition. In the same way, somewhere through
the primary signification and at some place through implication.
Although suggestion is another type of signification, still, it
necessarily gives either of the two: the express meaning or an
35
implied meaning, so it does not illustrate anything different.
There [in respect of the usage of words], an entity free from
distinction cannot be said as: "such and such", so although a word
is unable to teach an entity free from distinction through a positive
statement, still, it is certainly able to teach through negation. For
instance; "free from qualities" (Cu.7.2.), "without taint" ($v,6,19.),
"without sound, without touch" (Katha.l .3.1 5.) etc. Here [in respect
of negation], a word communicates Brahman free from distinction
through secondary signification [i»e„ implication]. Because even the
primary meaning of the words "free from qualities" etc. does not
exist there [in Brahman] in reality. So too, although a word does not
teach an entity free from distinction through an essential definition,
still, it is certainly able to teach through an incidental definition.
For example; "from which these beings are born" (Tai.3.1.1.) etc.
284
It must be understood that although this incidental definition is for
Brahman who possesses a limiting adjunct and has distinction, still,
by means of that [Brahman possessing distinction], it is possible to
be for [Brahman] free from distinction vhich is the support of that
[Brahman possessing distinction]. This [incidental definition] taught
by the scripture has to be understood according to the ordinary view,
because even the scripture is of an ordinary nature. For the absence
of absolute existence in regard to the sacred texts is taught by the
sacred text itself: "the Vedas are no longer Vedas..." (Bph.4,3.22.).
comment
Abhyankar states that Brahman cannot be directly denoted through
the primary signification of a word ( vacyavrtti ), for a word primarily
expresses either a class concept, a quality, an action, or a name
(see comment 3.47.). He also maintains that a positive statement ( vidhi )
is unable to reveal Brahman, for such a statement would communicate
by way of a subject-predicate construction denoting the relation of an
attribute and its possessor. A positive statement has no applicability
since Brahman is said to be free from attributes.
Abhyankar also considers that the nature of Brahman cannot be
revealed through an essential definition, i.e. a definition by means
of the essential nature ( svarupalakg ana). Such a definition requires
that the essential nature of the thing be offered as the definition
( svarupam eva lak sanam). The essential nature can itself be the
definition if there is an assumed distinction between the defining
characteristics and the thing to be defined, so once again there is a
38
relation of attributes and their possessor. Although this relation is
only a conceptual formulation for the purpose of the definition,
Abhyankar presumably classes svarupalak gana along with the previous
two modes because of the above reason,
Bhwever the principal view is that the nature of Brahman can be
39
revealed through an essential definition. In his commentary upon
the passage: "Brahman is real, Knowledge and limitless" (Tai.2.1,),
Sankara states on six occasions that the passage is intended to
provide the definition of Brahman. 40 Sankara considers that such a
passage reveals the essence of Brahman through the implied meaning of
the words 4 ^ (see comment to 3«47»)»
Ramanuja's contention is that verbal testimony cannot be a means of
knowledge for something free from distinguishing characteristics since it
285
functions through words which possess a distinct meaning and sentences
which express a particular relation between the different meanings of
the words, Advaitins reply that even if a sentence does express such
a relation, there is no rule that the object of the purport of the
sentence must possess, the distinctions belonging to the various words.
The purport of a sentence can be different from what is denoted by
the relation of the words. For instance, if. I express disapproval at
my friends plan of dining with my enemy by telling him: "go eat poison"
(vig arii bhunk s va ), the intention is not that he should eat poison but
that he should not eat with such a person, A sentence can also
express a non-relational meaning. For example: "this is that Devadatta"
conveys a non-relational sense because the relation denoted by
"this" referring to the present place and time and the relation
expressed by "that" referring to a past place and time are both negated
A/y
so that the sentence points to the bare substantive (see comment to 1.45.
Thus while a sentence can convey a relational meaning, it need not
always do so.^ The deciding factor is the purport,
3-58. ^ ( SRTtfRT H
wnm: ’ ( qo ? )
u ^ ii
3.58. But what has been said (&ri.B.Para.29,p.47,);
Perception, which is divided due to the difference
between indeterminate and determinate, is not a
means of knowledge for an entity free from distinction.
In regard to that, it is said:
Perception which is indeterminate is declared as
apprehending pure existence. Difference,
configuration and the generic character cannot
be mutually of the same nature. 9.
3.59
286
i isgsi g teRR tRcr; i
trrfr*? rtwrik^r ^rtd *ft<t t wsr
m R5pTfRIW^ tT^SRT ^TIRTR^Fm sTT?RT # I rffiJ
RTf R^TRI HIRFR^Fm RJR ?(% I Rcffsft $ FRIR-
RTTR ^T% | R^tsfq ’jIlR? f%R^RT I aPT TOTO'
% R77RTRTRRR T^R^^FRR: i R g FfRF ftf^^
WFRR I RTRlfa^ #sfq W R
rfrt f^fW^^RRR^KRRR; i
RR,Rti%tg I f| RfteR-
i «tr ^ ftrwR^r rrrnr:
^RTtRR I gfkl^RTRf f| A RrRtTR I *pi>-RR §r#gFn%
RTORTRT^ m RTSJW RR KTgrnfkft ^RW^R R RcflFF
R|R ft sg I
3.59. Because the indeterminate [perception] accepted by Ramanuja
is something constructed by his own imagination it most certainly
could not be a means of knowledge for an entity free from distinction.
But in actual fact, indeterminate means free from distinction. A
distinction is just the particular name, generic character etc., so
the perception free from that is indeterminate [i.e. free from any
distinction].
For example. Prior to the particular knowledge "this is
Devadatta", there is the general knowledge with regard to it, i.e,
"this is a brahman a", Prior to that, there is the general knowledge
with regard to it,i.e, "this is a man". Even before that, there is the
general knowledge with regard to it, i.e. "this is a tall thing". Even
before that, [there is the idea] "this is something". There is the
mention of the word "something" only because somehow or other it has to
be shown by a word. But not because the knowledge of that [indeterminate
thing] has the attribute of "somethingness" as its mode. The purport
of the use of the words "this is something" is just that in the
initial knowledge no attribute whatsoever appears. Because experience
is exactly in that manner. This alone is what is known in reality as
indeterminate. And this is certainly possible to be a means of
287
knowledge for an entity free from distinction.
For perception is exactly in that manner in the fourth state.
The momentary experience, prior to the distinct knowledge "I and this"
on the part of the person who has awoken from sleep, in which there is
no cognition of even the knower or the known separately from
Knowledge is indeed that ["fourth state"].
3 ' 60 ' RR'W-M I
qo
WffcK ^q^FTFiT^ I
4^ SRRTrMRN I
f¥l3RPRl% * 3 I
f% R tf*RRt TO RgFTO f^WRITORjiTO
rto # l rr ^ m&i *r*r-
to hrtoto rr%r tottto 3 l
3.60. But what has been said (3rI.B.Para.29.p.47.);
Indeterminate [perception] is the apprehension of
the first object among things belonging to the
same class. Determinate is said as the
apprehension of the second object etc. Upon the
apprehension of the first object, the "cowness"
etc. is not recognized as a form which persists
[in other cows]. There is the cognition of it
persisting only in the case of the apprehension of
the second object and so on.
That is not correct. Because the well known cognition free from
distinction such as "this is something" has no connection with
concealment. And because there is no means of knowledge for the word
288
"distinction" ( vikalpa ) in the word "indeterminate" ( nirvikalpaka ) to
have the meaning of persisting.
Furthermore, an expression of the twofold difference of that
type of perception is correct only through the two words; not having
[something] persisting and having [something] persisting, but not through
the words; indeterminate and determinate. Moreover, for a person whose
mental impression produced by the first cognition [of the object] has
vanished, its persisting even in the second cognition is not recognized
and so even the second cognition would be indeterminate. Moreover, upon
the acceptance of the way of the Vaise^ikas; that there is the
extraordinary perception of all individual cows through contact with
the universal characteristic in the very first cognition of a cow etc.,
that [perception] would be determinate. So this is a mere trifle.
comment
Advaitins criticize Ramanuja's explanation of indeterminate
( nirvikalpaka ) perception (see text, 2.44.) because his interpretation
does not coincide with the meaning of the word "indeterminate". When
a cognition has as its object a distinction such as a name, generic
character etc. then it is a determinate perception. When it is without
, 44
such distinction, it is an indeterminate perception (see text, 3.59.).
According to Ramanuja, the distinction between indeterminate and
determinate perception lies in the fact that in the former the generic
character is not recognized as persisting in other members of the same
class whereas in the latter perception it is known to persist. However
in both types of perception there is the cognition of such distinctions
as name and generic character etc., so that even in indeterminate
perception there is the apprehension: "this is Devadatta", "this is a
brahman a" etc. .Advaitins argue that due to the cognition of such
distinctions, Ramanuja's "indeterminate" perception is only determinate
perception and the use of the word "indeterminate" to characterize' it
is incorrect.45
The mention of the "way of the Yaise§ikas" i.e. the explanation
employed by Nyaya-Vaise§ika for the determination of the generic
character or an invariably concomitant relation ( vyapti ). is not
applicable here since the Visi§^advaitins do not hold this.view.
3.6i. ^
gqRqft *rf^tq£mfa 1 (>4hT« j®
sigueta ftmfrr- 3° qo ^ <rrft I *ft
agrafe: nt rew *r *r *r*n vzm-
qi^m ht-
'5tk (<j^?iq° 0 fafqsmq
swptw mssm^ i,
3.61. But what has been said (^rT.B.Para.29.p.49.):
Because perception refers to what possesses
distinction, inference also refers to what
possesses distinction because its object is
qualified by the connection to what has
been seen through perception etc.
That too is questionable. Because the universal is established as
free from distinction when a distinction is inferred to have the nature
of the universal, due to the existence of the pervasion previously
mentioned (3. 54); any distinction has the nature of the universal .
Just as the differences such as a pot, earthenware dish etc. have the
nature of clay which is their universal.
comment
The particulars have the nature of their universal, but the
universal is inherently free from the attributes of the particular.
While a pot has the nature of the clay, its universal, the latter
is not inherently connected to the form of a pot. The clay too has
the nature of its universal, i.e, its material cause such as atoms etc.
That universal has the nature of its universal and so on until there
is the termination in the highest universal: pure existence which
contains all distinctions and yet possesses no distinction.
3 * 62 * % 3
w I qpTT’
1 ^ fanm m gffamwrf MH-
q°q) ^q^ra $3
f% I Rg^wit 3nr ^ TOW^tsN
f%gn W I ^^OTftr'3R:<tq^n<4 ! t<it stst
fMfcqwr^r ^I ‘^’ (wo
^ I r I O ^ i
Hftfnr5^%^.qfif? sre^Ris^rf^i wwti: jtih-
fm ^twfM ^mrn wiM f%t%^T#& *nte Rfe?<m-
f^f JR^q; I qzts^f n ^TT^fWFRm 3 ?z-
qzrft^i mm Rq i
3.62. But those who ridicule (^rI.B.Para.29.p.49.):
[a person] who says that the very thing is free from
distinction on account of the natural distinctions
belonging to the thing does not know the
contradiction in his own speech. It is like the
assertion about the barrenness of [one's own] mother.
They must certainly be asked: this ridicule is about whom? The
exponents of maya say that an entity is free from distinction merely
through the absence of not being the substratum of the distinctions
which are appearing. But not because of some natural distinction.
It was just mentioned (3.59.) that such a Brahman, free from
distinction, is apprehended through indeterminate perception in the
fourth state. Here, there is certainly no appearance of even the
knower or the known. But this perception apprehends pure existence. I
does not have difference as its object. And here, even the difference
of apprehended and apprehending does not exist, what to speak of
difference belonging to the object. The statement: "apprehends pure
existence" is figurative. So too, even the statement; "Brahman, free
from distinction, is apprehended through indeterminate perception" is
figurative. This very non-duality is taught by the sacred texts such
as: "Existence alone..." (Ch.6.2.1.), thus there is certainly no
contradiction between scripture and perception. This Brahman, whose
nature is awareness free from distinction and which has as though
291
acquired another nature associated with the knower and the known
because its power in the form of beginningless Ignorance is
manifested, is the indeterminate etc. perception of an ordinary-
nature such as; "that which appears, that is something". But in the
ordinary perception such as: "this is a pot, not a cloth", the
difference of apprehended and apprehending and the difference between
the pot and the cloth etc. certainly appears.
comment
Advaitins also consider deep sleep to be a perceptual experience
free from distinction. For upon waking there is the recollection;
"I did not know anything" and the cause of such a recollection can be
inferred to be indeterminate perception since there is no recollection
without an experience. 4 ^
3.63.
fifth f ffhhr frh; I f|
^rmwTTR’iV<TT f w i fhhfh: ffhhtMfr; l
fft R^RfTft f fthfw.t:, hr; i sft:
h m # hiff f hr; t hr fh i f*rt fr
FH FFRI#^5FHTFFF1r: I FHFT rtr; I ^ F FHTfa
I H21HFFTHF 3 FTFTRH FFS HTOFT-
RTF fR HFfKT F HR] I i 1% F
FR FHH FR FRFIRHR-
I H F FH ?R^ t T ?R I
3.63. [objection by Ramanuja's opponent] 48 Difference is difficult to
determine since it does not admit [definite] alternatives. To explain:
in the first place, difference is not the essential nature of the
object. Because when the nature of the object is apprehended, just as
there is the expression of its nature, there would be the expression
of its difference from everything. It should not be said that even when
the essential nature is apprehended, because the expression "different"
292
depends upon a counter correlate, there is no expression of difference
at that very time because there is no recollection of that [counter
correlate], [reason] Because the requirement of a counter correlate
is not able to be observed for one who holds that difference is
nothing but the essential nature. For the essential nature and
difference are in essence the same. Just as the expression of the
essential nature does not require a counter correlate, the expression
of difference too should be just the same. And "pot" and "different"
should be synonyms like "hand" ( hasta ) and "hand" ( kara ).
Nor even is [difference] an attribute. If it is an attribute,
its difference from the essential nature has to be necessarily accepted.
Otherwise it would be the same as the essential nature. In the case
of difference, there would be difference even for that [first
difference] which is an attribute of that [first difference] and for
that [second difference] also. Thus there would be an infinite regress.
49
But 7 if there is no supposition of another difference, there could be
no expression that the initial difference is different from its own
locus. For there is no possibility of a cause for the expression
[i.e. that it is different] for itself with regard to itself..
Furthermore, there is the apprehension of difference when there
is apprehension of the object qualified by attributes such as generic
character etc. and there is apprehension of the object qualified by
attributes such as generic character etc. when there is the apprehension
of difference. So there is mutual dependence. Thus difference is
difficult to determine.
[reply by Advaitin] So be it.
comment
The position of the Advaitins , as represented by Maiidanamisra,
is that perception does not have difference for its object. The object
of perception is pure existence ( sanmatra ). Difference, as a reality,
cannot be proved through any means of knowledge. Conversely, Ramanuja
maintains that a thing qualified by the generic character is the object
293
of perception. The perception of the generic character is the cause
for a statement of difference about the object itself or something
51
else, because the generic character requires a counter correlate.
According to the Advaitin, perception simply reveals the object,
it has no capacity to differentiate one object from another. A
perception such as: "this is a pot", "this is a cloth" apprehends
mere being defined by the form of pot or cloth. The perceptual objects
are limiting adjuncts of existence which persists as the reality in
all cognitions.'* 2 The Advaitin contends that a statement about the
difference of a pot from cloth is not within the scope of a perceptual
means of knowledge since perception apprehends only the bare object.
Nor can it be established through another means of knowledge such as
inference.^ Though difference is something well known in the world
( lokaprasiddha ), the Advaitin maintains that it is not proved through
a means of knowledge ( pramanaprasiddha )■^
The argument presented in the text to demonstrate the difficulty
in arriving at the nature of difference can be exemplified by a
statement like: "the pot is different from the book”. Is the difference
which belongs to the pot identical with the essential nature of the
pot or is it an attribute of the pot? If it is the essential nature,
then upon the mention of its nature there would be the mention of
its difference from everything and the further statement that it is
"different" would be unnecessary. Also, the essential nature cannot
be identical with difference because the mention of the essential
nature i.e. pot, does not require the mention of a counter correlate.
However the mention of "difference" does require a counter correlate
for it creates the expectation of something which there is difference
from. Hence they cannot be identical.
Nor is difference an attribute of the pot. For if difference (d)
is an attribute of the essential nature then there must be another
difference (d^}, which is an attribute of the first difference, in
order to distinguish the first difference from the essential nature .
Otherwise it would be identical to the essential nature. So too,
another difference (d^) , which is an attribute of d^, is necessary
in order to distinduish d 1 from d. To distinguish d 2 from d 1 another
difference has to be postulated and so there would be an infinite
regress ( anavastha ).
Finally, the argument is put forward that an attempt to establish
difference involves the fallacy of mutual dependence ( anyonyasraya )
because difference is established when there is apprehension of the
294
object qualified by its generic character, but without first apprehending
the difference of a pot from a book it is not possible to know that
£T C
"this has the generic character of a pot". D
3
q^qq; i q ft qwW^^R i ^^qqpgqqraTgqq% I
‘f^Hr ( ' 4 rt® q° qo ?\s) sfdq^rr
Rqnq i v% rrr g?^q?q qRT-
w% i w% q fR^q f^wqq ‘wqqiqri^q qqq
fqwdi: ?mmq wmp
f\ ^ *\ ♦
*rqq-
<qq’ ( #r° \ ? q° ^ i i ^q r Rm
qq qTgqq? qqqRqfqqvffa qngqm srrr i qr 3 q^q qq rprt
q> ^qqiHR 5 qq^if qqqqfq q wimRRpr sqq^rc qqqfq I ^
HRqfq mfqqq q> jmwq?q RiRRqqwq# q qqqq qqfa l
qr 5 qqq fpf rrpt ^tirr snRqriqfq -wf Rqqqfa q *qf$r-
wii ^ pw 1 WT’q^Rq qq^mt^qq-
RqRq^qq^lqqpr qsqq: qqqRWwrqq; mrqqqtqirmqrm
^fR ^Rq^fq q RlRq rfd RtfR qqqq I me RR
q^Riqq 1
3.64. It should not be said that if [difference] is difficult to
determine, how is the appearance of difference logically possible in
the manner that: "this is a pot, not cloth" etc.? [reason] Because in
an appearance there is no requirement for the thing to be absolutely
real. For there is no logical possibility of the appearance of silver
upon a pearl-oyster etc. Tou also have accepted it to be exactly the
same by saying (^ri.B.Para.47.p.86): "because cognitions invariably
have an object". Moreover, the difficulty of determining difference
proves that it is an effect of Ignorance.
But what has been said with the intention that difference is
not difficult to determine (3rI.B,Para.30,p.50,):
Just as awareness and colour etc. are accepted by the
exponents of maya to be the cause for a
particular expression elsewhere and the cause
for an expression even in regard to themselves,
295
it is certainly possible for difference as veil.
That is not so. Because there is dissimilarity. Because colour
produces visibility in a pot vhich is its locus and it produces
visibility even in regard to itself. But that very colour, though
producing the expression "possessing colour" in regard to the pot
vhich is its locus, it does not produce such an expression about itself.
In the same manner, Knowledge also is the cause for the illumination of
the pot vhich is its object and it is the cause for its own
illumination. But that very Knowledge, though producing the expression
"possessing Knowledge" in regard to the Self which is its locus, it
does not produce such an expression about itself. Because the state of
locus and its possessor, which is dependent upon difference, is
impossible in oneself, like mounting upon one's own shoulders. Similarly,
this difference belonging to the pot which has cloth as its counter
correlate, though producing the expression "different from cloth" in
regard to the pot which is its locus, it cannot produce the expression
"different" about itself. What is known as "different" is only what
possesses difference.
comment
The Advaitin has argued that if difference is identical to the
essential nature there is no need to use the word difference at all.
If it is an attribute, then an infinite regress would occur. In reply,
Ramanuja states that there is no fault of infinite regress because just
as colour reveals its locus as possessing colour and reveals itself, or
just as awareness reveals its locus as possessing awareness and also
reveals itself, so too, difference reveals difference and reveals
itself as well.
Abhyankar answers that the illustration of colour or awareness
does not establish the point. Colour, for example, reveals its locus
as possessing colour; "this pot has colour" but it cannot reveal itself
as having colour. So too, even if difference is able to reveal
another thing as possessing difference such as a pot, it is not
able to reveal itself as having difference.
296
' * Trf * J ^ qo ^
*r:> ( wptr HR <r° i wm rmr-
s^rr I wir ^TSTm^^rwi: I h
HRR STIIcR ft H WR RTR*. 1 ^rrpf qpr ^W(^T-
fim wnfRBPTRHf RRWTR>tf R FftWRT
wif ^rptr snVn% I
*iRHHf wr. 1 srU ^wi^t:
^ FqiRsRPTRRT I T%% cT^RT tt^t^ttt-
*rr rf^iwir: I ^RwiRmre^r l
RTRRR ^ ^TR ^ *FRp$ I RnRq^fe^T rTTq^rqi qi^RPj; |
f% R Sffifa qzi R ^ SRPIT-
3nffi^tii^w gqqw: l ^3R3fT%wRFT $?r
jt 3 $fe[: jR^PTtmrr i
3.65 But what has been said (JsrI .B.Para .30 .p. 51 .):
the configuration is itself the generic character. The
generic character such as cowness etc. is itself
difference.
That is questionable. Because the configuration indicates the generic
character. What is known as "configuration" is the particular
arrangement of the component parts. That is certainly not itself the
generic character. Because there is the experience that the
configuration of various types of pots: those which are minute, large,
have long necks, projecting mouths or broard bellies, is different
with regard to each individual. It is quite another matter that there
is a mutual similarity of the configurations due to some attribute.
Because even though the configuration of two Kar s apan a coins has very
great similarity it is not identical. When one Kar s apan a coin is chipped,
only the form belonging to that is chipped and not [the form] belonging
to another Kar s apan a. But the generic character of being a Kar g apan a
coin is just one in all Kar s apan a coins.
"The generic character is itself difference" is also not correct.
Because the generic character reveals difference, it is separate with
297
regard to that. Moreover if the generic character is itself difference,
there is no logical possibility of the usage; "this is a pot, not cloth".
Because since the generic character of potness is said just by the word
pot, there is no possibility of the usage of a negative particle
which again has that meaning [i.e. the generic character].
comment
Ramanuja considers that the configuration ( samsthana ) i.e. the
distinctive form of the object, constitutes the generic character ( jati )
of the object; for it is only the particular configuration, such as
the dew lap of a cow, that is seen to inhere in all members of the
r/-
same class. D Moreover, Ramanuja equates generic character with the
determination of difference, because upon the apprehension of the
generic character such as cowness there is exclusion of all other classes
like buffaloes etc.
In reply, it is argued that the configuration reveals the generic
character but they are not identical. Though all the members of a
class partake of a very similar configuration, their respective
configurations are not identical; the configuration of Devadatta’s
cow does not itself exist in Yajnadatta's cow. The generic character,
ET O
however, is identical.
Nor is generic character identical with difference. Rather, it is
what reveals the difference of members of one class from those of
another class. If the generic character and difference were identical
then they should be synonyms and in the expression; "this is a pot,
not cloth" the use of the negative particle is redundant since it too
would refer to the generic character. Moreover, when the statement is
uttered;"there is difference of a pot from a piece of cloth", nobody
understands it to mean; "there is the generic character of a pot from
59
a piece of cloth". The mention of the configuration such as: "this is
a wide brimmed pot", or the generic character; "pot" does not require
the statement of a counter correlate. However the word "difference"
requires a counter correlate (because of the expectation: "different
from what?"), so the configuration or the generic character cannot be
identical to difference,
3.66.
mr fw:
298
raw l f^jn v^rz:
I ursn^j | 3F^*TF*nW ?w
vm 1 sft i jrflfem %^Jis*mVu f^^pt i
m wf^kRf mw. i ( >4 ptt° ?° 1
<r° ?H) (#n® 33 *t° O
fft l qr 3 5 *a 4 f p&: 1 ,
ft 1 i w* 1
^TOTqNRTO srfcRjtf^^Sf I <pr ^^TT%H?r?n
wm ^ # t^rt #
TTifR^FTHr T^4T: I
3.66. Furthermore, are these three meanings: cowness, difference and
the cessation of non-difference known to be mutually different
respectively? Or are the three just one? Alternatively, are cowness and
difference one and is the cessation of non-difference separate? Or
perhaps there is the identity of these two: difference and the
cessation of non-difference and cowness is separate? Thus there are
these four alternatives. With regard to those, the first alternative is
that those who rely upon cognition accept the three meanings to be
different. The second is that the meaning is just one, on account of
simplicity. But the cognition is like that due to the natural character
of words. The third and fourth are for those who follow both cognition
and simplicity. ¥ith regard to those, the third is the view of
Ramanuja since it is very clearly accepted to be so by his saying
(&ri.B.Para,30.p,51 .): "cowness etc, is itself difference", and
(^rI.B.Para.31 ,p.52.): "Because there is the cessation of non-difference
only through the apprehension of difference". But with regard to that,
the fourth is correct. Because non-difference is the absence of
difference. The absence of that [non-difference] is the cessation of
non-difference. The meaning is: the absence of the absence of difference.
The absence of an absence is certainly well known to all as the nature
of being a counter correlate. With regard to that, having given up the
identity of difference with the cessation of non-difference, which is
299
well known, the identity of cowness with difference is accepted even
though it is not well known. Thus what is this doctrine of Ramanuja?
3.67.
i * ^ wmm
f^R 7T I w ^ qzfw^n:
^Wl | ^nf^f^TT^f ft ^TiFRT^T^Tr
sur 11% ^ ^xtpt ^Wf ^m^FT^TFri %: m-
%fr l 'fczWi ^t l
¥?R[ |:WR'< ^ W{ tK^'^flPT^r I
lfeffr^^rfmR ftt^i
3.67. Furthermore, because the generic character does not require a
counter correlate and because difference requires a counter correlate the
difference [between the two] is certainly unavoidable. It should not be
said that just as the one Devadatta is not seen to require a counter
correlate if addressed by the word "Devadatta" and he is seen to require
it if he is addressed by the word "father" etc., it could be just like
that here [with regard to the oneness of the generic character and
difference], [reason] Because there [in the illustration], even though the
individual is one there is difference of the adjuncts of being Devadatta
and being a father. But here [in the topic], in one individual pot you
accept only the non-difference of the adjuncts of potness and difference
which are the reasons for the usage of the words "pot" and "different".
Thus the two words "pot" and "different" should be synonyms. Moreover, the
dependence upon a counter correlate is not able to be observed for one who
is the exponent of difference being nothing but the generic character.
Furthermore, if the generic character such as potness is itself
difference, then in the expectation of a counter correlate for that
difference, what is the counter correlate? Is it qualified by potness,
or not qualified by it or both? In the first case, there could be no
300
cognition of a difference from cloth. And that is because it is not
possible to say that: "potness is itself difference" if the counter
correlate of that [potness] is qualified by potness. For this very
reason it is not the third. Whereas in the second case there could be
no cognition of the difference of one pot from another pot.
comment
If the generic character of potness is itself difference, and
difference requires a counter correlate, is the counter correlate
qualified by potness or not? If it is, then one cannot say that a pot
is different from something else because the pot has itself as the
counter correlate. If the counter correlate is not qualified by potness,
then one could not say that "this pot is different from that pot"
because the pot does not have potness as its counter correlate. So the
generic character and difference cannot be the same.
^ i snctT^R w xm-
i ^Trft w?* ^ f%i%% zvti > (
^ Vo \9 ) I
3.68. But what has been said (3rT.B.Para.30.p.50.)•
Moreover, if [perception] apprehends bare existence, the
cognition referring to what is qualified such as: "the
pot is", "the cloth is" is contradicted. And if
difference, characterized by the generic character etc.
301
in the form of the configuration of the object and which
is different from bare existence, is not apprehended by-
perception, why does a person who seeks a horse turn
away upon seeing a buffalo? If bare existence alone is
the object in all cognitions, why are all the words which
are associated with the objects of those cognitions not
remembered in each particular cognition? Furthermore,
since the two cognitions, referring to a horse and an
elephant, have the one object, and since there is no
distinction because the latter [cognition] apprehends
what has [already] been apprehended, there would be
no difference [of the latter cognition] from memory. If
a distinction is accepted for each cognition, then
perception is accepted as referring only to what is
qualified. If all cognitions refer to the one object,
the result would be the absence of being blind or deaf
since everything is apprehended by just one cognition.
Bare existence is not apprehended by the eye.
Because it apprehends colour, the possessor of the
colour, and things inherently connected with the same
object as the colour. Nor by the sense of touch. Because
its scope is objects possessing tangibility. The sense
of hearing etc. too do not have bare existence for their
object. But their objects are only things distinguished
by the characteristics of sound, taste and smell.
Therefore nothing is seen here which apprehends bare
existence.
That is worthless. Because it has been told that the perception which
is not of an ordinary nature apprehends bare existence. But we
certainly accept that the perception of an ordinary nature refers to
what is qualified. So why is there so much prolixity for the sake of
showing that?
comment
302
The Advaitin does not deny the perceptual distinctions pertaining
to ordinary relations ( vyavaharika ), which are brought about by limiting
adjuncts. What is denied, is the ascription of an absolute status to
zr-i
such perceptions.
The "perception which is not of an ordinary nature" (alaukika)
refers to the indeterminate perception of the "fourth state"
( turxya-avastha ) (see 3.62.) and to the non-relational knowledge
acquired from the sacred texts (see 1.45. and comment).
3 69 >
^7Tqf | > ( 4m° ^
^ <TWTf—
*r*fr m ^ 4 ^ in« 11
3.69. But what has been said (^rI.B.Para.30.p.51.):
If bare existence free from distinction is apprehended
just by perception, then the scripture, whose object
is [to reveal] that, would be only a repetition since
it refers to what is [already] attained. And Brahman,
which is bare existence, would be an object of
knowledge.
In regard to that, it is said:
Pure existence cannot be an object of knowledge.
The world does not have an absolute reality.
Awareness is identical to existence and that
[awareness] is not manifest by another thing.10.
3.70.
'TPTO' I ^
303
wfo? wn mwn 1
wwr^wiM *q 5TRm% }%s^(^r° st ° W*Vl^i3°)
^TTT^ri#fT fl% 13T^l%^f%ff^ WfT^r-
qm%r^R h h*?rsrrt: ^i% Jn^rh (\stf I U) fa I
3.70. Pure existence free from distinction [i.e. Brahman] is indeed
established by indeterminate perception which is not of an ordinary
nature. But it is not apprehended by ordinary perception whether
determinate or indeterminate. And such a thing [indeterminate
perception not of an ordinary nature], which is certainly unknown
prior to such a perception of that [Brahman, pure existence free from
distinction], is made known by the scripture. Thus the scripture does
not repeat what is already known. According to your view also, the
supreme Self who is certainly unknown as the inner-controller of all,
is made known by the scripture such as: "He who abides in the self"
(£.Bra.14.6.7.30.). Thus the situation is certainly the same. It was
mentioned previously (3. 62 ) that the indeterminate perception which
is not of an ordinary nature is completely free from the relation
of subject and object of knowledge. Thus Brahman, which is pure
existence, is not an object of knowledge.
c omment
The Veda is the means of knowledge about matters which fall outside
£ p
the scope of the perceptually based means of knowledge. If Brahman,
pure existence free from all distinction, can be revealed by ordinary
perception then the Veda would only repeat what can be acquired through
another means of knowledge. The Advaitin could reply that ordinary
perceptual experience reveals pure existence qualified by adjuncts such
as a pot etc. But Brahman, free from all distinction, can only be
apprehended through the non-relational knowledge produced by the
immediate apprehension of the Upanigad texts which teach the nature of
Brahman and its identity with the individual soul. At such a time,
the apprehending mental mode ( antahkaranavrttyavacchinnam caitanyam )^
attempts to assume the form of the object of apprehension i.e. Brahman,
awareness as such. Since awareness is not an object as everything is its
object, the mental mode cannot objectify Brahman. It is said to be
non-relational or impartite ( akhandakara , ) because there is no a
knover-known relation but only the knowledge that the object of that
mental mode is the essence of the knower.
3.71
q% !ir«wr-
w **rrWk i m M v t qq
qm i qmq to wmi 3%
TOITO TOTO 3TRTO
q Hfi%: i i ^ r
qqm *r itot m %*m tottotoft. I to^ ttoitor
%f*RT dRJTTO I 3
TOTO «¥Fn%sh% bjTOFTOTO fan'll-
tTOIfl *T * ^q^RTTOFTmTOTO ^TJ > ( W° T {°
3 3 qo ^ q5f?qgyq?f—sflq TO 1 !:
rkhr%rrt%% q TmiTO^iRf tontito q ira^^sft ttoto:
iroqm fron^ I qm
*qqqq qK'rofro^ | ^ qq
dhc+>t«rqinfq^r-
^TFHRF
TOITOI?TOR
m hrto; t qq ^tjpnroiTO? mn
wrr% fdTO‘ l h to—, to,
qq TOsft
3TTO TORf TO qqTOTnqTOTOTOTSqiTOTOTO J\q \
3.71. But what has been said by those who do not tolerate that pots
etc. have no absolute reality ($rI.B.Para.31.p.52f.):
For when there is a contradiction between two cognitions,
there is the relation of sublated and sublating and
there is certainly the exclusion of what is sublated.
Here in regard to pots and cloth etc. there is
certainly no contradiction because there is a difference
of place and time. If the existence of a thing is
ascertained at a certain place and time and its non¬
existence is ascertained at that [same] place and time,
because of the contradiction there the stronger
sublates and there is exclusion of the sublated.
There is no contradiction if that which is experienced
305
as connected with a certain place and time is known to
he non-existent at another place and time. So how is
there the relation of sublated and sublating in this
case? Or how is it said that there is the exclusion
at one place of what has been excluded somewhere else.
But in the case of the rope-snake etc., there is contradiction,
sublating and exclusion because the cognition of non¬
existence certainly has connection with that [same]
place and time. So what is seen at a certain place and
time being excluded at another place and time is not
seen to be invariably concomitant with falsity. Thus
mere exclusion is not the reason for unreality.
In regard to that, it is said in this manner: although there is a
difference of view between the followers of Ramanuja and the exponents
of maya in regard to whether the individual soul and Brahman is
different or non-different and as to whether Brahman possesses
distinction or is free from distinction, there is no dispute that the
category of consciousness does not undergo change in its essential
nature and that it is eternal. Similarly, [there is no dispute] that
the category of the inert, consisting of the elements and elementals
etc., undergoes change in its essential nature and is non-eternal.
So too, it is also undisputed that the chariots etc. existing in a
dream and the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are certainly inert and
last for their respective times and can be experienced by the
respective persons. Thus when there is no dispute about reality, the
dispute is only in the mere name. That [dispute] is for instance:
can the three [categories] "consciousness", "the inert things” and
"chariots etc. existing in a dream" be expressed by the word "not
absolutely real" , or can the three be expressed by the word "absolutely
real"? Alternatively, can a certain one among the three be expressed by
306
the word "absolutely real" and can another be expressed by the word
"not absolutely real"?
3 * 72 ‘ mssm I ^ ^ ^ i t%
hi% ft qwfe^r
l h mi tfiw
#*: ronft l * gfrFHfi I fefcn
l Htsfq q- ^ i m ft I f% t
ztfcumi i'rMJin^r ssrf^j ^tith* l
jmmR^ <rwfe wtpM *jzrft3 *Wr
^n% ^ipif hw ?r i s??ft
I WI WIR 3W4 SffiiPtWft <RWTT^ l
« rtmfrorTw^ ^fk^m x i ^%pI frsrFraiV
( %° ? ?2-3) fft i aw wrcfe %t% l
PPTiPTT^: 1
3.72. Among those, the first alternative belongs to the Madhyamikas
who are the exponents of emptiness. And that [first alternative] is
not correct. What now is "not absolutely real"? If [you say] that it is
different from what is absolutely real, then what is some thing which
can be expressed by the word "absolutely real"? Because the compound of
a negative particle with the word "absolutely real" [i.e. a -paramartha ]
is logically possible when there is some thing which is absolutely
real. Not otherwise. Moreover in the teaching of emptiness, nothing
could be seen anywhere by anyone. So the cancellation of all worldly
transactions follows. And the teaching of random origination does not
withstand reason.
The second alternative belongs to the followers of Ramanuja.
That too is not correct. To elaborate. What now is "absolutely real"?
If [you say] it is the nature of being imperishable, then there is
inadequate pervasion of the proposition in regard to pots etc. and
307
chariots etc. existing in a dream which you accept as absolutely real,
if [y ou say] that absolutely real consists in being perceived, then
absolutely real, which has being perceived as another synonym, should
certainly continue in regard to pots etc. and chariots etc. existing
in a dream. We do not lose anything. We certainly refer to "being
perceived" by the word "not absolutely real". Although Brahman also
is perceived, nevertheless it is only as the nature of cognition and
that is absolutely real. But what is perceived possessing distinction
pertains to a limiting adjunct and is not absolutely real, like the
nature of being an individual soul. For there is the sacred text:
"it [Brahman] is unknown [as an object] for those who know well" (Ke.2.
3.). If [you say] that truth is absolute reality, what then is truth?
If [you say] it is the absence of untruth, then there is mutual
dependence; truth is dependent upon the knowledge of untruth and
untruth depends upon the knowledge of truth.
3 * 73 *
RWrTRRf M
1 1 ( 33 ^3 ) TOT-
i sumr 3 * mm*
m ) 5 ft 1
srrm^pq^ ?r Bn 1 ^
I ( >fPTTa Wo
■3.73. If [you say] that absolutely real is the absence of falsity,
what is this falsity? If [you say] falsity is just the nature of being
negated, then in the case of the rope-snake, you yourself have said
in the text(£>rl.B.Para.31 ,p.52f.Supra.): "But in the case of the rope-
snake etc." that the knowledge of the snake is negated. Thus the
308
knowledge of the snake would be false. But in regard to the desired
conclusion, your very own statement (^rT.B.Para.47»p.86.): "the
knowledge of a snake etc. upon a rope etc. is definitely real, being
the cause of fear etc." is contradicted.
Furthermore, in the case of the rope-snake, is the snake which
is the object [of the cognition] considered to be negated or not? In
the first case, the "apprehension of the real" which you admit is not
established there [with regard to the snake]. In the latter case,
there is the contradiction of the statement (Jsri .B.Para .47 .p.85 .):
"only the objects [of the cognition] are false".
Furthermore, according to your view, that of an exponent of the
"apprehension of the real", because the snake etc. also exists in the
case of rope-snake etc. therefore there is no falsity and since falsity
is not established anywhere the absence of falsity is difficult to be
stated. Because knowledge of an absence is dependent upon the
establishment of a counter correlate. Thus it is difficult to say that
absolutely real is the absence of falsity.
3.74.
to i *r -iH^RRrcrwrrr-
l a ^ m torft I to
VWV I h * I RPRt
si i 1M\ TW* Wi ^ i T^TsTRm
i to
^ I T^pri* $ l
I mt 1 srr^ i
* rft ra » sfa l
3.74. Furthermore, for you who say (^ri.B.Para.31,p.53.Supra.): "mere
exclusion is not the reason for unreality", a particular type of
exclusion is certainly accepted as the reason for unreality. The
309
particular type of exclusion is in the form of an exclusion which
"certainly has connection with that [same] place and time". And that
[particular exclusion] is for the rope-snake etc., so how is the
"apprehension of the real" established?
Furthermore, the contradiction between the cognition of the rope
and the cognition of the snake can be said only by means of the object.
That [contradiction] is not possible. Because according to your view
cognitions invariably depend merely upon an object, therefore a
cognition does not necessarily depend upon the existence of that object.
If [you say] there is contradiction of the two cognitions because of
the impossibility of [both] existing at a single instant, then there is
want of a decision between the two alternatives here, i,e. the knowledge
of the rope is what sublates and the knowledge of the snake is what is
sublated.
Furthermore, what is the distinction between the rope-snake etc.
and a pot etc? The snake upon the rope did not exist previously and
will not exist later. It is only recognized in between. The pot etc. is
also exactly the same. The snake upon the rope is subsequently negated:
"this is not a snake". The pot etc. is also negated: "this is not a pot"
in the condition of the fragments following its destruction.
3.75.
Sfpsrl q cPTT qs ^
l qiqf
sfc wft 1 qq qqqq Fiqi-
qRWR q qmnff
q qrr 5ft 3^ 1
3.75. [objection] Because of the negation; "this is not a snake" which
arises subsequently, even what relates to the time of the cognition
is negated in the manner; "this snake did not exist even at the time
of the cognition". The pot is not like that.
310
[reply] Since that existence relating to the time of the cognition
is equivalent to an instant, the absolute reality of a pot etc. cannot
be ascertained through that [i.e. the momentary existence at the time of
cognition]. But in reality, there is certainly the negation of a pot
etc., even at the time relating to its cognition, due to the insight
through the knowledge of reality. If [you say] that there is no
negation according to the insight of a bound soul, [we reply] what is
the use of that? Because even in the case of the rope-snake, the absence
of negation exists according to the observation of deluded persons.
Furthermore, is that snake real just by this alone; "there is no
negation on account of going elsewhere due to fear etc. through the
observation of the snake upon the rope"? If there is indeed the
capability of negation there, only because of running elsewhere there
is no knowledge of the rope as it is and so there is no negation, then
for a bound soul [i.e, who does not seek to know the truth] there is no
knowledge of the supreme Self as it is and therefore there is no
negation [of the world which is capable of being negated]. So it is
equal.
3
' 76, ^ {% sraFTfaft
StTT f|’TFTT I
i mwi wm I ^ 3T
rm to I ^ ^rn%iTW
( #trio tjo ^ qo ^ ) i 5 ^ w
ft; 3 i ^
i
311
*Tt^; i m ^ ^ %# Fmr %^r wr-
t<TT tf? £m*t ^ cR’T ’TTHlfe ^nrr ^T ^ I f%
1%l%3^cT ^ 37 | ^n^T 1 F7^sf7-3c77?7
i f|dft * m\€\ <mvh 1 (f^ 3°
^ l ?» l R» ) i%*tfN; ^ i
3.76, [objection] [lou say] that there is the negation of a pot etc.
due to the insight of a person who knows reality. What is the means of
knowledge in this matter?
[reply] Indeed a snake, though relating to the time of cognition,
becomes the object of the negation arising subsequently. Now the cause
here is that the snake does not exist as a snake even at the time of
cognition. Because the existence of the snake is only the existence of
the rope, not something different. Similarly, the existence of a pot is
only the existence of the clay, not something else. A twofold existence
is certainly not recognized. Nor can it be said that the existence of
the clay is absent at the time of the pot. In the same manner, even the
existence of the clay etc. is certainly not different than the
existence of its cause. Thus the negation of a pot etc., even relating
to the time of the cognition, is certainly correct.
Furthermore, in the case of the rope-snake, only the snake
relating to the time of the cognition is negated, but the cognition of
a snake is not negated. Because you yourself have stated the reality
of that [cognition] (^ri.B.Para.47.p.86.). But in regard to a pot etc.,
not only is the pot etc. negated following the knowledge of reality but
the cognition of a pot etc. is also negated. Because what is known as
the cognition of a pot is the form of the pot, which is a modification
of the internal-organ. And that [modification of the internal-organ
which has the form of a pot] does not exist following the direct
apprehension of the essential nature of Brahman on account of identity.
Thus if there is no absolute reality where only the object is negated,
312
to a still greater extent there must be no absolute reality where the
object is negated along with the cognition.
Furthermore, is there some thing which is not absolutely real
or not? The first is difficult to be said. Because according to your
view, existing is concomitant with being absolutely real and therefore
there is no possibility anywhere of what is not absolutely real. In the
second case, what more can be done since there is the mention of the
word "absolutely real" in; "imperishable and absolutely real" (Vis.P.2.
14.24.) etc.
comment
In the case of the cognition of a rope as a snake, Ramanuja
says that the snake which is the object of the cognition is negated, but
the knowledge of the cognition of a snake is not negated. Abhyahkar
states that after the knowledge of Brahman, both the object and its
cognition are negated because there is no longer the cognition of a pot
etc. as a pot since there is the knowledge of identity i.e. the absence
of anything having a separate existence apart from Brahman.
3
,77 ' wttotot 3 wro: to: i m I
TOTO q?TO RR
HITTO t * sl%
1%^’ ( 2° 33 <T°
TORfro vr ( q^ro ^ l wtot;
TOifq toWw fro: i ^ ^ mt, oil ^ q?: > tow tot
toN fTOqmrfTO tow i to rwrn ^ R^reTOTO regw:
qvro^FTORR torto: rt l wto tor-
TOTORTOTOTO ^TFCR RTO, I TO i * TOWWreWWW-
AW? 13: > ( TOT° 30 r <$)Tfh TORPJ. 1 f^TORrTW
1 hirwrirtw qw*M tot reTOsiRTO-
fTORTO W TOW I
3.77. The third alternative belongs to the exponents of maya . Brahman
free from distinction is absolutely real and what is other is not
absolutely real. Because that alone is absolutely real which is not
negated anywhere at any time. Xou also have certainly said (^ri.B.Para.31
313
p.53.)^ : "existence is absolutely real since it persists, is
certainly established." There is greatness and the possession of
unlimited pre-eminence in an object having the form of existence.
Because there is no negation of existence anywhere at any time. All
things such as pots etc. are seen to be counter correlates of negation
in the manner: "the cloth is not a pot", "the pot is not cloth". What
has no contact with negation, even a fraction, is alone entitled, in
reality, to the word "absolutely real". Thus everything which is
perceived to be different from that is certainly not absolutely real.
Consequently it is established that mere exclusion is indeed the reason
for unreality. On account of this, [the statement] (^ri.B.Para.31.p.53):
"mere exclusion is not the reason for unreality" is refuted. Because
even by contact with negation the loss of greatness is unavoidable. By
saying that even what is negated is absolutely real, the very reason for
the use of the word "absolutely real" is not understood.
comment
See comment to 1.19. and 1.21.
(ft mm i
3.78. But what has been said (£>ri.B.Para.31.p.53.):
Because awareness and a particular existence have a
subject-object relation and since the difference is
established by perception and is not negated, this
[statement] too; "awareness is identical to
existence" is refuted
314
In regard to that, it is said: because awareness and a particular
existence have a subject-object relation, we certainly accept that
difference is established by the perception which is of an ordinary
nature. We do not say that the awareness in the form of ordinary
perception is identical to existence. Because the perception of an
ordinary nature contains mental constructions. In the case of the rope-
snake, the snake is not identical to the rope. But the rope is the
substratum of such a snake. Accordingly, the awareness free from objects,
which is the substratum of all ordinary awareness which relates to
objects, is identical to existence.
-3.79. 1
^ TnHRFw w*TT*r^ w ftft i ft
I t%
% l *rmt m
I ^ pw ’Ter. ^ wf
% l f% % T i ^ l .
qR hr { ^mw .ft m I 1
• 3.79. Furthermore, by saying: "because awareness and a particular
existence have a subject-object relation", is a subject-object relation
accepted between awareness and universal existence or not? In the first
case, the mention of the word "particular" in: "a particular existence"
would be meaningless. In the second case, in the absence of a subject-
object relation between awareness and universal existence and in the
absence, according to your view, of universal existence having the nature
of awareness, then universal existence cannot be established through a
means of knowledge. Because that alone is established by a means of
315
knowledge which is an object of a means of knowledge or is itself a
means of knowledge. If [you say] that universal existence is indeed
accepted as not being [itself] a means of knowledge, then if such is the
case the mention of the word "particular" in: "a particular existence"
is meaningless and there is the same situation as before.
Furthermore, what is the reason for the absence of a subject-
object relation between awareness and universal existence? Generally,
every entity possesses the state of being an object of awareness. Even if
this is so, because universal existence does not possess the state of
being an object of awareness, therefore a clear minded person must
accept, even though not wishing to do so, that the reason for that is
only the non-difference of universal existence with awareness.
Furthermore, is this awareness, whose object is a particular
existence, in the form of existence itself or not? In the first case,
it must be accepted that "awareness is identical to existence", In the
last case, not existing itself, how could it possess the state of being
a means of knowledge for a particular existence?
3.80
* ‘ h
*mr I qwRR
www- 5^^, (sfar. Y 38
» «- K <\ v V
*T If qRI^TKIWT-
* nmt i fa g Hqrftgm-
1 (#no 3y tjo^) I
-3.80. But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.32,p.53.:
although the awareness of the self, the knower, is
self-luminous at the time of illumining the object,
there is no rule that it is like that at all times
316
for all people. Because the experience of another
person is an object of knowledge by inference,
having as its sign [their] rejecting and accepting
etc. And because even for one's own past experience
the expression is seen; "I knew".
That is worthless. The exponents of maya certainly do not say that
there is a rule as to the self-luminosity of the awareness which
possesses an object and is of an ordinary nature. If such was the case,
this refutation would be correct. Similarly, there is no rule that the
awareness possessing an object is unable to be experienced. But the
awareness free from objects, which is the substratum of everything and
can be expressed by the word Brahman, cannot be illumined by another at
any time and can never be experienced. On account of this, what has
been said (^ri.B.Para.32.p.53.):
because one's own past experiences and the experiences
belonging to others are able to be experienced, the
result is that [such experiences] would not be of the
nature of awareness
etc. is refuted.
c omment
Abhyankar states that Ramanuja's argument is irrelevant. The
Advaitins position is that awareness illumines the prior non-existence,
presence and subsequent disappearance of all mental states (vr ttijnana ).
Therefore the Advaitin does not contend that mental states consisting
of cognitions such as "I knew", memory, etc. are not eternal, not
self-luminous and are able to be experienced. The Advaitin maintains
that the awareness which illumines mental activity is self-luminous
and cannot be objectified by the mental modes. If awareness could be
illumined by another awareness then an infinite regress ( anavastha )
would be unavoidable. There are also difficulties if it is accepted that
awareness can be experienced. For if awareness is experienced by another
awareness then an infinite regress would result. If that is sought to
be avoided by postulating that awareness is experienced by another
awareness and the second awareness is experienced by the first, then
317
there would be mutual dependence ( anyonyasraya ). If awareness knows
itself, then there is the contradiction of the simultaneous relation
of subject and object ( karmakartrbhavavyaghata ). Hence the Advaitin
considers that mental states are illumined by awareness, but awareness
is self-evident and cannot be objectified.
A remark concerning the aptness of Ramanuja's argument is necessary.
In the Mahapurvapak sa, Ramanuja presented the Advaitins views with
admirable perspicuity. However in his refutation of the purvapak ga,
Ramanuja does not always confront the position he has described but
argues, as in the present case, against a position which the Advaitins
do not seek to dispute .^ Further instances of this will be noted in
the following pages.
TORS m ’ ( sffaT® fo
H ft ^>fcR1 W!3-
3.81. What has also been said (^rx.B.Para.32.p.54.
If awareness is unable to be experienced, the
non-contradiction to ignorance certainly
follows, like for a sky-flower etc.
In regard to that, an invariable concomitance cannot be ascertained
between the inability to be experienced and non-contradiction to
ignorance. Because there is no conformable reasoning. And the
illustration is not correct. The sky-flower, which possesses the
attribute [of non-contradiction to ignorance], is itself not known so
the non-contradiction to ignorance etc. which are its attributes are
far removed. Because non-contradiction to ignorance is only the existence
at the time of ignorance and nothing else. With regard to that [existence
at the time of ignorance], the flower certainly has no existence so how
does its attribute exist and how a, fortiori is there knowledge of it?
\ 318
3 * 82 * '
V^l\ ’ ( ^o ^ qo ^ ^ ST^—
h?*tt ^nTF^r^ffm^r fawir ^ nr i
§fr y#r%? ^ im: im n
3.82. What has been said (fsrl .B.Para.33.p.55,)^:
It cannot be said that there is no prior non-existence
of awareness since there is no apprehender [of the
prior non-existence]. Because there is the
apprehension by awareness itself.
In regard to that, it is said:
The awareness which is universal is eternal, it is
one and without an object. There is no appearance
of "I—ness" in deep sleep and there is certainly
no transmigration in liberation.11 .
3,83 ‘ 4 qn 37 I I
vm\l: jmmqi | F fefat \
ram jrmmwft^T TOTi^yp: »
m sraF^TiRrcmHFf 1 ^ l ? ft twn-
l fttr-
mt 1 sRfrnfrsjtror i
3.83. Does universal awareness or a particular awareness apprehend the
prior non-existence of awareness? Not the first, on account of
contradiction with the essential nature of universal awareness. Because
the awareness which apprehends some object is a particular awareness.
Nor is it the second. Does this particular awareness which apprehends
prior non-existence apprehend its own prior non-existence or the prior
319
non-existence of universal awareness? The first is the desired
conclusion. ¥e certainly do not dispute about the impermanence of a
particular awareness. In the last case, this particular awareness which
apprehends the prior non-existence of universal awareness can apprehend
its prior non-existence only having objectified universal awareness.
Because the knowledge of non-existence depends upon the knowledge of
the counter correlate. But if universal awareness can be apprehended,
there is contradiction with its essential nature being universal.
Because the awareness which is an object of knowledge is a particular
awareness.
c omment
With regard to the apprehension of the prior non-existence of
awareness, the Advaitin can put forward a number of other possible
alternatives: is the prior non-existence apprehended by oneself or by
another? Not by oneself, because if one exists it is not possible to
apprehend one's own non-existence. If one does not exist, there is no
possibility of apprehension. Nor by another, because awareness is not
the object of another and it cannot be apprehended by anything other
70
than awareness since everything else is insentient.
i mfr ft ^ I rrr 3 Mqw
wtw 1 m rwqt rtr m m fq-f< v TT^r mismzi
■3.84. Furthermore, the prior non-existence of universal awareness
certainly does not exist, so the apprehension of it is far away. This
is what is said: the awareness which is the substratum of everything,
without a location, without an object, which can be expressed by the
word Brahman, is alone universal awareness. It is the supreme limit of
320
what is universal. Vith regard to which, there is no other universal
whatsoever. For this very reason, even the threefold difference,
whether known or unknown, in the form of difference which belongs to
itself, pertains to its own class or to another class, does not exist
there [in universal awareness] in reality. Because distinctions create
difference. A distinction is certainly preceded by the universal,
whereas the universal is the prior condition for a distinction. Vhere
a distinction, even very slightly, does not exist, how could the
threefold difference have existence there? On account of this, the
manifold nature of universal awareness has been replied to.
comment
Because awareness as such is without distinguishing characteristics,
there is no factor to establish that awareness is manifold by nature.
^ Mwr ^ HftrFTO i ^ to-
fci: twt: I
ft ^ ^ ^ ^ H5I ^
JTRif ^ *T=ft F ^ ^ ITOT F IRfR F
ifaR? f vnff * ^ ^ ^rsfq nm: j « f
'1
J
I
i
-3.85, The prior non-existence of that universal awareness cannot even
be "said. Because prior non-existence is only for what has been limited
by time. A limit by time is only for a distinction, not for the
universal. Because just as a distinction exists brought about by the
object and the location, so also it is caused by time. Time, in the
form of a particular entity, certainly does not exist in universal
awareness, so how can a distinction be caused by time and how a, fortiori
can there be the prior non-existence of awareness which is based upon
321
that? For in universal awareness there is no heaven, no sky, no earth,
nor the lover regions, there is no sun, no lightning, nor the moon and
stars, there is neither darkness nor light, nor air, neither day nor
night, nor the tvo tvilight times, there is no time, no body, no sense
organ, no vital breath, no mind, no form, no species, no connection,
no ocean, no hills, neither knovership nor object of knowledge, no
possessor of attributes nor an attribute, nor any distinction whatsoever
Nor can that universal awareness be apprehended [as an object] by
someone, nor does it apprehend something.
-3.86. ‘»•!
i
sq^Rt r I rrprr? 1 1
I rim ^r^RtttTRmr ^ RRfRimm wxkxvzi rr
m i l I
m cRg^Rcrm^f Rfimmq skm mfq m *m-
i ? skmm rT^i^wicra
r%mq snpfRq; 1 * mH?m ’ irr miqmi !
mmRRR qRPfirRRRH R rTRqq m v R-
ffim I *rrt * wr: ? ( mrr ^ ^ ^
RRIR I arg^WHWRq TOT^TT^farcR I
JTR$SRP£T<%lfr m^qRRFnf^#RIRn¥l qRfVRqRlkR%; I
3.86. [objection] In the absence of all distinctions there could not
even be the expression "universal awareness", because a universal
requires a particular.
[reply] This is true. This entity has to be shown by some word
by those who are explaining. So this expression exists only to this
extent, but there is no obstinacy in that matter. Accordingly, how
could universal awareness reveal its own prior non-existence, its own
impermanence or its own multiplicity etc? And what is unrevealed
certainly does not exist, since there is no means of knowledge for its
existence. Then [if you say] that universal awareness Could not reveal
322
its ovn permanence, its own oneness and its own self luminosity etc.
also, [we reply] this is accepted as indeed desirable. But just
because of this, it must not be at all suspected that universal
awareness is impermanent etc. The purport of this; "awareness is
permanent" is only that it is not impermanent. Similarly, the purport
of this: "awareness is one and self-luminous" should be understood in
the sense of the absence of multiplicity and the absence of being
illumined by another. On account of this, [the statement] (l^rT.B.Para.
34.p.56.): "prior non-existence is established just by non-cognition
which is fit [to be perceived]" is refuted. And because Ramanuja does
not accept the means of knowledge known as "non-cognition". Even if
that [non-cognition] is included within perception, perception has no
application here because of the absence of an object at the present
time.
comment
Abhyankar puts forward three reasons against Ramanuja's contention
that the prior non-existence of awareness can be known by the non¬
cognition of what is fit to be perceived ( yogyanupalabdhi ) (see comment,
1 .50).
The first argument is of a rather technical nature. Non—cognition
of what is fit to be perceived is the apprehension of the non-existence
of an object, such as a pot, due to the knowledge that if the pot were
present it could be perceived and since it is not perceived it cannot
be present. The absence of the pot has the existence of the pot as its
counter correlate ( pratiyogin ) and the knowledge of the pot's non¬
existence depends upon whether the counter correlate, i.e. the pot, is
capable of being perceived if it were present. So the knowledge of the
absence of the counter correlate is the reason for the non-cognition of
the pot. Vith regard to the prior non-existence of awareness, Abhyankar
states that the intended meaning of the statement "awareness is
permanent" is that awareness is not impermanent. To say that awareness
is permanent means that awareness has permanence as a positive attribute.
However to say that there is the absence of impermanence in awareness
does not denote a positive attribute, for the absence of something is
not itself a distinction (cf., 3.55.). Hence the absence of an attribute
cannot serve as a counter correlate, which must necessarily be capable
323
of being cognized in order that its non-existence can be stated.
Abhyankar reasons that the impermanence of awareness cannot be
proved by non-cognition because the counter correlate is not capable
of being apprehended.
A statement as to the absence of a thing directly refers to the
locus of the absence. For instance when it is said: "there is no pot
on the table", the non-existence of the pot refers directly to the
table, i.e. the locus ( anuyogin ). Advaitins consider that the statement
such as; "there is no attribute of impermanence in awareness" refers
directly to the locus, i.e. awareness, in the manner that: the absence
of impermanence is in awareness.
3.87.
* q ROTT TOlH ^tTTTO HR HmWT
jft to?; ^%tohtu h mm i
htor TOrM^Wfi jrr: 1 TORiwiqq hr tot-
mi to^7r TORqf^r: wr %ii
qqFiTqqqfrTOTTTRf TOq^R^TRsfcr ^rtorr; i qur
r ( kh q* £\s ) htw rhr (totr
qfTORcrrqfd i
3.87. But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.34.p.56.):
Furthermore, the perceptual knowledge which proves that
its object, such as a pot, exists at the time of its
own existence is not seen to make known the existence of
that [pot etc.] at all times. Thus the existence of the
pot at a prior and subsequent time is not recognized.
And the non—cognition of that is because perceptual
consciousness is cognized as limited by time. If
- - perceptual consciousness, which has pots etc. as its
object, is itself cognized as not limited by time then
the object of perceptual consciousness such as the pot
etc. is also recognized as not limited by time and so
it would be eternal.
324
That is worthless. Because there is no negating factor [in regard to
our stated position] even though the particular modes of awareness
which possess objects are limited by time.
Furthermore, you yourself have subsequently taught that
Knowledge is permanent (HsrT.B.Para .40 ,p .70,)' :
In the state of the knower of the field [i.e. the body],
Knowledge has a contracted nature due to karma on
account of the state of gradation according to the
various actions. And that [state of expansion or
contraction] is regulated by means of the senses. The
designation as to the rising and setting [of Knowledge]
occurs having regard to this flow of Knowledge by means
of the senses.
Thus there is contradiction between the earlier and later portions of
your own work.
3 88 t r-'f • r\ r\ rv
1 H ^ j i ftwrwsFT-
\o) ^3% I ftw ft
- 3.88, But what has been said (^ri,B.Para,34.p,57.):
Awareness is not without an object at any time.
Because such a thing is not known. Indeed, awareness
is established as self-luminous only because
apprehension itself has the nature of illumining
objects.
That is questionable. Because the rule which is well known in the world
and which has just been mentioned previously: distinctions are
certainly preceeded by the universal, cannot be denied. And because
325
the purport as to the meaning of self-luminosity has been told
(cf. 3.86.)*
3.89.
%tot: \ ^ (sftro <j° H
qo ^ I to Rf^wqr tot*. to?: to?to-
TOTOPTTO f| 5 ^ 3 #^ ^ TOT TO-
^R{:
*3W .
TOUfsmrro
m to wqrf^qTOwro to^ [
q'l^fTO terror i <Tfrfr tot'ttto??--
‘ 3h% qfl^d I
m FT[3^rf^R^i^ ’ ( ^Tfo <?o \\ ) ^ |
PTfTOPTTt #^T #fTO*feTOTO^T 4 %£<I-
^ TOFTTORf l fq TO? I
rTOTRTOTOqT^ I TO ^
vk ?JT?R>? < to ?^T^?#^PI?T %TOTi q^TOT^S^-
VTR TOV ^ 1 % qTOTqq^TOTCTO ^ TO? ^ I
3.89. Vhat has also been said (Ssri »B,Para.34,p.57*);
It cannot be said that in sleep, intoxication and
swoon, awareness shines forth completely alone, free
from all objects. Because [this view] is negated by
non-cognition which is fit [to be perceived]. If
awareness is experienced in those states also, there
should be the recollection of that [awareness] at the
time of waking. And that is not the case.
That is incongruous. Because this awareness, which is itself free from
objects, is not the object of another awareness, there is the non¬
cognition of it [i.e. awareness]. But not because that [awareness] does
not exist. Even upon the non-cognition of a demon, which is not an
object of perception, they do not consider it to be negated by non-
cognition which is fit [to be perceived]. For the word "fit" means
"this can be done". That has been told in the Bha s apariccheda :
326
Where it follows that; "if it exists it should be
experienced", that would be non-cognition fit
[to be perceived] and that is the cause for the
knowledge of non-existence. (Bha.P.62,)
Because the awareness free from objects is not the object of another
awareness, therefore there is no applicability [for the statement];
"if it exists it should be experienced". And this awareness is not
experienced. Because it is not the object of another awareness. So
having forcibly imposed on this awareness the nature of being
experienced, which the exponents of maya do not accept, how could the
effecting of recollection at the time of waking; "if awareness is
experienced in those states also, there should be the recollection of
that [awareness] at the time of waking" gain congruity?
srw i * ?m\ fm: I
( '4NR ^ qo I BWTTT-
I rj[ | *T
TT^dt^fRcPTT
t: (qR
\
3.90. Furthermore, this awareness does not produce a mental impression
[during sleep] because it is without an object. For awareness produces
the mental impression of its object in its own locus. No locus
whatsoever appears for this awareness at that time, nor even an object.
Therefore how could this [awareness] produce a mental impression? Due
to this, [the statement] (^rl.B.Para,35.p.57.): "there is a rule that
non-recollection proves only the absence of experience" is answered.
Because the rule about non—recollection is based on the absence of a
mental impression. Even in regard to cognitions possessing objects there
is no rule that everything produces a mental impression. Because in
327
regard to the houses, trees, fields and gardens etc. seen by a person
going unconcernedly on the road, there is no rule seen as to the
memory of everything.
3.91 .
1 ^ I to
*T qo ^ qo ^ )
TRfRI \ fe[RW ^R^RRTOT^T
q%: l $rc*TTR*ffR^m faqWRtu^ I w ^ *Rv5\%
d/Rtl JfR JR 1 f%
qm^^fprto^o^vsiToy i Rm
RTWRIRBC 7RRRR I <RT
nm *m ^pferc^rprft are ^ ! i <n?sn*ferc-
i *nm\-
*TR WT I TTO * ^ ITO^T^R/ fRT-
TOFt aw^WfaR: Ha^^^qpTTWTW^rfM^ ^ 1 * fro-
^q'tfWg&TH *!%’( ’T* ) ftfTO 3^-
^ vm, l m r %wM ipn^ifR: i tI^h ^rt^rrt
1R I JtTWraf f| RRR 1 rpm^^T'
m I fRPTR: TFR^TR <RT
1 stai ^IJRTtTO! I !
3.91. But what has been said (^rI.B.Para.35.p.57f.):
Not only is absence of experience on account of the
rule of non-recollection. Because [absence of
experience] is established by the very reflection
of a person who has risen from sleep: "during that
time I did not know anything".
That is not correct. For there is the logical possibility of such a
reflection because the knowledge obtained in sleep does not possess an
object. Although the negative particle [not, na] is grammatically
connected to the meaning of the verbal root "know" (jna), the negation
328
relates to its object. Just like* when Devadatta goes to the forest,
Devadatta did not go to the village. It is just like that. Moreover,
just as there is no appearance of an object in the knowledge obtained
in sleep, there is no appearance of a locus also i.e, the sense of "I",
For that reason too, there is the logical possibility of such a
reflection.
[objection] It is said (^rl.B.Para.35.p.58.)^ 4 ;
the non—experience of one object and the non-existence
of another object cannot possibly be the cause for
the non-recollection of yet another object which was
experienced.
[reply] You are confused. Because awareness is the cause for
recollection only by producing the mental impression of its object in
its own locus. So when there is no experience of one object and no
existence of another object, awareness is certainly incapable of
producing a mental impression. [Hence] the non-experience of that one
object and the non-existence of that other object is indeed the cause
for non—recollection. When there is no experience of an object and no
existence of a locus, of what could awareness produce a mental impression
and where?
Furthermore, is the absence of the reflection with regard to
knowledge, which has the form: "I did not know anything", intended to
prove the absence of experience obtained in sleep, or, is the
reflection of the absence of knowledge having the form: "I did not know
anything" meant to prove that [i.e. the absence of experience while
in sleep]? In the first case, what has already been said (^rT.B.Para.
34.p. 57. Supra .)T^-: "there is no recollection at the time of waking"
would be said again. So there is incongruity of the text: "Not only.,.".
In the second case, if there is reflection of the absence of knowledge,
the absence of knowledge in deep sleep is certainly experienced.
329
Reflection means recollecting. And that is only for what has been
experienced. If the absence of knowledge is experienced in deep sleep,
then experience in deep sleep is established. So, on the contrary, you
[Ramanuja] alone are negated. This is the maxim of "day-break near the
toll-station"
s^rf^tTTTV ( ^ )
^ l <wiF<rciqf%rt t%r: t ^ mm t f% %s'
rfin wi^i OTtm ^ l
fPRPi I TWPpfmrc \i\m ^ \
3.92. Because the awareness which is free from objects has no
origination, there are no other modifications also.' Because other
modifications are not possible if there is no origination since they
are pervaded by origination. But what has been said (^rl.B.Para.35.p.58):
"because there is deviation in regard to prior non-existence." That is
not so. Because the destruction of prior non-existence is not a
modification. For a modification is the gain of another state and
another state is not possible for what is non-existent.
Furthermore, according to the teaching that the effect exists in
the cause ( satkaryavada ), prior non-existence is certainly difficult
to be stated; because there is existence in the form of the cause even
prior to the origination of the effect. How could deviation be there
[in prior non-existence which is not itself a valid concept]? And the
teaching that the effect exists in the cause is certainly accepted by
Ramanuja too.
comment
The Advaitin maintains that what has no origin is free from the
T8
sixfold modifications' commencing with birth and ending with
330
destruction. Advaitins consider that since the prior non-existence of
awareness cannot be proved, awareness is free from all modifications
which depend firstly upon origination. Ramanuja argues against this
view by saying that even what has no origination, such as prior non¬
existence, can certainly perish. For the prior non-existence of an
object, though beginningless, is destroyed at the moment the object
comes into being. The Advaitin replies that the argument cannot be
supported by the illustration of prior non-existence because
modifications are possible only for things which exist. If something
which does not exist is able to be destroyed, then even the non—
79
existent horns of a rabbit would be able to be destroyed.
Ramanuja puts forward another argument. Advaitins hold that unlike
prior non-existence, Ignorance ( avidya ) is something positive in
nature ( bhavarupa ). But they also maintain that Ignorance is
beginningless yet capable of being destroyed. Therefore the Advaitins
position that what is free from origin is free from destruction is
contradicted. Abhyankar now takes up this point.
3 ‘ 93 * ^
1 ( ^ )
'■^3% I <pit ft \
! ITT 4 4 FI IW I l
m 7tt I \
^ ^ | Fm m:
^TT'IIdyftq: {
rr I FRTqit i
i wfm l
i Ttcfpi^ t
i <tr- j
fav^n^r *?rp^ I -Hwm ^iqqRqqRtm i 3R7 I
.^ninwn^^t I ft^R *rt ^ \
fm wss^ I ^ I
331
4 1 ^rnw^f ^pt-
^TTHT^T 3^%rfqWT 3c[ ^qR^ft^Tfrrf^fir- j
Vf% { ^ m I-sr^ ht i **rf*reir:
M'Sm^vffa i
3,93. But what has been said (3rT.B.Para.35.p.59.
Ignorance, which is accepted by the exponents of maya
as a positive entity, is certainly unoriginated, it is
the seat of manifold modifications and it comes to an
end because of the knowledge of reality. So there is
inconclusiveness of reasoning in respect of that
[ignorance],
That is incongruous. To elaborate: Brahman, which is of the nature of
universal awareness, is free from distinction. The power of that
[Brahman] may be expressed by the word "Ignorance" ( avidya ), And that
[power] is not different from that [Brahman], Because difference is
based upon a distinction. For this reason, that power, having Brahman
as its nature, is indeed eternal. The Unmanifest etc. is the
modification of such a power. And that [modification] is based upon
karma. The defect of mutual dependence cannot be brought about even
though the modification of such a power and karma have a mutual cause-
effect relation. Because even both of them are a beginningless series
according to the maxim of the seed and the sprout. Even in regard to
the origination of both the seed and the sprout, "which is the first to
originate?" is not determined. Therefore a beginningless series has to
be accepted since there is no other recourse.
A beginningless series does not mean the absence of origination.
But the non-ascertainment of a time of origination. The non-ascertainment
of a time of origination is twofold; due to the ignorance of it even
though the time exists somewhere and due to the ignorance of it because
332
of the very absence of the time [of origination] anywhere. The first
is with regard to the seed and the sprout. The second is with regard
to the Unmanifest etc. which is the modification of the power of
Brahman, Because the origination of particular things such as the
directions, time etc. is only after the origination of the Uhmanifest,
Mahat and Aharikara .
Even in the state of liberation the power which has Brahman as
its nature is certainly eternal. The Unmanifest etc., which is the
modification of that [power], is destroyed. The destruction of Ignorance
is said in the state of liberation and there [in liberation] the
Unmanifest etc., which is the modification of that power, is what is
understood by the word ’’Ignorance". The destruction of the modification
beginning with the Unmanifest, which occurs due to the knowledge of
reality, is in the form of the non-appearance of such modification.
Non-appearance is because (1) the object itself does not exist anywhere,
(2) even though the object exists somewhere it does not appear, (3) even
though the object appears somewhere its appearance is false. Even the
appearance which occurs as something which is false is certainly non-
appearance. The first is just like the non-appearance of the snake
following the knowledge of the true nature of the rope. The second is
just like the non-appearance of a pot etc. in deep sleep. The third is
just like the appearance of one's face in a mirror. In regard to
liberation while living, the non-appearance of the Unmanifest etc.,
which is the modification of the power of Brahman, is just like the
appearance of one's face in a mirror. But in liberation free from the
body, [the non-appearance of the Unmanifest etc.] is like the non-
appearance of a pot etc. in deep sleep.
Vhen the established conclusion exists in this manner, [the
opponent] brings about a deviation in regard to Ignorance because of
the invariable concomitance: "what is unoriginated is without
333
destruction". In respect of that [deviation], is the power of Brahman
intended by the word "Ignorance" or is the XJnmanifest etc., which is
its modification, intended? In the first case, that [power] has no end.
In the last case, that [Unmanifest etc.] is not unoriginated. Therefore
how can deviation make an impression here?
3 ' 94 ' ^ I
1 (
l ) ( %o CR ) ! . tpj 1
' ft I 3
wtwtcit l *rercra
-WIWI a7 H. I ft H^Tr^ I
(#sn° ^ q° iftspH ^mrwni >
JHITTO, *T mtW’JFTr *T
3 i =T ft JRwinrt
wra l
3.94. But what has been said (^rl.B.Para.35.p,59.):
Though [it was said] ( Mahapurvapak ga.Para.27.p.42) that
awareness does not admit division within itself on
account of having no beginning, that too is not
logically possible. Because the Self, which is
certainly without beginning, is differentiated from the
body, sense organs etc. And because the Self has
necessarily to be accepted as different from Ignorance
* which is accepted as beginningless.
All that has been answered (see 3.84.), And by the text (^rT.B.Para.36.
p.60.):
Consciousness is the illumining of some object to its
own locus solely through its own existence. Vhereas
self-luminosity is the nature of illumining for its
own locus solely through its own existence. Illumining
334
[in the previous two definitions] is common to all
things sentient and insentient in conformity with
everyday usage. Eternity is existing at all times.
Oneness is limitation by the number one.
a difference of essential nature is said for consciousness, self¬
luminosity, illumining, eternity and oneness. That [difference of
essential nature] is in the state of the particulars but not in the
nature of the universal which is the basis of those [particulars].
The difference among pots, earthenware dishes, lids etc. is certainly
not able to be shown in the state of clay.
comment
Abhyankar's response to both these objections is to restate that
the awareness pertaining to mental activities, i.e. vr tti.jnana , can
be seen to possess distinctions. However distinctions exist only in
relation to a universal. Advaitins maintain that awareness which is
universal, i.e. awareness which is free from all mental modifications
81
such as memory etc., is the unchanging substratum of all particular
awareness, 82 This awareness is not differentiated by anything because
everything has been superimposed on it. °o°
Vith regard to the second quotation, Ramanuja argues that awareness
must possess distinction since Advaitins themselves say that awareness
is self-luminous, eternal, one by nature etc. and hence these must
constitute the attributes of awareness. Apart from the argument of
the particular in relation to the universal, Advaitins can also respond
to this objection by affirming Ramanuja's own pritna facie view.
Advaitins maintain that a thing which is known cannot be an attribute of
the knower, because it is an object of knowledge.^ Since awareness is
not the object of another awareness (cf., 3,80.comment) it cannot be
seen to possess distinguishing features. Any distinguishing attributes
perceived in awareness are objects of knowledge and not identical to
awareness. Hence awareness must be free from distinction. What the
Advai.tin means by "eternal" etc. is only that the absence of being
non-eternal exists in Brahman (cf., 3.86.comment, final para,),
)
-3.95. ^
335
\c qo 1 \ q<ft
ft qrq^qr ^q hwmkw
(T#^r^ ^qq 1 3R qqiqri^^Mm^qi g$$-
RRTRqpqiqRYq: qp^^Hlf^vq:
^4TF^ny 1-4,| m I^RtqFTT5rqr%WT i ^t: qTqRqT^~
fqr q I m q qqqqrwrr q 3 sqpffi l!
3.95. What has been said (^ri.B.Para.36,p.60.):
But if the opposite of being inert etc, is not accepted
as an attribute of awareness -whether of a positive or
negative kind- as something different from the essential
nature, then nothing would be said by its negation.
That is questionable. Because a negative entity is not an attribute.
An attribute is a form which is subtle with regard to the possessor of
the attribute and its condition is universal to the possessor of the
attribute. For this very reason, in the treatise of the Sankhya the
origination of the particulars such as space etc. is said to be from
the tanmatras of sound etc. which are subtle with regard to the
particulars like space and have a condition which is universal to them.
And it is generally accepted as such by others. So how is it said that
an attribute can be of a negative kind?
l%q * Hfriq qSRprqi
fq-M q qpq > qtq^q q qrq*?q: q*?q w mfaq qrq-
. htwt: l W: %q?y TqfcqqT ^qq qq q^FRiq: i
* qrfR q^TqTqiTfR » qqqTqWjWP^ Trq \ q?T^-
Wft ft qmrf: | qs* qi^Rqq q^qiwfcqq: | <^q q q^R
*npq: I WMisR^qq 3 q^qrqiq?qq: | q*q qrwf i qq
qRqffqf qmT^qqisqqqrq qq 15 qrqqqq qqfq
q ^srqqrqq qf^ftqq;} qq qq < r qri% 1 i <qqqr-
’ ^qq * qsr q qfqr »fqreqqq-
s qqw q #Rsq i qq qq q iqfTqmTT^qqiqq qr&fqq
q’qqiR qTqqtqrq^; 1
336
3.96. Furthermore, by the sentence: "there are no knowable attributes,
such as inertness etc., in awareness" no positive attribute whatsoever
is enjoined nor a negative one. But attributes such as inertness are
completely negated. This alone is the meaning of that sentence.
The difference in meaning between these two sentences is certainly
well known; "the pot does not exist", "the non-existence of the pot
exists". The meaning of a sentence is the syntactical connection
between the meanings of the words. In "the pot does not exist", the
grammatical connection of the pot is in the sense that "it exists" and
there is the connection of that [pot existing] with the meaning of the
negative particle. But in "the non-existence of the pot exists", the
grammatical connection of the pot is in non-existence and [there is the
connection] of that [non-existing pot] in the sense that "it exists"
Thus the difference in the meaning of the sentences is certainly
unavoidable since the express meaning is in regard to a difference in
the syntactical connection.
Implication, however, is only if a contradiction exists. So an
identity of the meaning of the sentences cannot be suspected here even
through implication. For this very reason, the respective difference
for a person: "you do not exist", "your non-existence exists" and the
respective difference of the sayings; "the pots do not exist", "the
non-existence of the pots exists" is correct. And it is for this reason
that the knowers of the meaning of sentences [i.e. MTmamsakas] consider
a prohibitive statement separately from an injunctive statement.
comment
Abhyankar has argued that a negative entity i.e, the non-existence
of a thing such as a pot upon a table, does not constitute an attribute
of the locus. Moreover a statement which negates attributes such as;
"there are no knowable attributes like inertness in awareness" does not
admit attributes of any kind in awareness, but is only intent upon
negating their existence. For the negative particle "not" (na) only
refers to the attributes of inertness etc, and then negates them, but it
337
does not affirm their absence.
^TTOTHf I W =ST|!—
draper, ^r4;, hwi (
^ Frl?r 93 ] %gi%r {
FrWTOTJIFJ fcptalwfcfPU (lo Fo 5 To vs) 5^1
3*11 3 35t 3T^73 SKPCPPtfftft: I <FFT
‘ «T %?j Mfl: ^!< r ti%' q?JTI3^fe^ I
d^rin Fffter (^Rkw^lsiFr 3 ^r f^r i
^TftcT %cq8jqR: F?R%3 2R: ’ I! ( foifo'Jo^ )
3.97. Furthermore, it is veil known in the school of the grammarians
that a negative particle which is not in a compound is correct only in
grammatical connection with an action. Accordingly, they say:
This eightfold group can be determined as correct only
[through connection] with an action; at the end of the
vocative case, the meanings of "so many times", the
grammatical cases expressing an action, the primary
attribute of similarity, what is derived from the
governing rule about the connection of the meaning of
verbal roots, a negative particle which is not in a
compound, so also the group of two said as the
locative and the genitive absolute. (Vai .Bhu.Sara .1 6-17.
So in "the pot does not exist", how is there the cognition of the
absence of the pot? On account of this, what is said in the Siddhitraya :
It was previously said; what is known cannot be an
attribute of Knowledge. Even by this, is anything
established by you about avareness or not? If it
is, there would be partiality [toward your own
338
■views] If not, your effort has no result (Sam.Si.Para.37.p.113,)
is set aside,
3 * 98, < afafoparra 31 * 3 T I wtW
i w> iRfift l ^ r
ttt rtfl m$i* ( r 4 m° <jo ^ ^ O
| ^ tT?TTf R Hl’^WFRT
TR I d I RTR RWfl^T I ^TRIRT
I ^ rtrw l ^ v mrn*{RHrft Rt’^rountR
^TFR TTTMTRRt^RT ^TmRFT I fMNrof ^
m ht-
( $° VO * It^ ‘ ^TRnxR Rm *rR’
(#Ro;<jo 3^ Tjo ^ ) ^RifdRT ^W> <T^R
*W ^ 3 tfTRRTO'R'TFlR ll 11 II
3.98. But what has been said (^ri,B,Para,36,p.60.):
Is awareness established [as existent] or not? If it
is established, it must possess attributes. If it is
not, it is bereft of existence like a sky—flower etc.
If [you say] awareness is itself the proof, [we reply]
that [the proof] is to be said for whom and in reference
to what? If that [awareness] is not for someone and in
reference to something then it is not the proof.
In regard to that, it is said: the proof which can be spoken of as
indeed "for someone" and "in reference to something" is a particular
proof conformable to ordinary relations. And the universal proof, which
is the basis and the giver of life to all particular proofs, is indeed
awareness. That [awareness] has no dependence upon a locus. Nor does
it depend upon determining [an object]. The Self is identical to
universal awareness. Awareness is not an attribute of the Self, Because
the relation of attribute and its possessor cannot be said in the state
of the universal since even a relation of locus and located exists only
339
in the state of the particular. And because distinctions are invariably
preceded by the universal, the nature of the universal which has been
told must be necessarily adhered to and certainly cannot be denied.
That has been previously mentioned (3,50.) and should not be forgotten.
So what has been said about awareness being an attribute etc, of the
Self by the text (3ri.B.Para.36.p,6l .); "Awareness is that which... in
reference to its locus" etc. should all be understood as accepted in the
state of the particular but not in the state of the universal.
3 ? im: wmw. ip* ^ m
The Self is indeed awareness which is universal.
That [Self] is not said to be the sense of "I".
"I-ness" must be superimposed. In liberation
there is neither the notion of "I" nor happiness.12,
3 ■ 100 * 7^ 1 ftiwTT mm ’
qo v) rPR i y
Rfwrpn Himnn:
R*T 1 f% ^
mRi ^RRT*pRTO^iRitiFTi%: I m i srflr-
WPffFmFI ^ # I R ^ RHW HTTW-
mfat m # I ^*uTmiRqf-
tWT ^ ilRfSRRsfq ^T^cf
? *r *m\ i {% 3 h^tw fm~
T rcf^r ^irt t «ri^ -RirnftRitm i mm f| l
^MT Mdi.itlm^R31%'TT RTIflfd | mi ttfR
RRRT 3RRWR l !
3.100. But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.37-p.62.):
340
Something known as awareness, without a locus or an
object, is not possible because there is the absolute
non-cognition [of such a thing].
That is not so. Because universal awareness, without a locus and an
object, must be necessarily accepted according to the manner previously
told (3.84.f.). Moreover, what is this non-cognition which proves the
non-existence of universal awareness? If [you say] it is the absence of
perceptual knowledge, [we reply] since there is no perception of the
individual souls in other bodies, they would be non-existent. But if
[you say] this is not absolute non-cognition, because there is the
cognition of an individual soul there [in another body] by an inference
due to the motion of the body, [reply] Here too [in respect of awareness],
why does the means of knowledge by inference; "because distinctions are
invariably preceeded by the universal" not occur to your mind?
The awareness which is without an object and a locus certainly
persists in all ordinary cognitions such as "I know". The Knowledge
which is universal persists. The particular locus and the particular
object are only superimposed. So even the sense of "I" which appears as
the locus of Knowledge is only superimposed and hence it is not the
Self. But the Self is just in the form of consciousness, without a
locus and an object. [The word] Self ( atman ) is derived from "it goes"
( atati ) in the sense that "it pervades" ( vyapnoti ), Because the
universal pervades the distinctions, just as the clay pervades pots,
earthenware dishes etc. Therefore that which is universal with regard to
everything is alone, in reality, the essential nature of the Self,
3 101
zw Mi: f% r wttMiti MM—
• sD
wr: l Mir: i »pn: I
*pfT rM I UTimni Ht: HRTR W Mi: 1 tfWFI
Mr: i rtMtM iripi itMit Mi: 1 Umv: pi
wh-ih i uprirMt ^ nr M Mi:}
341
I mi ^ r mmi \ <Nr f?-^it^KT q^r-
im: i ft t m J^TRPJ <R*tTO?:
l I w^, mwm{ l
^IWWfP£TT%?TT mvv SR^WM: ^TUTF^ I
^r*i^ i m ?i^t: I
mm q2RRp#j ms$% ^ i
tpin fgj jr ?trr^pf m % 1 *$rc<i ^iHRfrmN
’rfretf <TT^rmt% m§ =r ymh it mtm i m wtr^sn m
mm i m faftittppns I r m ^ sr^^i-
*rak, myn vffav, mrnyin ^ ^ f^rt ^h,
mm ^ WTIFITO q^' s 4 R^Ff 5 WFlf% i RTCFWT ^ FRPR
WJT^fFtFT: Rl^ROR^T^ * SRqRTRI ^ » (cTo ^ ? I ? I *0
WM W5?{ I RTFfR^^'{r+;i*f ^ wrt-
mmzmw 4 tw^ mm ^^rifwir^ ^^ranra: =*-
f^ra?#i g^tarrorfei ^ fetr i m ^
nm\ i
3.101. If [you ask] what is a distinction and what is a universal? [reply]
It is said; the minute particles ( paraman u) are the universal. The dyads
( dvyapuka ) etc. are the distinctions. The qualities such as colour and
taste etc, are the universal. The possessor of qualities is the
distinction. So also the attributes elsewhere are the universal and the
possessor of attributes is the distinction. What is subtle is universal.
What is gross is a distinction. An internal object [i.e. a thought] is
universal and an external object is a distinction. Mere Knowledge
without form is universal. Knowledge which has form, i.e. which possesses
a form which has been superimposed, is a distinction. For there is the
statement; "a distinction is only due to an object, because cognitions
have no form" (Nya.Ku,4.4,). So that which is the universal with regard
to everything is alone the Self.
To explain; it is indeed well known that the modifications of clay,
such as pots, earthenware dishes etc., are the distinctions and clay is
342
the universal. Similarly, the minute particles are the universal with
regard to clay etc., because they are subtle. Even among minute
particles the minute particles of water are universal with regard to
the minute particles of earth, because they are more subtle. And among
the great elements space is universal because it is absolutely subtle.
With regard to the great elements like space, their qualities such as
sound and touch etc. are universal. Because the tanmatras of sound etc.
are subtle even with regard to space etc,
In the same manner, with regard to all the possessors of
attributes their attributes are universal. Even in respect of those five
great elements and their attributes, the internal objects [i.e. thoughts]
are universal with regard to external objects. And the internal objects
are superimposed on the intellect, so they are only particulars of
Knowledge. With regard to those [particular modes of Knowledge] the
Knowledge which is universal is what cannot be said as "such and such"
and that is the Self, It is where even the relation of attribute and
its possessor certainly does not appear. For this very reason it is said
that the Self is pure consciousness free from distinction.
That very [Self] pervades all the attributes belonging to the
intellect, by means of those it pervades the possessors of the attributes
By means of the internal it pervades the external objects. Even among
those [external objects] it pervades the gross by means of the subtle.
And even there [in regard to gross objects] it pervades everything such
as pots etc, by means of clay etc. Because the universal is the [material
cause of the distinction, therefore the Self is the [material] cause of
everything. Hence the definition of that [Self] is established; "the
birth etc. of this [world] is from which [Brahman]" (B.S.1.1.2.).
Because the external object is based upon the internal object and
because the supposition that the effect belongs to the same class as the
cause is alone proper, it is correct that the external object, i.e. the
343
entire world, is certainly superimposed just as the internal object
which is the cause [is superimposed]. Thus it is proved [that the
world] is not absolutely real. And it is similarly established that
the Self is Knowledge which is universal.
WTT 5 ^ ^ I
%: \ ^T5T? f[ I
* TWT: I
3.102. The particular types of Knowledge [i.e. particular Knowledge],
which have a locus as their adjunct and an object as their adjunct, are
all only superimposed and so the locus and the object are only an
object. In reality, the definition of an object is only: an object is
established by a particular cognition. This object does not depend upon
an "I" like the conventional expression "you". But if there is an
insistence of that ["I", i»e. the need for a subject] then let it be
said that the "I" is only cognition in general ready for the state of
the particular. But the "I” relating to conventional expression is
established by the cognition "I" and the object is established by the
cognition "you" thus there is no dispute in this matter.
comment
The topic now under discussion is whether the word "I" reveals the
true nature of the Self, as the Visi^^advaitins consider, or whether it
only indicates the essential Self as the Advaitins claim.
According to Advaitins, the word "I" has two meanings: a primary
( mukhyartha ) and a secondary or implied meaning ( lak g yartha ). The
primary meaning reveals the knower ( pramatr ) qualified by the
superimposition of identity with the intellect, mind, senses and body in
the manner: "I know", "I hear", "I am happy", "I am fat", "I am thin",
"I am a man" etc. The implied meaning of the word "I" is the unchanging
awareness which is the "witness" ( sak sT) of the presence and absence of
all mental events. It is only this implied meaning which is expressed in
\
344
O rj
such statements as; "I am Brahman" (Brh.1 ,4,10.)°‘ (see comment, 1.47.,
1.50.).
According to the Advaitin, the primary meaning of "I" is objectified
by the Self and hence, like other objects, it is not the essential Self.
Abhyankar defines this objective portion of the Self as whatever is
"established by a particular cognition". Vith regard to the following
sentence;"This object ( yu s madartha ) does not depend upon an "I" like
the conventional expression "you"", the meaning is that the word "you"
( yusmad literally means "you") does not possess this sense in the
present context but is used to express the idea that everything other
than awareness is an object and hence is not the Self. However if, for
the purpose of argument, one insists that because there is the use of
the word "you" i.e. yug mad , there is necessarily the requirement of a
counter correlate i.e. the relation to an "I", then the author says let
that counter correlate be only cognition in general prior to any
particular knowledge i.e. "I have knowledge".
3.103.
tr ? m 1 rhhTtr
( '4RTO
srhtwwrr 1 RRfrfcFR
RHiqTRTRnqRR ^qRTrqRPTRRj 37^ tr hr q
3.103. But even the "I" relating to conventional expression is certainly
possessed of the definition of an object; an object is established by a
particular cognition. So the statement of the exponents of maya (&rI.B.
Para.37.p.62.); "the sense of "I" which is established [by the cognition]
"I know" is only an object, different from pure consciousness" is
certainly without negation. On account of this, [the statement] (^ri.B.
Para,37.p.63.);
The statement that the knower, who is established [by
the cognition] "I know", is an object is contradicted
345
just like [the saying] "my mother is barren"
is set aside. Because of the ignorance of the intended meaning which
has been told [above]. And the sense of "I" relating to conventional
expression, which is established by the particular cognition "I know",
is not in reality the Self, Because even though that [sense of "I"]
pervades its own distinctions, it does not pervade everything since it
does not pervade its own universal. For this reason, that [sense of "I"]
is not inner [i.e. innermost],
comment
Ramanuja's view is that the sense of "I" is none other than the
inner-Self (&ri.B,Para.37.p.62.): "If the sense of "I" is not the Self,
the Self would not be inner. Because the internal is separated from what
is external by the idea of "I"," Abhyankar's statements about whether the
sense of "I" is "inner" ( pratyak ) are with reference to the above verse.
-3,i°4. irfrr araatfra I
hw^rrjrrw sr^sfq asnf^rwi^ig
mrk is\% sfRJ
HTnR I RFIRURT kpTRRRT
rrrrf l k r
3.104. "Inner" ( pratyak ) is derived from "turns towards" ( prati + ancati )
and means all pervading. The word "inner" is only a synonym for the word
Self. Although pervasion by the Self exists in all things immovable and
movable , the pervasion gains the realm of experience in the form of an
individual soul, who is a reflection of consciousness in the bodies
beginning from Brahma and ending with immovable objects. Therefore the
individual soul is designated in the world by the word "inner" and by the
word Self. That soul, on account of proximity to the "I-notion" which
manifests Knowledge, imagines itself to have acquired "I-ness" and
considers itself to be the knower. Because of that, the immediate
346
cognition "I know" -which is a particular cognition relating to
conventional expression and which arises through the relation of
QQ
attribute and its possessor- is not contradicted. 00 Thus it is
established: the sense of "I" is certainly not the Self, nor is it
inner.
3 ' 105 ' I vfiisn- |
H ) i mw*' ,
T^nra: l mFixi f? \ ^ ire^i^r I ^ wmn
sfcrofWT-
vi[ wfift I
3.105. The "I-notion", which is a particular modification of the
Unmanifest, has also the logical possibility of being the "I-notion"
[literally the "I-maker"] for this very reason. Because this "I—notion",
on account of its proximity, manifests the individual soul as having
acquired "I-ness" although in reality it has not acquired "I-ness",
Because the etymology of the word "I-notion" has certainly been shown
by you also (£r:T,B.Para,45.p.81.); "having quoted the affix cvi in the
sense of becoming what was not previously".^ The "I—notion" is a direct
. . • 91
modification of the mahattattva . The mahattattva is the intellect.
"I-ness" and "this-ness" are distinctions of the intellect. Therefore it
is correct that this "I-notion" which has acquired "I-ness" quite
innately, on account of its proximity, makes the individual soul acquire
"I-ness" even though in reality it has not acquired "I-ness".
3 * 106 ‘ m #t: l ^^s^irarcT-
347
sfraHB ?cirr i * If msT IRPflR STCTjgq^
^i?pgR#rf^sfq qrqfq^ toi i 3 tih%^w. *qrqr- !
M qftf^r?! m i ^ ^qq *ftq ^pfr ^itqrfr'j'HT frqraf^q
sfraRgqiiqm i ^so^q(VTmfq^qi^> %^qqqifq HTqrft-
qq|qrre^R qrrqq i \% ^ <roraft ^ifr FlH'^n?Rfq^q^?q« 1
qpfl^n^ q^s**7WTfWiqft%qftg ^ q €tqi%g ^rq f^nrnr-
wmm l uur^r 3 ^s^qr^an^q: m^\ m qqi'qpqpj I ^
3 qr^sfqniR^qFT ^kr^qrr%: I qfuraq^TfrstqFft
^twfPr v -^rq^q^ I j
%qf ^h
P^qqrl^i% #*FT3 uq ^TT^j-qn: q?sqq t% q>:q irfTOF^
qfWP^ l Hnq-qqifqqqmfqrq w4 ?^ft q^qnifaj
3.106, If [you say] that in reality the individual soul has acquired
"I-ness" and in reality the body etc, has not acquired "I-ness". And the
"I-notion", which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest, makes
the body etc. acquire "I-ness" on account of the proximity [of the "I-
notion] to the individual soul who has acquired "I-ness".
[reply] Does the "I-notion", which is a particular modification
of the Unmanifest, have "I-ness" or not? If it does not, how could that
particular modification of the Unmanifest exhibit "I-ness" -which does
not exist in itself and which is located in the individual soul- in the
body etc? Turmeric [which is yellow] certainly cannot reveal the redness
—which does not exist in itself and which belongs to a flower of the China
rose— even in a crystal which is placed near the flower of the China rose.
. If it does, is that "I-ness" innate or the result of a cause? In
the first case, when there is the logical possibility of "I-ness" in the
individual soul and in the body etc, just because of that [its innate
character], what is the point of "I—ness" being located separately in the
individual soul? There is cumbrousness in the supposition that "I-ness"
is innate even in both places: in the individual soul and in the "I-notion"
which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest. Furthermore, if
348
that is the case [i.e. "I-ness" is innate to the soul and the "I-notion"],
[then one could say that] the "I-ness" being seen in the body etc. on
account of reasons such as proximity is in reality only located in the
particular modification of the Unmanifest and is not located in the
individual soul. Thus there is no determining factor here. But if such
is the case [that there is no determining factor], even the individual
soul would be able to be expressed by the word "I-notion", And that is
not desired by you also. But if it is desired, because you hold that
there is the destruction of the "I-notion" in liberation, the result
would be the destruction of the individual soul.
If it is the result of a cause, it has to be said that "I-ness"
is because of the proximity to the individual soul. The particular
modification of the Unmanifest, qualified by "I-ness" which is the result
of such a cause, is what exhibits the "I-ness" in the body etc. Does it
[exhibit the "I-ness"] in proximity to the individual soul who is the
real locus of "I-ness", or not in proximity to it? In the first case, the
"I-ness" which is only located in the individual soul can be exhibited
in the body etc. So what is the use of the superfluous "particular
modification of the Unmanifest" in the middle? In the last case, how
would it be able to make clear the "I—ness", which does not exist even
in itself, in the body etc? And there is no logical possibility of being
able to be expressed by the word "I-notion" [literally the maker of "I"].
3 * 107 - _ 5 ^
form: l i \,
l
349
3.107. Furthermore, if there is no proximity to the individual soul
there is also no continuance of the "I-notion". Because the "I—notion"
is not seen when the body has deceased. Moreover, even according to this
view the individual soul would be able to be expressed by the word
"I~notion". So the defect previously mentioned is just the same. Moreover
there is no determining factor here that the "I-ness" located in the
individual soul is recognized in only a certain particular modification
of the Unmanifest [i.e. the "I-notion] and not in all [the modifications].
Therefore, like "this—ness", "I—ness" too is superimposed just by
the intellect. So in reality that ["I-ness"] must be accepted as only
located in a particular modification of the Unmanifest, The "I-notion"
is indeed the particular modification of the Unmanifest and it is the
locus of that "I-ness". And that ["I-notion"] alone exhibits "I-ness"
in the individual soul also, just as in the body etc. This is correct.
Because the mahattattva is the modification of the Unmanifest and the
mahattattva is the intellect. "I-ness" and "this-ness" are distinctions
of the intellect. Therefore it is not correct that there is real "I-ness"
in the individual self.
i w wilmm
i 1 ^: 3 ^
dff m | I
^ 1 *WT * dWTRRS^T m pTR% ftij-
’rit ^ br 1 3 ‘w I
’ (30 y 1 r 1 ^orw^tsfq ^rcm i
tTRTrR WTORdf I TR dd ^pRdRT RWI-
^ I
350
3.108. In the state of liberation there is certainly not even the
cognition "I know 1 '. Because such a cognition is superimposed as it is
a particular cognition. Moreover, the cognition "I know” has dependence
upon the relation of attribute and its possessor. But in liberation
even the relation of attribute and its possessor certainly does not exist.
For an internal difference is evident in the relation of attribute and
its possessor. And the rule that difference is pervaded by the
generation of fear is certainly well known. It is another matter that
fear is in different degrees: somewhere great, somewhere middling,
somewhere less, somewhere even less, at some place perceptible and at
some place imperceptible. But in the case of difference it is difficult
to be said that even a trace of fear does not exist. Because fear even
of [one’s own] son is seen. Fear of teeth and nails etc. is experienced
even though they are part of one’s own body. And even the fear of one's
own words is seen. For there is a conviction in the world like; "I do
not know: what words will come forth from my mouth while I am obstinate
there? Hence the very going there is not proper." The statement: "fear
is certainly on account of a second" is for this very reason correct.
But in the state of liberation, the sacred text; "Janaka, you
have attained what is free from fear" (B^h.4.2.4.) shows that even a
whiff of fear does not exist. Therefore the relation of attribute and
its possessor cannot be said there [in liberation]. For this very reason,
there is no knower—known relation and subject—object relation there.
. 3 . 109 . ■ ^ vnz I \
i qfartf I ^ j
wrI n
351
i ggsnkk* I wm\ [
< WR«rU?KMKqi ! 1
* %?kk: i ■'
3.109. [objection] According to this way, even the experience of
happiness would not exist there [in liberation]. Because in the cognition
of that [happiness] a relation of attribute and its possessor exists
between awareness and the experiencer, a relation of known and knower
exists between happiness and the experiencer and a relation of subject
and object exists between happiness and awareness.
[reply] This is true.
[objection] How then does not even a trace of happiness exist
there?
[reply] Who says "it is"? If [you say] what is the reason for the
unsurpassed excellence of the state of liberation? [we reply] Understand
it to be the total absence of sorrow. But the statement of happiness
there should be understood as having the intended meaning: happiness is
used figuratively in the sense of the absence of sorrow, like "upon the
removal of the burden I have become happy". But the activity for the
sake of liberation has only the cessation of sorrow as its object. Due
to this, [the verse] (3rI.B.Para.37.p.62.):
The person desirous of liberation undertakes listening
[to the scriptures] etc. [with the idea]: "may I be
freed from all sorrow, the enjoyer of limitless
bliss, self-resplendent"
is set aside. Because as a rule, that type of resolve is not seen for
a person who desires liberation. But in the insistence that a resolve like
that is seen somewhere, it has to be thought of in connection with a
false impression about the limitless bliss there. Because the total
absence of sorrow is happiness in a figurative sense.
352
3.110.
*N*T. ^«TgWR ^ %^3T^ftsi% I fsTOtfjqT^-
*TR Hcftc^q qi^TT m*nfT§f %q^qq<fq%
^ g i ftjpnt^r 1 <rt ^
^w^RRRgfpp=n^5\q ^ str: i
i Wrrhrrpwiij; ’ tfq*q: R 5 ' «pnf%w-
’ $R I ^1%-sfq ft^RJ sn^ 4 ^
fornpRRRqij ;»sr $R^fo«qt ?r% l q*< g <RTfq *pj$qa%
* 3T|fq?T^f fSqgWft * ^J«p.V<TH H nm I HR ^ ^ RTR-
qt^ffrf: I JTT3W<IRT feq ^SRR*iT^T v^vn'qRlTO q^R-
HRWqTSftfqi^T^WTRRM I cRT ^ |:^RIRRR^ *T^
^TfRTTCR l%g^|
3.110. [objection] Even so, because there is no persistence of the sense
of "I" in liberation in the way previously mentioned, how is the resolve
"may I be the enjoyer of limitless bliss" logically possible?
[reply] Xou are confused. For establishing a resolve such as
this, the entity cognized as "I" at the time of the resolve is only
required to be indeed existent at the time of liberation but there is no
requirement of the cognition as "I" at the time of liberation. There is
no requirement of cognition itself, how much less as being "I"? So there
is no fault even though the sense of "I" cognized at the time of the
resolve does not persist in the state of liberation.
The resolve is only: "may I be the enjoyer of limitless bliss",
but not: "at that time, may I think of that sort of Self as enjoying
limitless bliss". Even in the world, the resolve is seen somewhere prior
to sleep; "may I experience the happiness of sleep". But even there, at
the time of deep sleep, the recollection is not seen: "I am now
experiencing happiness". So there_is no persistence of Ihe sense of "I"
in liberation. And because the persistence of the sense of "I" is
difficult to be demonstrated since the relation of attribute and its
possessor cannot be stated due to the absence, in any way, of
difference in liberation according to the way previously mentioned. Thus
353
it is established that an undertaking toward liberation is only for the
total absence of sorrow.
3 ■ 111 ■ wzrm srfa-
qfq ^ \%qrq ^
thw? nmzt ??qft i im\ ^ qtorom
5^5 mm fi% l tfp.fr ft 31%: 1 st =q
ttiw 1 * 3 <pt q**rf%^*q jnrn: 1 ft ^ witwfc q^rofa-
m^r ^ qfsrqTTtr tf I mm
^pppt fi% |:^ffN^|:i 3 T^rr^%^ mv, l ^ ft Tpq
^mffa i ^;:^ptt: I ^ ^ %w\h
^qprm ^ h: q#rt
1 mmw |:wtq * ^^rlr% tt ^ ?:*?-
ftfpfr I |:^prpdTqiqt iffa: fovqft 1
1 ,
1
1
t
3.111. Even in the world, the parrots etc. living in cages, although
eating tasty food at the proper time, desire liberation from the cage
through the mere fancy that: it will gain some fruit at some time
in the forest. The effort observed there is solely for the purpose of
the cessation of the sorrow of bondage. And the state of liberation
which is of this kind alone conforms to the meaning of the verbal root:
muc l in the sense of releasing. Because liberation means freedom. And
that [freedom] is in the form of getting away from something. But there
is no attainment of something else there.
Furthermore, because bondage and liberation are mutually opposed,
the meaning of the word liberation must be said only like that; which
is the nature of being opposed to bondage. And bondage is invariably
connected with sorrow, so liberation is invariably connected with the
total absence of sorrow since it is what is contradictory to sorrow.
Happiness is certainly not contradictory to sorrow. Because happiness
and sorrow are seen to possess co—existence. For. this very reason, the
354
Vaiseijikas made a separate designation of both happiness and sorrow
as qualities. Otherwise, like darkness is the absence of light, they
would have conceived happiness to be the absence of sorrow or sorrow
to be the absence of happiness. And the total absence of sorrow is
impossible if even a trace of sorrow exists. So it [liberation] alone
is contradictory to sorrow. Therefore liberation is proved to be the
total absence of sorrow even from the natural sense [of the word].
3.112.
C ^ vV c\ ' ^
tftnf r$ xffim i m i tg^rcit M
'•rcfa J w r>£ *fwrtwr: ; wt %
nvfrm 1 (^ v I \ 1 s?)
l *ft% ^TWRIRTRT
l%n H# 1 fs^fRPIRR wjRRHPTI l iT4T ^ %TPT-
I wM pnfa-
i \ f% ^ qfa sw.RiRmr
31TO R rP-FT l RttfiRRlft
$:#{ m i nRrc^ri^ift
5hh^: i ^ ^mrewr l
4kWT»: ^
S&RN TF^t^R? WRWRI I ^
Wtn ^ HlRlfdSR |RT ^ <nf ^TUi^RR^lFT
^RRRlRT^'lWT {%
3.112. The cessation of sorrow is remaining in one's own nature upon
relinquishment of the connection to what is agreeable and disagreeable,
It has been explained in exactly that manner by Ramanuja too (3ri.B.Para.
82.p.190.). The relinquishment of the connection to what is agreeable
and disagreeable is because the object itself which has innate duality
355
and which is agreeable or disagreeable does not exist, or because even
though such an object exists there is no connection to it, or because
although the connection exists there is no appearance of the connection.
According to the view of the dualists in that matter, the absence
of a second object in liberation is difficult to be demonstrated. There
[in their view], although there is the possibility of fear because of
the maxim; "fear is certainly on account of a second", the total absence
of fear in liberation has to be supposed as the blind adherence to one's
faith on account of only resorting to the sacred text; "Janaka, you have
attained what is free from fear" (B^h.4.2.4.),
However according to the view of the non—dualists, the total
absence of fear in liberation taught by the sacred texts is made logically
possible by reasoning alone. Because even the possibility of fear does
not exist in the absence of a second. So because the absence of a second
object is in accordance with the sacred text; "Janaka, you have attained
what is free from fear" how can the supposition of pre-eminent happiness
in liberation be correct? Because happiness has dependence upon a
second.
Furthermore, the exalted pre-eminence of liberation can be said
as the total absence of sorrow but not likewise as pre-eminent happiness
as well. Because it is well known in the world that even great happiness
is overcome by just a little sorrow. Similarly, the overpowering of
happiness by sorrow which is even of a figurative nature is well known
in the traditional legends etc. Sorrow which is of a figurative nature
is the absence of happiness. Prior to the birth of 3rl Ramacandra,
Dasaratha considered even all the splendour of the kingdom etc. to be
worthless due to such sorrow arising from childlessness even though it
was figurative.
If [you say]: where there is no sorrow, even of a figurative
nature and even a small amount, that alone is pre-eminent happiness,
356
[we reply]: then if that is the case, because ascertaining pre-eminent
happiness is dependent upon ascertaining the total absence of sorrov,
when the logical possibility only through the total absence of sorrow
is agreed upon by both of us what is the use of the supposition about
pre-eminent happiness being different there [in liberation]?
3 J13 ' iw-wrifa srep-
rs C Q ^ c\ Q r , - A _*\
3RWTT I
rr I mi 3 l
w topi rjh cnq-.^rnn i
I j nrft %f% l ^ !
l%T?WTr WX JmRcRT <TTRf
C rj S3 C. C
fi^rrn; i \
v^tst J ( ^pit q $<» W q° »)
RT.rTitR^ I
^qvjj 7T SMfrt dfdHf ¥fl«|o7ovoqo^ )
II ^ II
3,113. Thus because even a whiff of duality cannot be said in the state
of liberation, the persistence of the sense of "I" is impossible there.
Because cognition as the sense of "I" has dependence upon the relation
of attribute and its possessor which is based upon difference. So it is
indeed proved that an undertaking toward liberation does not have
happiness as its goal but its goal is only the cessation of sorrow. Just
as for a person who is pierced in the foot by a thorn there is an
undertaking for its removal. It is like that. But there is a distinction
to this extent; the cessation of sorrow is recognized following the
removal of the thorn. But in liberation even that [cessation of sorrow]
is not [recognized]. On account of this, [the objection]:
although the undertaking has the cessation of sorrow
as its goal, because the cessation of sorrow is
357
cognized in liberation the relation of knower and
known exists at that time. Hence difference is
difficult to be prevented
is set aside *
Furthermore, the cessation of sorrow is certainly not wished for
as "agreeable". But sorrow is "disagreeable", so it is desired to
remove that. You [Ramanuja] too have certainly accepted this when you
said ($rr.B.Para.82.p.90.): "because sorrow is disagreeable its cessation
is desired, not because [its cessation] is agreeable." On account of
this, the illusion conjured up by his own fancy which has been told
beginning with (&ri.B.Para.37.p.62.):
If the sense of "I" is not the Self, the Self would not
be inner.,,
is set aside.
3.114. •jra
3 Iiafa H fell'd I
| ’ ( Ro y o tfo ^ )
3.114. By this text (3rT,B.Para.37.p.63,);
This [consciousness] has existence and the nature
of being consciousness etc. just on account of its
connection to oneself. But upon separation of the
connection to oneself, consciousness itself is
not established. Just as there is no establishment
of the act of cutting etc. in the absence of the
cutter and the thing to be cut
what has been said is that Knowledge has the nature of being Knowledge
and has existence only with reference to the sense of "I" who is the locus.
358
In regard to that, it is said:
3.115.
mst mfi torw i
sTRrfM TO IM ^ II
3.115.
Awareness has no dependence upon a locus. Thus
the Self does not have knowership. The Self has
only Knowledge as its essential nature. The
knower must be the internal—organ.13.
3,116 ’ ^TT^iri-Km tr i m mm-
n^TTf r I
if% r ^wit^
mrirc^irK i
3fll«Kl«RT W£WI I
r I mr ^wto[s;ri ?rof mvs} l m
ipHi, R ti 5 lT I 3
mrcr ^rhirhrrtwi < *
Rd r^FT ^ R^Fdl RIPJ, I
3.116. It is granted that Knowledge has dependence upon a locus with
respect to the particular Knowledge concerning ordinary relations. The
awareness which is universal and which is the basis of all Knowledge is
all the more impossible to be dependent upon a locus. It has been
declared more than once that if the establishment of that is with
reference to a locus, the result would be the destruction of the nature
of Knowledge which is universal.
Furthermore, even in regard to conventional reality, the
origination of the "great elements" from the tanmatras of sound etc.
subsequent to the beginning of creation and their dependence upon them
359
[the tanmatras] has been, told by the Sankhyas and is accepted by you
too. Vith regard to that, how is there the establishment of those
[tanmatras] without reference to a locus? But if [you say] that sound
etc. are qualities and Knowledge is not like that. But Knowledge is an
action like cutting etc, [we reply] If that is so, because action is
invariably impermanent, Knowledge too would be impermanent and your
very own conclusion: "the Lord is the locus of eternal Knowledge would
be contradicted.
3.117. Cxf
. . 1
* fltta WTf&icT ’ ( sfmro 'Jo V? qo \)
mm i
q.runi i
m fdN; (mm I mm
I nupn?: m mf
I mm 1 i%mrcqt ftRRRR; (|o ? | y i ? y, y | M
mm \wmm
I H %HTN ITT'RR
f^T f ^ > ( ! *
3.117, But what has been said (^rT.B.Para.37.p.63.):
Therefore it is ascertained that the sense of
"I", who is certainly the knower, is the inner
Self.
Vith regard to that, is the individual self intended to be expressed by
the word "inner Self", or the Lord, or Brahman which is pure
consciousness free from distinction? In regard to the first and second,
there is proving of what is already proved. Because the individual soul
and the Lord are in proximity to the "I-notion" which is a particular
modification of the Unmanifest, therefore knowership for both [the
360
individual soul and "the Lord] which are "the locus of "I—ness" is
accepted by us as well. Nor is it the third. Because you do not accept
that. And because that [Brahman] is free from distinction, therefore
being the locus of "I—ness", being a knower etc. is impossible. Brahman
is not a knower in its essential nature because knovership etc. is
superimposed and therefore the nature of being a knower is perishable.
The sacred text: "by what, my dear, can one know the knower?" (Brh.
2.4.14., 4,5,15.) says that Brahman has knowership. But what is the
object of the purport of the sacred text is that the knowership there
[in Brahman] is only superimposed. Knowledge, even about what is
qualified by the knowership which is superimposed, is not possible by
any means. How much less about what is pure, free from knowership etc?.
If knowership is real, there would be contradiction with the sacred
text: "Brahman is Knowledge" (B^h.3.9.28. ).
3.118.
^ to .
H/T t ; 0
fencfm
f¥m
{wm pro? ^ i
9RW mm W: I cTCT
3,118. But what has been said (^ri.B,Para,38.p.64,65.):
Just as one and the same substance fire exists in
the form of effulgence and what possesses
effulgence..,, in the same manner, the self has
only consciousness as its nature and has
consciousness as its quality.
361
In regard to that, it is said: is the meaning of this "one and the same"
(1) belonging to the same class or (2) distingusihed by the numeral
denoting the tact of being one? In the first case, the meaning would, be?
just as fire, which belongs to a single class as the nature of fire, is
seen to have both forms: as light and its effulgence, so too Knowledge
belongs to a single class as the nature of Knowledge and has both forms:
the self and its quality. If that is so, because both types of Knowledge,
i.e. the attribute and its possessor, belong to a single class, a locus
and an object must be stated even for the Knowledge which is the
possessor of the attribute just like for the Knowledge which is an
attribute. According to the view of the dualists, though an object can
somehow he stated, a locus is certainly difficult to be demonstrated.
Because the locus of Knowledge can only be said to be the self. Thus
there is self-dependence: Knowledge which is the possessor of the
attribute is the essential nature of the self and the self is its locus.
comment
According to Ramanuja, the nature of the self (see text and comment,
2.10.) is analogous to a light and its effulgence. Light is a self-
luminous substance possessing the quality of effulgence which illumines
objects. Though the effulgence is a quality of the light, it is also a
substance since it can exist elsewhere than its locus. The light is
comparable to the substantive consciousness ( dharmibhutajSana ) of the self
and its effulgence is like the self’s attributive consciousness
( dharmabhutajnana ) which is a quality of the self and yet is also a
substance as it can exist elsewhere than its locus,
Advaitins consider that this twofold conception of consciousness is
based upon a false analogy. The substance known as fire ( tejas ) does not
exist in the twofold form of effulgence and its possessor. On the contrary,
fire is solely of the nature of effulgence. Even if effulgence is
experienced separately from the light of a lamp or the sun etc., the latter
are never experienced apart from effulgence and it is not possible to
apprehend a possessor of the effulgence which is different from the
effulgence.^ Hence Advaitins conclude that light is not other than
effulgence itself.
Even if a difference is allowed between light and effulgence, it is
362
further argued that the analogy is inapplicable because fire ( te.jas )
possesses the component parts (avayava ) of effulgence and its possessor.
But if consciousness is in the form of the self who has consciousness
as its essence and its attribute, then the self possesses parts and
therefore would be subject to change and consequent impermanence.93
In addition to this, Abhyankar raises a series of arguments against
the Visi§-fcadvaitins view that consciousness has a twofold nature.
Firstly, he asks whether Ramanuja’s expression "one and the same" (ekam
eva ) means that the substantive consciousness and the attributive
consciousness belong to the same class in being consciousness, or whether
it means that they are really one. If the former is the case, because
there is no qualitative difference between the two they should possess
the same characteristics and just as the attributive consciousness
requires an object and a locus the substantive consciousness, too, would
require an object and a locus. If it is said that the substantive
consciousness, which is the self, has the self as its locus then there
is the fallacy of self-dependence, Abhyankar proceeds to put forward
further arguments to show that the conception of a substantive and an
attributive consciousness is untenable.
^ mm vfir mm mmm mm
i mm i m
3.119. But if there is a difference between the self who is the locus and
the self whose essential nature is Knowledge, does the self who is the
locus have Knowledge as its essential nature or is it inert? In the first
case, once again there is another locus even for that Knowledge, Thus
there is an infinite regress. In the last case, there is the loss of your
own viewpoint. .
But if the Knowledge which is a quality and the Knowledge which
constitutes the essential nature belong to a different class, there is
contradiction with the statement; "one and the same". Moreover, upon
363
accepting that the Knowledge which is the essential nature of the self
and which is the possessor of the attribute is without a locus, due to
the acceptance that it belongs to a different class, what is the fault
of the exponents of maya who teach that Knowledge is without a locus
and free from distinction?
comment
If the substantive consciousness, which constitutes the essential
nature of the self, is qualitatively the same as the attributive
consciousness, then the former would require a locus like the latter.
Thus all consciousness requires a locus. To avoid self-dependence, it
could be said that the substantive consciousness and the self which is its
locus are distinct. But if the self is not inert then it must have
consciousness as its nature and consciousness requires a locus, so what
is its locus? If another self is postulated as the locus, then it can be
asked whether that self has consciousness as its nature or whether it is
inert. If it has consciousness as its nature then that consciousness
requires a locus and thus there would be an infinite regress.
If it is said that the substantive consciousness does not require a
locus because it is qualitatively different from attributive consciousness,
then there is the acceptance of the Advaitins position that consciousness
94
does not require a locus.
3.120,
ft ^ m
Im ^ 1 ft ^
I ft ^ URm-
? r: htit wt: I m ^ ^^t-
WS" ftq*T I
* ssr’ (|° 3 l ^ I ^ ^57T^n # ft-.
q^ ^ l ft ^ %tq%q
i q qqftm qft q I
364
WTffarc;
nm I ^ VTWfaTCt ^Tct ctf^FStt FTt^ I
3.420, Furthermore, by the text (^rT.B.Para,36,p,61,):
Awareness is the nature of bringing about some object
to be in accord with conventional expression, solely
by means of its own existence and in reference to its
own locus. It is also known as "Knowledge" ( jnaria ),
"comprehension" ( avagati ). "awareness" ( samvid ) etc.
It has an object, it is a particular attribute of the
self who is the experiencer and it is well known to
aJLl as having the self as its witness; "I know the pot",
"I understand this matter", "I am aware of the pot"
what has been established is that Knowledge possesses a locus. All that
here [in the quotation] would be contradicted for one who accepts that
the Knowledge which possesses the attribute is without a locus. Moreover
in accepting that the twofold Knowledge is mutually distinct, the word
"Knowledge" would have different meanings because there is no reason
for a single usage [of the word "Knowledge"] persisting in both of those
[two types which are mutually distinct],
Purthermore, the Knowledge which is a quality pertains to the nature
of the Self and is eternal and is not at all different from the possessor
of the attribute. So when absence of inertness is established for the self
by that alone , what is the reason that you again accept a Knowledge
which is the essential nature of the self? If [you say] it is accepted
because of want of recourse for the logical possibility of the sacred
text; "Brahman is Knowledge, bliss" (Brh,3,9,28,), [we reply] if the
sacred text is the resort, then when there is establishment by that alone
[i.e, the self is proved to be not inert just through the substantive
consciousness] there is no need of the Knowledge which is a quality. For
365
example, both kinds of expression: "the pot is vhite", "there is a
white quality in the pot" are logically possible by just the one quality
vhite which is a qualification of the nature of the pot. It is like
that. Moreover, if the sacred text had intended the word "Knowledge" to
have a twofold meaning; Knowledge which is a quality and Knowledge which
possesses the attribute, then for the ascertainment which is free from
doubt the very same word "Knowledge" would not be used in both places.
Therefore the difference, i.e. Knowledge which is an attribute is
separate and the Knowledge which possesses the attribute is separate, is
not accepted by the sacred texts.
But if [you say] that the meaning of this: "one and the same”
Fsupra ] is "distinguished by the numeral denoting the fact of being one",
[ve reply] that what transpires is that the relation of attribute and its
possessor is superimposed there [in awareness]. And then your conclusion,
i.e. the relation of attribute and its possessor is real, would be
contradicted.
m ^KTqfqr: i q ft
q q-
^ Sgqqi f ( qo # )
q qqr^ l %wrq qqq \
mF&ft I t TO TO
ftfcf %q^qfq\qft | qR^qpTrqqqqqreqwq^ I
q srerRRTO<n: I qqroq qqf $Tqtfrq; l iHifq q
qwq Wl I mi tfrsft qMi |
f% 3 ^nqqq q3i r Mi l xiRi 3
qn qq i qqq * qqqrcrra
TO ;* ( #*tt^ ^ sqreqpqt
q^qfro l qq q qrqT^fo^qTqnqqmt
q<fim4q qq I q^qmmiqqq qq qfqqrqqF^q faro I
3.121. But what has been said (Jsrl.B.Para ,38.p.66„) •
366
The knowers of words and their meanings [grammarians]
say that the words "awareness” ( samvid ), "consciousness"
(anubhuti ), "Knowledge" (jnana) etc. are words which
express relationship. In the world or in the Veda, the
usage of "he knows" etc. is certainly not seen to be
without an object and without a subject.
That is trifling. If that was the case, there could be no use of the
word "Knowledge" in the sense of Knowledge which is the essential nature
[i.e. the substantive consciousness]. If [you say that the use of the
word "Knowledge" in respect of the substantive consciousness is] by
convention, [reply] it is exactly the same for me as well. It has
certainly been told previously that the Self is indeed awareness which is
free from distinction.
The usage [i.e. a syllogism] is: awareness is the Self, because
it is not inert. The reason has only negative concomitance: what is not
in this manner [i.e. not the Self] then it is not thus [i.e, not not
inert] like a pot etc. "Not being inert" means having a nature which is
manifest without being dependent upon another thing, A pot, a light,
happiness etc, are not by nature manifest. Their manifestation depends
upon the Kaower. Even the knower is not by nature manifesti. Its
manifestation is based upon a locus of Knowledge which is superimposed.
Therefore that [knower] too is not the Self, But the Self is only in the
form of Knowledge. Whereas the knower, which is superimposed as the locus
of Knowledge, is only the "I-notion" which manifests Knowledge. On account
of this, that refutation which was done by conceiving another explanation
of "not inert" in the text beginning (£jrI.B.Para,39.p.67»):
If [you, the Advaitin, say that "not being inert"] is:
being manifest resulting from its own existence, [reply]
if that is so, there is inconclusive reasoning [due to
over extension] in respect of the light of a lamp etc.
367
has been answered. Thus the cognition which refers to the Self in the
manner; "I know" is only error. Khowership is certainly false, because
its appearance is only for the one who has the false presumption that
the body is the Self. 95
comment
In the Mahapurvapak ga (Para,27.p.43.) it is stated that awareness,
which is self-manifest by nature, is the Self because awareness is not
inert ( a.jad a). The meaning is that everything which is other than
awareness is insentient and so awareness alone can constitute the nature
of the Self. In the Mahasiddhanta (Para.39.p.67.), Ramanuja inquires as
to what the Advaitin means by "not inert" and he suggests the following
definition; being manifest resulting from its own existence. He then
proceeds to argue that such a definition is invalid because there is
over extension in the case of the light of a lamp, far that too is
manifest solely on account of its own existence.
However this definition is not acceptable to the Advaitin. Abhyankar
explains that what is meant by "not inert" is: having a nature which is
manifest without being dependent upon another thing.96 There is no over
extension in the case of the light of a lamp because its manifestation
depends upon cognition on the part of the knower, Abhyankar also argues
that the knower is not the Self because the manifestation of knowership
is dependent upon superimposition.97
3 122 ' wwi Frrmr rttstct ^ w
I ^5 4 l uww
vtmvm? I are i
^ i w hhtth: j
w.qm rfkwFi * (yy h )
hhththh: i ? ft we 7
i ^1 I TOSpTOWHf-
368
^^F^FJ'TRormi'w'T: mfwrcrenRfa ^ i ^ mf T^rrm^r-
i^fifrfW^s^nfTgR^T w\*\ jrirkf* ^55-
^ ijim \ 3T^r^cmitn: ^ i *rst ^roRifaw^R^
mh: 1 1
3.122, Awareness, in reality being without an object and a locus,
appears as a knower on account of error just as a pearl-oyster appears
98
as silver. But what has been said (s5ri.B.Para.39.p.67 ,68,):
This is not correct. If that was the case, the sense of
"I", i.e, the experiencer, would be recognized in co¬
existence with experience: "I am awareness". Just as
silver etc. are in the form of the shining substances etc.
existing before the eyes. But here, this awareness certainly
appears as separate and qualifies another thing, the sense
of "I", like a staff qualifies Devadatta. To elaborate:
there is the cognition "I experience". Such being the case,
how can the apprehension "I experience", which manifests
the sense of "I" as qualified by awareness, be declared to
depend upon mere awareness which is the qualifying attribute?
It is like the apprehension "Devadatta has a staff" relates
to the mere staff.
That is at first glance. The effecting of the cognition: "I am awareness"
is certainly not correct at the time of error. Because at the time of
error there is no cognition of the substratum in its essential nature.
Likewise, it is also incorrect that: "the sense of "I", i.e. the
experiencer, would be recognized in co-existence with experience," Becaus
the sense of "I" who is qualified by experience and who is falsely
imposed, is recognized as only in co-existence with the substratum. To
elaborate: in the cognition "I experience" how is it understood by you
that the cognition of the sense .of "I", the experiencer, is without
co-existence with awareness which is the substratum? Because the
experience which is a qualifying attribute of the sense of "I" in: "I
369
experience" is certainly not the substratum. But the substratum is only
awareness which is pure existence. The experience which is a qualifying
attribute of the sense of "X" is a particular modification of the
Unmanifest and it is certainly included in what is apparent.
[objection] Just as the cognition of the substratum here: "this
is silver" is as "this", so too, in what form is the cognition of the
substratum here [in "I experience"]?
[reply] Understand that it is in the form of existence. Because
finally, "is-ness" exists everywhere. And for existence, there is
cognition only in co-existence.
c omment
■Ramanuja says Hie sense of "I" in the statement "I experience" is
in co—existence , i.-e. apposition (samanadh.ikaraq.ya ) with experience.
Abhyankar states that the sense of "I", which is superimposed, cannot
be in co—existence with experience but can be co—existent only with
the substratum of the superimposition. In the case of a statement based
upon the superimposition of silver upon a pearl-oyster; "this is silver",
the silver is in co-existence with the substratum "this”. The experience
qualifying the "I" in "I experience" is not the substratum, for it is
of an apparent nature ( pratibhasika ). This means that an experience cannot
be the substratum because it exists only at the time of the knowledge of
it. For instance after eating one cannot say: "what I experienced at the
time of the meal I will experience now." Pratibhasika . which is negated
at the time of everyday life (vyavahara ). is of two types: the
experience of happiness etc. which is real and the experience of silver on
a pearl-oyster which is unreal.
Existence is the substratum because "is-ness" persists in all
cognitions. In the case of existence, there is always the cognition of it
in a relation of co-existence: "the pot is", "the cloth is".
:3 ' f% WIFI
fWnre H7C o qo yy qo I
370
tk^nrm wkkmkkT^ I ^ ^ m krknikk w k kkft!
kk kkFkt kT^Rk^takT? kl ^ ^l l 4 kkfa i k 3 *^T-
fdk* kkk% i k^lWkSkkttftmkRW^ kTW SftW ^
kreftk I k 5 Tkretw^nwn ^TkPkw-nkr wm i
3.123, Furthermore, it is all the more impossible to say that there
is the cognition of the substratum as Knowledge which is the qualifying
attribute of the sense of "I", Because the substratum is in the form of
mere existence free from distinction, therefore it is not suitable to
become the qualifying attribute of another thing. On account of this,
what has been said (^rJ.B,Pana,40.p..68. )^*
Even the awareness which is accepted as the Self
would be false. Because the cognition [that
awareness is the Self] is only for one who has
the false presumption that the body is the Self
is set aside. Because the falsity of the awareness which is a particular
modification of the Unmanifest and which is perceived as a qualifying
attribute of the sense of "I": "I know", is accepted. But not this
awareness which is the substratum. Because that [awareness] is not
perceived since it is not cognizable as it exists in the form of mere
being. For this very reason, that [awareness] is not sublated by the
knowledge of reality. What is perceived, whether it is the locus of the
notion of "this”, or the locus of the notion of "I", is an object which
is capable of sublation. But the cognition itself is not negated. Even
cognition, which is a particular modification of the Unmanifest and which
possesses a locus and an object, is certainly capable of sublation. But
[ awareness] which is in the form of pure existence free from
distinction is not sublated in any state whatsoever.
comment
In the Mahapurvapak ga (Para.27.p,43.) the Advaitin has argued that
371
knowership is false because it is superimposed upon the Self due to the
erroneous idea that the body is the Self, In the Mahasiddhanta (Para.40.
p.68.) Ramanuja contends that if the idea that the Self is a knower is
false because it is based upon, the erroneous 'presumption that the body
is the Self, the idea that awareness is the Self would also be false
since it arises in the same way as knowership.
Abhyankar replies that the awareness in the statement "I know" is
a qualifying attribute of the sense of "I" and is not sought to be
upheld as absolutely real. But the awareness which is the substratum of
the mental mode of knowership is not an attribute of the knower and so
it does not follow that because knowership is false the awareness which
is the substratum is also false. To argue that awareness is false,
because the idea that awareness is the Self arises for a person who has
the erroneous presumption that the body is the Self, is not correct.
Because the conviction that: "awareness is the Self" occurs only to one
who does not have that erroneous presumption.^^*
Ramanuja further states (Para,40.p.68.) that if the Advaitin says
awareness is not false because it is not negated, then knowership is
not false because it too is not negated, Abhyankar responds by saying
that any object of knowledge, whether external or internal, is capable
of being negated. Knowership is negated at the time of deep sleep.
Awareness, however, cannot be negated because it is not the object of
another awareness (cf., 3.80. comment-). Only what is the object of
awareness is capable of being negated.
3 * 124 * ijtt ^ |
. * ■ m ^ i k illI %ht-
smprer (sfhTT° i* an q° \) ^5% m t
qJHTMqt 1TR tTR^T RRT
’nw l ^ i
^ tfsRTcf * W I H 3RcR?^-
I ihRw hr 1 hhtr vm -
pjwr hhh ^ *n h g RiwwnRH; l
^pwp; 1 w wi TRiJrq
3.124, But what has been said (^ri.B.Para,40,p,69,
372
Knowership is not logically possible for the "I-notion"
which is of the nature of the internal—organ. Because
like the body, the "I-notion" which is of the nature of
the internal-organ is associated with insentiency, it
has the nature of being a modification of prak r ti , it
is an object of knowledge, something outward, for the
sake of others etc - And because the nature of
knowership is specific to what is sentient.
That is not so. Because the ordinary Knowledge relating to pots etc, is
an action pertaining to the mind, it is a particular mental modification
and it is a transformation of the mind in the form of the respective
object, knowership is the nature of being the locus of the action of
Knowledge. And that is possible only for the mind, not for the Self. On
account of this, the inference: "the internal-organ is not the knower,
because it is insentient, like the body" is refuted. Because [ordinary]
Knowledge is a particular transformation of the mind, therefore there is
the possibility of that [Knowledge] only in the mind. And the absence of
knowership on the part of the Self is established by the inference: "the
Self is not a knower, because it does not undergo transformation."
knowership is not the nature of being the locus of the quality of
Knowledge. In grammar, the agent affix (trc_) is said to be in the
sense of the locus of the verbal root because it directly expresses an
action. If [you say] that only the action of Knowledge is said by the
word "quality of Knowledge", [we reply] then it is accepted. Still, that
[action of Knowledge] is only for the mind which is characterized by
change, not for the Self which is free from change. Although the mind
has similarity to a pot etc, due to the many attributes such as
insentiency, being a modification of prakrti , being an object of knowledge,
being outward-and for the sake of others etc., nevertheless, there is no
373
negating factor in the acceptance of its dissimilarity as a knover. For
example, although the body has similarity to a pot etc. due to those
very attributes [just mentioned], there is dissimilarity in being the
locus of the sense-organs and in being the locus of motion. It is like
that.
c omment
In respect of knovership, the Advaitins position (see 1 .51 . and
comment) is that the Self is not in reality a knover. Knovership occurs
due to the mutual superimposition of the Self and the internal-organ
( antahkarap a). The internal-organ possesses a tvofold modification;
the first is a mental modification in the form of the subject (afaamvrtti )
and the other is the transformation into the various cognitions
(idamvrtti ) vhich are objects to the knowing subject. The internal-organ
possessing the modification in the form of the subject is called the
f .
"I-notion" ( ahankara ) and the internal—organ possessing the modification
in the form of other cognitions is called "mind" ( manas ).^^ The statement
that "I knov" is the result of a mutual superimposition; the "I—notion"
acquires sentiency on account of the superimposition of the avareness
vhich is the Self and the Self becomes referable by the individual sense
of "I" due to the superimposition of identity vith the "I-notion". This
superimposition is the pre-condition for all ordinary relations
( vyavahara ). Folloving this fundamental superimposition, an expression
such as: "I am happy" is due to the mutual superimposition of the Self,
qualified in the above manner by the "I-notion", vith the mind. The
expression: "I am a man" is due to the mutual superiraposition of the Self,
qualified by the "I—notion", vith the body."* ^
Ramanuja maintains that knovership is intrinsic to the self. Abhyankar
replies that knovership cannot be intrinsic , for knovership means "being
the locus of the action of Knovledge". Because cognitions are constantly
changing in accord vith their objects, the locus of these real cognitive
changes could not be itself free from change. If the Self can undergo any
transformation then it vould not be a permanent entity,
Ramanuja vill nov proceed to argue that knovership cannot be identical
to the "I-notion" because the latter is an object of knovership in the
same vay as the physical body is an object of knovledge. Abhyankar
responds by saying that a single entity can be both the knover and the
object of knovledge if it possesses parts. Since the internal-organ
consists of mental modifications, there is no contradiction in the relation
374
of knower and known with respect to the mental modes.
3.125. 5RT%«IT ^
iRtiRTH ^ Pi# I W
I * ITFfR^
(^^To^o y^ (Jo \s) T^T^riq I TRn#R##tRrft
fifpTJRPl i ^ I ^R-
# u \\ H
3.125. Such an action of Knowledge, which is in the form of a mental
modification, is certainly divided as it belongs to respective minds
either because minds in reality are many or because of difference due to
the distinction of limiting adjuncts. Even belonging to a single mind it
[the action of Knowledge] is certainly different due to a difference of
time. Thus the mind which is the agent with respect to one action of
Knowledge is certainly not contradicted in being the object of another
action of Knowledge. On account of this [the statement] (^rl.B.Para.
40,p.69.): "there is no knowership [for the "I-notion"] because of the
very contradiction of being an object of knowledge" is set aside. Because
there would be contradiction between knowership and being an object of
knowledge which are both ascertained in respect of the one action [of
Knowledge], But there is no [contradiction for the two] which are both
ascertained by a different action [of Knowledge], Otherwise, even according
to your view the absence of knowership would be difficult to be prevented
because of the very contradiction that the Self is an object of knowledge.
3*r#<r ft i
in v »
3.126. The "I—notion" can manifest Knowledge which is
non-eternal and of an ordinary nature. There is
375
no "I—ness" in sleep. Even so, the Self is the
witness there, 14.
3 * 127 * *?I R fsFTTRT^i ‘ KR TRRH
Rr^ 1 ( Mtm.o K
<To ) T7WR^I ^rSrFTT ^TRTR*
^ RFR ^r N ITRRft ^!TC
i r ^ir Rrnfa i 37^4 Hre^r ^rrto-
nW: i wit r rrft tfsErafaqraifafa i
wwpirft 11% r irwmr-
^RR $TR*R TR I f% ^R vjRWT-
RRRRJRT^: l *RT |[H*n?»R: RRnWt JR $R
( >M\° <j° vh qo U ) l rrmt^r
^mRR^R'JT ^r l *R]j ^3 3^im^
3.127* That action of Knowledge is certainly non-eternal, because it is
an action. On account of this, [the statement] (3ri,B.Para.40,p,69.
Knowledge is eternal, because it is a natural
attribute of this eternal self
is set aside. The expression that "Knowledge is produced", "Knowledge is
destroyed" is logically possible only because the action of Knowledge is
non-eternal. It should not be said that: Knowledge is certainly eternal.
But the expression "produced" and "destroyed" is figurative, as it is
based upon the expansion and contraction of Knowledge, The contraction
and the expansion of Knowledge is due to karma , [reason] Because there
is no means of knowledge for it to be a figurative expression when the
logical possibility exists [i.e. for the expression to be understood in
its primary sense]. Moreover, "contraction and expansion" mean only
"decrease and increase", so because Knowledge undergoes change it must
be non—eternal and so there is just the same situation as before.
Furthermore, according to the above reasoning, the individual soul
too would be non-eternal. Because you yourself have said fsupra ] that
376
Knowledge is a natural quality of the self. For the increase and
decrease of a natural quality is certainly not possible without an
increase and decrease of the locus. Because in regard to the elements
which are effects, it is seen that there is an increase of the corporeal
nature upon an increase of the quality ^.
3.128. ^
^nt^STrPTT I |
mj
‘vTRTIW'T 3-l!1^57n^Rr i
SZRWRT q (STRIc ^)-
wrft i ?r<fr mq:
| ^W^TWqbfifq
3.128. This ordinary Knowledge, which is in the form of a particular
modification of the mind, is certainly included in what has an apparent
nature. The "I-notion" which manifests only this [ordinary Knowledge],
manifests it as located in itself [i.e. in the "I-notion"]. Like a mirror
etc. For this is indeed the nature of the things which bring about a
manifestation, i.e. the manifesting of what is to be manifested as
located in themselves. Fe do not say that the "I-notion" manifests the
supreme Self which is of the nature of awareness. Because the supreme
Self is not able to be manifested by the "I-notion", On account of this,
[the verse] (£rx,B,Para,41.p,7l,):
That the "I-notion", which is insentient by nature,
manifests the Self which is self-luminous is without
reason. Like [a statement that] a spent coal
manifests the sun (S.T.p.35.)
377
is set aside.
It should not be said that: even the ordinary Khovledge, which is
in the form of a particular modification of the mind, certainly exhibits
the nature of being luminous. So how is that [Knowledge] manifest by the
insentient "I-notion" which is by nature not luminous? [reason] Because
this is not a rule; "there is certainly no manifesting of what is
luminous by nature by what is not luminous by nature." The manifestation
of the sun which is by nature luminous, is seen by means of water etc.
even though [water etc.] are by nature not luminous.
3.129.
I ws-
mm i
qqr% mm\ iJrktfu
i mg‘ ft
qo y\sqo c) ^ ^ \
ft I ^ l
g r*rr33&itt t^rri qwiwR wq I
mr l
3,129. It should not be said that; even this ordinary Knowledge illumines
all insentient things. So how is there the manifestation of that
[Knowledge] by the "I-notion" which is illumined by [Knowledge] itself?
[reason] Because this too is not a rule: "there is no manifestation of
itself [e.g, of A] by what is to be illumined by itself [by a]." Because
the manifestation of the sun's rays, which have entered through some small
cavity into an inner apartment enveloped in darkness, is seen by the palm
of the hand which is to be manifested by [the rays] themselves.
But what [has been said] (j3rT,B.Para,4l .p.72,;):
For the rays, which are obstructed in their motion by
the palm of the hand, become numerous and are perceived
378
very clearly of their ovm accord. Thus the palm of
the hand does not manifest [the rays] since it is
the cause for their abundance only.
That is not so. Because there is no experience of an abundance of rays
even though the palm of the hand is held a long time. For rays are
objects of visual perception. Therefore if their abundance exists, that
abundance must certainly be visible. But the increasing inability to
endure [the rays] is because of the excessive penetration of the rays
into the palm of the hand by means of the subtle perforations [on the
skin]. Or let there be abundance. Still, [the manifestation of the rays
by the palm of the hand] is not impaired; the palm of the hand manifests
the rays only by bringing about an abundance.
3
.130.
b^ ‘btb feqr i bbtbb-
?rr%: i rb:hh< riBr^BF7TRBRBqn<p i bttb brbrib^ l b*bt
R]PBFBTTBBBFRRTB J ( \ \ B*t 1 17^-
i btbtb Brpr-
BFBTTBBRB7BB^BBTB BcWt^RW BBTRPT%: |
BTPT BR BTBRTTTP'TBTRTB^T B^TRlBr
BBFB, BBT BT RTTTBBT B fa f RBBT
P Bp B%fBRBW7 IHBR I BBT B BBBB RB*R TTBT^BI-
BBT *IRT BTR ^BBftRBBT RRIRBIRBIB BBT BB RBltBTT^R
BTTBBTBTBBt pBT BBB IRB RBBPRBBJ BBpTB BB.TBBTB I
'3.130. But vhat has been said (^ri.B.Para.41 .p.72. );
Of vhat nature is the manifestation which is brought
about by the "I-notion" for this Self whose nature is
awareness? It cannot be origination. Because it is
accepted that [the Self] is produced by no other
thing on account of being self-established. Nor is
there illumination of that [Self whose nature is
awareness]. Because that [awareness] cannot be
experienced by another experience.
379
That is not so. Because we do not accept the manifestation of the Self
whose nature is awareness. And the Knowledge which is a particular
modification of the mind is certainly able to be experienced by another
experience. So the manifestation of that [Knowledge which is a particular
mental modification], in the form of the illumination of that, is
certainly feasible.
Just as the sun’s rays, though they have entered into an inner
apartment through some cavity, are not illumined as long as they are
without a locus; or just as the tanmatra of sound etc. do not manifest
when they are without a locus but only when possessing a locus; it is the
same for this Knowledge also which is a particular modification of the
mind. And just as the palm of the hand, having itself become the locus of
the sun's rays and itself being manifested by those very rays, reveals
them; so too, the mind alone in the form of the "I-notion" has become the
locus of such Knowledge and itself being manifested by that very Knowledge
it reveals that Knowledge.
comment
Abhyankar considers that Ramanuja's objection is invalid because
the Advaitin does not hold that the Self is manifested by the internal-
organ. What Abhyankar states is that the Self, i.e. awareness as such,
becomes reflected in the internal-organ and it is this reflection-of
awareness ( cidabhasa )^ ^ which illumines the internal—organ and is also
manifested by the internal-organ in the form of the cognizer ( ahamvytti )
and the various types of cognition ( idamvrtti ).
Ramanuja proceeds to argue (Para.41.p.73.) that because awareness
is not the object of another experience there is no means to assist the
experience of that awareness, such as by the removal of any obstructive
impurity ( kalma ga). Abhyankar will reply that the mental modification
(v rtti ). although itself a product of the primary Ignorance ( mulajnana ).
is able to remove the obstructive impurity consisting of the ignorance
of the Self. Hence the effecting of the experience of the Self is
actually the removal of the ignorance of the ever present Self by means
of an appropriate v ^tti .
3.131 .
itr wra^ i vzvi M
I % qfwqfw'Ti zGvrniw*®*-
Wgn ^smrMqr: 1
'<s 3 prRii?% pin i^wi«nwn?H-
W 1 W! ^ I mWH ^Pjftrfa
wreCTRf^ ^ w wr^un^fonq ^rmmfrfR^-
HTT% fl*IT qrfqmW^^dXt^q q^f^TCfwi
^wjt^ft m^m I 35Tt%^
^T^W'TTT W'Wi ^WP?E I
iiw^wii i 1 ^Tw'^wrof i qfpm^r-
(%Nr* i° vc vo \% ) <F 5 i i ^ fo rercv wnn-
i (% 3 <t?wt i w|%-
‘enwq tf[d¥ ctfq: ^ ^prcq =q jptj ’ |t% i
380
3.131. This Knowledge which is manifested removes the obstructive
impurity centred on the knower. This obstructive impurity is not the
Ignorance which is a positive entity and which is the basis of the entire
world. But these [e.g. obstructive impurity etc.] are particulars of
Ignorance, which are as it were minute particular modifications of that
very [primary Ignorance] and are parts of it. The ignorance of the rope
which is the cause for the appearance of the snake, etc. are of this
nature. Even this knowledge, such as the knowledge of the rope etc, which
removes a particular ignorance, is only a particular modification of the
primary Ignorance which is a positive entity. For example, even the
waking which removes a second dream which is [itself] contained in
another dream is only included within the first dream. It is like that.
So just as the waking, although included within the first dream, is
capable of removing the second dream, so too, the ordinary Knowledge,
though included within the world of appearance, is in the form of a
particular modification of the mind i.e. these actual, particular parts of
Ignorance, and it is certainly capable of removing those. The "I-notion”,
having become the locus, is said to be the manifesting agent of this
ordinary Knowledge. The nature of manifesting agents is to manifest
381
[things] as located in themselves [i.e. in the manifesting agent].
But; what has been said (5ri,B.Para.42,p,74.
This is not the nature of manifesting agents,
because it is not seen in the case of a light etc.
That is not so. Because a light is not the manifesting agent of a pot
etc,, but rather its effulgence. That has been told: "a light shines
only for itself, the effulgence is for itself and for another,
^ <1 -i 2 ^ ^ ^ ^
*' I *lTj ( ^ ^
wti I WkRFI | vfiWTT^t-
q ^ 3 I srpw 3 mm-
fa l #? ’ (sfcn® <{° <r° c )
*rpj m i
\WRr^3 I
3.132. A mirror etc. too manifests a face etc. only as located within
itself. But what has been said (3rl.B.Para.42,p,74.):
A mirror etc, is not the manifesting agent of a
face etc. But it is the cause for the fault in
the form of the reflection of the ocular light.
That is not so. Because there is no impairment for [the mirror] being the
manifesting agent of the face etc. by means of the reflection of the
ocular light. In the same way, the "I-notion" is the knower because it
manifests Knowledge through being the locus of Knowledge. The individual
soul too is the sense of "I" and the knower only on account of proximity
to the "I-notion", but not in reality. The Self, however, is only pure
consciousness. But what has been said (£rl,B.Para,42,p.75.):
In the absence of "I—ness", consciousness is not
established as being "inner".
That is not so. Because even though there is no illumining for oneself due
382
to the absence of "I-ness" in consciousness, being "inner" exists in
the form of the essential nature which illumines without dependence
upon another thing.
3 * 133 ' 1% WTRt wmw ^ I ww. I sw wn T-
5W WWW I ^ (wmft-
r^rr^r w- mwm tRt 1 sTfti^imr-
w\\ \ ww^ i l
W WW'WW HHTT%W*T?i ! f% ^ JfR ^wr
w:A ;
wn l w ^ m
I W^\SWW WWtfW TO<ra-
wwmw wxi xw'<m 3 <^i^nw5-
ww wr mw t; i% v % j tWpsht www( ^rwnw^-
xmf?rn^^TR wRafa^i mww ww
qpT W % h^PiT ww i%wTq^wj; 1
3.133. Furthermore, "I-ness" is not the essential nature of the Self.
Because there is deviation in the case of deep sleep etc. Although
Knowledge exists in deep sleep, there is no clear appearance because
Knowledge is without a locus due to the absence of the sense of "I". It
should not be said that: though the sense of "I" exists in deep sleep
there is no appearance in a clear manner because it is without an object,
[reason] Because there is no means of knowledge [to prove its existence in
deep sleep]. And because an object exists in the form of ignorance. And
because the sense of "I", which is the locus of Knowledge, does not
depend upon an object. Because Knowledge depends upon a locus and an
object but the locus does not directly depend upon an object. Moreover
how could the locus, which appears prior to the connection with an object
on account of the experience; Knowledge depends firstly upon a locus and
then upon an object, have a cognition which depends upon the object?
It should not be mistaken that; the sense of "I" is established in
383
deep sleep because of the reflection on the part of the person risen
from sleep: "I slept happily", [reason] Because by this reflection, the
existence of the individual soul who was cognized as the sense of "I" at
the time of the reflection can be established at the time of deep sleep.
But the cognition of that [individual soul] as the sense of "I" cannot
be established at that time [during deep sleep]. In the statement; "in
another birth, Jsikhandin practised penance for killing Bhi^ma", the mere
existence of the one who had been cognized as ^ikhandin in a later birth
is seen at the time of the performance of penance in the previous birth.
But at that time he was not "^ikha^Jin".
3,134.
1 % ^
| ^ f%NT?R RW d
wwm %r ^r^r^rwt 1 wnft
RRIFT I m IR *T flcRR. 1
vm jrffara i w wm
TOTJ^RTFRT ( ^ ) ’TTIRT I tR ^ < ^gf^T-
^SR^1PRR^ 5 RTRR lURT^RR f%RRf^RR
Wf tf^RR R%:
in^T =3n%R?R^I ^ TCR3R
r v iwrw-i ^Rm m: r v t^ ? ('4ir°
srr $3 sq^rcr: RmtqmrR wtr rwp| I
3,134, Furthermore, by the reflection: "I did not know anything", even the
sense of "I" is established as not being an object of cognition at the
time of deep sleep. Because there is the negation of everything: "not
anything". But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.43,p,76.):
If the negation "not anything" refers to everything,
384
even the awareness which you accept must be negated.
That is not so. The negation of even awareness, as something knowable in
deep sleep, is certainly accepted, For awareness is not experienced in
deep sleep as the object of a perceptual judgement. Because the negation
"not anything", which relates to the universality, negates as an object
of knowledge indeed everything: pots etc., the sense of "I", knowledge
and ignorance. The meaning is that nothing whatsoever is an object of
knowledge in deep sleep. For this very reason, the non-remembrance of
even the sense of "I" is recognized at that time in the manner; "I did
not know even myself". On account of this, the logical possibility
which Ramanuja somehow or other made for this: "I did not know even
myself" through the supposition of the meaning (5ri,B,Para,43.p.77.) :
"I did not know [myself] as qualified by caste, stage of life etc.", is
refuted. Thus intelligent people must decide whether the ridicule made
by the text (^rl.B.Para.43.p.76.):
In the knowledge "I did not know anything”, having
reflected that the "I" is the knower, the self, the
sense of "I", who has continued existence even at the
time of deep sleep, then upon the negation of that,
one proves by this very reflection "I did not know
anything" that the knowledge being denied at that time
is established and that the knower, the sense of "I",
who persists is not established. Only a person who is
beloved of the gods [i.e. a fool] could establish this
me aning
is, on the contrary, for the ridicule only of himself [Ramanuja],
3.135.
385
m ww 1 () sra l h
^TPt W<ft TOTTO q^TTOTIS*q^ TO* *
5 ( #qT° Ho qo?<\) q^TO-g^HVTOSfPRTT-
wqTO w i qf 5 <rq totw * ?wnw 5 ^tor-
HT^^Tf^’-TTn^T^q TOT 1 ft 3 ‘ ^ ftftWTO] I
^i% ittott^t ftftqr *rcfa i l ^ %ror~
fttsfq mflu * to^to^torto qfoq qro dKqfa r
$TO TO?^F.ft TOTTTO31TTO ^TOWTOTTTOTT TOT t
toto qT^qq%^^HpnqsT^ qrawFft * ^rog ttttot f
^qq qisro^ t wro htsTt tot i <t*tt Tjp * iw
W^ 1 ^^^TPTrqsfq ^ TOift ttoto
3H’-TR TOT l WTO TTCWRSlfarT *£P I TOT igmti TO~
^q TTqrfq bto^wtotoi WHwrowifoqrTO ^rro
Trqqrw {ttjht ircqft totot
d^RW^HqHdlldS^HMBR I
3.135. But what has been said (£r!.B.Para.43.p.77.):
The doctrine of the exponents of maya is that in deep
sleep the Self remains as the witness of ignorance. To
be a witness means just to be a direct knower. Because
one who does not know is not a witness. In the world
and in the Veda, only a knower is designated as a
witness. Not mere Knowledge. The venerable Panini
teaches that the word "witness" is only in the sense
of a direct knower: "direct ( saksat ) in the sense that
the seer is designated" (Pa.Su.5.2.91.). And this
witness is only the "I" who is recognized [in the
cognition]: "I know", so how could the sense of "I"
not be recognized at that time [during deep sleep]?
In regard to that, it is said; it is certainly true that; "in deep sleep
the Self remains as the witness of ignorance". But the nature of being a
witness there [in deep sleep] does not consist in the remembrance which
has as its object ignorance in the manner; "this ignorance". But it is only
in the manner; "I did not know anything",
386
For in the world, the witness of what is absent is of two types.
Here [for example]: "there was only a quarrel between Caitra and Maitra,
nobody was beaten by anybody", Devadatta etc. who remembers the absence
of beating at the time of the quarrel: "this was merely a quarrel between
Caitra and Maitra and nobody beat anybody" is the witness of the absence
of beating. But somewhere, even in the absence of remembrance in this
way at the time of the quarrel, there was no remembrance of beating at the
time of the quarrel in the manner that: "this one beat that one". The
witness is only to this extent. Similarly, in deep sleep, even though
there is no remembrance in the manner; "this ignorance", there is no
remembrance of any object at that time in the manner: "this is so and so".
That [Self] is the witness of ignorance only to this extent in deep sleep.
Although the primary Ignorance is a positive entity, still, the
nature of being the witness in the manner which has been told is easy to
be demonstrated because the particular modification of that Ignorance
which is situated in deep sleep exists only as possessing the power of
concealing. Knowership certainly does not exist in deep sleep when there
is the logical possibility of being the witness of ignorance in this way.
So cognition as the sense of "I" at that time is certainly very difficult
to be demonstrated.
c omment
In Advaita, the rational demonstration of the nature of the Self
rests upon the cornerstone of the analysis of the state of deep sleep.
The premise of such reasoning is: only what is not subject to negation is
absolutely real. The mode of reasoning is based upon the principle of
"continuity and discontinuity" ( anvayavyatireka )J^ In the state of
waking the individual sense of "I" is manifest, while in dream it is
partially manifest. During deep sleep, however, the sense of "I" is
negated because at that time it is unmanifest. On account of negation, the
sense of "I" cannot be the Self. Yet a continuity of existence during
deep sleep cannot be denied: for upon waking there is no sense of prior
non-being but rather there is a natural sense of the continuity of being
even though self-consciousness did not exist prior to waking. This
387
experience can be explained because the Self, as awareness, remains
unchanged through the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. The
Advaitin argues that in deep sleep the mind resolves along with the sense
of "I” which is a constituent of the mind. But the Self persists because
upon waking there is a recollection such as: "at that time, I did not
know anything". Since a recollection depends upon a previous experience,
the Advaitin states that the Self exists in deep sleep as the witness of
the absence of cognition.
Just as the Self is conditioned by the limiting adjunct of the
internal-organ during waking and dream, so too, in deep sleep the Self is
conditioned by the limiting adjunct of Ignorance ( ajnanavacchinnacaitanya ).
The Self, conditioned only by Ignorance at the time of sleep, is known as
^ H H C
Prajna. If the Self did not have Ignorance as its adjunct, the state
of deep sleep would be the same as liberation and there would be no
return to the waking state,
Ramanuja holds that during sleep the individual sense of "I" persists,
though it is not clearly manifest due to the absence of external objects
and because it is overpowered by the quality of tamas .^ ^ The Advaitin
considers that the experience of deep sleep does not support Ramanuja's
view. Because upon waking there is the apprehension of the total absence
of knowledge during deep sleep and so there is no means to demonstrate
that the individual "I" exists at that time in a type of muted condition.
Prom reasoning based upon a comparison of the state of deep sleep
with the states of waking and dream, the Advaitin concludes that the sense
of "I" is not the Self because it is negated at the time of sleep. The
awareness which persists through all the three states constitutes the
actual Self.
3 *
W&i t \ ^
PH i ^ -RqTT TR ^
prri hpp(t~
ur I pttr w §<rrewiT 5 wri i pr
pit pit jpt *r m
388
q^f
<mRn^m m ^ £*# <rar 5 %rr
irrqqq^f ^Rnr^TTR^SR ^ ^ ^ I % R
fah>m rtHiRTHM 11 ! i$r sting ^t^ng^g %N^^f
HRRtT^qq; %f%^Tl^^I ffra^R l '
3*136. In regard to the state of liberation, a cognition as the sense of
"I" is indeed all the more non-existent in liberation which is free from
the body. There [in liberation free from the body], the relation of
knover and known certainly does not exist so how could there be a
cognition as the sense of "I"? But in the state of one who is liberated
while living, even though the sense of "I" appears, nevertheless that
[sense of "I"] is only according to the vision of another person. But
according to the vision of that [liberated person] there is no negating
factor for him [that there is the appearance of the sense of "I"] like
there is for a bound person [i.e. the bound person may believe that a
liberated person should not have the sense of "I"], because there is the
ascertainment: though this "I-ness" appears in the individual soul, it
is not innate as it is only based upon the connection with the "I-notion”,
The ordinary relations of those [liberated souls] are as such; the
ordinary relations with people must be done only according to the vision
of the people.
[objection] Ordinary relations are certainly not possible.
[reply] Do you say there is no possibility of them due to the
absence of a cause or on account of the absence of a purpose? It is not
the first. Because the accumulated karma which has begun to operate is
not destroyed by knowledge, therefore the limiting adjuncts such as the
intellect exist until death in accordance with previous mental impressions.
But the absence of a purpose is indeed accepted. Still, the ordinary
relations are only for the welfare of the world, being solely due to the
influence of compassion.
389
[objection] Just as the ordinary relations are seen in this
manner for Janaka etc,, they are not seen in that manner for f3uka etc.
¥hat is the difference?
[reply] Just as even among bound souls a difference is seen in
accordance with previous mental impressions: only some shov the right
path to others, some are indifferent and some even show the wrong path,
so too, even among liberated souls a difference is certainly proper since
a mental impression is not destroyed until death. And those who show the
wrong path in the state of bondage are certainly not qualified people for
the knowledge of the truth,.Thus among those who know i.e. those who are
liberated while living, there are only two types: some show the right path
to others and some are indifferent.
3 - 137 * ^
m 1 SRT^fqqTrwt » ( v\° $ 1 \ }R)
* > (jfto i \c ) ^
srnmr sw# I *
51% i ) sqqiK-
cT^ I ( mm'.
( ' 4 m° 1° q° c ) 1 1 s ^
^ 1 (Hvq»
qw*NHT^ i #Fp7r I \% g ^nq qr: m
* wt ^BTnqigq^ l gR
smw ^^icrwmi U u
3.137. The sense of "I-ness" such as: "I was Manu" (Brh.1 .4.10., cited in
^n.B.Para.45 ,p,79.) etc. is logically possible for Vamadeva etc. in this
manner. Just as for children, the ordinary relations of adults with them
is only through language, in just the same manner, the relations on the
part of people liberated while living and on the part of the Lord are only
390
according to the way of the world. Thus the conventional expression
preceeded by "I-ness", which has been taught in the sacred texts; "Indeed,
I [having entered] these three deities" (Ch.6,3,2.) etc. and in the
traditions; "Because I transcend the perishable" (G.15.18.) etc., is
logically possible.
It was demonstrated previously (3.110.) that a resolve which is
preceeded by "I-ness" in the state of the person who is desirous of
liberation does not establish "I-ness" in the state of liberation. On
account of this, what has been said (3r:T.B.Para.44.p,78.
If there is no persistence of the sense of "I" in
liberation, the destruction of the Self would only
be stated in another manner
etc., is set aside.
But what has been said (^rI,B.Para.44.p,78.);
The inner-self manifests only as "I" even in
liberation. Because it is luminous to itself.
That is certainly not possible in liberation free from the body. Because
the relation of illumined and illumining certainly does not exist due to
the abandoning of the limiting adjuncts such as the body. If [you say]
that it is so in liberation while living, [we reply] granted. But even
there [in the state of liberation while living], that [liberated person]
does not again enter into the cycle of transmigration because the
mentioning of "I-ness" is to relate ordinarily with others only according
to the vision of others. But in liberation free from the body there is no
appearance of difference in any way.
3 . 138 . RTrt i
3.138.
Brahman has scripture as its means of knowledge
The scripture negates perception. There is a real
cognition even from vhat is unreal. The scripture
operates in itself, 15.
391
3 * 139 ' 4 toto(tor* (■« Ii a i U ) ^nK-
TOW% sttor tori^to I ^ qTqMWTOTO-
TOTq^i f™fpif?wi r ^
TO q?fcqT TO TO TORSfTOTO TOTO
I toTO to TO *TO TO 1
- %TOt RRPT *Fjf qspft | ^ %rtTO TO
TO TO%R ^R*T WmmfRRT-TOR TOR q|Rt |T TO I R R
|TO e]JT TO RIRR Hfrft TO %qfTOTO * TO RRIRTOt
qm: J RtTOTOR ^TOf TORWR TO ^qqqq<TOR
TOTO iTO rtTO q^^iqrroTTOT TOpTn qRTOt^FU-
f^R^RlR qqTS^R%q TOR J l’ r ^ q^Tii< q qiq <7 q^timiq ^q<¥tq
31 tor. q^sfiqTO^^MiqiiTOrog to RTOfTOrro
qqqrq .q^TOrciro^m hr qfirqT TOTOt
mtm to qm qtqqfq
3.139. Even this very scripture such as: "there is no diversity here
vhatsoever" (B^h.4.4.1 9., Ka-fcha,2,4.11,) teaches that Brahman is non-dual.
[objection] If difference is entirely unreal, the scripture which
has operated accepting difference in the form of the relation between
what is to be taught and the teaching and in the form of the relation
between student and teacher etc, must itself belong only to the untrue
path.
[reply] Let it be so.
[objection] If that is the case, how can the scripture be a means .
of knowledge?
[reply] In this manner. Caitra and Maitra set out to go to Prayaga.
Caitra went in front and due to an error about the division of the path
along the way he proceeded along the wrong path which did not go to
392
Prayaga and he vent far avay. Having seen him in the distance, Maitra
proceeded along that same path and he was informed by someone familiar
with the path; "this path does not go to Prayaga". Maitra, in order to
bring back Caitra to the right path, set out himself by that same path
even though it was known to be vrong as there was no other recourse and
going near to Caitra he turns him back from the wrong path. Similarly,
the scripture, to turn back the bound souls -who had set out to go along
the wrong path and not only just set out but had gone a great distance-
from the wrong path; in order to teach the souls, it has itself accepted
difference, though unreal, as there is no other recourse for going near
to them and having come near to the souls it teaches them.
comment
See the statement of Sankara, at the conclusion of the comment to 1.2,
3 . 140 . ^ r-
m i hht fro-
TO )^TH
rh w# i hr ^335# TOFfWr^n:^l
3 TORTORRR RFFffafa I «FTOs|tlTOTT H I HHT
R TO^T 5 I
t Wlf HTOHT
HHTRR I TOWTO^^trf RHfd I
♦ rv -s * r\ . > ♦ r\ rvrv r\ __ \r\ *
^ iriw asr t hth to^t
RPW WtR HR Him RHTH I
( TO^T Rfd RHTOTOT ?>-
RRspft ^TORPTT RH TO*H RTRHWRRR-
’ ( >4\rto 3° hv ho U ) '^tTOtwn?nnqT^-
RRW l
3.140. A teacher of such a kind is rare: one who teaches, having announced
the faults which belong to himself. But the reason for this can be taught
393
through the knowledge of the fault, i.e. having become indifferent to the
faults, one would follow all other paths belonging to him. Similarly,
the scripture has operated to show the true path having accepted
difference in the form of the relation between what is to be taught and
the teaching and in the form of the relation between student and teacher
etc., even though in reality it is unreal, and having announced the fault
in the form of unreality with respect to itself, by its own mouth: "the
Vedas are not Vedas" (Brh.4.3.22.), it communicates non-duality. The
reason there is that a person desirous of liberation follows the path
belonging to the scripture. But a person who knows the truth certainly
considers even the scripture as unreal. Otherwise the understanding of
non-duality would not be firm. Thus the scope of the scripture only
extends as far as the door to liberation, but not in the state of
liberation. This is the position of the Veda which is the crest-jewel of
the means of knowledge, what to talk of the other means of knowledge?
All means of knowledge have the status of being a means of knowledge only
extending as far as the door to liberation.
This non-duality, which is established by the scripture which is
the means of knowledge, is conformed to by reasoning as well. Because
distinctions such as pots, earthenware vessels etc. are seen in the world
to be preceeded by their universal which is clay, Brahman is established
as free from distinction, the basis of all distinctions.
Thus the scripture is ascertained as communicating an entity from
which all distinctions are removed. So on account of that, perception,
which depends upon all kinds of difference, is negated. Due to this, the
effecting of mutual dependence (^ri.B.Para.46.p.82.);
there is the ascertainment that the innate impression
of difference is a defect when the scripture is
ascertained as communicating an entity from which all
distinctions are removed and there is the ascertainment
394
that the scripture communicates an entity from which
all distinctions are removed when the innate impression
of difference is ascertained as a defect
must he understood as incongruous.
comment
In the Mahapurvapakg a (Fara.1 9.p.30f,), the Advaitin states that the
reality of the perception of difference is sublated by the non-dual
statements in the Upani§ad texts, The criterion which is given for the
relation between sublated and sublating is that while the former can be
accounted for in another way ( sambhavyamananyathasiddhi ), the latter
cannot be accounted for in any other manner. Scripture, which is the
means of knowledge in non—empirical matters (cf,, comment to 1.2,),
sublates perception because it operates subsequent ( para ) to perception
and negates the erroneous conclusion of real duality which is based upon
perception. Thus perceptual duality can be accounted for in another way
i.e. as apparent, but the non-dual texts cannot be accounted for in any
other manner. The Advaitin maintains that the conception that duality is
real is based upon a "defect’' (doga) called Ignorance which is in the
form of a beginningless, innate impression of difference,
Ramanuja responds (Para.46.p.82.) by stating that the Advaitin has
committed the error of mutual dependence: the innate impression of
difference can only be established as a defect when the sacred texts have
been ascertained to teach non-duality and the latter can only be
ascertained when the innate impression of difference is proved to be a
defect,
The Advaitin replies that there is no mutual dependence because while
the innate impression of difference is established as a defect on the
basis of the non-dual texts, the latter are ascertained as "communicating
an entity from which all distinctions are removed" solely through their
own meaning. The method of reasoning is as follows. It is axiomatic that
the Veda is a means of knowledge free from error. Because Vedic passages
such as: "there is no diversity here whatsoever" (Brh.4,4,1 9.) teach that
non-duality is true and duality is false, it is ascertained that this
duality which is of an apparent nature is produced from some "defect".
Advaitins consider this defect to be Ignorance assisted by the
beginningless, innate impression of differenced^
3,1 4 i. ^ 1
395
( ^TT. 0 *T° K\ ) ^ ^T-
q 5sft: I f% ^ toft ^wns^tsiq =t ftroro^q; I forft-
TTPIFT ^ ^pt-SFFIFTTTO SFT^T W^q; I TO W%TO !
*RT^rq^T^51W3 =T TO I **TOTO 3
TTOqTOT I ^l?nftqR[^IW^Rf f^WI%^Tf^TWTO^RT
to*t|tTOiti^ i H^srcfr^ I ;
to ^ toft ^wron ^wrrottsffi =r ftrCtarot^ I
3.141. But the effecting of the defect (^ri.B.Para.46 .p.82f. )^0.
If perception is of a contrary nature because it is
based upon the innate impression of difference, the
scripture -would also be to no purpose because it is
based upon that [innate impression of difference]
is not correct. Because the requirement of the validity of the scripture
only extends as far as the door to liberation. There is no impairment
even though the scripture is subsequently useless.
Furthermore, even though the scripture is based upon the innate
impression of difference, it does not have a contrary nature, What is
known as a "contrary nature" is making known an object which in reality
is unreal, as being real. Like the ordinary perception of pots etc. [is
of a contrary nature]. But the scripture does not make known anything
whatsoever in that manner. But the innate impression of difference is
1 21
required for the sake of the operation of the scripture. Because the
operation of the scripture is impossible without the connection of the
relation between what is to be taught and the teaching and the connection
in the form of the relation between student and teacher etc. And because
the cognition of a connection is based upon the innate impression of
difference. So even though the scripture requires the innate impression
of difference as there is no other recourse for its operation, it is not
of a c ontrary nature.
396
3.142,
R r * m 1 ( 3® l I l I <0 ^R^T-
l^TOSrjHTC ^ m?T%r: q^TRT^ I f^'W-
RTSTTRKTCRR^R I
‘ 5r^r fcierr *ui ’
^ ;intpT wra: ^fRi f>qpr% s^f%: I fra: Hfists# I ?rft ■
i ^rttt^r frg«isrcw<rcr^T ^
%pRNR R|RT^ v RfNRH ^WrPtWT Mf^fgRtRj
^3 u R^^RTSiq ( wk Rsrfcf (f °3R)
met: ^rmTmmm i r srei ^wfa
tew*rcj I
3.142. It should not be said that: the sacred text; "He who is all
knowing" (Mu.1,1 .9.) etc. has a contrary nature because it makes known
Brahman who possesses qualities and who is not accepted as real, [reason]
Because the sacred texts which teach about Brahman who possesses
qualities are ascertained as having their purport only in communicating
Brahman free from qualities. For there is no possibility of the direct
apprehension of Brahman free from qualities in a mere instant. According
to the maxim; "having stood on the untrue path, then one endeavours to
gain the true", the operation of the sacred texts is firstly in teaching
ritual action. Then in teaching Brahman who possesses qualities. Then in
teaching Brahman free from qualities. The sacred text does not have a
contrary nature just because of teaching ritual action or just because of
teaching about Brahman who possesses qualities. Because an operation in
that manner is seen even on the part of the people, for the easy
comprehension of the listener according to the maxim of the "large
Arundhati", 1 Even an exponent of Brahman possessing qualities must
resort to this very course since there is the sacred text: "he knew food
to be Brahman" (Tai.3.2.) etc. For nobody accepts food to be Brahman.
397
I ^ ‘ ^rm '-khmhth-
l 7^r%RnftniH^ *tt% ^rqim^
^qff m wit^%sfa wft|fasfcn^l th^pt ^ ^°i^t-
( WTo^o^Vqo \c) dv{ i 1
^tq^W^ipi mw vzfl ixt^ *mm I ^i#r#*pjm
K^TPfu^r mi I %t 3%r: ’(fovRR^) ^ i
^xfjpnn | w wfl
tT^T ^T^W’TT B-'vild <fi^t
3.143. Thus perception, whose establishment in a different way is made
possible due to it being based upon a defect, is negated by the scripture
of non-duality which is not established differently and which is later
i.e. it applies subsequently. But what [has been said] (^ri.B.Para.46,p,
83.):
When [scripture] is known to be based upon a defect,
the fact that it is later does not prove anything.
Because when there is fear caused by the knowledge
of a snake upon a rope, no cessation of fear is seen
even upon being told: "this is not a snake, do not be
afraid" by some person who is recognized as; "this one
is confused". And that the scripture is based upon a
defect is known at the very time of listening.
That is not so. Because differences are of many kinds, the scripture is
certainly able to remove all differences other than the difference which
depends upon itself. But the difference which depends upon the scripture,
having removed the others, ceases instantly just of itself. Because in
the scripture itself it is said: "the Vedas are not Vedas" (B^h.4,3.22.).
For example the powder of the cleaning nut 1 ^ , which is tossed into dirty
water to bring about clarity, goes down of itself along with the dirt. It
is like that,
comment
The Upani^ad texts which have their purport in non-duality are said
to negate the truth of perceptual duality because they operate subsequent
398
( para ) to perception. Texts such as: "there is no diversity here
whatsoever" (Brh.4,4.19.) pre-suppose the existence of duality and
subsequently negate it. Advaitins consider that the Upaniijad statements
operate as the final means of knowledge, because when the truth of duality
is negated, nothing is able to subsequently negate the knowledge of
oneness revealed by the Upani^ad passages. (See comment to 1.9.)
3 * 144 * *tt|
tW 1 ijfaftsfa wr
i rp-ti
I ^ | W4R~
wit i ffim-
dlHd'b^Irt i ftRT^t ml f% g ^W^WKi 1
to: ^ to m\ ft ^ i% 3 ^qto^towK
^ I ^ tofftolW tof
3.144. There is certainly no rule that: the one who shows the path must
indeed be free from defect in every way. Even a lame man and even a deaf
man is the guide for a blind man. The dirt contained in the water is
removed by the powder of the cleaning nut which is itself a particular
type of dirt. Thus the teacher is required to be free from error
concerning the matter which is to be taught. But it is not necessary in
respect of everything.
Error is seen to be of many kinds. For the causes are numerous,
such as separation from women etc., the loss of all capital, demonical
possession, bile etc. In regard to those, the error caused through bile
does not relate to the object but it relates to the colour belonging to
that [object]. Because the error that: "the conch—shell is yellow" does
not relate to the conch-shell but only relates to its yellow colour. So
the cessation of fear is certainly seen upon being told; "this is not a
snake, do not be afraid" by some person even though he is recognized as;
"this one is confused" due to having error caused through bile. Because he
is not mistaken in respect of the object
399
3.145.
^TTN^ftsfa h qtwq I i
<RT-fRI^ I t^kpk. I W™ j
wmtmrT^ ^Rprmqrfir^T ^ri wtr^wrr ;
nwfnr wft i h wft |
^rpto T^qiirwm qmr q?fcqRHf j
w irm *wR*n^rwrft wi\ I ^ i: mM
^nwm^TFW^’H 3 ^MMw^hf^ ^ 7 n >
( Too <Jo \^^<> \) ^TflfTf^q^ | , ^W^.l ^i’
TfW^PJrTii-
wftql: irm m: qi^rctsiq rrw \
%4RRq R ; 1Fq?5q^^qqi%[r(Jr » ^ J
nrq qfdqrqfqqq lpisq^qqH?iw to°t rnwqn?-
$xi qq-wn <rmfq qi^rmR %?q-
rwir qr^R mq?qqR qqrqqPiwqTsqTfaq \
3.145. Thus the scripture of non-duality, though dependent upon difference
for its operating, can be a means of knowledge because it is free from
defect in respect of the non—duality which is to be taught. Even a trace
of a defect is not possible for the sacred text; which is established as
beginningless and which is taught by the supreme Lord at the beginning of
creation and which is the primary means of knowledge for the words of
men i.e. the traditions, legendary histories etc.
But perception has a possible defect. Because it is experienced to
be so in the case of the snake upon the rope etc. Even Ramanuja must
accept it in this very manner. Otherwise, how could the sentient souls and
insentient matter be relied on as being the body of the supreme Self?
Because it is not experienced to be so through perception, though they
[Visig-^advaitins] accept it since it is taught by the sacred text. So too,
although there is no requirement of a defect for the purpose of the
400
cognition of what is unreal -since they accept the "apprehension of the
real" ( satkhyati ) everywhere— still, in the case of the cognition of
the snake upon the rope etc., they certainly say that the absence of the
cognition of the real rope etc. is based, upon a defect. Thus they too
certainly accept that perception has a possible defect. On account of
this, what has been said (^ri.B.Para.46,p.83,):
Moreover, by what means do you know that this
scripture has no possible defect whereas
perception has a possible defect?
etc, is set aside. Because both are equal. That has been told by the
learned people:
The defect being the same for both, the
confutation is also the same for them.
Upon the examination of such a meaning,
one [of the two] should not be accused
[of having defective logic].
Thus even though in the final conclusion it is established that non¬
duality alone is the reality taught by the scripture which is without
even a trace of a possible defect concerning what is to be taught, still,
because the appearance of difference exists extending as far as the door
to liberation, the ordinary relations pertaining to the means of
knowledge and the objects of knowledge are certainly not negated until
then [liberation].
3.146
nH bIr 3 qWi: l u| ‘ l sRriwnTq
fara ^ i vifa < forenwflftra mi
mi ’ (^PTTo^o^qot ?)
401
5 ^TWn; I
3.146. Brahman, pure awareness free from distinction, is alone the
highest reality because the object of the scripture, i.e. Brahman which
is existence without a second, is not seen to be subsequently negated.
But what has been said (3rl.B.Para.46.p.84.):
That is not correct. Because what is based upon a
defect is ascertained as not absolutely real, even
though it is not negated.
In regard to that, "in what way is the scripture based upon a defect and
in what manner does it have validity?", all that has been told just
preceding so it is not mentioned again here. On account of this, the
syllogisms told in this manner are refuted (^rT.B.Para.46,p,85.):
(1) The Brahman under dispute is false. Because it is
the object of knowledge produced for one who is
possessed of Ignorance. Like the phenomenal world.
(2) Brahman is false. Because it is the object of false
knowledge. Like the phenomenal world.
(3) Brahman is false. Because it is the object of
knowledge produced by an unreal cause. Just like the
phenomenal world.
Because the reason is not the criterion [for establishing the proposition].
And because there is deviation. For it is seen in the world that there is
a real cognition even from what is unreal.
comment
The reason does not establish the proposition because Advaitins do
not accept that Brahman free from distinction can be an "object of
knowledge". They accept that Brahman possessing a limiting adjunct, i.e.
saguiiabrahman , is an object of knowledge and is ultimately false. But
even there, Brahman only becomes an object of knowledge due to the
402
limiting adjunct and. so only the adjunct is false, not Brahman who is
1 26
qualified by the adjunct.
-3.147.
Suffer:
*RPT I *T§ '* !
ft i ft *
( ^ <?o \ !
\ ft .^’Tri^^TR
3T I ^ R*pRi% I RJ{ SfFPlH ?R
wiiiRwfa.
otr I «n sirst ^nq-
*TH ^ w4 PRiq; I Tsp?U WT’JIFR RRIR
trri rri^vt q jjcu^ i ^n^f| qiwH RT^i 5
^T( g«n ^ rth^rr
I TRFPHR: RTf JRTOT?TR3 RWR I f§N R1W KR n
STREET STWWRT»%tcK 1 i% <T 1
\J SJ 'v ”
tt'irr^pbM ^ n^n^r * ^<r rft 1 f%R
RUWi srr
^KlR'SRFTRfw^ I
3.147. Even though the knowledge of elephants etc, which belongs to a
dream is unreal, it is the cause for the ascertainment of what is really
auspicious or inauspiciousJ ^ But what has been said (^ri.B,Para.47.p.85.)
Because the knowledge belonging to a dream is not
unreal. For it is only the objects which are false
there. Because negation is seen for them alone, not
for the knowledge.
That is not so. Because the perceptual knowledge of elephants etc. which
belongs to a dream does not exist in the waking state. Because the person
who has awoken merely just remembers the dream elephants etc. and the
perceptual knowledge of elephants etc, which belongs to the dream. But he
does not experience [the elephants etc,].
Even though the knowledge arising in dream only consists of the
403
nature of recollection —because just as recollection in the waking state
depends upon a mental impression, so also the knowledge which belongs to
dream- still, that [dream] recollection is different. And the recollection
arising in the waking state of an object experienced in the waking state
or of an object which belongs to a dream is different. Although both are
similar in being recollection, the knowledge which belongs to dream and
which consists of the nature of recollection is not recognized as
recollection at that time. But the recollection arising in the waking
state is recognized as recollection even at the time of the recollection.
That is the distinction. Thus the knowledge which belongs to a dream is
certainly unreal because it does not exist in the waking state. And
because Ramanuja accepts only perceptual knowledge in dream.
Furthermore, the knowledge which belongs to dream is not the cause
for the ascertainment of what is auspicious or inauspicious in being of
the nature of knowledge, but only through being associated with the
particular object respectively. And that knowledge is not seen in the
waking state to be associated with the particular object in that manner.
So [the knowledge belonging to dream] is all the more unreal. Moreover,
if the knowledge which belongs to a dream is real, then it certainly
cannot be avoided that there is a real cognition from what is unreal,
because the production of that [knowledge] is only from the dream
elephants etc, which are unreal.
comment
The context for this discussion is the Advaitins view that the
scripture is not ultimately real, though it reveals true knowledge. Brahman
alone is ultimately real. The scripture has a "relative eternity"
( pravahanityata ) in so far as the Lord reveals the same Veda at the
beginning of each cycle of creation. Although the Veda too is ultimately
within the operation of maya , Advaitins consider that the Veda reveals
the true knowledge of Brahman. Thus true knowledge can arise from what is
unreal. The illustration cited in support of this (3rT.B.Para.47.p,85.) is
that while the knowledge which arises in dream is false, since it is
404
found to be so upon waking, it can nonetheless give rise to the
1 29
ascertainment of real auspicious or inauspicious future events. 7 Hence
the real can arise from the unreal.
To disprove this proposition, Ramanuja seeks to show that the
illustration of dream does not lend support to the Advaitins views.
Ramanuja maintains that the dream knowledge is not unreal, only the dream
objects are unreal. Thus the real arises only from the real because the
ascertainment of a real auspicious or inauspicious event is based upon the
real dream knowledge. The discussion continues, centred upon the use of
the illustration of dream.
3. 1 48. ^ i i fsjrcf
ft ^ qo l sra-
^ j gf: w-i-
} ^ qo ?o ) l
i ^ <IPTI SS^ItTWTvJ
3.148. But what has been said (£ri.B.Para.47,p.86,);
[objection by Advaitin] In the absence of the
elephants etc., how can the cognitions of them
be real?
[reply by Ramanuja] This is not so. Because
cognitions as a rule merely require a support.
Indeed only the manifestation of an object is
required for being a support and the manifestation
certainly exists on account of the defect. But
that [object] which is negated is determined to
be unreal. The cognition which is indeed not
negated is certainly real.
That is not so. You accept the possession of a support and not the
405
possession of a locus here; "because of the rule of merely requiring a
support". Because for demonstrating that a cognition possesses a locus
there is no requirement for the manifestation of an object. Whereas you
say: "indeed only the manifestation of an object is required for being a
support",
Furthermore, by the word "merely" here: "because of the rule of
merely requiring a support", is the possession of an object excluded or
not? In the first case, there is contradiction with your own statement
(^rx,B,Para,34.p,57.): "there is no awareness whatsoever which is without
an object, on account of its non-apprehension". In the last case, this is
not a possible answer to the question: "in the absence of the elephants
etc., how can the cognitions of them be real?".
comment
Abhyahkar attempts to demonstrate that the explanation of a "support"
for cognitions is vague and untenable, A "support" (alambana ) can mean a
locus or an objective support. If Ramanuja intends the word in the sense
of a locus then there is no requirement for a dream object. For example,
in the cognition: "I experience" there is a locus but no object. So
Ramanuja uses the word in the sense of an objective support. However
the use of the word "merely" in the statement; "because of the rule of
merely requiring a support" must exclude something, Abhyahkar seeks to
show that whatever is excluded involves Ramanuja in contradiction.
3.149.
lSRPPIT Hlfw ’ (’aPiT 0
wtrsr; tr l
i mro SRlW'ii^RT~
v.mm ^ 3
?r?frTTtw 1| ft ^ 1 h 3 f
(\) vk h I
406
3.149. But if the possession of a support just means the possession of an
object, then by the 'word "merely" here: "because of the rule of merely
requiring a support" is the possession of a locus excluded or is the
requirement of a real object excluded? In the first case, there is
contradiction with the statement (£ri.B.Para.37.p.62.): "something known
as awareness which is without a locus or an object is not possible, on
account of total non-apprehension". In the last case, if a cognition
possesses an object due to the mere manifestation of the object even
though the real object does not exist, is that manifestation real or
unreal? In the first case, a real cognition from an unreal object must be
accepted. But if the object is not accepted as the cause of the cognition,
then there should always be the knowledge of a pot etc, even when the pot
etc. do not exist. Whereas in the last case, a real cognition which is
the cause for the ascertainment of what is auspicious or inauspicious must
be accepted from an unreal manifestation.
Furthermore, the statement (3ri.B.Para.47,p.86.): "indeed only the
manifestation of an object is required for being a support" is not correct.
Because the cognition is itself the manifestation, it is not something
different from that. Because there is no apprehension [of the manifestation
of the object as being different from the cognition]. Moreover, the
statement (&ri,B.Para.47.p.86.): "but that [object] which is negated is
determined to be unreal" is not correct according to your view, that of an
exponent of the "apprehension of the real".
-3.150.
I to t^T wki ^ m I f%
g wmm l. imm i *rg * wwf mtwu
I TOTT ftwWPI firm ^ ^
<?G H ) <P»T I H I
* cptt I ws ig: l I *m
^ ^ ft ^ ^
407
^tht% l <\ w -
TJX tti 3# i H^TT^WT ^ |g-
q^qq^ ^ J H M^ld | H^qK^mq 3T3(3ppn^ dt^q-
; TPTT | !
3.150. This is another example of a real ascertainment from vhat is unreal:
the ascertainment of a real letter [i.e. a sound like "a", "i" etc.] is
seen to be from a letter which is unreal i.e. which is in the form of a
line [i.e. the written character]. Although the line is certainly real,
still, it is not the cause for the cognition of the letter through being
a line, but only through being of the nature of the letter. But being of
the nature of a letter is certainly unrealBut what has been said
(3ri.B.Para.47.p.86.):
[That is not so], because the nature of being a letter,
which is unreal, cannot be the means [for the apprehension
of the letter]. Because what is unreal and indefinable
is not seen to be a means nor is it logically possible
[to be a means].
That is not so. Is there some reason why what is unreal cannot be a means,
or not? If there is not, what is the point of that mere statement [i.e.
without logical grounds]? If there is, what is the reason? If [you say]
the reason is that it is not seen anywhere, [we reply] that is not so.
Because it is seen here itself [in the case under discussion]. And in
dream, because the fact that it is seen in that manner has been mentioned
just previously. The logical impossibility too does not exist, according
to the maxim: "because when it is seen, it is certainly not logically
. 131
impossible".
[objection] How is it ascertained here that a real knowledge is
produced from what is indeed unreal?
[reply] How have you also made the ascertainment that it-is certainly
not produced from what is unreal? Therefore the dispute which is under
408
discussion here is only concerning whether it is seen in that manner,
so the answer: "because what is unreal and indefinable is not seen to be
a means nor is it logically possible to he a means" is incongruous. Even
the indefinable horn of a hare etc, is certainly the cause for its
imagination.
- 3.151
3Tf * ^ ^nfsq * 3 -^:’ 34n^ir*3ijpf3-
fMto: I f% 3 |
i .^rt ;
wm ^ i zmj ^ %
trrmwR% i #TO *i3Ff l mm vzm~
l^l^dldWlT ^ J Wt^KIrTWTT-
fw^ i < fr^TK^ t (3i° w ? i o
wm ffw^TRm3r-
TMHR I 5^3 ?V4c| | m ? 413
3T%^s^tWt ^ 331^ltllMdV4 l>fe3I3nf^R3WT-
tft: t i¥ ^^^ \ ^ ^ i ^^ ^m ^ -
*RHT ¥t f^r%313 tT i ¥lFT33T^ft
qo H\9 qo ?^ )
^ I l ¥ 3 -
mi *m ^rrl^w I 33 I *m-
3.151. But if it is said (^ri.B.Para.47.p.87.) 132 ;
Just as there is the convention of using the word
Devadatta" etc. in relation to a particular physical
form, a particular line is the cause for the cognition
of a particular letter on account of the convention
that a particular letter which is apprehended by the
ear [is associated] with a particular line apprehended
by the eye. So there is a real ascertainment from what
is indeed real. Because the line and the [phonetic]
409
convention are real.
Then there is contradiction with the experience of the identity of a
letter with a particular line, in the manner; "this is the letter *k' ,
this is the letter 'kh ! ",
Furthermore, that there is a real ascertainment from what is unreal
cannot he avoided even in the illustration which you have told; "just as
there is the convention of using the word "Devadatta" etc, in relation to
a particular physical form". Because the words "Devadatta" etc., though
they are real in the nature of being a word, they are certainly unreal
as identified with the respective particular physical form. Only in that
manner [through the imposition of identity] do they make known the
respective particular physical form. Otherwise, why is there no
ascertainment of cloth from the word pot? Even the convention on the part
of the Lord; "this meaning is to be understood from this word" only has
the intention of the imposition of identity between the word and the
meaning. The revered Panini too, who brings about the usage between the
word and the meaning through grammatical apposition in the sutras dealing
with technical terms such as; "a, ai and au are called v rddhi " (P.S.1 ,1,1,),
intends only the imposition of identity.
And in the world, an appearance of emotion is seen on the face upon
pronunciation of words like; kvacit , cinea etc. Even though the face is
not burnt upon pronunciation of the word "fire", nevertheless there is no
defect because there is no rule that what has been imposed causes an
action having an effect. And the exponents of the eternity of sound, who
consider that there is the ascertainment of an eternal sound from an
unreal sound which is a particular sound that has been pronunced, certainly
accept a real ascertainment from what is unreal.
But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.47.p.87.):
The cognition of a real ox is even from the outline
of an ox, being based upon similarity.
410
That is not so. Having shown the outline of an ox, someone making known
a real ox teaches: "it is similar to this". And. somebody teaches: "this
is an ox". There is certainly a real ascertainment from what is unreal
in the second case there. Because the particular outline, qualified by
identity with the ox, is unreal.
3 ’ 152, I.
STT^T I H 33T
Whitt I
'TOnfa* |y$: I.
i 3Rn% snarer I <rat
wit ftww*v
( \ ) ^5% <&{ \ ^ it {wrFim
I itTO rt m\ ^ %)
l^*PTP J lTO^<f c R^S\'T
3.152. Furthermore, having stated this [the Advaitins position] (3rI.B.
Para.48.p.88«);
The scripture is not unreal like a flower in the sky.
Because prior to the knowledge of non-duality it should
be understood as something which exists. Indeed when
the knowledge of the truth has arisen, the scripture
[is seen to be] unreal. Then the scripture is not the
means for the knowledge of Brahman which is pure
awareness, from which all difference has been removed.
When it is the means, then it certainly exists and
there is the knowledge that; "the scripture exists".
But what has been said [by way of reply] (^rT.B.Para.48.p,88. 33 ;
It is not so. Because when the scripture does not
exist, the knowledge that; "the scripture exists"
is false. Then because the knowledge produced by
411
a scripture vhich is false is [itself] false, the
object of that [knowledge] also, i,e, Brahman, is
false.
That is not so. For instance in the text (£rl.B.Para.47.p.85.): "for it
is only the objects which are false in dream. Because negation is seen
for them alone, not for the knowledge" you yourself have said that even
though the objects are unreal the knowledge relating to them is real.
Similarly here, even though the scripture is unreal the knowledge that:
"the scripture exists" would certainly be real.
3.153. foaOTfcWHfin
TO fWbjjt I ft ^ | TO
3 m ttot sro nzwift l * 3
wtixh l inWr^ni^ironFT: l 1
tot i to
TWT TOW I ^TTOT
I '+W.H | TOf^T TOTOftft
(*° )l’
3.153, Establishing the falsity of Brahman on account of being an object
of knowledge which is false is also not correct. Because Brahman is not
the object of any knowledge whatsoever. For Brahman is pure awareness;
free from location, free from an object and free from distinctions. But
the scripture, while remaining at a distance, only shows the clear path
to the essential nature of such a Brahman.But Brahman is not an
object of the knowledge produced by it. And the path is the means for the
removal of Ignorance, Brahman possessing a limiting adjunct is expressed
by words, which is mediate knowledge. And this means, is such mediate
knowledge etc. The two things; the scripture and the means shown by that
[scripture], although false, are certainly able to remove Ignorance.
Because Ignorance too is false. Just like the removal of a thorn by a
412
thorn. It has been indeed previously told (cf., 3.139-140.) that the
scripture is valid only to this extent.
- 3 - 154 * . ^ 1 ,
Rtfo: ppwrt i ii ^ ) ft 3 i
* argqRi iito g vr 1% ’ (*nqr qiio )
I ^ ?TH^t ^TP^R-
^Rq*SPft$pN «p-
<TTf BTppqqqpR ^ ftqid;: i qpqftqRft
ptrpt cpn ^^rmnuftR 1 ^p?ir qpq
rr^ i^rptrt^ 11% =q
sr PRqq- ( wn« q q* U )^ft q^i R^n
qpqsiq str^tr ^hr PRq^ft q^Rq; l qqr =q ^^ptr ^
sr q^%RpqRRR mvn *tr i q;?ppi qf|q^*£TPRPP?R i-
3^1
3.154. The mention of the illustration [in the reply; "because the
knowledge produced by a scripture which is false...", cf., 3.152.] (^n.
B.Para.48.p.88.);
because just as the knowledge of fire, which is
produced by mist [wrongly] apprehended with the
idea that it is smoke, is false; the fire which
is the object of that [false knowledge] is also
false
is incongruous as well. Because smoke is not the means for the knowledge
of fire. But the knowledge of smoke [i.e. when it is recognized to be
smoke then it is a means]. Because it has been told:
The inferential mark being known is certainly
not the means for an inference. (Bha.P.67.)
And the knowledge of the inferential mark is knowledge which has the
determining of causality as its qualifying attribute. And that knowledge
413
has as its qualifying attribute the quality of smoke vhich is the
determining factor of causality in regard to the inferential knowledge of
fire by means of smoke. And if the knowledge which has the quality of
smoke as its qualifying attribute has smoke as its content then that
[knowledge] is certainly real and so there is no dispute in this matter.
If [the knowledge which has the quality of smoke as its qualifying
attribute] has mist as its content, even then, you who are an exponent
of the "apprehension of the real" cannot say: "that [knowledge] is unreal".
Because according to your view, portions of smoke exist in mist vhich is
of a similar nature to smoke.
Furthermore, you say (3ri.B.Para.47.p,86.):
The knowledge of a snake etc. upon a rope etc.,
which is produced by a defect in the object and
in the sense organ etc . , is certainly real and
the cause of fear etc.
so the knowledge of smoke vhich is produced even in respect of mist has
to be said to be certainly real. So if the knowledge of smoke is real,
how can it be the cause of the unreality of the knowledge of fire? Much
less can it be the cause for the unreality of fire which is its object.
comment
Ramanuja has argued that if the means is false the result must be
false,i.e. if the inferential mark ( linga ) is false then what is to be
proved ( sadhya ) by means of the inferential mark should also be false.
Abhyankar responds by saying that the Visi^advaitins maintain that
knowledge is always real and so they are in the untenable position of
holding that the means is true but the result can be false.
- 3 . 155 . ^ stfr 1 ‘
\ ^WF3, i sn^pR^ ^ ^r^v^4: 5
*n wl iwwi^ i ^te?-
il^TOrq^ SItW$ RTO-
f^npRi^^wm I'lfr-w^’T^^i *jq|^m
(rRi^R^nuqn 3 tow
5 ^ I NTWSTS^TOTO =q 1 W'H ^%fT^-
3PTt-
TO^’TfcfT^ I rim ^ 1 ^RtfTOT iV*?T#T ft WT-
rWj ( > 4 tTO 30 I
3.155, The unreality of fire is not known through the unreality of the
knowledge of that. Where a negation is subsequently seen, in the maimer:
"that did not exist even at the time of its cognition", that negated
object is unreal. Therefore the fire w T hich is negated is ascertained as
unreal. Thus when some matter has been taught by the teacher etc, and
there is the cognition on the part of the student etc, in the form of the
perceptual judgement; "the matter is understood", even when it is not
understood by the student etc., and later when it is taught again there
is the subsequent cognition: "now this matter is understood, but not
previously" : the prior knowledge which is the object of the perceptual
judgement: "the matter is understood" is unreal even at the time of the
cognition, because the negation is seen subsequently.
But the knowledge of the snake, in the case of the snake upon a
rope etc,, is certainly real in its mere essential nature [i.e. as
knowledge]. But it is unreal as the particularity of the object. In regard
to the case previously mentioned, even the knowledge in the form of the
perceptual judgement: "the matter is understood" is just the same [i.e, as
knowledge it is real until it is negated, though its object is unreal].
And so unreality is twofold; knowledge is somewhere unreal in its very
essential nature [as in the statement; "the matter is understood" when it
is known to be negated] and somewhere though real in its essential nature
415
it is unreal as the particularity of the object. But because the
knowledge of fire, which is produced by mist apprehended with the idea
that it is smoke, is real in its essential nature, unreality has to be
said only as the particularity of the object. And unreality as the
particularity of the object is based upon the unreality of the object. So
the unreality of the knowledge of fire is based upon the unreality of the
fire. But the unreality of fire is not based upon the unreality of the
knowledge of fire. Because there would be the occurrence of mutual
dependence. And so the statement (^ri,B.Para,48,p,88,): "because the
knowledge of fire is false, the fire which is the object of that is also
false" is incongruous.
comment
There would be mutual dependence since the object is said to be false
because the knowledge is false. But if it is asked: how do you know the
knowledge is false? The reply would be: because the object is false,
3.1 5 b. ^ hr-
asre qrqr4; ? 1
q° ^ i qm i 1qtTO-
qw 3 qrot'RR twRRr I
<PJT TO I
Ov »
TO^TOTOTOTTTOqrr-
sRT ^ TO^ i wq
^TRqiq I sRIWTR 3 ^ \
TObIr to w r q 1
3.156. But by way of refuting the view of the exponents of non—duality
[who say]: because the object of the scripture, i.e. Brahman which is
existence without a second, is not seen to be negated subsequently,
Brahman which is pure awareness free from distinction is alone the highest
416
reality; what has been said (^rl.B.Para.48.p.88.):
The absence of seeing a negation subsequently is
not established. Because the negation is seen even
for that [knowledge of Brahman without a second] by
the sentence: "reality is only emptiness".
That is not so. This sentence is not unoriginated by mankind. Because it
is not seen in the sacred texts. In the chapter on the means of knowledge,
Jaimini has taught that the validity of the statements of a human origin
is based upon the sacred texts. And so when the sacred text is not shown
to have this meaning, how can this sentence be a means of knowledge? And
not being a means of knowledge of itself, it is not able to negate the
Brahman without a second which is taught by the scripture.
Furthermore, does the meaning of the word "emptiness" signify
something existent or non-existent? In the first case too, does it signify
a particular or a universal? If it is a particular, because all
particulars —substances and qualities etc.— are preceeded by their
universal, then how could Brahman which is the supreme limit of all the
universals be negated by that [particular]? But if it is a universal, that
is indeed Brahman, so the dispute is in the mere name. But if it signifies
something non-existent, the mention of the word "reality" there is
incongruous. Because that alone is reality which can be said as: "it is"
and which is not negated. If [you say] that emptiness can be said as:
"it is", [we reply] then it can only be something existent.
3 • 157 . \% ^ ( tFPPt» nh VRq OT
I ’R qf wr tf'bro'r l m viqy
w mi w-r wr
l wmv ft l
q qiRnRR c^T qifqg |
417
vm qr stV crt^n^qmTqrqq-
* qrlwim ^qpr wmi Hq’qqq \ ^ 3 4 ^jfro
?rc^ \\k wf tqq wh, wTmqFf s^rqrqqq^sfq qq-
ctn% q q;*m ?r mr qifqg I
3.157. Furthermore, is the sentence: "reality is only emptiness" itself
negated just by itself or not? In the first case, how can Brahman be
negated by this sentence which has been negated?
[objection] The mistake of a snake has arisen upon a real rope.
Then there is the mistake: "this is not a snake, this is a cleavage in the
earth". Then there was the knowledge; "this is not a cleavage in the earth
but this is a rope". Just as the snake is negated by the cleavage in the
earth which is also negated, so too, Brahman can be negated by this
sentence which is also negated.
[reply] No. On account of the dissimilarity. Because at the time
of the negation, what negates is required to be indeed not negated. The
cleavage in the earth is not negated at the time of the negation of the
snake and so at that time the snake is able to be negated by the cleavage
in the earth. In this same way, the scripture such as: ">ty dear, the Self
should indeed [be seen] " etc., though of a false nature [i.e. having the
same "apparent" status as all empirical things], is not negated at the
time of showing the means to the path of the knowledge of reality and so
it is certainly able to make known the path. But here, the sentence;
"reality is only emptiness" is itself negated just by itself, so it is
certainly negated even at the time of the negation of Brahman and hence
Brahman can in no way be negated by it.
3.158. (fo y | | <£1° « I U )$!
stwj; \ f% fof
^ qr? qrqfq qmtq
418
l hrr-
I m 5pRR RrRRFHRM RTfrRn%RPTRR RPRR TFT %tRR-
rrrrtrtrirtrtr: i r^rprm r^pt pufepr h
rstrr r^trtrr *mn; I
3,158. [objection] Even the sentence: "there is no diversity whatsoever
here" (E^h.4,4,1 9., Ka^ha.4,11,) is itself negated just by itself and so
the manifest world cannot be negated by that,
[reply] No, This sentence does not negate anything. But it is made
known that whatever is seen here is not different from the Self, The
meaning is; everything, having the Self as the substratum, appears only
in the Self. And so although the sentence: "there is no diversity..."
operates in itself, it can have an apparent nature but it is not
fictitious like the horns of a hare. Therefore that [sentence] is
certainly able to make known the apparent nature of the manifest world.
But if [you say] only the apparent nature [of the world] is made
known by this also; "reality is only emptiness", [we reply] that there
would be the occurrence of the teaching of maya which you do not accept.
If [you say] that the fictitious nature [of the world] is what is said,
[we reply] then even [the statement] itself must be fictitious and so that
sentence is not able to negate Brahman.
3J59 - wi r rprr tft %ft:
rst: pfr fwm tt% %£TrtrtR rt fe: i ricrtrr \
RR RIRRTRTRWHf RIRR^R RRPTFTR WH ^mR^RTFRTRRl^
RRTR 1 RRPTft RmiRlRrRTFFRR | RRR WflTR- PtTR PT(iq-
RRIRTIR RR1%: m RRRTRiqRTFFfT RRvI I RlWftR RR%! ^RRR-
PTRF^FRTRRRlRRFFRT^ I RRPTR RT IRR
sjfRrRRPT R HlRWiRt I WTRT^R] I
R RRiRRTRRTRmTlV^R ! RR RRiRR 3 »
G ^ Cf ^
RmiFRI RR RTRRTRVRT RTRRTRIRU Rf^FRRR
RRpRRRTCR i R^TCRR RPRl^
RT^ I RR RR RRRRT RlfalRRI RRR'ff Rt, ( RT<> C
419
^ I \\ ) ( qTo go C | 3 | ^ ) IRW
(qio^ro \\ \ 1 1 ) q|f%: $<rc 13R^f wn
1 ^T?T^tsv%^: » ‘ % ^rnn% fqr*R’ (tf I W i ?<\
^m\m mv\v\ II \\\\
3.159. But if the second view [cf., 3.157.] is accepted, i.e. this
sentence is itself not negated by itself, [we ask] what is the reason for
the absence of negation? If [you say] self-dependence, [we reply] you
are confused. Where the operation of a sentence is helpful for the meaning
of the sentence, the operation of itself [i.e, of the statement] in itself
is not because of self-dependence. Because the operation [of the statement
in the statement] only takes place subsequently to the meaning of the
sentence. And therefore even though the operation of itself [i.e. of the
statement] has occurred in itself subsequent to the meaning of the
sentence, how could it be helpful for the meaning of the sentence?
Because [the operation of the statement in the statement] is affected by
the defect of self-dependence necessarily prior to the operation of the
meaning of the sentence. Therefore that [operation] is indeed useless
there [in the sentence].
For this very reason, in grammar, there is no operation of the
a pudit sutra (P.S.1.1.69.) in itself. Because the a nudit sutra is a
treatise dealing with technical terms. And the operation of a treatise
dealing with technical terms is only helpful for the meaning of a
sentence. But where the operation is to make known something else, but is
not helpful for the meaning of the sentence, in that case there is the
possibility of the use of the operation which occurs subsequent to the
meaning of the sentence even in itself just as elsewhere. So the operation
[in itself] is certainly difficult to be avoided. Because like another,
that too does not differ in being possessed of the distinguishing
420
characteristic of what is to be explained. For this very reason, in
grammar, the revered Paqdni made the operation of sutras such as; "for a
final 's' and for the of sa.ju s, ’ru' is substituted at the end of a
word" (P.S.8.2.66.), "a visarga is substituted for 'r' before a hard
consonant or when there is a pause" (P.S.8.3.15,) and "an affix" (P.S.
3.1,1.) in itself [i.e. the grammatical rule taught by the sutra is also
operative in the sutra ]. In this very way, the operation of these two
sentences of the sacred texts: "one's own portion is to be studied",
"there is no diversity here whatsoever" (Bph.4.4.1 9., Ka-fcha.4.11 .) is in
itself.
Furthermore, if there is no negation of itself by the sentence:
"reality is only emptiness", this very sentence which is distinct from
emptiness is left remaining and so the meaning of the sentence: "reality
is only emptiness" would be contradicted.
comment
This passage, of a rather technical nature, is in response to the
opponent's statement that the sentence; "reality is only emptiness" does
not negate itself because the sentence is self-dependent. The sentence is
thought to be self-dependent because it is both what negates ( badhaka )
and what is negated ( badhya ) and hence it is both the cause and the effect.
If the meaning of the sentence is dependent upon the prior operation of
the sentence in respect of itself, then when the sentence is understood it
is already an effect. And so if what negates is itself negated, it cannot
negate since the cause of the effect is included in the effect.
Abhyankar replies that the sentence is not self-dependent because the
operation of the sentence in itself only occurs subsequent to the meaning
of the sentence being understood. The meaning of the sentence: "reality is
only emptiness" is firstly known and then one thinks: "this sentence must
also be included in the meaning" and so the operation of the sentence in
itself takes place after the meaning is known. Therefore the sentence is
not self-dependent and so negates itself.
Ramanuja now shifts the focus of the discussion to the consideration
of scriptural passages from the prasthanatraya ; the Upanigads, the
Bhagavadgita and the Brahmasutras and also from the Vig nupuran a. Abhyankar
accordingly takes up the examination of these passages.
421
3.160. ^ i t ( Jjftqjo q 0 qo ^ JPfr
4 ^ *TOT ’ (v5T° % I R I $ ) prifagcfRi
HTNcT rpfl^R—
m*m ttt spt CTPrafft ^ ii
flmiwrcr%*r: ^ fftwn ii ^ ti
3.160. But what has been established by the text (^ri.B,Para.48.p.89.)
beginning with: "by the knowledge of one thing...", is that the sacred
texts such as; "My dear, existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.) etc. teach about
an entity possessing distinction. In regard to that, it is said:
These sacred texts; "fty dear, existence alone",
"Then there is the higher" and also "real,
Knowledge" are not said to have as their aim
Brahman possessing distinction.16,
3,161 ' ’(^T 0 $RI 0 ^1^-
Tqtqmfc TOid I to » ( 50 \ I? I H )
\fk TOPI < wm **T ’( t° Rl? I ? ) ^
%TTO^TTR^K | <HT
f%P^N St^FTOT TO TO5T
ft ^ I ^ cJTCWlft
i ara ^ ^ qTOPFPtf FtfqqH I $ fRHR-
qffro $ s^rcfif^nfro?: I
*mi HPTTO1T5W ^tt qtoq I
3.161. "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning, one alone,
without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.) is cited in the Chandogyopani g ad . "Then
there is the higher [knowledge] by which that Imperishable is attained"
(Mu.1.1.5.) is cited in the Mun flakopani g ad . "Brahman is real,
Knowledge, limitless" (Tai.2.1.1.) is cited in the Taittirlyopani g ad . In
the sacred text; "existence alone" an entity which is pure "is-ness" is
said by this [word] "existence" ( sat ). With regard to which [is-ness].
422
there is no universal whatsoever, Where there is the supreme limit of a
universal, the essential nature of that [universal] is indeed that
[is-ness], For this very reason, [is-ness] cannot be said as "such and
such". And for this very reason, that [is—ness] is extremely subtle, free
from distinction and all pervasive. The first [of the sentences cited]
has the meaning: "this" (idam) refers to the entire visible world, "in
the beginning" ( agre ) means prior to origination, "was existence alone"
( sad evasit ). The state prior to the world is made known by this sacred
text through the statement; "this was,,.in the beginning".
3 ' 162 * ^ ^ ^M
| srrq- <TTT-
( !l t) 1 ^ \ | « } \ O )
—■* ^TRT ^fT trhj
X \ \ ) (fo u tf l 1°)
^ suw^rPc wt^r-
i t%t
v l \? l ^ ) sm
3-.162. [objection] Is this entity which has acquired the state prior to
the origination of the world, and which can be expressed by the word
"existence", the same as the Self or is it something different? In the
first case, that [Self] alone has this transformation into the form of the
world and so the Self would be liable to change. In the last case, the
sameness of meaning with another sacred text making known the state prior
to the origination of the world is not attained, i.e, with this: "In the
beginning, this was indeed the Self, one alone" (Ai.1.1.) and with this;
"In the beginning, this was indeed Brahman" (B^h.1 .4.10.). Because there
the word "Self" and the word "Brahman" are mentioned. In accordance with
423
that, here too, only the Self is fit to be understood by the word
"existence".
[reply] The sacred text teaching very clearly: "In the beginning,
this was indeed the Self, one alone" (Ai.1.1,) and "In the beginning,
this was indeed Brahman" (B^h.l.4,10.) is required to employ the word
"existence" in the Chandogya only as having the meaning of "Self". So
there is no dispute. But the Self being liable to change cannot be
established. Because the Self is taught as being free from change by the
sacred text: "This great, birthless Self which is undecaying, immortal
and without fear, is Brahman" (Brh.4,4,25.). And those who rely solely
on the sacred texts must accept everything only according to the sacred
texts.
3 ’ 163 * ^3 ! HTN tor RTORI
‘RTO RRRP*’ ^TTT7-
f% 3 hi RRT MR H -bn :-
TOTRT 3 I ? I 0 PRT-
i ?T ^ PT^TTnR^-
MKMWIVT SRPPR TRRRT m TO t
wtirt I
I ^ J^cf.
H'bK y ( Aly?RT-
i ^TO'PRR foRPTRR
^ I <R qi>TPR'TRT^IT^RRTOT: # fo-
RRHf Rto 7<TKFR, tR %f^H+KR^TT ftfR! RrWt-
*J[ I
3.163. [objection] How could the sacred text then tell a mutually
contradictory meaning [i,e, that the Self is the material cause and yet is
without change]? But when a contradiction appears, one of the two is to
be interpreted as teaching a figurative meaning. The sacred text [teaching]
424
freedom from change cannot be interpreted as having a figurative meaning.
Because in being liable to change there is the occurrence of the defect
of non-eternity etc. and hence there would be contradiction with many
sacred texts such as; "eternal among the eternals" (^v.6.13.) etc. But in
accordance with the sacred texts [teaching] freedom from change, the
sacred texts [teaching] that the Self is the material cause of the world
must teach a figurative meaning. The purport of the sacred texts which
teach the nature of the material cause of the world, such as; "from which
[Brahman] indeed..." [Tai.3.1.] etc., is that subtle primary matter
( pradhana ) is directly the material cause of the world and by means of
that [primary matter] the supreme Self is the material cause of the world.
It should not be said; what connection does the subtle primary
matter which is directly the material cause of the world have with the
supreme Self, due to which the supreme Self is said to be the material
cause of the world by means of that [primary matter]? [reason] Because it
is accepted by Ramanuja that there is a connection which consists in the
relation of body and soul,^'’ In the topic under discussion, i.e.
"existence alone" (Ch.6,2.1.), the indistinct name and form which is
directly the material cause of the world only as qualified by a subtle
body, is said by the word "existence".
[reply] A material cause is of two types. The material cause which
undergoes transformation and the material cause which is an apparent
transformation.^^ If the Self is accepted as being the material cause
which undergoes transformation, there would be contradiction with the
sacred texts [teaching] freedom from change, but there is no [such
contradiction] upon the acceptance of the material cause which is an
apparent transformation. When there is the logical possibility through
non-contradiction in this manner, the supposition that one of the two has
a figurative meaning is not correct.
3.164.
($° W ) < ^ toHK ^I°$R
? ) ^*rRife^^!^R«r ^ I ^ra% tottr:-
%w^RtRt wnx^ i ^ I wfa
t^t %-;
^ l 3*nrt—3 tt^t ^ ^rfn^i *afrc$RTft-
vri wscror *^; l h^ f^|q^rfkf^%:%^r j
^T | ffc^TTW^ ^Irq^m: ^q\ WkJI STfTRnftN^m Wk
^ f| %^r I ^m ^ ^«n jroi^ife th^^kj 3^-
f^r ^kM^^n sfq *iftct^I ^ ^
’i|(UfrM rftTMT^^tn? TR^RTlfemi WS-
smr^: I
425
3.164. Furthermore, the loss of the sameness of meaning [referred to in
3.162.] between the two sacred texts: "In the beginning this was indeed
the Self, one alone” (Ai.1.1.) and "Ify dear, this was existence alone in
the beginning” (Ch.6.2.1.) which teach the state prior to the world, is
just like before. Because only the Self within the body is understood by
the word ”Self" and [the Self] qualified by a body is understood by the
word "existence". Even though the cognition of non-difference between the
body and the possessor of the body is conventional in the world, still,
a oneness of meaning between the two words "existence" and "Self" is not
logically possible.
To elaborate. The Self [i.e. the supreme Self] is the possessor of
a body. The sentient [souls] and the insentient [matter] are its body. In
the view of those who accept the body-soul relation in this manner, what
is the single meaning for the two words "existence" and "Self"? Is it (a)
qualified by a body consisting of the sentient and insentient, or (b)
alone [i.e. without qualification]? If [the single meaning of the two
words] is "qualified", then a meaning of the word "Self" which is not
established has to be imagined. Because their [Visi^^advaitins] view is
that the word "Self" is meaningful in relation to a body. And so just as
the word "father", which is meaningful in relation to a son, tells the
426
meaning of indeed being distinct from the son, so too, the word "Self”
must also teach the meaning of indeed being distinct from the body. It
should not be said that: the connection between the body and the Self
must be only the relation that exists between part and whole, [reason]
Because it is not known in that manner in respect of the individual self,
3 * 165 * f% ^ j
^ I ^ I * ( fTo \ \ \ \o ) rfi
^rfq I ^ to-
511dtq V*Ti( r i I'd r r 4dl Ti d l4\'I
?jy i ^ I
trg wnq i% ^ * ^trtt ?
(f» RI a 1H) I
g ^rr Wg I
3.165. Furthermore, if that which is qualified is considered to be the
Self, Knowledge must be a quality of a part of the Self and not a quality
of the whole Self. And that is not a desired conclusion. Because by the
sutra : "Since [the quality of Knowledge] exists wherever the Self is.,,"
1 37
(B.S.2.3.30,) the quality of Knowledge is said to pervade the whole
Self.
[objection] By this; "Since [the quality of Knowledge] exists
wherever the Self is...", just like the Self is eternal, the Knowledge
which is its quality is made known as being eternal, but not the
pervasiveness [of that Knowledge],
[reply] Even so, if what is qualified is considered to be the Self,
the occurrence of defects such as being liable to change etc. is
certainly difficult to be avoided.
Furthermore, if that which is qualified is considered to be the
Self, although there is the logical possibility of what you accept, i.e*
427
that the Self has Knowledge as its quality since [Knowledge] is located
in one part, there is no logical possibility that the Self is of the
nature of Knowledge, which has been told by the sacred text: "a mass of
Knowledge" (Brh.2.4.1 2.). But you too have certainly accepted that.
Furthermore, if that which is qualified is considered to he the
Self, the injunction: "My dear, the Self should indeed be seen" (Brh.2,4.
5.) etc. would be meaningless. Because the perception of the Self has been
established without effort. But in the meaning of the word "Self" to he;
"a part of the Self" there would he implication.
^ WCRKPi; ffcf I W ( ^1° \ 1
q ^ q w l q f| fcqfq^q mi qqr qs n
qpnpR: | 3^ ^ q I q
n « 1 ^5 qfaqiR<i qw<:Hqi
q qqqm 1 3 T$f^ u Tlfqqq 1 fqqqq^q qK«u*Hi^
q l zm qriqqTmq^qqwpi t qqq I
qqiq Trcrqqq^ qrwRf q qqqrq I Trqi^qtqRq^iqrqwrw^ I
qifq i wiwi qfVnfcfa q^qiprwRq: %q^p? qu^im-
PRiq I SRlireTRqm Hprl 3 Tq^ I mPR^TR^W-IR'13IPT
m m tTd7qpTfqfq I qm ^rq^rvrcq pi^kup-t ^ftqq^fq-
qpq q qRPTRqqq i
3..166. But with the desire of removing these defects, if [you say] the
meaning of the two words "existence" and "Self" is just [the Self] alone
who is within the body, [reply] There is loss of the proposition. It is
said in the sacred text [i.e. the purport of Ch.6.1.3. is told]; through
the one Self being known, all else becomes known. With regard to that,
the knowledge of the individual souls and inert objects is not possible
through the knowledge of the supreme Self. The body [of the supreme Self]
in the form of the sentient and insentient is certainly not a
transformation of the supreme Self like a pot from clay. And for this very
428
reason, there is a lack of congruity with the example of the clay etc.
Furthermore, the supreme Self being the material cause of the
world, which is taught in the sutra : "[Brahman] is the material cause..."
(B.S.1,4.23.) , is not possible if that which is alone [i.e# without
connection] is considered to he the Self, For a material cause is of two
types: according to the teaching of "apparent transformation" and
according to the teaching of "[real] transformation". The first, is a rope
being the material cause of an apparent snake. The last, is clay being
the material cause of pots etc. In regard to those, the first is not
possible for the supreme Self according to the view of Ramanuja. Because
Ramanuja does not accept the teaching of apparent transformation. Nor even
is the second [possible]. Because although the body undergoes
transformation, there is no transformation of the Self alone who is
within that. But being a material cause, on account of being merely
internal, is difficult to be said. Because the space which is internal to
the ball of clay is not the material cause of a pot. So too, nobody
accepts that the individual soul is the material cause of the physical
body, which [in fact] has the subtle body as its material cause.
3.167.
(fo r l v K) wrirownfrofas* I
whrrw Hirat I i
* i
3.167. Furthermore, if that which is alone [i.e, without connection] is
considered to be the Self, there is contradiction with the sacred text;
429
"My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning" (Ch,6.2.1.) because
prior to creation the subtle body of the supreme Self, which is the
material cause of the world, exists as distinct from the supreme Self.
And there is no logical possibility of the grammatical apposition taught
by the sacred text; "all this which is, is this Self" (Brh.2.4.6,),
Because although the visible world recalled by the word "this" is the body
of the supreme Self, it is not the essential nature of the supreme Self,
Although the usage is seen; "I am fat", "I am thin" etc. due to the
grammatical apposition between the body and its possessor, there is no
identity between the two in reality. Even though the world is in a state
of indistinct name and form prior to the creation and is extremely subtle,
it is the body of the supreme Self, and so it is certainly different in
reality from the supreme Self according to your view.
It should not be said; there is an implied meaning of the word
"this" in the sense of "the inner controller of this". Or there is the
implied meaning of the word "existence" and the word "Self" in the sense
of "the body of that [inner controller]". And so there is the logical
possibility of grammatical apposition, [reason] Because there is no
authority for an implied meaning. And because there is cumbrousness [in
such an explanation].
3.168
ft \ I ^ I \ ft rrr-
9 ($ \ l I 3 )
i <r ( \ | i \ n )
i ftPTmnmrcN » trr sfttsg-
Rq: I *R SRRcIr HRR^R |
ft ^rrtfr ( ^irr
^ ^ m ftrftcT^ ( f o V I \ \ $ ) ^RRR RRfRR
Wtm I, cR fqf^qRRWm^RRR R^Rmft
rssrrr; i * ( w ° \ I ? i \
430
3ft«T Sli-
RIHt*RI? ^RRrfeg'mfl I wn TR p-
Wt€ W*^ RTOTT I TR =q
‘ wi^t %m TOm Rim to ’ ( 9® ? \ l \l ) ^
W<T I ^f f| Wimfitl ^RRIRR^Tt-
gilR^ ^ I
3.168. Furthermore, the sentence: "existence alone" (Ch.6.2.1.) is
mentioned to logically demonstrate the meaning of vhat had been
previously stated; "Through vhich, vhat is unheard becomes heard, vhat
is not thought becomes thought of, vhat is unknown becomes knovn" (Ch.6.
1.3.). There [in the above sentence], by this [vord] "Through vhich"
there is the recollection of the instruction connected vith the vord
"that" in the previous sentence: "did you ask for that instruction?". The
vord "instruction" is a functional derivation [i.e. it has the meaning of
the verbal root] signifying teaching. And it gives the meaning of the
object, i.e, it signifies the entity -the Self- vhich is being taught.
And it is an instrumental derivation signifying the scripture vhich is
the means of instruction. Though there is the logical possibility that
the meaning too is in three parts, it is proper here to accept only the
derivation vhich gives the meaning of the object. Because teaching or the
means for that can produce the knovledge of everything only by producing
the knovledge of vhat is to be taught.
Furthermore, only vhen the derivation which gives the meaning of
the object is accepted is the sameness of meaning gained vith this
sentence: "indeed my dear, vhen the Self is seen, i.e. vhen it is heard,
reflected upon and knovn, all this is known" (Brh.4,5.6.) vhich is
located within another sacred text and vhich has this [meaning of the
object] as its purport. Because there, it is very clearly told that the
knovledge of everything is to be gained from the knovledge of an entity
in the form of the Self vhich is being taught. In accordance vith that,
431
the sameness of meaning in the manner that: the knowledge of everything
is to he gained from the knowledge of the Self, is logically possible
upon accepting that the Self is what is being taught by this [word]
"Through which" even in the Chandogya sentence: "Through which, what is
unheard.,," (Ch.6.1 .3.), Because only upon accepting that the word
"instruction" gives the meaning of the object is the recollection of the
entity in the form of the Self which is being taught gained by this
[word] "Through which". Not otherwise. And for this very reason, the
Mupd aka sacred text too: "Revered sir, when what is known does all this
become known?" (Mu.1.1.3.) is conformed to. Because there, only the
object of the knowledge which is the means for the knowledge of everything
has been asked: "when what is known?".
3,169.
4 wp ( &\o % \ { \ \
m { 3RRR * faTORR WrrRRT
iRR TO If 4# I
5 W4{ RdlNW-N KIR
TB | ^ FRBR FUTIBf HTO ! ftw
I * f| fkm wm\ Wl i H
fkm 1 to zpk w\ qif dro-
to'b urat ^«nfq h ci^r ^^rRwrfTO 7 ^ |
^ ?TOTR #T I FRTOtTOm; ^IR
f? I FRTOfTR RRIRTTO'TOR I 32-
IRsfq RTO^TKRdf tRJ JRqgRTT
SfUfq R- \ %$\ ^ l%R TORfll l <Rr
R^qqfc^i^^FFFT-^ I TO: (30 )
* q^V (|o h l O I r<t qqfar
v? 1 ^ 1 $ ) 1 ^
R'TOUT-NJTR'TBN RpsmRT ‘TOl-
3.169. [objection] Is the entire collection of things said by the words;
"heard", "thought" and "known", which is the object of the knowledge to
432
be gained., non-different or different from the Self which is the object
of the knowledge which is the means and which is indicated by the word
"which" here; "Through which, what is unheard becomes heard" (Ch.6.1.3.)?
If it is non-different, nothing whatsoever is taught by this sentence.
For nothing whatsoever is told when it is said: through the pot being
known, the pot is known.
But if it is different, then between two things which are mutually
distinct, by the knowledge of one the knowledge of the other is difficult.
For through the pot being known the cloth is not known. The same applies
to two things which, though mutually connected, are in reality different.
For when Devadatta is known his son is not known. Or when the [potter’s]
stick is known the pot is not known.
Even though when the stick is known as the cause of the pot the
pot becomes known as the effect of the stick, still, that knowledge does
not make known the essential nature of the thing. The knowledge which
makes known the essential nature is indeed said by the word "knowledge"
( vi.jnana ). The knowledge which makes known the essential nature [of a
thing] is the basis of all knowledge. Because without knowledge of the
essential nature there is no possibility of knowledge by having a
connection to another. Even when the stick is known as the cause of the
pot, the pot which is not known in its essential nature as having a
conch-shaped neck etc. cannot be known as the effect of the stick even
though it is seen right before the eyes. And in the sacred text it is
said: "[what is unknown] becomes known ( vijnata )". So too, the verbal
root vid ["to know"] only signifies the knowledge which makes known the
essential nature. Because it is seen in that manner in: "The one who is
omniscient and all knowing" (Mu.1,1.9.) and in; "The knower of Brahman
attains the supreme" (Tai.2.1.) etc. For this very reason, "all this is
known" (B^h.4,5.6.) is said in the B rhadaranyaka sacred text which was
previously cited [cf,, 3,168,]. Thus what is the scope of the sacred text:
433
"Through which, what is unheard,., 1 ' (Ch.6.1,3.)? Because even the
twofold alternative in the form of difference or non-difference between
the object of the knowledge which is the means and the object of the
knowledge to be gained cannot be stated.
3.170.
I i qqq
fqnfqq qir qrtqqqqrqqqqq I q^q^q qmqrq-
qqc? qq qrq^qfd 4 Tt qpftqsn q qqqqrqrqi^ I
frq: l tfqq*qqrqFqq: qqqqrr^^^q h q to
l wrw qqqqrir-
q^ri ^ptqrf^rqn^n qq^qqq , q HKqqt q wm
qqrfq q % q: l qqt qqiq qrRqTqrrqqqq ^q qwq^qr
qiqqqr qrqq qq qw^: *Rqq i r% 5 q^qqq I
qqi q espq ‘ qf%%?qq ( ^\° \ \ \ I y) ^qq^ I q^3-
qrqq ^TgfeqqTsfq ^q q*§q: qqfq ■qirrqR *qqq q qqqfqqr-
*qqq[ I jjrfq^q^qifq q?q?q qrqriqqqqqrqqqqr \ qqrqrr^^rqT 3 ^
t qfq^qq
qfrqr l
3.170. [reply] In this matter, it is said: everything, which is the
object of the knowledge to be gained and which exists in reality as
certainly non-different from the Self which is the object of the
knowledge which is the means, appears as different. Because of the
existence of the appearance as being different there is no meaninglessness
like there is for the sentence; through the pot being known, the pot is
known. The requirement of the meaning of the sentence concerning the
declaration which was told [i.e, "Through which, what is unheard..,"] is
only at the time of the appearance as being different, not after the
knowledge of reality.
Nor even is a defect said through the alternative of difference.
Since all things are in reality non-different from the Self, therefore
only the knowledge of the Self is the knowledge which makes known the
434
essential nature of all things such as a pot, cloth etc. Although
through the knowledge of the Self there is no knowledge of things like
a pot, cloth etc. in terms of the essential nature of the respective
object such as having a conch-shaped neck etc., still, there is no
defect. Because the essential nature of a pot as having a conch—shaped
neck etc., which appears as reality according to the ordinary view, is
not real in reality. But only the clay, which is the essential nature
of the pot, is real. Accordingly, it was said in the example: "the clay
alone is real" (Ch.6.1.4.). In accordance with that, in the subject
matter of the example too it has to be acknowledged that the essential
nature of every thing appearing now is not real. The reality of even
the essential nature which is clay is with regard to the pots etc. which
are its effects. But with regard to [its] cause, [clay] has no reality.
But the statement: "the clay alone is real" must be understood with
regard to the effects such as pots etc. in accordance with what is well
known.
3,171 • ^4 mz 1 J i ? U ) P qftnwsq:
( 5 l ^ i ?) i * swmf wr: wm\-
mvii %Tri^fr #( I '1't si \A Rq
\ nTiq I F Tf 'm I W^T-
kim: qfkrm: l wk i fs 3
mh I qrkmm 1 ^qq qqnq
f mi ! f *t4Hr qn^qqqsk I qqrk f|
wriq Tjsfq cgPcTi ftrj; I ff 4 ft
^3WIf %3 4^Rr egFci: qkiqqrqfqfkkqfaq l
3.171. When that is so, the meaning which was stated; "Through which,
what is unheard..." (Ch.6.1.3.), which has been rendered as a statement
having possibility by the sacred text having shown the examples of the
435
clay etc., is logically proved by this: "My dear, this was existence
alone in the beginning" (Ch,6,2.1.). But in the view of Ramanuja who
teaches in this manner; "the world is real, it is the body of the
supreme Self and it is different from the supreme Self" , even though
there is the logical possibility of grammatical apposition of the word
"existence" or the word "this" through implication in the sacred text;
"existence alone", the meaning which was previously stated ["Through
which, what is unheard becomes heard.,."] is not logically proved.
Because by the knowledge of the Self there is no possibility of the
production of the knowledge which makes known the essential nature of
the world. Nor even is there congruity with the examples of the clay
etc. For the pot is not the body of the clay.
Although according to the view of the exponents of non-duality
there is dissimilarity between the example and the subject matter of the
example in the manner; the world is not a transformation of Brahman.
Because Brahman is without change. But [the world] is an apparent
transformation. Pots etc., however, are transformations of clay.
Nevertheless, there is no impairment. Because the similarity between the
example and the subject matter of the example is not required in all
aspects. For if that was so, there could be no example at all about
anything. Because a similarity in all aspects occurs for itself [a] with
itself [a] alone, but not with another. But the example is required to
be similar in that aspect by reason of which one wants to teach it.
3. 1 72. ^ ^ ^
| VXmHl m 7TIHT-
436
STRPTOT TO TOJT m I h^t ^
S&3 I ^ <FR mTT VTOR'H Rft^-
w-HKpRprtM^ I ’pit to^tvtow <rcr mnn:
Hfrf^TTHTO J1H s^J ^#pkl^ i 3tm%TKTO% j
TOFTRnd H TOT I
3.172, But in the topic under consideration, the example is intended to
be told in this aspect: by the knowledge of one thing there is the
knowledge of everything. And the reason for that is the object of the
knowledge which is the means is real, whereas the object of the
knowledge to be gained is certainly unreal. Because the purport of the
sacred text in that manner is demonstrated very clearly by the sentence
connected with the word "alone"; "the clay alone is real". Thus in order
to show that; "the knowledge of the real portion belonging to the effect
is dependent upon the knowledge of the essential nature which is the
material cause belonging to that [effect]. Just as it is seen in the case
of clay and pots etc., so too, the knowledge of the real portion of the
world is dependent upon the knowledge of the material cause of the world"
the state prior to the origination of the world is shown by the sacred
text; "existence alone" for the knowledge of the material cause of the
world.
Regarding all the distinctions appearing in the world, the state
of the universal which is preceded by the removal of those [distinctions]
is in the form of pure "is-ness", which is the supreme limit of the
universal, and that is what is said by the word "existence". And that
alone is Brahman, in the form of pure existence free from distinction.
And by the word "alone" [in the sentence; "existence alone,.."] all
distinctions are removed. Hence this sentence certainly indicates Brahman
which is pure existence free from distinction. In whatever manner there
is the origination of the world, in that manner distinctions appear. So
Brahman possessing distinction is only in relation to a limiting adjunct.
437
The sentences [denoting] the possession of distinction teach that [i.e.
Brahman possesses distinction in relation to a limiting adjunct]. Thus
no sacred text whatsoever is contradicted.
3 ' 173 *
l ^ I w- 7 ^\ srcrrrati mv-w. i
wnw I ?rrq- I <^Hr
m FTW M<t(t J 4d11o^\%-
^ I «r u^r srrero
s4 j ^T ? 1T T$?t
^^TT^RTWWJ ^K' J , t ijv(^^T 3K*? dV-T
3.173. But some say: the material cause of the world said by the word
"existence" here: "existence alone" is only the subtle primary matter
which is in a state of unmanifest name and form. And by the word "alone"
there is the exclusion of the manifest name and form seen now. [reply]
That is not so. Because the word "existence" ( sat ) is brought about by
the affix satr [i.e, at] to the verbal root asa ["to be"]. The reason
for the usage of that [word "existence"] is [to signify] pure "is-ness".
But not a distinction of that [existence] in the form of unmanifest name
and form. It should not be said; "in the beginning" ( agre ) is said in
the sacred text. The meaning of that is; prior to origination. And at
that time, because of the mentioning of the word "in the beginning"
[as having the meaning]: "there was only indistinct name and form", there
is the understanding of the particular meaning of "unmanifest name and
form", [reason] Even so, there is no separation of manifest name and form
438
by the word "alone" [supra.]. Because this rule is established by
etymology; what is separated by the word "alone" is only what has not
been qualified by the attribute which determines the reason for the
use of the word connected to itself and that [what is separated] is
indeed connected by the word "also". Even in the understanding of a
particular brahman a such as Devadatta through the context etc. here:
"this one alone is a brahma na", Yajnadatta is certainly not separated
by the word "alone". Because he too is qualified by the attribute of
being a brahman a which determines the reason for the use of the word
" brahman a". Similarly, in the topic under discussion, because manifest
name and form is qualified by "is-ness" which determines the reason for
the use of the word "existence", how is there exclusion of that [manifest
name and form] by the word "alone" [in the sentence]: "existence alone"?
Thus the word "existence" signifies pure "is-ness" and so the sacred
text: "existence alone" is established as teaching Brahman free from
distinction.
3.174.
i m to * (30 ? ! ? 1 m I
3PJ <TTT W I m
I WRHW WT ^ *n>
fiwwi 1 ^ h#-
mm l!
I m 511^5 l^TWTRR
RRft \mm^\ mi
vm r rrt
439
RHPPf ^rRT W. 1 3W? HSTR H^T
R>$fa^4 §<foflrc^ mtfto w 5^f vm'ri <mnq qpf^R
ftfarpr I f^i i t^$ ^ra:q(R^f|-
^ \ ^rhcv I ^rh l i
; ^ hr qjiv^f rcfa$$H ^N% 1
3.174. The sacred text too: "Then there is the higher" (Mu.1.1.5.) only
teaches that Brahman is free from distinction. "Then there is the higher
[knowledge] by which that Imperishable is attained." Here, what is to he
gained by the higher knowledge is said as: "Imperishable". Imperishable
(akg ara ) means it does not perish (na kg arati ), i.e. it is indestructible.
Indestructibility is the reason for the use of the word "imperishable".
The meaning is; the absence of destruction. And so the mention of the
entity to be gained by the higher knowledge is firstly only by way of a
negative statement. On account of this, that entity is indicated to be
free from distinction.
Then, in the expectation: "of what nature is that entity?", [the
sage Angiras] says:
The wise behold that which cannot be seen, cannot be
grasped, which is without a source, without colour,
without eyes and ears, which has neither hands nor
feet, which is eternal, all pervasive, omnipresent,
extremely subtle and which is the source of [all]
beings (Mu.1 .1 .6,). ^9
"Cannot be seen" means that it is not within the scope of perception.
"Cannot be grasped" means that it is not within the scope of inference
etc., or that it is not within the scope of the organs of action. "Without
a source" means that it is without a name. "Without colour" means that it
is free from colour such as blue etc. "Without eyes and ears" means that
it is without the organs of knowledge, "Having neither hands nor feet"
means that it is without the organs of action. The organs of knowledge
440
are implied by the words "eyes and ears" and the organs of action are
implied by the words "hands and feet". So in the first two quarters [of
the verse] the entity to be gained is taught by way of negative statements
The procedure of the sacred text is to allude thus: although the
description of some entity by way of a positive statement which is done
in the manner: "such and such" is what makes known the essential nature
of the object as it is and the description by way of a negative statement
does not do so and hence only the description by way of a positive
statement is proper at the beginning, still, in the topic under discussion
the description of the entity to be gained by the higher knowledge is
certainly not possible, in reality, by way of a positive statement.
In the latter half, even though the description by way of a
positive statement appears at the outset in the third quarter [of the
verse]; "eternal", "all pervasive", nevertheless, the final conclusion is
only in the manner of a negative statement. "Eternal" means free from the
limitation due to time. "All pervasive" means free from the limitation
due to location. "Omnipresent" means free from the limitation due to
objects. On account of this, freedom from the three types of limitation
has been told. Therefore no attribute whatsoever is made known here by
way of a positive statement.
3.175. ^ ^
srewrnfts ^ j ^ttr rpr-
WHRg; i 3 *i
3^ iwi ^ t
l mmvkw. Kt <tri: \ ^gg^iRWR i
ftRWRR <TRRJ^ | ^TTT ‘W^fTRR: I V 4^T M spi^ R-
M i inti |tttRnTTI j
441
TOTO TOTOT^TO WTOTTOTO TO IW ^ ‘ TOTO *
< qfroTO ’ (tot: i totototo tototo toto \
^ 3 ‘ (toto toj to j -h tor’ pi witto, | ^totor-
yfafTO-TO I r'itoitcto v 4tn; qftqroftft totoh 3 ^ %to
^TOlt tR% I TO^TOTOTOTOTOlTTORTITOrTO^T^l
TO ^ TOS Rf#mm rcre^ l tor
i TOTOT ^TOTO feWTOpftT\ H RTOTO
(g°un^)
tt% to i%p^i tottor tttoto i wro to: tot;
$RTO T RR TON TTJRfTR TO i TO TO TOT pf^fW-
WSIRNtTOR ITO^ I
3.175. [objection] If freedom from distinctions such as the quality of
being visible etc. is told by: "cannot be seen" etc., then that entity
cannot indeed exist.
[reply] He says there; "extremely subtle”. The meaning is that
fictitiousness is not the reason for not being visible etc., but rather
extreme subtlety [is the reason]. Here too, the final conclusion is only
in an operation by way of a negative statement. Extreme subtlety is not
the direct reason for not being visible. But rather the absence of being
gross is invariably concomitant with not being visible. Because being
gross is the criterion for visibility. And so the purport of this;
"extremely subtle" is freedom from being gross.
[objection] Though the final conclusion is in the operation by
way of a negative statement here; "eternal, all pervasive", why has the
operation by way of a positive statement been accepted at the outset?
[reply] No. Because there is the acceptance of that [a positive
statement] in order to indicate this; the immediate apprehension of the
entity free from distinction is through the medium of the knowledge of
the Lord who possesses distinction. Because that [operation by way of a
positive statement] is possible with regard to the Lord who possesses a
limiting adjunct. He [the sage Angiras] shows this; "which is the source
442
of [all] beings 1 '. "The source of [all] beings" means the cause of the
■world. The purport is; what is seen by the wise as possessing distinctions
such as being the cause of the world etc., that entity, in reality, is
indeed free from distinction. "The wise" means those who are endowed with
steadiness. Steadiness is the firmness of intellect that; in this manner
there will be the immediate apprehension of the entity free from
distinction in due course. Having superimposed the distinction of being
the cause of the world etc., meditation upon the entity possessing
distinction is certainly the means for the immediate apprehension which is
free from distinction. And so there is no contradiction between these two;
"cannot be seen" and "they behold". Due to superimposition they see the
entity which, in reality, certainly cannot be seen. But it must not be
mistaken that; an entity free from distinction certainly does not at all
exist, [reason] Because there is contradiction with the sacred text;
"cannot be seen" etc. But the explanation; "the wise behold what cannot be
seen by the unwise" does not produce admiration in the mind. Because the
result is the loss of the natural flow of the sentence: "that which
cannot be seen, cannot be grasped, which is without a source" etc. Thus it
is established that the entity is free from distinction.
Even further on, an entity which is certainly free from
distinction is taught by way of negative statements in the sacred verse:
There is nothing higher and lower than which,
/ \ 1 40
there is no one smaller or greater than which (Mu, 1.1.7.).
Although this sacred verse is not seen in all books, nevertheless it is
certainly seen in some. And so it is established that the sacred text;
"Then there is the higher..." teaches that Brahman is free from
distinction.
. l
3.176
443
fRIHfcl *5T- I ^ ^
i^iqrfe'7^ ^ ( <{o V9^ ) |
^rsferawT^|friPtPhn&l ^ Hmpwr to w ^r wiw
^ Hig^r l ^ I ‘*% HTR»(^r° )
W TO^r ft I 'W^qro^TOT ^qin-
tos^ ^riq^TOr ^ ^ i rwi
WTFT^E#?
3
^ Bf^ror I sto ctft fq^rof ^im-MPr^m toNm-
l fa^wi pqiw?: ^Iwtopj^pt-
^rs: I
3.176. The sacred text too: "Brahman is real, Knowledge, limitless"
(Tai.2,1,1.) only relates to Brahman free from distinction. The nature
of being indestructible is the reason for the use of the word "limitless"
there. The meaning isj the absence of destruction. And it was certainly
told previously (3.55.) that a thing does not possess distinction
because of the absence [of an attribute]. There is no cognition of the
possession of distinction even on account of the word "real" ( satya ). To
explain. It was mentioned just previously (3.172.) that the word
"existence" ( sat ) has pure "is-ness" as its reason for use. Vhere there
is the supreme limit of the universal, it refers to such pure existence
free from distinction. This is correct. Because the sentence; "My dear,
existence alone" (Ch.6,2.1.) makes known the state prior to the world.
If the entity which has gained the state prior to the world, which is the
primary cause of the world, should possess distinction, then it is not
possible to be the primary cause. Because distinctions are preceded by
a universal, therefore the primary cause must be necessarily said as
free from distinction. But the possession of distinction cannot be stated
by "is-ness". If that was so, its distinction is indicated by the
universal, therefore in our view that [universal] alone can be expressed
by the word "is". Because among the things which indicate [existence],
this word "is" directly expresses the entity which is the universal of
444
everything.
comment
The statement* "among the things which indicate ( nirupaka )
[existence]", refers to expressions like: "the pot is", "the cloth is",
"the pot has existence" etc. In such statements, the pot is the
substantive ( vise g ya ) while existence is the qualifying attribute
( vise sana) which is universal to all the particulars such as pot and
cloth etc.
ft wi * g kprfjh. I ^ *
I ffrSRq
WffffrtqT^spJT q ^TTH FFWFWq-
^it qr (fo \m \<>) (v
?l?) qm 1
wm smtqr^fag tot im wc qti nrwr w #1^3 i
cFTT =q ^ I
3.177. The word "Brahman" too is exactly the same. "Brahman" has the
sense of "expanding". Expanding means pervading everything. Because the
distinctions are pervaded by the universal, not the universal by the
distinction. And so Brahman does not possess distinction even on account
of vastness. If vastness is a distinction, the universal which would
indicate such a distinction could not be pervaded by Brahman who is the
locus of vastness and thus Brahman has no possibility of pervading
everything.
The word "Self" is also the same. Because the etymological
derivation of the word "Self" is: the Self ( atman ) means "it goes" ( atati )
in the sense that "it pervades" ( vyapnoti ). The word "Brahman" and the
word "Self" are used by the sacred text only with this intention [i.e,
to denote that they pervade all distinctions and hence are free from
distinction] in the sentence which makes known the state prior to the
445
world; "This was indeed Brahman" (Bijh.l .4.10.), "This was indeed the
Self" (Ai.1.1.). When that is so, having commenced with: "The knower of
Brahman attains the supreme" (Tai ,2.1.1.), how could the sacred text:
"real, Knowledge" (Tai.2,1.1.) which is engaged to teach the definition
of such a Brahman, make known Brahman as possessing attributes? And so
the purport of the word "real" is only in the sense of: excluded from
what is unreal.
■3.178.
^ 1 wrni * > ( ^t° $ I l \ v ) I
Rlfo RTTfrm m? } fa ^ tfft-
qu^lOTT: *TOT-
mq; ymm miMiRURiif^T mm\
I %Rf,Rn?Rfs%'ir-cfTTrRrTf
ym I my ft ftrw^tT^|xt ym i 5 y
ft^TP^TRT RRRRF1 i R ^ %#
WR* rtd'J RRRTRR>
mim # R^dTRTRWTTsiq y ^w'kYRfiJ 1 ^mymy-
wzfati mfafa y myymy\( 3° y I U 1 tfH) ^ >
rir wr (Ro 30 R 1 UUc) ^ wrrtwit:
(#^To tjo %o\q q 0
3,178. Furthermore, if the word "real" makes known an entity qualified by
the attribute of being real, the result would be a contradiction. Indeed,
because the distinctions are mutually excluded, they are considered to be
false. Just as a pot, earthenware dish etc. are false with regard to the
clay which is their universal. And this is established by the sacred text
"the clay alone is real" (Ch.6,1.4,), And so if "being real" is a
distinction, then Brahman possessing distinction, who is qualified by
"being real" in that manner, can only be false. Thus the statement: "real
446
Knowledge" is contradicted.
Furthermore, if the word "real" makes known an entity possessing
distinction, then just as a human being is a particular type of living
being and is separated from another type of living being such as an
animal etc., so too, it must be told: real is a distinction of what? And
from which other distinction is it separated? If [you say] "being real"
is a distinction of existence, [we ask] from what other distinction of
existence is "real" excluded? For "real" is excluded from what is false.
But what is false is not another distinction of existence. Because what
is false does not exist. And so the universal of everything is what can
be said only as just: "it is" and that alone is real. So "being real",
which is invariably concomitant with pure "is-ness" , is only another
synonym for "is-ness". Hence just like the word "existence", the word
"real" too does not make known an entity possessing distinction. Tou
[Ramanuja] too have certainly accepted that the two words "is" and "real"
are synonyms when you said (3rT.B.Para.70.p.159.): "Here, "real" and
"unreal" (Vis.P.2.12.45.) is the conclusion of what was begun: "what is"
and "what is not" (Vi§ .P.2.12,38.)".
3.179.
^ ! frltw RTTW dTsgijRRW:
) I ^
^ f% fRdd Md Sd fRRd I dRIR R $ dftl%gFTRRT
I m ^ d dWd i |
ll ) ^WTR-RdT I d*IT tfTd Ufpsf SfRd^s^ dT $fdfd-
f^l %ffd 3 IRd^T ITRTWTt 5}"PJd dR
d 5 dT^JJ^dd'tRr^dRd jRT^HTd ^R^TTRdtddfFn:
ddTTdd *RdTd I m IRddd StSTRWTd fR d# d 3 g^^Wd
^ddT HR^ndd^ddd^d dldM ‘3rd IRddRWR R\%RT d^ddT-
| cR dRdd fd^dTdfRdURTdd^ | ?R gd^dl-
fra: I 37FT ft qhTTdRTd: dTdB$Tdd$fTdT ^1%
UVTo'O ^Td dTCIdsfRTdRP$d^ | ?1R#T TIWpIFM
| ¥T$q>pflR^ ^WT* R^T^IT^
3.179. The word "Knowledge" too does not make known an entity possessing
distinction. Because that -awareness which is free from object and
location- was previously demonstrated (3.78,79.) to he of the nature of
pure existence. Moreover, if the word "Knowledge" makes known an entity
possessing distinction, is Knowledge itself the distinction or Knowledge-
ness [i.e. the class of Knowledge, the .jati ] ? In the first case, the
cognition of the Self qualified by the distinction in the form of
Knowledge should occur from the word "Knowledge". And that is not possible
Because the affix lyu t^ ^ is not prescribed in the sense of an agent. But
-142
the statement of the author of the Vi g ayavakyadipika ; "the word
"Knowledge" (jnana) is &c_ [aj ending, among the class of words beginning
with arsas" does not conform to the letter of the sacred text. If that
was so, the sacred text would specify the word "knower" or the word
"possessing Knowledge".
But in the second case [i.e. if the class of Knowledge is the
distinction], in accepting the word "Knowledge" to mean the Knowledge
which is a quality ( gunabhuta.jnana ), the distinction in the form of
Knowledge—ness is in the Knowledge which is a quality but not in Brahman
whom you accept as the locus of such Knowledge which is a quality. So the
cognition of Brahman possessing distinction is not possible from the
word "Knowledge". But if [you say]: the Knowledge which is the essential
nature of Brahman ( svarupabhutam ,jSana ) is what is understood by the word
"Knowledge", not [the Knowledge] which is a quality of Brahman, [we reply]
If that is the case, the word "Knowledge" would certainly be meaningless.
Because what Ramanuja has intended [by the word "Knowledge"] is ($rx,B,
448
There is a single definition of Brahman consisting of
the group of three words, having connected: "real,
Knowledge, limitless". There, the word "Knowledge"
has the meaning of Knowledge which is always
uncontracted. On account of that, there is the
exclusion of the liberated souls. Because prior to
the state of liberation, the liberated souls have
only contracted Knowledge. Hence there is the
exclusion of them.
But in accepting the word "Knowledge" to mean Knowledge which is the
essential nature, there cannot be an exclusion of the liberated souls.
Because even in the state of being bound there is no contraction of the
Knowledge which is the essential nature. But if the Knowledge which is
the essential nature is accepted as having contraction and expansion,
then the self would be liable to change and the result is the defect of
non-eternity etc.
comment
The context of the statement; "the affix lyut is not prescribed in
the sense of an agent" is that if the word Knowledge ( jnana ) makes known
an entity possessing distinction and if the word Knowledge is itself the
distinction, then the word Knowledge should make known that entity as
qualified by the distinction in the form of Knowledge, i.e, as possessing
the attribute of knowership. Abhyankar states that the word "Knowledge"
does not denote knowership. The affix lyuf ( ana )’' ^ in the formation of
the word ,jfiana ( jna + ana - jnana) is used in the sense of the verbal
root ( bhave ); "what is known is knowledge" ( jnayate iti jnanam ) or in the
sense of the instrument of an action ( karag a): "knowledge is what is
known through which" ( .jnayate anena iti .jnanam ), However the affix is not
specifically prescribed in the sense of knowership,
3 ‘ 180,i ^ Mn ^
449
I * f| sT^F^MT^ l%t%-
qft *pw%, H q inwT, qpqfaqift *r qqqqrcnwi *qi^ i
^ I —'^r*I ft ^ftsFirra*
qqFf I i q^T ^ nTMM^? 9 ^»
V3
^rnrffot nr qqiq q^fr^m^r jfa strs*? ^thr
^^ qs^n<mn^i?r^: m^i rht i qq nriri%
q^rq fWf ^ I q*q q n wriq qpq%-
sfrn qRiq q^qkr^qRq tth ^hpt rw^w nrirfn
i%qq I qq q*q ^qfq^rqrc I qmq Riq^mq r^-
qfq%wqft?^qm pfwq^qqTqfq$q RTqqq wth nr<qV j -rrn-
rt-
'■sR^qpr qq \ qrn q qq ^5 twpt% gRR ^wr h-
#sq nqf^ l q^ 3 wqf ^qmm q wriq* *nq qpr^Tq-
qqrcfq ^Wq%wm^snq^^’niFRn qrqq;qq 1
3.180, However according to the view of the non-dualists, there are three
definitions in the sentence "real" etc.: Brahman is real, Brahman is
Knowledge, Brahman is limitless. Although this sentence "real" etc.
teaches a single meaning through grammatical apposition according to the
express sense, still, the purport of this sentence is understood as
teaching a threefold definition. Otherwise, if there is accomplishment
by one word, the other two would be meaningless. There is certainly
nothing whatsoever which is real which is distinct from Brahman, nor
[anything] in the form of Knowledge, nor [anything] imperishable: on
account of which the group of three words must have meaning,
[objection] Vhat is the reason for espousing more than one
definition?
[re ply] Because a definition at some place [i.e, in some instance]
excludes and at some place it brings about an accurate determination of
the essential nature. For example, when it is said: "Caitra, bring the
cow", Devadatta who has heard that and who sees the cow brought by Caitra
and for this reason knows: "this animal can be expressed by the word
450
'cow' ", could still have the idea of a cow in another animal on account
of similarity in being a quadruped etc. There, the definition which is
made; "a cow possesses a dewlap etc." excludes another animal. And for a
person who has no knowledge at all of an individual cow, the definition
is made: "a cow possesses a dewlap etc," for the knowledge that; "this
animal can be expressed by the word 'cow* ", That [definition in the
second instance] brings about an accurate determination of the essential
nature for that person. Even though excluding too brings about an
accurate determination of the essential nature and the accurate
determination of the essential nature is what excludes and so this
twofold difference is not mutually unconnected, nevertheless, the twofold
purpose in the form of exclusion or conventional expression [i.e.
definition], which is intended in espousing the definition, is certainly
mutually free from confusion. And so where the accurate determination of
the essential nature is principally intended in espousing a definition,
even espousing more than one definition is certainly correct. Because
there is greater facility [in understanding] on account of that. In regard
to the topic under discussion, Brahman can in no way be comprehended
through perception since Brahman has no form etc. and so espousing more
than one definition for the accurate determination of its essential nature
is certainly meaningful.
l ere
<£o ^ qo $ ) I WIT-
T T° ^ I ‘ wn-
451
^44 rithwfrto ^{%rcfq*r 4 ^tf^rarcii rot *<ri^OT 1
SOTRT^IROTnt^ i ROTlt ^RRlf^R^ HRFOTR^’ (
^o C\l\\3\ ) ^Trf ^ ITRFOTOTtWT ‘ ^4 df* RtOT T
sOT^rt | ^ wotrir
47TOT3 Rp^iTT ^RTROTOTRTrH l ^ I 3 £*4 if ft 4. d nr4t
rtwri#otrrr¥tit% yidwsf:’ ^ott ^rFr-
4^r*rr444 rottotr Rteq; t tr ^ ^4 hotr^j^r-
II ^ II
3.181. But what has been said (£rT,B.Para.48.p.89f.):
Grammatical apposition means the reference [of several
terms] to a single object with a difference of reason
for the application [of the several terms to the one
thing]. A difference of reason for the application of
the words in the very same object must necessarily be
admitted because of the primary meaning of the words
"real", "Knowledge" etc. [as denoting qualities] or
because of being opposed to what is contrary to those
particular qualities [i.e. opposed to "unreal" etc.].
That is not so. Because grammatical apposition is without an authority
in respect of a rule involving the difference of reason for application.
Establishing Brahman as possessing distinction on account of the
attributes such as "real" etc. is certainly hard to be stated, because
the purport of the words "real" etc. has been told just above to be in
the sense of; "excluded from what is unreal" etc. It was also certainly
demonstrated previously (3.95., also 3.55.) that because exclusion is in
the form of absence, in no way is there a possession of distinction due
to that [exclusion].
But what has been said (&ri.B.Para.48.p.90.);
The grammarians say that grammatical apposition is
452
the reference of words, which have different reasons
1 46
for their application, in the one object.
That is not so. Because in the jjabdendusekhara , the foremost among
grammarians, Nagojxbha^a, has very clearly refuted grammatical
apposition as involving a difference in the reason for the application
[of the words]; "Grammatical apposition only produces the knowledge which
has a single object as the thing to be distinguished, it is not the basis
for the difference of reason of application [of several terms to the one
thing]"J ^
The author of the Tyakaranamahabha g ya has given the counter
illustration; "0 Aghnye, goddess Sarasvatl" for this [word]; "expressing
a common property" in the sutra ; "A preceding vocative, when it expresses
a common property, is not to be considered as if non-existent for the
purpose of the subsequent vocative which stands in apposition with the
former" (P.S.8.1,73.). Because "Aghnye" etc. are synonyms there is no
difference of reason for their application and therefore in the way you
[Ramanuja] said there is no grammatical apposition and so upon the
occurrence of the deficiency of two members there must be incongruity of
the commentary relating to the counter illustration. In that place,
Kaiyata too has accepted grammatical apposition even in the absence of
a difference of reason for application when he said; "because synonyms
too have grammatical apposition, a grave accent is the result on account
of the negation of possessing non-existence".^® Thus the sacred text;
"real, Knowledge" is established as teaching an entity which is free from
distinction.
comment
Ramanuja maintains that grammatical apposition ( samanadhikaranya )
requires a difference of reason for the application of each word.
Abhyankar controverts this view by showing that grammatical apposition
primarily means the reference of the words to a single locus.
According to Ramanuja, the words "real", "Knowledge" and "limitless"
453
should be understood in their primary sense as denoting the attributes of
1 51
Brahman. Advaitins, however, consider that these words define Brahman
through implication ( lak gapa). Implication is only applicable when the
express sense is not logically tenable and Advaitins hold that such is
the case with regard to the words "real", "Knowledge" and "limitless".
The word "real" primarily signifies something existing, however there is
no existing object which is limitless. If it is said that space is both
real and limitless, space nonetheless does not have the nature of
Knowledge. The word "Knowledge" primarily signifies mental states and the
latter have both a beginning and an end and they are limited in terms of
a division between the knower and the known object. Hence Knowledge is
neither real nor limitless. On account of such contradiction in the
express meaning, Advaitins maintain that the statement; "Brahman is real,
Knowledge, limitless" can only be understood through the implied meaning
of the words. For an explanation of the implied meaning, see the comment
to 3.47., final paragraph.
3.182. '■N rv *s r*
3.182. The sacred text [teaching] "without a second"
certainly does not allow the possession of
duality, through any attribute whatsoever, in
the supreme Self who is pure existence. 17.
3.183.
WT R 1 31%^ ’ (
’ (
i W ft—
^ ^ mmj (^t° ^ R 1 3) # ft
1 %i wfmt sni: i
f^Ntsi to 1
mx$R\ 1 zmvgi ^ I
454
3.183. Because Brahman is indeed free from distinction, it is established
as being without a second. But if there is the possession of a distinction,
the sacred text: "without a second" (Ch.6.2.1.) would be contradicted
since a distinction, which is a second thing, exists. But what has been
said (^rT,B.Para.49.p.91.):
because the word "without a second" aims at
teaching the union with various powers for
Brahman, who is the material cause of the
world, by denying another ruler distinct from
Himself.
That is not so. Because this meaning does not conform to the commencement
[of the topic]. To elaborate. The proposition was introduced: "Through
which, what is unheard becomes heard, what is not thought becomes thought
of, what is unknown becomes known" (Ch.6.1,3.). The meaning there is not:
some thing which is unheard becomes heard. If that was so, would a
particularity, a thing, be said by this proposition? Because even though
there is no possibility of the knowledge of cloth etc. through the
knowledge of clay, there is the possibility of the knowledge of some things
such as pots and earthenware dishes etc. Therefore the meaning must be
said as: all that is unheard becomes heard through which. But things such
as clay etc. are not like this. Because there is no possibility of the
knowledge of all things through the knowledge of that.
3.184. ^ ^
?Tqi q^Rqq sri q I
sqqqq qrqiiqfcq: i qqtKMtq qqqiq i ^
qqjUTqq
l mi quqtqisqqr ftqRfaq; qrqr I qqi
qrq^iq: qqqRTH: | qq qqq^^qqRq
q FRqqq HRqq m q^^Rf-
v*\\ i £tqg^q qr %p qiwifaqqqTiqqTq q
^ t ^^sFnrqftqiq i qff *nqqqqr qqqftr^q mm
m I q qr qterqf qfqq^qq qiqiqr q^q
455
?R \ 3 JpTSPri WT I
#T sTR W<T | W ^ *JT%%c*R r ' !
i
3.184, Similarly, the meaning of the word "which" here in the proposition:
"Through which" is to be understood as some thing which is one alone, not
more than one. In accepting more than one, just like before, some thing
previously unknown could not be said here. Because there is the possibility
even with regard to clay etc. It is certainly well known that by the
knowledge of clay, the knowledge arises about its modifications such as
pots, earthenware dishes etc., and that by the knowledge of thread, the
knowledge arises about its modifications such as cloth. Therefore nothing
additional would be said by this proposition. And so the meaning of the
proposition is established as: through the knowledge of the one thing,
there is the knowledge of everything.
There [in the previous sentence], by the word "knowledge" here;
"through the knowledge of the one thing" and by the vord "knowledge" here:
"there is the knowledge of everything" the knowledge which is certainly
real is to be understood, not [knowledge] which is common to what is
unreal. If that was so, because the knowledge which is unreal is based
upon a defect, there could be no mention of a supramundane meaning in the
proposition. And because there is conformity with the examples of the
clay etc. Because when clay is known as composed of cotton there is no
possibility of the knowledge of a pot as composed of clay. Or when clay
is known as clay there is no possibility of the knowledge of a pot as a
piece of cloth. But when clay is known as clay there is the knowledge of
a pot as clay. And so the very clear mention is seen there by the word
"real" in the manner: "the clay alone is real".
comment
The "knowledge which is certainly real" means the pure awareness
which persists in all knowledge'and is therefore real. The knowledge
456
"which is common to what is unreal" refers to the knowledge which is
qualified by an object. Such knowledge is unreal because it is based upon
the defect of Ignorance ( ajnana ). Only the knowledge which is the basis
of all knowledge, i,e> awareness as such, is in agreement with the
supramundane meaning of the proposition: "through the knowledge of the
one thing, there is the knowledge of everything".
In reference to the examples of clay and cotton, the meaning is that
unless you know clay you cannot know what is made of clay, When the cause
is not known as it is, there is no true knowledge of the effects. When
the cause is correctly known there is no false knowledge regarding the
effects but only the true knowledge of the effects.
-3.185.
qqft qfqqrqr: q*qr qfa-
qreqr sqrqi: l ^t% f| ^q^q qRn^qq i
qm qz^q inwRqq; I & qz^q^r qrqfrt rcqq^nf^qr^t
qq^qT qz*q qzRq \ qz*wqfqqqr qzH^qr-
ftqqrreqqnqrqm l q% qr?q qz^q qz^r ^rqqfq q^q
^qrq I qzi?q%: qFqzqriirM q q^rn^q f^qq?qi^ I qf%qi#q
HRqfq ^K«iH^q^pnq^qi^qqq sqnq^q^ i
3.185. Although since clay has no absolute reality even the knowledge of
that [clay] as being clay is only unreal, still, those examples are
mentioned having recourse to conventional reality in accordance with
ordinary cognition. Because in the world, reality is recognized in
different degrees. The knowledge of a pot as a piece of cloth is unreal.
Because the nature of cloth in regard to a pot is impermanent since it
only remains as long as there is a defect. With regard to that, the
knowledge of a pot as a pot is real. Because with regard to the nature of
the cloth, the nature of the pot continues at a later time. But even such
a knowledge of a pot as a pot is certainly unreal with regard to the
knowledge of the pot as the nature of clay. Because with regard to the
nature of the pot, the nature of the clay continues at a later time.
457
For the nature of the clay remains prior to the origination of the pot
and subsequent to the destruction of the pot. Even the knowledge [of clay]
as clay would be certainly unreal with regard to the knowledge of the
nature of its cause. That is another thing.
3.186.
Xl *)l -mwn I jiftc^rr^^r-
*pRRR i are ^
W < ifhf f£r m i ?r r ijr r
^TRfg JRTbTrf^RT \
FRR ^^RRIFIRT sRRFR
I ORT SRFT RFRRR |
3.186. It was indeed previously mentioned (3.171.) that having shown
this proposition to be a statement which has possibility through the
examples of the clay etc., for the subsequent proving of that [proposition]
it is said: "My dear, this was existence alone in the beginning, one
alone, without a second". This is the intended meaning; here, the state
prior to the world is made known. The material cause is indeed the state
obtained prior [to the wor Id]. That very [material cause], obtaining
another state, is the effect. And by the knowledge of the material cause
the knowledge of the real portion belonging to the effect is easily
gained (cf. , 3.172.). In accordance with the meaning previously stated,
the single entity understood by the word "which"; "Through which", forming
part of the proposition ["Through which, what is unheard" etc.], is said
by the word "existence". Similarly, every object, which is what is
understood by this: "what is unheard becomes heard", is comprehended by
the word "this". And that which is gross or subtle, near or remote,
capable of perception etc. or incapable of it, is to be understood as
458
indeed everything [referring to the previous sentence]. Otherwise there
would be the failure of the proposition, because what is not understood
[by the word "this"] is not said to be the effect of existence here [in
the sentence: "My dear, this was existence alone.,,"] and therefore
there is no possibility of the knowledge of that through the knowledge
of Brahman. And because without authority there is no proof for a
restriction [in the meaning].
3.187.
| I —
^ 3 | f^rq^n^qf|tjj I WHf
\ K c7%: qrqTT|q^rm^ | <r*r? *Tn^q%:
^ l are
qpiifqd: | Trf^fd ^THHirq^^q
fapntm vi4l<(H$Kui^ q i ftmS'R'-V-hKiTqi^HlFH-
*FRTffa: |
<*S ^
trtirt RprcpT$rc«iqT?: jRqirqrF: i ^ q q^rr^T^T
I
3.187. The word "this" presents the subject here. The word "existence"
presents the predicate. Because it is connected with the word "alone".
That has been told;
The word "that" and the word "alone" ( eva ) would
be the distinctive mark of the predicate.
The two words "one", "without a second" relate to the predicate. There
too [in reference to those two words], the subject is only what is
expressed by the word "this". Not what is expressed by the word "existence".
Because the predicate, which is conceived as being the subject, is not
459
authoritative. Although being one and being without a second, which are
enjoined with reference to pointing out the meaning of the word "this" ,
resolve only in the meaning of the word "existence" on account of making
known the identity of the meaning of the word "this" with the meaning of
the word "existence"; ">fy dear, this was existence alone", still,
according to the expressed sense the meaning of the word "existence" is
not established as the subject there. And "in the beginning" ( agre ) is
also connected to the threefold predicate.
(a) This world was existence alone prior to origination, (b)
Similarly, this world was one alone prior to origination, (c) So too,
this world was indeed without a second prior to origination. In the first
sentence, the teaching of an existent cause is established through the
refutation of the teaching of Emptiness. And existence is established
as the material cause on account of the designation through grammatical
apposition; "this [was] existence". In the second, the teaching of a
single cause is established through the refutation of the teaching of
multiple causes. In the third, by this; "without a second" the teaching
that the cause is free from distinction is established through the
refutation of the teaching that the cause possesses distinction. Thus the
cause is established as being free from the threefold differences.
3.188.
i m\<
dfwj— !
ddrald d d d d |
Mdh d d d f%I%d d dddi ddd ( ct-dro I
3,188, It should not be said that; "a second" is only by means of
460
something similar to oneself, but not on account of some attribute
belonging to oneself. So how is there an exclusion of the difference
belonging to oneself through the word "without a second"? [reason]
Because the possession of a second is seen even through something
belonging to oneself in: "accompanied by a sword he followed the Pandava"
"when my father, together with a bow, bears the brunt of the battle, what
is the occasion for fear?" (VenTsam.3.7.) etc. The declaration of the
exponents of non-duality that; the word "without a second" does not allow
the possession of a second even due to a quality, is only based upon this
The absence of the threefold difference is shown in the Te jobinduffa nissad
also:
There can be no threefold difference for me;
there is nothing whatsoever belonging to the
same class as me, there is no member of
another class anywhere for me and there is no
internal [difference] whatsoever for me (Tejo.3.47.).
3.189.
^ FTR 1 ^%RHRfT ft TOUR
toto I ^ rR l m
TO m cR I ^ ft ^^TRR *12-
m to^ i
fftror i ^ f
W uro ^nj wm \ i m *?2t
T(TO TO fPR TOR 1 HR-
rr i rto ft ^ toh \ fs-
to ^ ftTOTO m
TO ^ WRWTOJTO TORR ^ to?* I
RTO ^R'RTOTOTO ^RTFTOTOT-
461
Rrm: i
farm: i ^ i
3.189. There would be failure of the proposition in the teaching of
Emptiness, in the teaching of only an efficient cause, in the teaching
of multiple causes and in the teaching of a cause possessing distinction.
Because the proposition of the knowledge of everything through the
knowledge of the one is established only when, with regard to the mere
effect, one without distinction is the material cause. Not otherwise.
In the teaching of Emptiness, a cause which is a positive entity indeed
does not exist, so how is there knowledge of the one? The knowledge of
everything through [knowing] that is far removed. Similarly, if that
[one to be known] is only the efficient cause, how is there the knowledge
of everything through that? Because the knowledge of a pot does not arise
through the knowledge of a [potter's] stick. So too, in the teaching of
multiple material causes, how is there the knowledge of everything through
the knowledge of a single cause which is included in such multiple causes?
Because a pot made with multiple metals such as gold, silver, copper etc.
cannot be known through the knowledge of the single [metal] gold. Or pots
made separately with those metals cannot be known through the knowledge
of the single [metal] gold.
Similarly, there can be no establishment of the proposition even in
the teaching that the cause possesses distinction. Because a thing which
possesses distinction can be said to be "like this" [a] on account of that
distinction. And because being like this [a] is contrary to being like
that [b], something else which is like that [b] must be necessarily
admitted to be a thing. If the thing like that [b] is the cause with
reference to some effect, the knowledge of the thing like that [b] and its
effect is hard to be gained through the knowledge of the thing like this
[a]. So the previously proposed knowledge of everything is not accomplished
462
By this: ’’one alone" there is the removal of the difference which
has another cause as its counter correlate, which belongs to the one
cause and is included in that and which results through the supposition
of multiple causes. Whereas by this: "without a second" there is the
removal of the difference belonging to the cause even though it has a
counter correlate which is not active. And that [removal] is even for
the difference belonging to oneself, in the way that was told.
comment
A pot, for example, has
stick used in fashioning the
the idea of multiple causes,
idea of difference belonging
which does not have anything
many causes such as the pot maker, the
pot, etc. The statement: "one alone" removes
The word; "without a second" removes the
to the cause which is "not active" i.e.
to do with causality.
3.190.
^ 3 ^
I ^TOTT ij^WT
i qew 3&3-
^ ^ c
to hr sit-
TOkm: I ga*?-
xm sng<nri^ ^ 11 {v 11
3.190, When it is so established, wise people should certainly ascertain
that if, according to the statement of Ramanuja, the word "without a
second" aims at teaching the union with various powers, how is the
knowledge of such powers applicable for the establishment of the
proposition? Or how could there be the failure of the meaning which was
proposed if there is ignorance of such powers?
Furthermore, according to the view of the Visiftadvaitins who
think that the whole world consisting of the elements and elementals is
real, the knowledge of all things is certainly difficult to be gained
463
through the knowledge of the entity expressed hy the word "existence".
And there is incongruity with the example: even when clay is known as
the nature of clay, the knowledge of a pot as having the nature of
potness is certainly difficult to be gained. But according to the view
of the Advaitins who are the exponents of falsity in the manner: "a pot
is certainly unreal as having the nature of potness", when clay is known
as the nature of clay, the knowledge of a pot as the nature of clay —
which is real with regard to the nature of a pot- is easily gained and
so there is congruity with the example. And there is establishment of
the proposition; through the knowledge of the pure existence which is the
cause of the world the knowledge of the existence-portion which is the
reality in the world is easily acquired. So what has been previously
demonstrated should certainly not be forgotten.
3.191
3.191
mi men
Statements about qualities are seen in the sacred
texts, traditions and legendary histories. The
purport of those [statements referring to qualities]
is indicated elsewhere in the same sacred texts etc. 18,
3 . 192 ,
*r<j ‘ ft rrsti: * 5 : > (
4 w i Wf 1 * 8 1
h ft mm m asr-
vwm m 1 ^ ^ ) 1
^ ‘ r^r^: i
Rndrr ^rr^r 1^ } (sftoTo
X v) i rI^wr i w
m l 3 ^ 1 : <r
diR 1 w<f\ r
RR3RRR 3RRI^T R<RR-
464
*
i
l fa ^fa ufa ^rc°i-
m 7 ^ ^ I q^ 1 f^tri^T^ sn^fa^lfa^ ’ ( 9 AW Q
^o qo <RJflfa ( <jo ^ qo \c ) c^SHl^ I
vm wfa * .q: *fe 1 ( 3° U ! IM
^q; q^Tfar: ( q° 5? q° y ) ^qrifa^-
3^TR"T *npTT ^ifr sng^Rf ( ijo qo ^ ) | ^qT i
( 1° VD ) ^PTR^ I
3,192, But what has teen said (£rI.B.Para.49.p.91 .) :
Indeed, if there is the negation of everything
[by the word "-without a second"], [qualities]
such as eternity etc., which you accept, must
be negated.
That is not so. Because it is the desired conclusion. For the exponents
of mava do not accept any positive attribute whatsoever in Brahman.
"Eternity" is only the absence of possessing origination and destruction.
It was demonstrated previously (3,55.) that there is no possession of
a distinction due to the absence [of possessing a quality].
But what has been said (£rI.B.Para,49,p.91 ,92.):
The maxim that all the recensions [of the Veda]
teach the same meaning^ ^ has a contrary result
for you. Because it is the reason for bringing
together here [in the sentence "existence alone.,."]
qualities such as omniscience etc. which are
connected with the cause [of the world] in all the
recensions.
That is questionable. Brahman, who is accepted as the cause, is in
reality indeed free from distinction. Even causality is only superimposed
there [in regard to Brahman], Because it is our established position that
even qualities such as omniscience etc., which are applicable for such
causality, are only superimposed there [in Brahman], And so how does
the maxim that all the recensions [of the Veda] teach the same meaning
465
have a contrary result here? Because even in bringing together qualities
■which are superimposed, there is no negation in reality of the nature of
being free from distinction. On the contrary, according to that maxim,
Brahman being free from distinction is certainly recognized to be a fact
everywhere in the sentences [which teach] a cause.
But what has been said (^rl.B.Para. 49 .p.92 , ;
a statement [teaching] freedom from qualities
relates to the qualities which are to be given
up as they pertain to prakrti [i.e, "nature"].
That has indeed been answered before (3,49.). It has also been previously
stated (3.48.) that the sacred texts beginning with; "The one who is all
knowing" (Mu.1.1.9.) which are shown (£rT.B.Para.49.p.92.) to teach the
qualities such as knowership etc. in Brahman, are employed as connected
with qualities which pertain to a limiting adjunct. Otherwise, there
would be contradiction with the sacred text: "free from qualities" (Cu.7.)
3.193.
^ 1 4 fWt
c I HH) (13
I ^ to i i
1 Rtrrft di ^ i%i%n \
™ =q gdifq^n m I <??n
^ 5 tJ iMq^fd'TFfq:^cTR(
466
3.193. But what has heen said (3rl.B.Para.50.p.93.);
This sacred text (Ch.8,1.5.) certainly distinguishes
the scope of the statements [teaching] freedom from
qualities and the statements [teaching] the possession
of qualities. Having negated the qualities which must
be given up beginning with "who is free from sin" and
ending with "who is without thirst", it enjoins
auspicious qualities for Brahman; "whose desire is
true", "whose resolve is true". So because there is no
contradiction between the statements [teaching]
possession of qualities and freedom from qualities,
it must not even be suspected that one of the two
depends upon an object which is false.
That is incongruous. For you accept that the sacred text:
[This is the Self], who is free from sin, ageless,
without death, without sorrow, who is without
hunger and thirst, whose desire is true, whose
resolve is true (Ch.8.1.5.)
distinguishes the scope of the statements [teaching] the possession of
qualities and freedom from qualities. There, the scope of the sacred text
[teaching] freedom from qualities is shown by the part beginning with
"who is free from sin" and ending with "who is without thirst". The scope
of the sacred text [teaching] the possession of qualities is shown by
the part; "whose desire is true", "whose resolve is true".
That is not possible. Because sin, old age, death etc. are not
known anywhere as being a quality. It is also not correct that the scope
of the sacred text [teaching] the possession of qualities is shown by;
"whose desire is true" etc. Because the sacred texts [teaching] the
possession of qualities do not enjoin qualities keeping the general quality
in the forefront through words such as "possessing qualities", "the
467
possessor of qualities" etc. But [they enjoin qualities] keeping the
particular quality in the forefront such as knowership, divinity,
lordship etc. You too have certainly specified those [sacred texts]. In
"whose desire is true...", only particular qualities are taught such as
the nature of true desire etc. And so vise people must indeed ascertain:
hov is there a demonstration of an object [of worship] for the sacred
texts teaching particular qualities through a sacred text which teaches
other particular qualities?
comment
Abhyankar firstly argues that statements such as "who is free from
sin" etc. cannot denote freedom from qualities since sin, old age, death
etc. are not accepted as qualities of the Self.
Abhyankar then argues that the sacred texts denoting qualities do
not state in a general manner that Brahman "possesses qualities" ( sagu na)
or is the "possessor of qualities" ( gunavan ). For if that was so,
qualities could be connected to such statements in the same way as one
could say; "think of Mr. X. endowed with these virtues". But the sacred
texts denote only particular qualities such as "knowership", "divinity"
etc. If for the purpose of worship, the divinity mentioned in the text:
"That divinity reflected" ( seyam devataik g ata ) (Ch.6,3.2.) is connected
with qualities such as "whose desire is true" ( satyakamah ) (Ch.8.1.5.)
then there are just two sets of statements denoting particular qualities.
Abhyankar argues that the object of worship is not revealed by merely
stating the qualities.
3 - 194 - ^
(j® TOwiwi mm-
1 m rwt 3R I Rt%qr
. RTP-R 1TR q I
fRR^nr i * 1 (#qio
l ° ) 5*$*l ^ ^ clRft flipi-
^ i
468
3.194. Furthermore, the nature of true desire etc. taught by the sacred
text; "whose desire is true, whose resolve is true" are not inherent
qualities of the Self, Because the sacred text itself clearly tells that
desire etc. are particular modifications of the mind:
Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith,
steadiness, lack of steadiness, shame, intelligence
and fear; all this is only the mind (Brh.1.5.3,).
Knowership too is only a particular modification of the mind. Because
Knowledge [i.e. cognition] is denoted by the word "intelligence". And so
it is indeed correct that the sacred text* "Desire, resolve..." certainly
brings about the non-contradiction between the statements [teaching]
freedom from qualities and the statements [teaching] the possession of
qualities. Here, the Knowledge possessing a locus and an object is a
particular modification of the mind. But the Knowledge without an object
and a locus is indeed the essential nature of the Self, So on no account
does the Self possess qualities. Bliss too is only a particularity of
Knowledge. You also have certainly accepted this when you said (£rI.B.
Para.51.p.97.): "Because Knowledge which is itself agreeable is said to
be bliss". And so Brahman does not possess a quality even on account of
that [bl iss].
•3.195
( to \ I V M )
\ (sfroTo ^ qo ^ )
■3.195. But what has been said (^rl.B.Para.50,p.94.);
This sacred text; "He who knows the bliss of
Brahman" (Tai.2.9.1.) tells with great attention
469
that Brahman has limitless auspicious qualities.
The purport of that [text] is that the attention to the qualities of
Brahman is made known, because having not said: "He who knows Brahman"
it is said: "He who knows the bliss of Brahman". But just by this, bliss
is not established as a real quality of Brahman. When a woman's clothes
are worn by a man, although the spectators are engaged in looking on with
great attention, he is seen as only relating to a limiting adjunct.
■3.196.
^ ssnm vwvm (1° r I ? I O
ftqfsRT sRRlT I
<n<qqq;
5i?3«iFEi^^r x^& 1 (wn* T°
. ^ ? ) x^ l m ^
cn^npiTRr si^t I 3^3
^ I f } xfo !
^ H I WV*\ 5^1T-
PT^rsft h tpiT wi w: 1 gSrafai nn^TRi
I WT W I * 3
TiRRR f#H5 i W* HMq- ?T WTFWR RRFRTiq URT-
‘ 3.196, But what has been said (^ri.B.Para,50.p.94.);
The statement making known the result of the knowledge
of Brahman: "He attains all desires, together with the
wise Brahman" (Tai.2.1,1.) tells that the supreme, wise
Brahman has limitless qualities, [the prose order is]
vipascita brahma pa saha sarvan kaman asnute . "Desires"
are [the objects] longed for, i.e, the auspicious
qualities. The meaning is that he attains, together with
Brahman, all the qualities of that [Brahman],
That is questionable. Concerning this, what is this word which directly
expresses qualities? Or how is there a connection of such qualities with
470
Brahman? The word "desire", however, is not conventionally used in the
sense of qualities. Xou too have certainly accepted this by showing the
etymological connection: "Desires ( kamah ) are [the objects] longed for
( kamyante )", When the etymological connection is kept in the forefront,
the word "desire" does not directly express qualities in the sense of
qualities. Even in the denotation of qualities in the form of what is
desirable, qualities certainly cannot be accepted here. Because it is
possible for objects of enjoyment to be desirable [things] other than
qualities. For this very reason, [qualities] are not even able to be
postulated here. Because the universal is postulated through a distinction
but not distinctions through the universal. Although there is a rule that
there is no universal without a distinction, still, it cannot be
ascertained by the universal that "so and so is indeed the distinction
there".
3 - 197 ' tpi ^ ^ TPHT nwm
fwr: I h ir ^ **r*#^i i
^ vrrq^ i RtWTWtfRT-
I % I 1% ^
wm i f% g yni: 1 ^ wr
*PJlTR v T^sfq * I STT^T^TRTUfa ^
^ aSTH^T"
I §gsj-
l ?wi m I
-3.197. How is there the ascertainment that those qualities here indeed
belong to Brahman? Because there is no word seen here which ends in the
sixth case, i.e. "of Brahman" and is connected with [the word] "desires".
471
But the expectation "-whose desires?" does not invariably arise. Because
the word "desire" does not always possess expectancy. Because even in
such a case where there is the usage of the word "always possesses
expectancy" in the manner; "he obtains a son", the cessation of the
expectancy is customary just through the supposition; "only for the
agent himself".
Furthermore, the qualities of Brahman certainly cannot be obtained
by the individual soul. But qualities which are similar to the qualities
of Brahman. Hence this zeal of Ramanuja for establishing Brahman as
possessing qualities is certainly out of place. Because the word "desire"
does not denote a quality. Even in the denotation of a quality, there is
no expectation due to that. Even in the expectation, there is no
connection to Brahman. Even in the connection, there is no possibility
of the attainment of the qualities of Brahman.
But if [you say] there is the possibility of the attainment of the
qualities of Brahman through the intended meaning of the identity
between the individual soul and Brahman, [we reply] you have come to my
path. Accordingly, the meaning of the sacred text is correct in this
manner; saha is in the sense of "simultaneously" ( yugapad ). Sa means
"he who knows, who is of the nature of Brahman", attains simultaneously
all desires on account of being the very nature of Brahman. Since
those particular pleasures which are accepted as being able to be
experienced in the limiting adjuncts of Hirai^yagarbha etc, are not
distinct from the bliss of Brahman, the one who knows -being of the
nature of Brahman- attains indeed all bliss. Even becoming the nature of
bliss is only a particular desire [i.e. bliss, kama = ananda , supra .]
belonging to the state of the person desirous of liberation. And so
[in the state of liberation] being the nature of Brahman which is
unbroken bliss is arrived at.
472
3 98 ' vfa \ ^^qtqq^qiqi q 1 ^m%
| <T§tT^—
qwiqq cT^t m jkt q*q q M q: \
, aq%iq f^nqqr fwquftqrqmq h (%o \ \ ) i
q^r ttnm ^qrfqqq Tm fasprefo qrqqqqq^ j qqq q qqr
r.. . qq ^qqqq^Rifqqq ^ q % 1
STIdqnq q§T?iq-
qi^qq
fqqiqqi q^q%FTtfq i ^ qqrm
tqwwqqTqrqqqi^ | ^(qqrqqr * qqr q qiqfqqq :’m ta-
qqr ^ Nwroq «Rqq: I srra\w4Tq't 5
^qq l qqpf<qi q 4 wfq^ratfq qqq^ 1 (q<> q 1 ? 1 ?)
q?rfq%qqrq 1 q?R * fiqnqqq^ q^fqqmfq qrq;( q*
q l ? U ) q^r qq q^q qqfq (q° q RI q ) ffq irpu#^
q ^qrq’ (>ko <jo ^ q 0 ^o) ^qq^qq 1
3.198. This is indeed the state of liberation. There is no knower-known
relation in this state. Because Brahman is not an object of knowledge.
That has been told;
For whom it [Brahman] is not thought, for him
it is thought. For whom it is thought, he does
not know. It is unknown for those who know and
it is known for those who do not know (Ke.2,3.).
The meaning of the sacred text is; "for whom" ( yasya ) Brahman is "not
thought" ( amatam ) i.e, there is the ascertainment; "not an object of
knowledge", it is correctly understood by that person. But "for whom"
( yasya ) Brahman is "thought" ( matam ) i.e, accepted as being an object of
knowledge, "he does not know" (sa na veda ). Because Brahman is certainly
"unknown" ( avijnatam ) "for those who know" ( vijanatam ) in the manner;
"Brahman is known by us as an object of the knowledge depending upon us".
Because a subject-object relation is not possible in the non-dual Brahman.
Brahman is "known" ( vijnatam ) "for those who do not know" ( avijanatam ) i.e.
for those who know; "Brahman is not an object of knowledge".
However in the state of being a seeker, the assumption of the
473
'relation of knower and known certainly exists. And in accordance with
that, the "knower of Brahman" is told here: "The knower of Brahman attains
the supreme" (Tai .2.1 .1 .). Due to this, [the statement] (Jsri .B .Para .50 .
\156
p.95.) :
if Brahman is not an object of knowledge, there
could be no teaching that liberation results
from knowledge: "The knower of Brahman attains
the supreme" (Tai.2.1 .1 .), "The one who knows
Brahman becomes Brahman indeed" (Mu.3.2,9.)
is refuted.
3.199.
C * si
I WR IRR ^ R I y I l ^ sRRTTSTOFTT-
( <{° $r ro \c )
i T( 3 ^ I R5TRTO-
i TO 1 *R
_ rN *, /*sp i*v \ _
^ dRIRTW I TjtrjPRWT <R vpj-
#U^I TOttf; Wti ^TfRlrW^r ^ lr*&ZJR~
f^5 35R WJ 5 RR et 7TRTP
f q"o\so
sO>Qi’ ’ ’ ' ' ' ^ -"•• -v '■"* • ' \ <.
I rrsto ‘ srnmrRR ^ ( y<> «R I \R ) #
^ ^ to tojrrt ( f o v i y i $ ) ir ^rr tot-
pr^fro##TOi tr hr-
3TRRI3 1 (qo^) ^
I tPTT R 5RRU Hl%(|R(TfRl^ TOT^l^TO'
^ rs
l
3,199. But what has been said (lari.B .Para .50.p.95,96.):
"From which words return, along with the mind,
having not reached" (Tai.2.4.1 .). Through hearing
that the limitless Brahman, who has immeasurable
qualities, is incapable of being limited as
474
"so much" by speech and mind; [we understand that in
the Kena text] Brahman is said to be "unknown"
( avijnatam ) and "not thought" ( amatam ) for those who
have knowledge of the limitation of Brahman in the
manner: "Brahman is so much". Because Brahman is
without limit.
There [in the Kena text], it is certainly true that Brahman is unknown
for those who have knowledge of the limitation of Brahman. But that is
not the purport of the sacred text which is under discussion. Because
there is no authority for this [word]: "for those who know" as having
the meaning: "for those who have knowledge of the limitation of Brahman
in the manner; "so much" ".
Even the sacred text; "From which words [return]" does not have
that as its purport. Because limitlessness of qualities has not been
specified there in the sacred text as the reason for the return of speech
and mind. It was indeed previously mentioned (3.51.) that in the
expectation of a grammatical object for this [word]: "having not reached",
Brahman alone, who is specified by the word "which" and heard as the
limit for the return of speech, is proper to be connected. But not the
limit, of qualities etc. which are elliptically supplied. You [Ramanuja]
too have certainly accepted this way when you said (^rI.B.Para.518,
p.1007.) 1 57 .-
because in the expectation of a locus of separation,
i.e, "from what do they rise up?" in relation to the
sacred text; "his pranas do not rise up" (Bph.4.4.6.)
occurring in the sutra ; "If it is said on account of
the denial, no..." (B.S.8.2.12.) , the self alone,
which is heard as having connection [with the pranas ] ,
is to be understood even as the locus of separation
because it is [more] contiguous than the body which is
475
not heard [i,e, which is not mentioned in the passage].
And so because Brahman is just of the nature of Knowledge which is free
from distinction, the return of speech and mind is from that.
3.200.
ddT ^ 1 ( f o ^ l « l r ) fra^ra-
3RR HTWlfd |
^ c 10
fi^ntR^rai f traftraj d ddiss^nd l
3 zgmw *m\ 1 (<£<> l ) #
?n%3^} f^raisr^w shrto ^draPrefyi^ j fw>
IdRIW, I < %d 1 ( d° R I V I ? « )
fra I f% d Trct^srat mid-
vm wm RfFTIRR fid v ddP4[ dd dddT ddfd | fWdT fd d
RT^dwr^Tdd:: | ^5[sd%d idd^^dTretdid i f% ranrcr-
fe ! %idiTOd^dmddw^Wi^i dd^rn drctf nrw^nlra
ddTd I dd TPn^fTdRrrafd^fd i dTTdfdt I
3.200. Accordingly, the sacred text: "You cannot see the seer of seeing"
(Brh.3.4.2.) negates a seer distinct from seeing. But the explanation of
this sacred text (^ri.B.Para.50.p.96.
Having thought that ignorance is the essential nature
of the knower, [a view] established by fallacious
reasoning on account of [the knower] being connected
with the adventitious quality of consciousness, [the
sacred text tells]; "you must not see the self in that
manner, but you must see that even the seer has only
seeing as its nature"
is contrived. Because being insentient, which is the determining factor
for the negation ["you cannot see..."], has not been specified in the
sacred text. For the sacred text is suitable in the negation only of the
nature of being a seer. It has certainly been told previously that the
expression of knowership: "by vhat, n^y dear, can one know the knower?"
(B^h,2.4.1 4,) is figurative.
476
Furthermore, if knowership is real according to the view of
Ramanuja, then the meaning of the sacred text: "[by what], my dear, [can
one know] the knower7'’ is certainly not congruous. Because the word
"what" here does not have as its purpose a question relating to a means.
Because an answer "by such and such means" .is not subsequently seen. But
it has the sense of a doubt. Because the means for the knowledge relating
to knowership only has its purpose in a doubt, through that, even such
knowledge is doubted. But that is certainly undesirable for Ramanuja,
Because he accepts that the self is knowable.
3.201 .
mvn R R %3RT s\\ RRFIRRt; j i %
HR UR f%RR 1 R R
RFR ’ (|o y | | ^ < RR
fuf^R URUI frTT ) RR RtR
RRR?WjvR%R £ ( fo I H \ \\ ) ^RTTRRR^
%mRR§RR[ I ^ ; irFM rrR urrtrttrrrrt
r UTTRRRHtu [R7R?qw[ rhirttr^rr 1 ]; rrfrr?T %
*Rf RRTRR ( $ I R 13 ) # RRRH RTRRR
> ( =ifRTo <{o qo ^ I
w tMrri # ^Rirfr r;rr:,
1 RTRT RRT RTRfl RRRRRT TRRT I RR R %:
SRfRHRRq; i H RTR R^TRRRTFRU | T^UTRT RRT
R2M51RRRR f*M I RR R TRRRv^ R : qfl%T^TT^ I RT-
RTRRTRTS^R RTSRr^R R^RTHRTRRRT^R R R^'UtRR RTRRTcRT-
<#^R( RRIRWRRT^I f% TW
^t^rriirt^rrhururr r rhrrc^rtr ^rirfurr^ i
- 3.201. There is no scope for even a trace of difference in Brahman who
is of the nature of Knowledge free from distinction. Because the negation
of difference is seen in various ways in the sacred texts: "There is
no diversity whatsoever here. He who sees diversity, as it were, here,
goes from death to death" (Brh.4.4,19.), "Because where there is duality,
as it were, then another sees another...but where everything has
become the Self alone for this [knower of Brahman], then what should one
477
see and through what?” (Brh.4.5.1 5.) etc. But what has been said (3rI.B.
Para.51.p.98.) 160 :
Since the entire world is an effect of Brahman and has
that [Brahman] as its inner ruler and because there is
oneness on account of [the world] having that [Brahman]
as its Self, the diversity which is contrary to that
[oneness] is negated in the sacred texts cited. On the
other hand, the manifold nature of Brahman which is
established in the sacred texts and which is preceeded
by the resolve to become many: "May I be many, may I be
born" (Ch.6.2.3.) is not negated.
That is questionable. To explain. The expression "different" is of two
types: (l) based upon difference which has another [thing] as its counter
correlate and (2) based upon internal difference. The first is like earth
is different with regard to water. Here, difference is the reason for the
use of the word "different". And that [difference] is located in earth
and has water as its counter correlate. The second is like earth is
different due to the difference of pots and cloth etc. Here, difference
is not the reason for the use of the word "different". Because the
difference which has pot as its counter correlate does not exist in the
pot and the difference which has cloth as its counter correlate does not
exist in the cloth, therefore difference does not exist in earth as there
is the characteristic property of earth-ness. But variety, which is based
upon internal difference, is the reason for the use of the word
"different" in this case. And this alone is the reason for the use of the
word "diversity" too.
3.202.
I stst ’
478
wi l 5 ^ I wt *rfa ‘ >pffc
^ *R3pmtft ^ ^ wrfcf» ^ I
3R ^ *RR HRRT I rR^ ^ ^ ¥TT^ 9
%* WT Wri 5 §r'TT IFRt I TRR *s
fTFii 5(^r: I^’TFT #T ^r-:^T > ( ? 4p*T° T°
A« 'T° ^ ) ^fW^ I ^RIRW I
whM wr *^f w^wpw
cR ^ I ^ ^ #R v TfR * *T ff«
Wi r ^H ^n ftlWffi I f% jj 4R|^R$iqRW R(W
fR frorT^w I jrr ^ »■ m fmk#ri^TWTWRj
1 n wra»^ s |RTWf^m^i
^TR ^ |
3.202. Seeing the vorld in this very manner [as having variety], which is
well known in the world, is negated by the sacred text repeating: "He
who sees diversity, as it were, here". Because there is the recollection
of the whole world [by the word] "here" in the sacred text, just as there
is by the word "this" in; "All this is indeed Brahman" (Ch.3.14,1.). The
negation of the seeing as being diverse amounts to seeing as being one.
But the sacred text does not have its purport in the negation of mere
seeing. If that was so, it would say only; "He who sees here -goes from
death to death".
Moreover seeing the diverse objects as being one is possible only
when they have a single material cause. And that alone is what is taught
by the sacred text: "May I be many" (Tai.2.6.1., Ch.6.2,3,). This world,
although being experienced as diverse, is made known by that sacred text
in a manner which was unknown; as possessing origination preceded by a
resolve which has as its agent [one who is] the single material cause.
On account of this, [the statement] (^rI.B.Para,51 ,p,98. ^ •
Having taught that Brahman has diversity, which is
479
unknown "through all the means of knowledge like
perception etc. and which is difficult to
comprehend, then that very [diversity] is being
negated -this is ridiculous
is refuted. And because diversity in the world is known through the means
of knowledge such as perception etc.
If [you say]: this diversity is certainly not known through
perception etc, as belonging to Brahman, [we reply] The purport of the
sacred texts is to be conceived only in teaching the connection to
Brahman. And that connection is not negated by the sacred text: "He who
sees diversity, as it were, here". But only the seeing as being diverse
is negated, so what is ridiculous here? On the contrary, the sacred text:
"May I be many", having shown that the world has a single material cause,
is certainly applicable for seeing oneness which is the object of the
sacred text: "He who sees diversity, as it were, here".
3 - 203 * f% ^ TRrfwr * q ^
fwTt tthtI i wm wmm %c-
mm l v ^ mm wrfe%wrr l
TOtrRriqt mm
^TThT ^ ™
m mu 1
l ft q
I ^ j ft mmrnm&r
I
1 m ft mm nf^n: wnn» (.f ° v i s I,
•?H) ‘ m mm t > (|«»
•V I s l \\ ) ^mfcm mfkm ^ I
■3.203. Furthermore, the negation taught by the sacred text: "He who sees
diversity, as it were, here" is all the more logically impossible
according to the view of Ramanuja. Because he accepts the diversity in
480
the world as real. In. his view, no sacred text can be connected with the
intended meaning that there is no diversity in Brahman. Because there
is no cognition of such a meaning due to the expression "here" in: "He
who sees diversity, as it were, here". And because he accepts diversity
on account of the difference of the threefold reality consisting of the
sentient, the insentient and the Inner-controller, which [difference]
belongs to Brahman who is qualified by a body consisting of the sentient
and the insentient.
But if [you say] that the intended meaning [of the text; "He who
sees diversity,as it were, here"] is that there is no such object
whatsoever different from Brahman, for which Brahman is not the cause
or the Inner-controller, [we reply] There must be implication in the
word "diversity". Because there is no reason for the usage which was told
before [ supra ., "...he accepts diversity on account of the difference..."].
For we mentioned just previously that difference is not the reason for
the use of the word "diversity". Nor is difference the reason for the use
of even the word "duality". But duality is based upon internal difference.
It is to be understood that having repeated the seeing etc. which is well
known in the world as having some agent and some object and which is the
effect of the duality belonging to such a world, by this; "Because where
there is duality, as it were, then another sees another" (B^h,4.5-.1 5.)
etc., it is negated by: "But where everything has become the Self alone
for this [knower of Brahman], then what should one see and through what?"
(Byh.4.5.15.) etc.
3.204. < ^ apf TO ^
5
'THRIFT wn
3 I 1 $ )
481
( s 4faro \o W I r^oC ) ^5% I m\ f|-ffrT Wrl Tff*
'^Rq^RFcf: to ; '^ rri^N w 1
rrsmfam^Wt srt trsfw^m i r ^
^ I ?Rqi^wi:
ir i ??pr jft ^ 13Tf^n% wt^rik 151%
wri%i zw'u i tr*n %sr ^ w*r I ^nr hTO f#n
^FRR sTST^T ?RR a^fa^TOF^PTi c^W^R <R>T-
^TRRl jyWt RRTRR^ i pi?* sliNw^^JR ^ HRKMFPi-
^RRTR TT^RRT^TIR: l^TT I <RT ^RTRl^ERR
fRpR ^pt |(RH RTRo^Rr'RTf: I
■ f ' '
3.204. The attainment of fear has been taught on account of seeing
diversity: "For when he makes the slightest difference in this [Brahman],
then he has fear" (Tai.2.7.1.). And so it is indicated that seeing
diversity is not desired on the part of a person seeking freedom from
fear. Thus the purport of that sacred text too is only in the negation
of seeing diversity.
*1 AO
But what has been said (Jirr .B.Para. 51 .p.98,) :
The recollection of the manifold nature of that
[Brahman] is taught as the cause of peace: "All
this is indeed Brahman. The origination, absorption
and sustenance [of the world] is due to that [Brahman],
Thus being peaceful, may one contemplate" (Ch.3.14.1,).
That is questionable. To explain. The word "thus" here: "Thus being
peaceful, may one contemplate", having recalled what was previously said,
it makes known that [recollection] to be the cause of peace. The pair of
words "Brahman" and " ta.j.jalan ", occurring in the prior portion: "All this
is indeed Brahman. The origination, absorption and sustenance [of the
world] is due to that [Brahman] ( ta.j.jalan ) 11 , denotes the predicate. Vith
reference to all this world [which is the subject], the nature of being
Brahman and its having origination etc. from that [Brahman] is enjoined
[as the predicate]. Born from that ( tajjam ) means it arises from that
482
Brahman, Lam means "it resolves". An means "it breathes" in the sense
that "it lives". The origination of the world is only from Brahman and
the dissolution is only in Brahman. So too, the activity of the world is
only through Brahman. When everything is made known as being Brahman by
the first positive statement here, in the expectation; "how does
everything have the nature of being Brahman?", the second positive
statement; "The origination, absorption and sustenance [of the world] is
due to that [Br ahman ] 11 is begun for demonstrating that. And peace is
easily acquired upon the recollection that everything is only of the
nature of Brahman; because there is no desire and aversion due to the
absence of the recollection of diversity. And so the recollection of
diversity is certainly not enjoined here. So how could there be the
instruction that it is the cause of peace?
3.205.
mmm I 3 |t^ i m ^ I
^ ft wwj I ^ i
l =t 3 33-
^miTTfTI ’ (toRlvSlO
-3.205. But the diversity made known by the word "all", which denotes the
subject, does not present a cause at all. On the contrary, upon the
recollection of diversity, even though peace was existing previously it
is thwarted due to the possibility of desire and aversion. Perhaps there
is the possibility of the decrease of aversion upon the recollection of
483
diversity even as consisting of the nature of Brahman. But there would
certainly be an increase of desire. And so peace is indeed difficult to
be acquired.
On account of this, having taken the word " antara " as having the
meaning of "an interval" in the sacred text: "For when he makes the
slightest interval in this, then he has fear" (Tai.2.7.1.), the
establishing of that [meaning] (£>ri.B.Para .51 .p.99.) is replied to.
The word " antara " even having the meaning of "a hole" must be understood
as refuted in just the same way. Because no one is able to make an
interval or a hole in Brahman. So his fear is far away. In the
expectation: "where does he make a difference ( antara )?", only "in this"
~which is mentioned in the sentence itself- can be connected there. But
not the "stability" in Brahman which is mentioned in the previous
sentence. And because the word "stability" in the previous sentence; "...
he finds stability in this invisible..." (Tai.2.7.1.) does not end in the
seventh case. But there is certainly trouble in changing it to a seventh
case ending. And there is no possibility of the connection of this; "in
this" which belongs to this sentence ["For when he makes the slightest
difference in this..."] to the meaning of the word "stability" which has
persisted [in the sentence; "For when..."] because there is the maxim;
"Between what has been heard and what is inferred, the connection with
what is heard is stronger".
3.206.
^ * m | ^ ^
q^TTr^TWI3T-
M JTOiRf t
484
3.206. It should, not be said that: the connection of Brahman as being the
meaning of the word "this" ["For when he makes the slightest... in this"]
is not possible when the meaning of the word " antara " is heard in the
sense of "an interval" or "a hole". So there is no scope of that maxim
here. Because that maxim is applicable only upon the possibility of a
connection in both places, [reason] Because the connection is possible
when the meaning of the word " antara " is heard in the sense of "difference"
For there is no restrictive rule here: "difference cannot be accepted as
the meaning of the word " antara " here".
Furthermore, because the word "in this" is in the previous
sentence also, there would be the connection of the "stability" connected
with that [previous "in this"] in the latter sentence. So the sacred text
certainly need not utter the word "in this” again in the latter sentence.
And so the intended meaning of the sacred text is understood as: the word
"in this" occurs again only for the purpose of the cessation of "stability"
3.207.
m ^ httopttotto: ^ to | ^
pimsfq mi nr »
ftmri m ( to %o \ \ ^ \ \ \ ) to 1 tohi-
WT: I TOT TOR TTPR’TR'
'TTOTT, TO 5 RTTOtTO | mt TOT
* 3 I ^
TO TOT! I ^ ^ PTOTO TOPTOTTON mKi TO-
Tm toto; l TOms^i^^m tot to
1 tori
TO I —
‘ WI, ’ ( ) 3 FT I
*rg 1 tot tor: TORroropprtsft I
TO: Tpfa TO TOT frot *4 ITOPT^ * TO
TOTTOR TO? TOTOrgT^ TTOT% | ^ f| PTTOTOTOP}; I TO
RTTO | TOT ^ TORWKdTO TOT I
tottort TOSRronfer tor to~to i
485
3.207. This teaching of Brahman free from distinction is certainly
accepted by the author of the sutras also. That has been told: "There is
no twofold characteristic for the supreme , even on account of place,
because everywhere [it is taught otherwise]" (B,S .3 .2,11 .). The meaning
of that is; "place" means a limiting adjunct. The "twofold characteristic"
( ubhayalingam ) i.e, the characteristic of possessing distinction and being
free from distinction, "for the supreme" ( parasya ) i.e. Brahman, certainly
does not inherently exist. But it does not exist "even on account of place
[i.e. due to a limiting adjunct] ( sthanato 1 pi ). Because "everywhere"
( sarvatra ) in the sacred texts such as: "Soundless(Katha.1,3,15 .)
etc., Brahman is taught only as having all distinctions set aside.
It should not be said: then how can there be the declaration of
the non-dualists that "Brahman is free from distinction"? [reason] An
expression by words such as "free from distinction", "non—dual" etc. is
for those who ascertain there only that; Brahman, which is indeed utterly
inexpressible [directly], has to be said somehow. But in reality,
Brahman cannot be directly expressed by the word "free from distinction"
or by the word "non-dual" etc. That has been told in the Dak s asmrti :
This is in relation to the highest truth: there
is no duality and nor even is there non—duality (Daksasm.7.46.).
But the explanation of that sutra (B.S.3.2.11,), (drl,B,Para.401 .
p.810.)
1 64 .
Not even a trace of imperfection is possible "for the
supreme" ( parasya ) Brahman, "even on account of place"
( sthanato ’ pi ) such as earth etc. Because "everywhere"
( sarvatra ) the supreme Brahman is told as having this
"twofold characteristic" ( ubhayalingam ) of being free
from defect and possessing qualities.
That does not bring about admiration in the mind. Because this [sutra ] is
486
a statement of negation, Yhat rule is this: "what is to be negated there
is only what is accepted as being supplied through an ellipsis"? And so
Brahman is certainly free from all distinctions. It must be understood
that the distinctions which are recognized in the world are all together
certainly without absolute reality,
3 • 208« _ r* -\ ~ ,, , _ _
% d 41% ( Jflo ? o | ^ )
( sfpn° ^ NS ) ‘ddtxd%-
dd?d ft d mi l
nidi- vJFnrnm: I ddddT%d l
dddTdldW^TdPdf WW!
m remra i w% * d%dfd >
< df ® ^ 1 V ) >$dldltfma4i ^j\\: ddTT% ^
d^fddmdgw l m m-
<: 3rni%?nii%n^'TR'T^Fnrnn54n: ’ ( nr° >\ I )
i dm—
£ 3id^ d4nln hjfi jjqnf^d d’ (iffo \\ \ )
dWd g"TO*fad?d d dd d$I%Wdd^Bdd I
‘fosrcfa gqitN r%% ra^dddid’ (*fio \\ \ \% )
^i% nidimnddd ddddnmdi idgddmrdf d ftdd fmrnrdm%
3.208, By way of refuting the view of the exponents of non-duality [who
consider that]: "pure Knowledge free from distinction is alone the
absolute reality", a collection of sentences from the Oita beginning with:
"He who knows me, the great Lord of the worlds, to be unborn and
beginningless" (0.10.3.) have been cited (^ri.B.Para.52,p.100.) as
teaching that Brahman possesses distinction. Vith regard to that, it is
said; the nature of being unborn is not some attribute which is a positive
entity. But it is the absence of birth. In the same manner, the nature of
being beginningless is the absence of having an original cause. And
437
consequently how is the Self established as possessing distinction on
account of these two negative conditions?
Although qualities such as being the support of living beings are
recognized in the sentences such as: "All beings dwell in me" (G.9.4.)
(^ri,B.Para,52.p # 100.) etc., nevertheless they are only based upon
connection with the primary matter ( prakrti ) but they are not actually
real. For this very reason, freedom from qualities has been very clearly
told there; "This supreme Self is without change because of being
beginningless and because of being free from qualities" (G.13.31.).
Similarly, being the support of all and the enjoyer of qualities here too:
"Unattached and indeed the supporter of all, free from qualities and the
enjoyer of qualities" (G.13.14.) are only based upon connection with the
primary matter. Indeed the sentence in the Gita : "Know that modifications
and qualities are born of the primary matter" (G.13.19.) distinguishes the
scope of the sentences [teaching] possession of qualities and the scope of
the sentences [teaching] freedom from qualities. So in no way can
qualities be suspected as being innate.
3.209.
U utucTTfid ip ( [4 o 7o )
R? )
vfcXymx ^ fro 50 )
5T3TUI%UC( || ( fro <7o ^ | V3 | )
- 3.209. The collection of sentences beginning with: "0 sage, He transcends
the primary matter of all beings, its modifications and defects such as
488
qualities etc." (Vis? .P.6.5 .83») , which are located in the Yis pupuran a,
have been cited (^ri.B.Para.52,p.101.) as teaching Brahman possessing
distinction. Even for that [collection of sentences], no purport is seen
in teaching Brahman possessing distinction. Because distinctions such as
th,e nature of transcending beings etc. pertain to a limiting adjunct.
Because the Self is taught as being free from distinction in the
Yis nupurap a itself;
That which is unmanifest, undecaying, inconceivable,
unborn, changeless, indescribable, formless and which
does not possess hands and feet etc. (Yi§.P.6.5.66.).
In which differences have vanished, which is pure
existence, not an object of words and which can be
known by oneself —that Knowledge is known as
Brahman (Vi§.P.6.7.53.).
3.210.
CRPcTl || ( f^o 30 )
f%R | ( Ro 30 )
tf R vr ^ pr |
^fiKOPR n ^ qiprqsfa: n
( r?o 30 \ I ^ 1 I
‘ (ft©
5 ° $ 1 H j ^ K y !fq^%; WF&h |
^ ^ RmK lRHmq wfd f^Tctij; |: ^ Rfw HTm
V9M° V ) I HTWm STSnm ^T-
i
r%R q^l' 4 f l? ( fto 30 I ? y I^ ^ )
W I
489
3.210. Even the nature of being the source of beings is not an actual
reality in the Self. Because the world is false. That has been told in
the Vig nupuran a itself;
The ignorant, seeing this entire world which has
Knowledge for its essential nature as being of the
nature of objects, are whirled around in the flood
of delusion (Vig.P.1.4.39.).
Knowledge is indeed the highest reality. The
dualists see things falsely (Vig .P.2.1 4.31 .) ,1^5
"He is I and he is you and he is everything. This
[universe] has the Self as its essential nature.
Give up the delusion of difference." That excellent
king, instructed by him [the brahman a], had the
understanding of the highest reality and abandoned
[the view of] difference (Yig.P.2.1 6,24.).
The statement "not a cause" immediately following "the source of beings"
here; "the source of beings, not a cause" (Vi§.P.6.5.67.) is in agreement
only because the nature of being the source of beings has no actual
reality in the Self. Thus it is established; Brahman is free from
distinction and of the nature of pure Knowledge. And that Knowledge has
certainly been previously stated (3.54.) as being without an object and
without a locus. Because the Knowledge which possesses an object and a
locus necessarily possesses distinction. If the Knowledge which possesses
distinction is the highest reality, because there is the possibility
that such Knowledge is the highest reality even according to the view of
those who see duality as real, then the statement containing the reason;
"The dualists see things falsely" in the previously cited text of the
Vig pupura na; "Knowledge is indeed the highest reality. The dualists see
things falsely" (Yig .P.2 .1 4,31 .) must be incongruous.
490
3,211 ' qRTR% I W ( Mt^FT 0
^ *° % )
g* 'K 35IR q^T |
tpR *phfRURRR0f II
wmrf mi mi i
m\ aroRcji m ii
«*wq qlfcq qsrcn foq: |
5fR%|iq^|yq -qt3CT|} *R ^fi^OTT 1|
<Wrd m 3;qiR ^fr^tirr i
q q 3 ^% q^RR^^ussqq: 11 (fto qo ^ | ^ \ v^-
) |R i
wl:—in^^Rpk—l
■q’TTrfllMrq U * q ’ T%*^R l FR 1 *rq<R W ? \
I TOR * *W-
q?roR I Wt vm i nroiwi—l 4 q >
^K.‘ I l f ITOI I l
l * m*t ’ 5 ft
I *wiFpq: wmw I «fpfcqtfq^ \
torto?*: | qroPRR-TORim I tor qr zmqq
i q’ 3 R: \w*m ! *m\rMH tohrirth i WRwqwrow |
*v os
R^RT fq^PTRU y 4'+<RU'i MWIV4 -(Ml<(,U^-*
risk I h q I
qqr q qw^Rt w^^RqRT^rfq%qR q^q qq Hiqq-q-
rs rv .
imq |
3.211. [objection] A distinction in the Self, in the manner of being an
object of speech, is taught in the Vig pupuran a. For instance (3rT.B.
Para.52.p.1 01 ,102.):
0 Maitreya, the word " Bhagavat " is used to denote
the pure, highest Brahman, known as the one of
mighty powers, the cause of all causes (Vi§.P.6,5.72.).
The letter " bha " is endowed with a twofold meaning:
"preparer" and "supporter". So too, 0 sage, the
meaning of the letter " ga " is the "leader", "mover"
and "creator" (Vi§.P.6.5.73.).
491
[The tvo syllables] " bhaga " indicate the six [qualities]
in their entirety: sovereignty, heroism, glory, prosperity,
knowledge and dispassion (Vi§,P,6.5.74.),
The meaning of the letter "va" is that beings dwell there
in the Self of beings, in the entire Self and he [dwells]
in all beings and hence [the meaning of the letter "va”]
is "imperishable" (Vi§.P.6.5.75.),
The meaning of this [is as follows]1^: teaching the meaning of the
component parts of the word " bhagavat" , he [the sage Parasara] tells the
meaning of the letter " bha " as "preparer". The word " bha " is established
in the affix "<^a" [being added] to the verbal root bhr. The twofold
meaning of that [word " bha" ] is: "preparer" and "supporter". "Preparation"
means arranging the necessary paraphernalia. The "preparer" is said to be
the one who makes the primary matter etc. capable of the production of
effects. The "supporter" means the master. He [Parasara] tells the meaning
of the letter 11 ga" as the "leader". The word "ga" is established in the
affix "da"[being added] to the verbal root gam which ends in [the causative]
"ni". "Leader" means the one who causes stability. "Mover" means the one
who brings about the destruction [of the cosmos], "Creator" means the one
who brings about the origination [of the cosmos]. The verbal root gam has
the meanings of origination, sustenance and destruction.
He tells the meaning of the tvo syllables which have been united;
" bhaga " as "sovereignty". The word "entirety" is connected everywhere.
"Glory" means fame through the possession of qualities. "Prosperity" means
good fortune. "Dispassion" means indifference.
He tells the meaning of the letter "va" as "they dwell". The word
"va" is established in the affix "da" [being added] to the verbal root
vas(a ) in the sense of the location or in the sense of the agent. "In the
Self of beings" means in the Self of [all] beings. "In the entire Self"
492
means in its entire body. In the addition of the affix " kvip "^^8 to the
verbal root tyaj(a) in the sense of "he gives up the qualities to be
abandoned", the mere consonant, in the form of the letter "t" , remains
upon the elision of the portion beginning with "y" on account of being
included in the group of words beginning with prs odara .^^ And that letter
"_t" is the final for the word " bhagavat " . And so because the supreme Self
can be directly expressed by the word " bhagavat 11 , the possession of
distinction must certainly be accepted in reality.
3.212,
( 3° \ \ H I ^
aTST^FTl^FTlfa cl FI I sTSiqi |
'Tsrrqt ftm n ( ft o q Q )
I trq ^ qT q^I^R: *nq%qqm q<fa r?q%
3^141 K'K\i'MlSS?qFl * 3 q*IT TC-
*n$ I * anr^qq^v (qo ^ 3 \ \\) srqri^
wnq I ^q^TCsqqtqq^ l
-qrq^mqpFTift <^q tiFwif qqqcqq l
>:q^ 5 R f^xFR I cFf q^*r 4 q^J
fqpqq jc^qq 1tf*nwnRqqr qfaqftqrc
q>TmqR<qi<HMVdi^qr sprm q^ srsrnt
\Vu: ’ ( ^To tjo ^ qo * -WlwiFFmi?'
V) t^T-
jf«r qfq%wr qwFFr: qrwfteqwTqqqi^ i ^n^TK-
spmFFqr^qqnt i
3,212, [reply] This is certainly not the case. Because there is the
statement that the word " bhagavat " has a figurative meaning here;
0 twice born, the word " bhagavat" is indeed a
figurative expression used in the worship of
Brahman even though that [Brahman] is not an
object of words (vis,P,6,5.71 ,)
493
in the very preceding verse contiguous to this: "...the pure, known as
the one of mighty powers..." (Vi§,P.6.5.72.). How did you, while directing
your sight upon the series [of verses] commencing with; "...the pure,
known as the one of mighty powers...", have feebleness of sight in the
very preceding verse contiguous to that? It is a great wonder. Hence it
has to he adhered to that the description of the Self as possessing
distinction, which is seen in the Puranas or elsewhere, is effected only
having accepted that the distinctions appearing in the Self are according
to an understanding which pertains to ordinary relations, but it is not
so in absolute reality.
Even the colour which is taught in the sacred texts such as: "the
colour of the sun" (Tai.J.3.11.) only pertains to ordinary relations.
Because that is of use only according to an understanding which pertains
to ordinary relations. Although that [colour] pertains to ordinary
relations it is certainly possible to be an "auspicious locus" for
concentration. "Concentration" is fixing the mind at one place in the
object of meditation through giving up other objects. The object to be
meditated upon there is said to be an "auspicious locus". On account of
this, the demonstration that the supreme Self possesses distinction in
absolute reality, by the text beginning (tsri.B .Para. 53 .p.106.);
In this context [vis.P.6.7.], having declared yoga as
the sole remedy for worldly existence and having stated
the component parts of yoga up to the withdrawal of the
senses from external objects ( pratyahara ), in order to
mention an "auspicious locus" for the purpose of the
establishment of concentration, [it is taught] that the
supreme Brahman, Vig^u, [has two forms]...
and ending with (&ri.B.Para.53.p.1 06.):
the embodied form, which is established by Vedanta
[passages] such as "the colour of the sun" etc., is
494
said to be the "auspicious locus"
is set aside. Because there is no negating factor in accepting that even
vhat pertains to ordinary relations can be an "auspicious locus".
^IIsfowT 1 | ( Ro 50 )
^ 1 ~irfer^ r l hrt r rirrr r
RRTTRRR RPTJRTCcTTRRrj 1%^ I ^HPPRTfaRfRTTR
RR?PR R IR^RPR RPTMl^R I
RIRT RRH’fRTR^RlT^TRqTRt ^MtRRIRRTRRRHT^ I R f|
HfiT^rT trrrrtsrrtrt rrpt rrh rjrrih wm
RRfa 1 ( \3\ qo l o ) ^ | H^ppR^-RR
^tfqrRinRRT^tRRTHiRR RiRTORqRRRT’k^R ^fRTi?-
trw&i^irtrrt3; I r ft
^[rrsthh: i%r i
5?^Rr RRRRPT RR HcRRHH, %# f^^RR iVRPRRRR
RR^awr rrpr tor I Rsrfa sjfTORT rrrrrtsrri^
^TTTORRRi' RRPt.TOH RRH^RH TR^RT R RRp! RRRR 5J\%RRRT
TOTtR IRHTHTOR *PRrR RTPRR I R^RR RRRPI flRPR RT PFRPR
RTWIRPRlR TRRRRTR RR RTPR RRR1R RPRRqjRTR RRRT-
RFHRRRfHRR ‘ RRPf STIRIRR TRHHRT RRTRH > f?f^RR RRRTTR
RRRR PHT2R I RRI RTR RR£HR\: WTRTlR^^RRRWRR^Rt
HRH^MtqTRTR^RT ^RRIRcHtR RFRRRTRfR fRR fa^RTH-;
RRi RRTR I
3.213. Here too;
[l bow to that Vi^nu] who is, in reality, of the
nature of Knowledge and who is absolutely pure.
That [Vi^jju] is indeed determined to be a physical
entity on account of erroneous vision (Vi^.P.I .2.6.)
Brahman is in reality of the nature of pure Knowledge and seeing that
[Brahman] as the nature of a physical entity is said to be error. The
nature of being a "physical entity" is the nature of being a knower and
495
the nature of what is known. And so the "nature of Knowledge" which
possesses distinction and has a locus and an object is established as
something not really existing.
But what has been said (^rT.B.Para.54.p.108.);
Even here [in the passage]: "the nature of Knowledge"
(Vi§.P.1.2.6.), the entire collection of things different
from Knowledge is not taught as being false. Because the
statement is only to this extent; the appearance of the
Self, who is of the nature of Knowledge, in the form of
objects such as gods, human beings etc, is erroneous.
When it is said that the appearance of the pearl-oyster
as silver is error, the entire collection of silver
objects in the world is certainly not false.
That is not so. Because here; "That [Vi§nu] is indeed [determined] to be
a physical entity", there is no possibility of accepting the particular
meaning "gods, human beings etc." by the word "entity" which has a
universal application since it is mentioned as contrary to the Knowledge
which was mentioned in the prior half [of the verse].
From the statement; "the rope is determined to be the nature of a
snake on account of erroneous vision", no body believes that a particular
snake is real in the manner that; "the white snake is certainly real there
only the black snake is indeed false". Although when it is said that the
appearance of the pearl-oyster as silver is error, the entire collection
of silver objects in the world is not false, still, some particular silver
on the pearl-oyster is certainly not real. That the truth or falsity of
silver elsewhere can be established to any extent by another means of
knowledge is not the purport of this sentence there [ "the appearance of
the pearl-oyster as silver is error"]. If like "That [Vi§nu] is indeed
[determined] to be a physical entity" it is said; "the pearl-oyster is
496
indeed recognized in the world as silver" then it would certainly be the
purport there also [in relation to the sentence: "the appearance of the
pearl-oyster..,"]. And so hereto. when it is said that because the world
and Brahman are cognized as identical due to grammatical apposition [in
the scriptures], Brahman, whose nature is Knowledge, having the form of
an object, is erroneous, then the entire collection of objects is said to
be false.
3.214.
i[% ^ mv* ^ W* qo l I $ >
mm i m tV
mA ( Ro Jo ^ I M ^ )
I M l hr i
i I%rnjrR;’ ‘ W TTH vRHRJH^'K-
HW. I AH ^
SFThrSFT 5PTf. R: (fro ^ | ^ |
tttwM 1
’RHlRMt R1%(TH ^ ( Ro 30
^ i ^ I l ) ^r w: mm%-
qr^Hdi hff^ wn g ffrq^qRTJHqft rrhhh vRRr
fiPHIH I
3.214. Furthermore, the falsity of the world is indeed indicated at the
very beginning of the Vis nupuran a by teaching the identity [of Vi^nu
with the world] through grammatical apposition: "and he is the world"
(Vi§.P.1.1 ,35.). To explain. A twofold question was put forward by
Maitreya; "0 Brahman, what does the world consist of, and from what is
this [world] consisting of the moveable and the inert?" (Vi^.P.I.1.9.).
The affix mayat in: "consists of what?" is in the sense of modification J 71
Or it is used in its own sense [i.e. only as conveying the sense of the
word to which it is connected]. This question is about the material cause
of the world i.e, "of what is this world a modification?", or "what is
497
the nature of this world?". And the question: "and from what has this
world consisting of the moveable and the inert been produced?" relates
to the efficient cause which is remaining. And for that double question,
Parasara has given a twofold answer; "That [Viijnu] brings about the
sustenance and destruction of this world, and he is the world" (Viij.P.I.
1.35.). The efficient cause of the world is stated; that supreme Self
brings about the sustenance and destruction of this world. The material
cause of the world is stated; and he alone is the world.
It is established by hundreds of sacred texts that the supreme
Self is free from change and it is repeated by Parasara in a later verse
here itself; "[Salutations to Yi^^u] who is without change, pure..." (Vi$.
P.1.2.1.), So the Self cannot be accepted as the material cause which
undergoes transformation, but only as the material cause which is an
apparent transformation. And so the falsity of the world which is appearing
is established.
3 215
^ i ww h 1
I VWR fawkb 1 i
i l ^ r|
^ ^ jsmprnt:
srroffi
•3.215, But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.54.p.110.);
because the efficient and the material cause have been
asked: "and from what is this [world] consisting of the
moveable and the inert?", by this; "consists of what?"
it is asked; what is the nature of the world which is
the object of creation, sustenance and destruction?
The answer to that [latter question] is: "and he is
the world". This identity is brought about by the
invariable association through being the Self [of
the world] in the form of its inner ruler. But it is
not brought about by the oneness of substance between
the pervaded [world] and the pervading [Vigpu], Because
the grammatical apposition: "and he is the world" is
the answer to the question: "consists of what?". The
affix mayat in "consists of what?" does not have the
the sense of modification. Because a separate question
is meaningless [as the material cause was asked in the
first question]. Nor even does it have its own meaning
[i.e. conveying only the sense of the word to which it
connected] as in the case of pranamaya [which is taken
as meaning pran a only] etc. Because there is no logical
possibility of the answer; "and he is the world" [for
the question would only mean "the world is what?"].
Indeed then, the answer would be; "Vignu alone".
Therefore mayat is in the sense of "abundance" according
to; "The affix mayat is used wherever an abundance of a
thing is to be expressed" (P.S,5.4.21 .). And the entire
world certainly has an abundance of that [Vignu] since it
is the body of that [visnu], Therefore it is ascertained
that the grammatical apposition "and he is the world",
which is the answer to this; "consists of what?", is
based upon the relation of body and soul between the world
and Brahman.
3.216.
499
I 7 T^~
w: ? ( rt° ? I
s^iWra^rc * w: ? ('H® Ho ? 1 a I \\ ) wot-
ra? l l
l spsrar^t pm! I s^h-
^ sTFTfl 3 ; pr re >NR ^l^n ! *r$fitaK-
* H^friar* (!l#^?|8l^)
w^sn vm i ^rttr 1 5 rfrto^-
rftrwf: rw 1 RWtRJiW'T^^RT^R^PT^ I <frt-
.frRT^RT^m^ 5 «T f%I%^n^3WV^ \ i
TTRTTRTR HIMtUmI^Rm I’. 'Jg^RT ^ } ^RURRR] I
3.216. That is questionable. Because the fifth case "from what" [in the
sentence; "and. from what is this [world] consisting of the moveable and
the inert"] can be logically demonstrated in the technical term denoting
the locus of separation [i.e. apadana , the ablative case]^^: "The prime
cause of the agent of the verb jan 'to be born’ is in the ablative case"
(P.S,1.4,30.) having accepted that the action of production is elliptically
supplied. Alternatively, [the fifth case] can be logically demonstrated
in the technical term of the ablative; "The source of the agent of the
verb bhu 'to become' is in the ablative case" (P.S.1 .4.31.) having
accepted that the action of arising is the "first manifestation". Because
by that, the technical term of the ablative is enjoined for the locus of
the "first manifestation". In the first case [with reference to P.S.1.4,30„],
the question ["and from what.,."] can relate only to the material cause.
Because [the word] " prakrti " is used in the sutra . And the word " prakrti "
signifies only the material cause. Otherwise there would be the consequence
that; a pot is produced from a [potter's] stick. But in the case of "joy
arises from a son", the fifth case is to be understood upon the elision
of the affix lyap t "having beheld the son".F3 p n the Brahmasutra too;
"[Brahman is] the material cause ( prakrti ) as well..." (B.S.1.4.23.), the
500
word " prakrti " is seen to signify only the material cause. You too have
accepted it there in that very manner.
But in the second case [with reference to P.S.1.4.31.], the
question ["and from what.,."] can relate only to the efficient cause.
1 74
Because the locus of the "first manifestation" is not the material cause.
But no authority is known for bringing about the twofold meaning [i.e.
"from what" signifies both the efficient and the material cause] by
resorting to tantra or av r tti . And so [the statement]: "because the
efficient and the material cause have been asked; ’and from what is this
[world] consisting of the moveable and the inert?' " is incongruous.
comment
The terms " tantra " and " av r tti" (repetition) are used in Mimamsa
texts to denote the performance of auxiliary rituals. For example, if the
same auxiliary ritual is to be performed for two principal rituals, the
1 75
performance of the auxiliary ritual once only is called tantra . ' The
repetition of the auxiliary ritual, once for each of the principal rituals,
is avrtti.
Abhyankar states that Ramanuja cannot demonstrate that the word "from
what" signifies both the efficient and the material cause. Because either
of the two sutras : 1.4.30 or 1.4.31. cannot be applied in both senses. Nor
would it be correct to apply both of the sutras to the one word in order
to derive the two meanings.
3.217. ‘ WTO WH
l l l
^ RW i m ^
?r% ^
1 FRRrfwrnf qrn-
ft##’ I PR h ppt srft-
*RPIWRT
Jipro i ^ m^pm rtr-
^ I <pret-
501
m I w 1 ^ ^ ^ ^ >
# I srp ^r * ^rrgw%: I
^t: 1
3.217. [The statement]: "The affix mayaf in 'consists of what?' does not
have the sense of modification. Because a separate question is meaningless"
is also incongruous. Because a separate question is logically possible in
the way that was told (3.214.). [The statement]: "by this: 'consists of
what?' it is asked: what is the nature of the world...?" is incongruous
as well. The meaning of this: "what is the nature?" is "who is the Self
of which [world]?". And the word "Self" there is accepted by you as having
the meaning of being connected with a body, not as having the meaning of
the essential nature. However the meaning of being "connected with a body"
is not obtained through the affix mayat . Even if the affix mayat is used
in the sense of "abundance" there is no rule: abundance is only through
the nature of being the Self. And so because there is no ascertainment
that: " 'what is the nature?' is alone the meaning of the question”, the
ascertainment of the meaning of the reply on account of its congruity with
that [meaning of the question] cannot be done. And so [the statement]: "it
is ascertained that the grammatical apposition 'and he is the world', which
is the answer to this: 'consists of what? 1 , is based upon the relation of
body and soul between the world and Brahman" is incongruous. On account of
this, having accepted it to be as though established that the grammatical
apposition in the reply: "and he is the world" is only based upon the
relation of body and self, the demonstration, in conformity with that
[above view], that the affix mayat in "consists of what?" is not used in
its own meaning [as conveying only the sense of the word to which it is
connected], is refuted.
Furthermore, even though the affix mayat conveys its own meaning
there is no logical impossibility for the answer; "and he is the world".
Because in the question ["what does the world consist of?"], "world" is the
502
subject and there is no negating factor in specifying that again as the
subject in the reply. Just as in the question; "what is gold?" , [there is
the reply]: "gold is fire". On the other hand, if the affix mayat has only
the meaning of "abundance", there is no logical possibility of the reply:
"and he is the world". Because even in the relation of body and the one
embodied there is no grammatical apposition in reality.
3.218.
q?T-
qfaq^RTH * \ qrqq^^ ^ to ^ wrz&i I
U JfW MTOIH-
1 ( %fPTTo Vivo % )
i m ^
FiT^TT ’ IT%T^-TWm gq: gq:
^ ’TTR 4 ^ ^RRTTTO°t
=q qr-% I wt\~
5[w ^ 5RT ( Mph° ^ qo \o) q^fq q I
i ‘^ro^kqrq qM ^mqnqq^q
( no vs^ qo W H | 5PRqe[F? rl^Wlttrq^
*T qT ^qg^qi-
mqr^l
qw 3 ‘sr sq^n’ (HIUO ^nfin ^fa^g^qq-
’Tih JWFRMq^wiR ( #qt° govsss qo ^ ) qpg-
xfiftrqi sqiqfTftqPqT q^Rqq Hf^FftfcT H rTT^Tt^ ^Tf^frq: I qq
3.218. But what has been said (^rT,B.Para.54.p.111 .):
if the scripture is accepted as aiming at teaching
an entity free from distinction, all these questions
and answers do not agree. And the entire scripture
which is in the form of an exposition of that [entity
free from distinction] does not agree. Because if that
was so, for the single question: "what is the substratum
of the erroneous world?", there should be only a single
503
answer: "pure Knowledge free from distinction".
That is worthless. Because the cycle of worldly existence is based upon
a beginningless mental impression, therefore formulating questions again
and again, successively in a different way, is meaningful for
accomplishing the steadiness of intellect: "Brahman is real, what is
other is false" which is for the purpose of the removal of that [mental
impression],
Although it is said (EsrT.B.Para.54.p.111 .);
If the grammatical apposition [in the statement "and
he is the world"] relates to the oneness of substance
between the world and Brahman, then the nature of
being the sole resort of auspicious qualities such as
"having true resolve" etc. and the nature of being
opposed to everything which should be abandoned would
be negated. And Brahman would be the abode of everything
impure.
That too is not so. Because in regard to what is free from qualities, the
negation of qualities is acceptable. And on account of resorting to the
teaching of "apparent transformation" there is no possibility of
demonstrating [Brahman] to be the abode of everything impure.
And what has been said (£ri.B.Para.54,p.111,);
This grammatical apposition has its primary sense
only in the relation between a self and its body.
That is also not the case. Because you must necessarily say that there is
an implied meaning of the word "world" in the sense of "its inner ruler",
or that there is an implied meaning of this "he" in the sense of "[the
world] has that [vi§^u] as its Self" and therefore there is no primary
signification.
But those statements in the sacred texts, sutras and Puranas such
as: "Two birds..." (Mu.3.1.1.) etc., which are adduced as the means of
504
knowledge for the difference between the individual soul and Brahman
(^ri.B.Para.57.p.11 6f«), are engaged only having accepted the difference
pertaining to ordinary relations in the way that has been told. So no
contradiction, among those [texts] can be suspected. Thus the non-duality
of Brahman, free from distinction, is established.
505
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE: VlSlST£DVAITAMAT5NUPAPATTI .
1 . The Siddhantadarsanam is a sutra vork which attempts to
reconcile the view of Sankhya and Vedanta. It is said to have
been composed by Vyasa, though M. Lai Sandal in. his introduction
to the text dismisses this opinion and suggests that the work
was composed after the fourteenth century, cf., M, Lai Sandal
(trans), The Siddhanta Darsanam of Vyasa . The Sacred Books of
the Hindus. Vol.xxix. Allahabad. 1925. The text with a
commentary by Visvadevacarya is published in the Snandasrama
Sanskrit Series. No.134. Poona. 1907.
2. The name of the commentary upon the Siddhantadarsanam .
3. This explanation is based upon the commentary to the
Siddhantadarsanam . 1.1.7.
4. According to this maxim, when a compound can be resolved either
as a karmadharaya or a tatpuru ga the former takes precedence,
Cf. , P.K, Gode and C.G. Karve (ed) Prin. Vaman Sivaram Apte ,
The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary . Revised and enlarged
ed. 1957. Kyoto. 1978, p.926. Also, G.A. Jacob, A Handful of
Popular Maxims current in Sanskrit literature . Second ed.
Reprint, Delhi. 1983. p.80.
5. Cf,, B.S.3. 2.1.14. p.373, line 5ff.
6. Read adrgte. The avagraha in the text has been added by the
translator.
7. In the Gitabhasya 6.8, Sankara distinguishes between ,jnana and
vijnana in this manner: "jnana is the thorough knowledge of the
things told in the scripture. Vi.jnana is bringing about the
experience for oneself that what has been known from the
scripture is 'indeed in that manner'."
8. The separation of the pot from the name and form is for the
purpose of understanding through imagination. According to the
Advaitin there is, strictly speaking, no pot separate from the
name and form.
9. This is in agreement with Sankara's alternative explanation, Cf.,
Ch.^.8.14,1. p,604, line 4.
10. B.S.Jd, 1,1.1. p.27, line 1, Sari.B.I .1 .1 , Para.2. p.2.
11. B.S.3.1 .1 .1 . p.34, line2,
12. Ramarayakavi, £rl ^ankarasankarabhagyavimarsah . Guntur, 1953. p,4.
13. Baudhayana. Cf., Karmarkar. Introduction, p.xx.
14. This view is put forward in the £rutaprakasika . U, VTraraghavacarya
(ed.) Brahmasutra-^rlbhagya withSrutaprakasika . Vol.1. Madras.
1967. p.24.
15. Abbreviation of the JsriT.B. text,
16. Cited in the Srutaprakasika , p.24.
17.
Ramaraya, op-cit ,, p.4, line 15f. p.6, line 25f.
U. 1 .18.174.
506
18.
19.
20 .
21 .
22 .
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31 .
32.
33.
34.
ibid ., 1 .18.199.
Adaptation of the ^ri.B. text to convey the meaning more succinctly.
This statement is based upon &fh.!SS. 4.4.21. p.928, line 27.
"Remembrance is knowledge which is produced only through a
mental impression caused by a previous experience.” Tati.Paral8.
p.11 .
The latter interpretation is according to Sankara. B.S.^. 4.1.12.
p.844,- line 4.
Cf,, gloss upon this verse by Earxdharasvamin,
These are enumerated in J.S. 3.3.14.
Slight adaptation of £rI.B. "tegam" has been substituted by
udgitadyupasananam .
Vedantakalpalatika , op-cit ., p,80.
Tai.Js. 2.1. p.285, line 14ff.
ibid ., line 14,
ibid ., line 14,
The meaning of the maxim is that a positive statement ( vidhi ) or
a negation ( ni g edha ) resolve in the attribute of the substantive
if they are not applicable to the substantive. For example, a
positive statement is that "the individual soul is an agent".
But according to Advaita, the individual soul is consciousness
qualified by the internal-organ. If it is accepted that
consciousness, the substantive ( vise g ya ), is without agentship
then the ascription of agentship must go to the internal-organ
which is the attribute ( vise gapa). The example of a negation
could be a person qualified by a walking stick. If the person
is standing without the stick, then a statement that "the man
with the stick is not here" the substantive is negated ie,,
the man qualified by the stick. But since the man is there , the
negation resolves only in the attribute i.e. the stick.
Cf., the commentary of Rangaramanuja, TaittirTya-Aitareya-Chandogya
Upani g ad Bha g ya by fari Ranga Ramanuja Muni with the Pari g kara of
U. VTraraghavacarya . Madras. 1973. p.45.
This statement is made by Ramanuja in the Mahapurvapaks a. Para.24,
p.40.
Adaptation of the ^rl.B.
Suggestion ( vyanjana ) is considered to be a separate mode of
signification in the poetic treatises. The Naiyayikas include it
within implication ( lak gapa). Cf., Vedantakalpalatika , op-cit ,,p.77.
35 .
507
36. "the scripture is of an ordinary nature" means that (a) it has no
absolute reality like Brahman, (b) It employs methods of reasoning
vhich are in accord vith the modes of reasoning established in the
vorld.
37. V.P. p.114.
38. ibid . , pi 15.
39. ibid . , p.114. Tai.3. 2.1.
40. Tai.g. 2.1. p.282, line lOf, line 15; p.283, line If, line4f ; p.284,
line 8; p.285, line 18.
41. ibid ,, p.285, line 16, 18,
42. The remarks on "purport" are derived from Ramaraya, op—cit ., p.35,
line 8f. See also, V.P. p.28.
43. Ramaraya, ibid ., p.36, line 17. For a useful examination of these
and related matters see R. Balasubramanian, Some Problems in the
Epistemology and Metaphysics of Ramanuja . Madras. 1978. p,19.
44. Ramaraya, ibid ., p.33, line 4f.
45. ibid ., p.33, line 6f. Balasubramanian, ibid ., p.llf,
46. U. VTraraghavacarya, Paramarthaprakasika . Madras, 1940, p.93, line 20,
47. Ramaraya, op-cjt ., p.3l , line 23f.
48. This passage occurs in the Mahapurvapak ga section of the Jsrl.B. ,
Para.23,p.37f.
49. The portion: "But if there.,,vith regard to itself" has been added by
Abhyankar.
50. Cf,, Balasubramanian, Some Problems , op-eit .. p.28.
51. Ramaraya, op-cit ., p.42, line 6f. £r”.B.Para.30.p,50.
52. Ramaraya, ibid ., p.43, line 5f.
53. ibid . , p.43, line 23f.
54. Balasubramanian, Some Problems , op—cit ,, p.36.
55. V.S. Abhyankar (ed),. £ri Bhagya-Catussutrl , vith the editor's t ika
Samasokti . Pune, Second ed. 1965. p.66.
56. ^ri.B.Para.30,p.51. Balasubramanian, Some Problems . op-cit ., p.37,
57. 3ri,B.Para.31,p.52.
58. Ramaraya, op—cit ., p.45, line 25.
59. ibid .. p.45, line 30f.
60. ibid .. p.46, line 3f,
508
61. ibid ,, p.47, line 14.
62. Cf., 1.2. and comment,
63. V.P. p.12,
64. Slightly adapted. Ramanuja's use of the word " siddham " refers to
the acceptance of the purvapakgin 1 s statement in Para.24, p.39.
65. Slightly adapted to convey the context of the quotation.
66. Ramaraya, op-cit ., p,68. line 13f.
67. Ramaraya also refers to this matter, ibid . , p.72, line 7f.
68. " anubhuteh " has been added for clarity.
69. " anubhuti" has been added for clarity.
70. Ramaraya, op-cit ., p.71, line 3f. Also, cf., lari'.B.Para.26.p.42.
71 . " karmanam" in the quotation is better read as " karmaq a 11 which is
found in the Karmarkar ed. and the ed. by Viraraghavacarya, op-cit .,
p.160.
72. Cf., V.P, p.99« Also, B. Jhalaklkar (ed.), Nyayakosa . Re-edited,
V.S. Abhyankar, Poona. 1978, p.677, line 13.
73. The text of this verse cited here and the text of other editions i.e.
Madhavananda and Roer, are mutually discrepant,
74. Slightly adapted.
75. Slightly adapted,
76. This maxim illustrates the failure to accomplish the desired object
and the occurrence of what one strenuously tried to avoid: a person
who seeks to avoid paying the road toll takes another path but
loses his way in the dark. At day—break he finds himself in the
vicinity of the toll-gate he had sought to avoid, Cf., Jacob, Maxims ,
op-cit ., p.26. Also, Gode and Karve, op-cit ., Appendix E. p.60,
77. The sixfold modifications of an object are; it originates, exists,
grows, modifies, declines and perishes. Cf. , B.S.3, 1.1.2. p.48,
line 2, They are quoted from the Nirukta of Xaska,
78. Cf., Mahapurvapakg a Para.26f. p.42.
79. Ramaraya, op—cit ,, p.77, line 22.
80. Slightly adapted.
81. Ramaraya, op-cit ., p«77, line 13.
82. B ? h.g. 2.4.9. p.762, line 3 - 2.4.13. p.767f, line9f.
83. Ramaraya, op-cit ., p.80, line 22f.
84. Cf., B. S. . Adhyasabha sya. p.4f. Also, Sw. Nikhilananda trans,
Rr sya-Yiveka . Mysore. Fifth ed. 1970. Vs.lf.
509
85. The illustration of; "the pot does not exist", which was previously
discussed, is mentioned by Kaundabhatta in his comments to verse 16.
in the Vaiyakaranabhu ga nasara .
86. This verse is cited in the Ssrutaprakasika , Viraraghavacarya (ed.),
op-cit . , p.144, line 4f.
87. Ramaraya, op-cit .. p,84, line 24f,
88. Ramanuja maintains that the Advaitins view contradicts the knowledge
of the attribute and its possessor which is immediately evident in
a cognition such as: "I know". Cf., £ri.B.Para.37.p>62.
89. Abhyankar has made a word-play upon Ramanuja’s verse: "If the sense
of "I" is not the self, the self would not be inner...".
90. P.S. 5.4.50.
91. Cf. , 1.34., and comment.
92 . Ramaraya, op-cit .. p.90, line 29.
93. ibid . , p.91, line 3f.
94. Balasubramanian, Some Problems ., op-cit ., p,51.
95. Cf., Mahapurvapak sa. Para.27.p.43. Ramanuja presents a very accurate
account of the Advaitins view: "ato manug.yo ' ham
96. Cf,, also Ramaraya, op-cit ., p.92, line 22f.
97. Cf,, B.S.3, Adhyasabha g ya , p.24, line 2f.
98. This is Ramanuja's purvapak sa.
99. Slightly adapted. Tadvata is explained as dehatmabhimanavata .
100. Ramaraya, op-cit ., p.95, line 22.
101. ibid ., p.95, line 26.
102. Slightly adapted.
103. P.S. 3.1 .133.
104. Ramaraya, op—cit ., p.96, line 16f.
105. ibid , . p.96, line 21f.
106. Slightly adapted. The word atmanah added for clarity.
107. Space has the quality of sound. Air has the qualities of sound and
touch. Fire has the qualities of sound, touch and form. Rater has
has the qualities of sound, touch, form and taste. Earth has the
qualities of sound, touch, form, taste and smell.
108. Cf. , comment to 1.51.
109. Adapted
510
110. Cf., text, 2.10.
111. This sentence is Ramanuja's opponent's objection (£ri.B.Para.43.p.76.
Abhyankar has utilized it as the conclusion of his own argument.
112. Adapted,
113. Cf., comment to 1.19.
114. Cf., comment to 1.10., and fn, 36. in ch.1.
115. Cf,, Ma. vs.5. Also, Ramaraya, op-cit ., p.114, line 9f.
116. Ramaraya, ibid ., p.114, line 17f.
117. £rI.B.Para.42,p,75.
118. Slightly adapted,
119. Ramaraya, op-cit ., p.122., line Ilf.
120. Slightly adapted: " tathaiva" changed to "v^ tha ".
121. Read as the passive form; " apek s yate ".
122. Cf., comment to 1.2., final para.
123. Cf., Stmabodha ., vs.5.
124. This sentence is given by Ramanuja as the objection.
125. Viraraghavacarya (ed.), op-cit . , p.177., reads.- " jnanavi s ayatvat "
instead of " mithyajnanavi g ayatvat" ,
126. Ramaraya, op-cit ., p.129., line 24f.
127. This sentence is based upon Ramanuja's opponentls objection.
128. Cf., fn. 186 in ch.1.
129. Cf., B.S.3. 3.2.4.
130. This sentence is based upon Ramanuja's opponent's objection,
131 . Cf. , B^h.iS. 4,3,6. p.865. , line 1 5.
132. Slightly adapted. The first sentence of the quotation is a prima
facie view. In the following sentence, Ramanuja shows that it is
in accord with his own position.
133. Slightly adapted.
134. Cf,, comment to 3.47.
135. Cf., comment to 2.3.
136. Cf., comment to 1,17.
511
137. "And there is no fault, since [the quality of Knowledge] exists
wherever the Self is, because that is seen" (B.S.2.3.30.). In
keeping with the topic, the translation of the sutra follows the
Visig^advaita interpretation,
138. "[Brahman] is the material cause, since this is not in conflict
with the declaration and the examples" (B.S.1 .4.23.).
139. In the verse cited, the words: "that which is imperishable" ( tad
avyayam ) have been omitted.
140. This mantra has not been located in the texts consulted.
141. P.S.7.1.1. See comment to 3.179.
142. This text has not been located.
143. The statement is an attempt to bring the word "jnana" under the
class of words beginning with arsas . However it does not appear
in the list supplied by Vasu. Cf., P.S.5.2.127. The meaning of
that sutra is; "The affix ac (a^) is used in the sense of possession
( matup ) after the words ' arsas ' etc.",
144. The text is adapted,
145. P.S.7.1.1.
146. In Kaiyyata's commentary upon the Mahabhasya (P.S. 1 .2.42.),
grammatical apposition is defined as: bhinnapravyttinimittaprayuktasya
anekasya sabdasya-ekasminnarthe vr ttih samanadhikaranyam ucyate .
147. Nagesabhat^a, Brhat —sabdendusekhara . Saraswati Bhavana Granthamala.
Vol.87. Pt.1. Varanasi. I960, p.655.
148. Patanjali, Vyakaran a -mahabha g yam . With the Pradipa of Kaiyyata and
the Uddyota of Nagojibhat ta. Rohatak. 1961. p.352.
The context is that sutra 8.1 .72. states that a preceding vocative
is treated as though it does not exist so that the following word
receives the accent it would have taken had the vocative not existed.
Sutra 8.1,73. prevents the operation of the previous sutra in the
case where two vocatives are in grammatical apposition and the second
qualifies the first. In this situation the second vocative loses its
accent, Patanjali then gives a counter example; "0 Aghnye, goddess
Sarasvati" to show that if the vocatives are in grammatical
apposition but are synonyms, the rule does not apply and the second
vocative retains its accent. Abhyankar cites this example to show
that grammatical apposition does not depend upon a difference of
reason for the application of the words to a certain thing, for then
even synonyms would not have grammatical apposition.
149. Kaiyata is the name of the principal commentator upon the Mahabha g ya .
150. Vyakarap a -mahabha s y a, op-cit ., 8.1.73. p.352,
151. ^ri.B.Para.48.p,89,90.
152. Raraaraya, op-cit .. p.157, line 3f.
512
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
1 58.
159.
160.
161 .
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
Slightly adapted; " sigadhayi g ita " is omitted.
" Sarvasakhyapratyayanyaya 11 . cf., Jacob, Maxims , op-cit ., 111 . p. 1 4-3.
Slightly adapted.
Slightly adapted.
Slightly adapted: " kasmad utkramanti " has been added.
Slightly adapted.
Ramanuja has cited these texts as his purvapak ga, &rT.B.Para.51,p.97.
Slightly adapted; " uktasruti su" has been added.
Abhyankar reads; " anavagatananatvam ". Karmarkar reads; " avagata-
nanatvam ". Thibaut's translation follows the latter reading while
the translation by Rangacharya and Aiyangar follows the former
reading. " Anavagatananatvam " would appear to be more correct in
view of the subsequent discussion. The edition by Viraraghavacarya
reads: " anavagatam nanatvam" which would confirm Abhyankar's reading.
Slightly adapted.
" Kurvadrupata " is used in Buddhist thought to designate the cause
that exists just prior to the effect. For example, because everything
is momentary in nature, the seed that gives rise to the sprout is
different at every moment. The seed which exists just before the
production of the sprout is the " kurvadrupa ". Cf., Nyayakosa , op—cit .,
p.238. In the topic it means "not a cause at all".
Adapted, without deviation of the meaning.
The reading in the Vis.P. is; " dvaitino ' tattvadarsinat ;.
This explanation is based upon the isrutaprakasika . Cf., Viraraghava¬
carya, op-cit ., p.123, 124,
P.S.3 .2.101 .
168. The affix " kvip " modifies the verbal root while adding no form of
its own, cf., Abhyankar and Shukla, A Dictionary , op-cit . , p.1,35.
169. P.S.6.3.109.
170. Abhyankar restates Ramanuja's purvapak ga as his conclusion. Cf., ^rT.
B.Para54,p.108.
171. P.S.4.3.143.
172. P.S.1 .4.24., 2.3.28.
173. The fifth case is used in the position of the object when the affix
lyap (ya) is elided. For example; prasadam aruhya prek g ate = prasadat
prek g ate . Cf., S.C. Vasu. Siddhanta Kaumudi of Bhattoji Dlk g ita .
Delhi. 1970 [?]. p.358. ~ ‘ .
513
174. In the sentence; "the Ganga originates from the Himalaya", the word
"Himalaya" is the "first manifestation".
175. Cf., Nyayakosa , op~cit., p.319, line2f.
514
4,1
m W ft *t \VMH I *W-
f^rni? ( \ ^ ) TW f TRT 5 w% ( 3 ) ^w-
3TT^ ( « ) ^ ^ ) r^-
T>\$m% ( V9 ) R^^rqfTTRW: BP(T ^I'TT^TT RT^tw-
T^m: ^ ^^
3 ^rt: 1 <rar ft—
4 ,1. All this world, consisting of mountains and oceans etc., is of an
apparent nature and is certainly false because it is the effect of
Ignorance. The exponents of Visi§tadvaita have shown seven types of
logical fallacy in regard to the teaching of Ignorance: [l] the logical
fallacy concerning the locus, [ 2 ] the logical fallacy of "concealing",
[ 3 ] the logical fallacy concerning its essential nature, [4] the logical
fallacy of being indeterminable, [ 5 ] the logical fallacy concerning a
means of proof, [6] the logical fallacy of an agent for its cessation and
[ 7 ] the logical fallacy of its cessation. Those [types of logical fallacy]
can only be pleasing on account of not being investigated, but they are
incapable of withstanding scrutiny. To explain:
4.2.
£r^%rr%r*rr arrwj'm^ h
4.2. Commencing with the "locus", the "concealing" and the
"essential nature" and likewise being "indeterminable"
are [all] logically possible for Ignorance which is the
power of Brahman, 19.
wwm toj: twfh
a#m*TT ^ j
515
^ \ h*i i to* to i w <r
^ to^r wi^ *r: ?ti\wi-
r* I ^ ^wr irf^r qwt^rto tom i tofTto-
*mrfa I m *r?t to *to
#?rap^l ^1 l i ^ffetow ^
wmwERifi^ i r f£to 1 mmtototo wi
toltolH | ^ T| w: Wlto ^ v THto ?3T?-
^TR^m I ^ 1 TIR sRnfto | ?R*r
mTtom s > ( to° 50 £3 ’T 0 ? o) toton aren-
ftomtotoy^ito fto*T 1 ^ ft to^rRto^RqHm
smniton ^wffitoFtfto I
4.3. [l] According to the view of the non-dualists, the individual
soul alone is the locus of Ignorance, Because the individual soul alone
has the cognition; "I am ignorant". Although the supreme Self has the
power in the form of Ignorance and so that [supreme Self] too is the
locus of that [ignorance], still, that [ignorance] does not cause any
effect there [in the supreme Self],
But what has been said (^ri,B.Para.59.p.1 25.:
because the state of the individual soul has been
superimposed by Ignorance, the individual soul cannot
possibly be the locus of that [ignorance] since
[the soul] comes into being at a time subsequent to
Ignorance.
That is not so. Because there is no defect of mutual dependence here
between Ignorance and the individual soul. For instance according to
your view, the individual soul, who is the body of the supreme Self and
whose nature is contracted just because of karma, is [nonetheless] the
locus of karma . For being the locus of karma [i.e. the locus of good and
bad unseen results] is impossible for a nature which is uncontracted
such as a liberated soul. If [you say] there is no defect because [the
connection between the soul and karma ] is beginningless according to the
516
maxim of the seed and the sprout, [we reply] then it is the same for me
also.
According to your view, does the individual soul perform karma
while having a nature which is [already] contracted or while having a
nature which is uncontracted? Not the first, because the contraction of
its nature is produced by karma and therefore there is no possibility of
the contraction of that [nature] prior to doing karma . Nor the second,
because there is no possibility of engaging in karma which causes the
contraction of one’s own nature. Indeed, no vise person who is able makes
2
a prison house for himself and enters it unless it be under duress.
What has been said (£$rT.B.Para. 59 .p.1 25 .) beginning with:
Nor even depending upon Brahman, because that [Brahman]
is of the nature of self-luminous Knowledge and therefore
is contrary to Ignorance.
That too is refuted. Because ve certainly do not accept that Ignorance
is dependent upon Brahman. For we do not accept that Brahman, who is
unmanifest as having gained the state of an individual soul, is the locus
of Ignorance.
comment
For the Advaitin, the metaphysical principal of Ignorance ( avidya )
is necessary in order to account for the appearance of the phenomenal
world (see comment to 1.33.). Ramanuja contends that if avidya has no
independent existence, which the Advaitin must accept, then it must depend,
upon something else, Ramanuja asks whether the individual soul ( jIva ), or
Brahman, is its locus. He argues that both alternatives are untenable.
The j Tva cannot be the locus of avidya since the jlva is itself a product
of avidya . The effect cannot exist prior to the cause in order to serve
as the locus for the cause. Moreover, Brahman cannot be the locus of
avidya because Brahman is of the nature of Knowledge i.e. self-luminous
awareness, and avidya is what is opposite to knowledge and is considered
to be sublated by knowledge and hence avidya cannot have what is contrary
in nature as its locus.
In his reply Abhyankar upholds the view espoused by Mandanamisra and
517
Yacaspati that the jTva is the locus of avidya . J He then argues that there
is no mutual dependence in the manner that the ,jiva is due to avidya and
avidya exists because of the ,jiva . Because neither can be ascertained to
have a beginning just as in the case of the seed and the sprout. Abhyankar
points out that the Visi^^advaita criticism of the jiva as the locus of
avidya does not carry weight because the Visig-fcadvaitin has the same -
difficulty explaining the connection between karma and the existence of a
body. There is no possibility of karma without a body, but without karma
a body is not possible.^ The Visigtadvaitins seek to avoid this mutual
dependence through the postulation of a beginningless series. Advaitins
maintain that the same explanation can be employed in the case of the
jiva and avidya .
According to the view of Suresvara and the Vivaran a, Brahman is the
locus of avidya . This view is acceptable because Brahman is of itself
not opposed to avidya . Brahman, as the witness—consciousness ( sak s icaitanya )
of all mental states, illumines both knowledge: "I know" and ignorance:
"I do not know" and so because Brahman is not opposed to ignorance there
is no untenability in Brahman being the locus of avidya . ^
Advaitins distinguish between the consciousness which is the essential
nature of Brahman ( svarupa,jnana ), which is not opposed to avidya , and
consciousness in the form of a cognition i.e. a mental modification
(vr ttijnana ), which is contrary to avidya and hence is required in order
to remove avidya . Ramanuja argues against this distinction. He says it is
not correct to distinguish between the cognition: "Brahman is of the nature
of Knowledge" which is considered to negate avidya and the Knowledge which
is the essential nature of Brahman. Because both kinds of Knowledge are
of the same nature i.e. the nature of illumination which is Brahman. If
a mental modification is opposed to avidya . the consciousness which is the
nature of Brahman should also be opposed to avidya .
Ramanuja's objection attempts to blur the important distinction
between consciousness per se and the consciousness occurring in a cognition.
Consciousness per se merely illumines the presence and absence of all
particular co.grdtions such as memory etc. Consciousness is opposed to
neither knowledge nor ignorance since it illumines both. Cognition,
however, is consciousness in a specific "form" which is conditioned by
the content of the cognition, A valid cognition is opposed to ignorance
since it is a matter of experience that; "previously I did not know this,
now I know it", A cognition is contrary to ignorance when both ignorance
and knowledge have the same content ( vi g aya )^ Ignorance, like knowledge,
518
is about some thing for upon inquiry it can be ascertained that: "I do
not know this". If ignorance and knowledge have the same content then
they are brought into opposition and the ignorance of the particular thing
is sublated by the knowledge of that thing, just as one may say: "I did
not know the pot, now I know it". So too, the ignorance and the knowledge
of Brahman have the same content, i.e. Brahman and so the ignorance of
Brahman can be sublated by a particular cognition arising from the
appropriate means of knowledge.
Ramanuja also argues (3rT.B.Para.59,p.126.) that a cognition such as:
"Brahman is of the nature of Knowledge" would invalidate the Advaitins
position that Brahman, being experience per se , is not the object of
another experience. However, what the Advaitin means by the "knowledge of
Brahman" is that the true nature of Brahman is experienced, but Brahman
is not experienced as an object. For if Brahman is experienced there
would be the contradiction between the experiencing agent and the object
of experience which is none other than the Self.® Even in nirvikalpaka—
samadhi there is no objective experience of Brahman. The wise person
remains as Brahman alone due to the absence of any experience of duality
and because of that reason it is said; "he experiences Brahman".^
^ 1 irerafafaR HR H^r%<rirT-
t^rhh mrai m > ( Mtaio q° ^ ^
*F-R W-TRSRR HtJ-
| WTCricrtfaR HR tR SfOT-
h g m m* ® I h f| mi hot
HS fTH ^TSn I
*4.4. [ 2 ] In order to establish the logical fallacy of "concealing", the
refutation has been said by dividing the meaning of the word "concealing"
in the text (3rl.B.Para.60,p.128,);
What is known as the concealing of light, is the
obstruction to the origination of light or the
destruction of existing [light].
That is worthless. Because there is no understanding of the real meaning
of the word "concealing". What is known as the concealing of light, is the
519
non-manifestation of the light which is indeed existing hut not the
destruction of light. For nobody believes that when the light of the sun
is concealed by clouds the light is destroyed,
c omment
In Ramanuja's third objection, which will be discussed below, he~
seeks to prove that the Advaitin cannot explain the ontological status
°f avidya , Ramanuja asks whether avidya is real ( paramartha ) or unreal
( aparamartha ). The Advaitin cannot accept the first alternative since it
would result in duality. Ramanuja then attempts to demonstrate that the
second alternative too cannot be accepted. Briefly, he argues that the
Advaitin considers the unreal world to consist of the three factors of
seer, seen and seeing. If avidya is unreal then it should be in the form
of one of these factors. But if avidya is either the seer, the seen, or
the unreal seeing which is conditioned by the seer and the seen, then it
too would require a cause to account for it and that too would require a
cause and so there would be an infinite regress.
4.5.
JwflFRR fwr qRPPJR
WTixfn I
f r rrirrt r Tjotr Rr l
STRUTT WR fd^: RRRR: || ( RR-Ro 30 )
I rtrwrh r cp-^%: i rr Irttri: I 5i%:
-4.5, [ 3 ] What has been said (^ri.B.Para.60.p,128,) for establishing the
logical fallacy concerning the essential nature, beginning with;
This awareness, which is self-luminous and without an
object and a location, on account of a defect [i.e avidya ]
located within itself, it experiences itself as having
endless locations and endless objects. It must be
discerned here; is this defect which is located in itself
520
[in avareness] absolutely real or not absolutely real?
That is not pleasing. Because according to our view, that of the naay l
Vedantins, the supreme Self is of the nature of Knowledge. For there is
the statement:
Knowledge is certainly not an attribute of the Self,
nor is it in any way a quality. The Self, who is only
of the nature of Knowledge, is eternal, all pervading,
auspicious . (Yoga.vp)J
And the power of that [Self] is Ignorance which is a positive entity. The
occurrence of duality should not be suspected, because a power has no
separate existence with regard to the possessor of the power. And because
the power is of an apparent nature, it has no existence in reality.
4.6 .
1 fTO
I ^TFir pnr rrhitpht srfr; i ff^
I sriclRTV^ | 5^$$ qRHIRq
i * wqinRT: r tm %f^ i
^ RTO HTP-PT tP-TTN 'STTWPffcTPR
^ m ^TTOrwKqR- mm ^ mm \
m I mmm-
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^ 5 ^ ^ ^ Wp
I Rfq 3^T p* i # 5 RT*PPPT
^ i wsspr ^ pfrmT htM*tr
t% S l hr l p^fppRTW-
h ^isqiRn% m I mvm HRiRmn I
mmm m RTfq qq^r^rra hr ^mq~
w
521
I zm I 1 pTT'TRTn^n^RT>JT J
( ^RTo ^ cVq° ^ ^ JT^q; |
4,6. That [power] is indeed the material cause of the world. This very
[power] is expressed by words such as " prakrti" , " roaya ", " tamas " etc. since
it is a particular type of modification. That has been told in the
Vasi §t asm rti ;
Some call that [power] prakrti , 3ome call it maya ,
whereas others say it is minute particles (Yoga.vr.).
The transformation of this very [power] is in the form of the pradhana ,
mahat , aharikara and the five great elements and it is in the form of their
respective aggregates. The subtle primary matter ( pradhana ) is the state
of equilibrium of the three qualities sattva , rajas and tamas . The
mahattattva is indeed the intellect. Because the intellect is translucent
by nature, pure consciousness —which is the essential nature of Knowledge—
reflects there. The Lord is consciousness reflected in the total intellect.
The individual soul is consciousness reflected in an individual intellect.
Some say that the Lord is consciousness reflected in Ignorance,
Although the Knowledge which is the Original is without an object
and a location, still, the Knowledge which is the reflection -in the form
of the individual soul and the Lord- appears to possess an object and a
location on account of the Ignorance which is a positive entity which is
located in itself [i.e. in the reflection]. Because Ignorance, just by its
own nature, has something as its object and is located in something. For
example, because of the dirt [i.e. avidya ] on a mirror, the face reflected
in that appears to be dirty. It is like that. And so the Knowledge which
is the reflection -in the form of the individual soul and the Lord-
experiences itself as having endless locations and endless objects on
account of the defect in the form of Ignorance which is located within
itself [i.e. in the reflection]. But not [the Knowledge] which is the
522
Original [i.e. consciousness as such does not "experience itself"].
The Ignorance which is a positive entity has no independence in
regard to its own transformation and in regard to apprehending the
Original. Nor even does the pure Brahman induce that [ignorance to undergo
transformation etc.]. But depending upon the pure Brahman which is its
locus, it transforms and apprehends the reflection. A mirror, for instance,
does not apprehend the reflection due to the impulse of the face, but
naturally. Just because of this, that [mirror] does not have independence.
Because there is dependence upon proximity to the face. This individual
soul, who is a reflection of Knowledge, experiences itself as having
endless locations and endless objects because of the defect in the form
of Ignorance which is a positive entity and that defect is certainly
without absolute reality. Just because of this, that [ignorance] does not
have dependence upon something else. Just as a light, through illumining
pots etc., illumines itself too just of its own accord without depending
upon another light, so too, this defect in the form of Ignorance which is
a positive entity, depending upon Brahman, it superimposes the world and
superimposes itself just of its own accordTherefore there is no infinite
regress. On account of this, [the statement] ($rx.B.Para,60.p.128,):
"there must be infinite regress due to the requirement of another primary
defect" has been answered.
4.7. ITFPimH -Jo <;<> qo
fVft h 5 tnwfijndirom Mt-
*rTOrriR*n^ ^ | h
ferih U% 3 l
m sumft i i r re reiw r ft I
i ^ wrf trirrhi ^ |
fRqttRR ^T v TTR 7 4\n5Ud f%
523
rRUH {% ^T ^RRT^^^RTlfm^'KRRR-
ftwrq; i h WR^fpfr I wft sra gwfe^nrc. ?wt srrftfn: !
I *tt 3 Bf ^wpto 1/
4.7. Although it has been said (^rT.B.Para.62.p.133.)^:
only the prior non-existence of knowledge is
experienced in the case of "I am ignorant".
That is not so. Because prior non-existence is invariably cognized only
as what is limited on account of time. But if [you say]: the cognition
"I am ignorant" must relate to absolute non-existence, or if temporary
non-existence is different then it could relate to that, but it does not
refer to Ignorance which is a positive entity, [we reply] Certainly not.
Because we do not accept that there is some "non-existence" which has
absolute reality. But [we accept non-existence] as a reality which pertains
to ordinary relations. And the reality pertaining to ordinary relations
is of a fictitious nature and so the unreal construction which is the
basis is only the Ignorance which is a positive entity. Thus the maxim of
1 2
"day break near the toll-station" occurs. Because the Ignorance which
is a positive entity is alone the basis of the absence of knowledge which
pertains to ordinary relations.
Furthermore, according to the system of you, Ramanuja, the cognition
that "I am ignorant" occurs for a bound soul. Is the knowledge which is
the meaning of the verbal root jha , which is being denied there, the
knowledge which is universal or a particular knowledge? Not the first,
because if there is no denial of a particular knowledge then such a
cognition which-is included in the knowledge which is universal exists,
therefore there is no possibility of the denial of the knowledge which
is universal. Because without the universal there is no possibility of
establishing the particular.
524
In the second case, is that [particular] knowledge about the
essential nature of the supreme Self, or about the qualities of the
supreme Self, or does it have the supreme Self for its object? It is
not the first and second. Because if that was the case, there would be
the cognition in that manner even for a liberated soul and that [type
of cognition] is not accepted even by you.
c omment
The sense is that if the knowledge being denied in "I am ignorant"
refers to the essential nature of the supreme Self or to His qualities,
then even a liberated soul would have to say "I am ignorant". Because
although a liberated soul can objectify the Lord he can not completely
comprehend His essential nature or His endless qualities. Therefore
the knowledge which is denied is that which relates to the supreme Self,
,4.8.
TWlt |TR 5TTH TO 3T
^Twrfwr: tor i \% 3
5 | TI-
^r-
I rR ITFT fTO-R HVTO flTSR SITO
VTTOT 1^mTTO
* Vi ^ ^RT^R^rqii%;iq
.4.8. But in the third case, in regard to the knowledge having the
supreme Self for its object, what has been superimposed -which is
indicated by the negative particle- can be demonstrated somehow with
difficulty. Because a liberated soul is one for whom knowledge has arisen
having as its object the supreme Self as it really is. And a bound soul
525
is one who has the false presumption that such knowledge has arisen
as it really is, even though it has arisen erroneously, and he
believes "I am not ignorant". But for whom such knowledge does not exist
to an even greater degree, he alone believes in that manner ["I am
ignorant"]. In regard to that [latter case], in the absence of that very
knowledge, how is the nature of it being superimposed able to be
demonstrated? But the superimposition of the nature of knowledge relating
to the supreme Self upon the knowledge relating to pots etc. is not logical
because those two are completely distinct.
But according to our system, since there is no knowledge having the
supreme Self as its object and since there is no knowledge concerning the
qualities of the supreme Self, the knowledge concerning the essential
nature of the supreme Self is alone the meaning of the verbal root jna .
And that Knowledge [concerning the essential nature of the supreme Self],
is in reality without location and without an object and so the Knowledge
which arises for a bound soul and which possesses a location and an object
is easily said to be just superimposed. Because the possession of a
location and an object in Knowledge is superimposed due to Ignorance, The
superimposition of having a location etc., which belongs to Ignorance,
upon the Knowledge which is a reflection is reasonable, like [the super-
imposition] of movement etc. belonging to water -which is the limiting
adjunct- upon the reflection of the sun. It is well known in the assembly
of the grammarians that the negative particle indicates what is super—
13
imposed. Moreover, in not accepting the Ignorance which is a positive
entity there would be the occurrence of tautology in the usages "I am
ignorant, I do not know anything" because even both of these words
"ignorant" and "I do not know" have the meaning of the absence of knowledge.
4 . 9 . m k *
( mnro <To \
526
^^fqqi%: I $wf ^qqfq cm \
*rfa$ mh m <n* rr^mwwim; i ^n%
tojt ^^nrn^mR ^ h |
ft’nvfo i ct*tt ^ *r*nm;TT^ wiww *Rm
<T*TT ^5RT^3TR v: T^T^m^^q *HWIWTTO ^WtMh^fa-
fam wr sr^wm^Ff to !
4.9. [4] What has been said (^rr.B.Para.60.p.1 29.) for establishing the
logical fallacy of being indeterminable;
indeed the whole totality of things has to be
established according to cognition.
In regard to that, it is said: every colour such as "this is white", "this
is yellow" has to he established by light. Even the black colour of
darkness is just the same. Although there is no direct dependence upon
light for the ascertainment of the colour of darkness, still, because
[the ascertainment of the colour of darkness] depends upon the absence of
light, there is certainly a dependence upon light as the counter-correlate
of its absence. When something exists at some place, where it does not
exist, there is the counter—correlate of its absence in that place. If
there is the total absence of the existence of light in the world, just
as the colour of other objects could not be ascertained so also the
colour of darkness could not be ascertained, just as it could not be
ascertained by one who is blind from birth. And so just as the colour of
darkness, though not an object of light, is able to be established by
light, similarly, the essential nature of the Ignorance which is a
positive entity, though not an object of the twofold cognition in the
form of "existent" or "non-existent", is certainly able to be established
by the cognition in the manner of being "indeterminable",
comment
In regard to the logical fallacy concerning the essential nature of
527
avidya (cf. 4.5. and preceding comment), Ramanuja stated that avidya
has to be determined as either real or unreal. The Advaitin, however,
considers that there is a third alternative: avidya is indeterminable as
real or as unreal. In response to this view, Ramanuj’a argues that all
cognitions are in a twofold form: either a thing exists or it does not
exist. When all cognitions are restricted to the form of existent ( sat )
or non-existent ( asat ) it is untenable to argue that there can be the
cognition of an entity which is distinct from both sat and asat ^
The Advaitin can respond to Ramanuj'a’s critique by applying an
uncompromising definition of what constitutes real and unreal. What is
not cognized at any time is totally unreal, like the horns of a rabbit.
What is not negated is real, such as Brahman.^ On the basis of this
definition, avidya cannot be totally unreal because it is perceived in
statements such as "I am ignorant". Nor can avidya be real since it is
sublated by knowledge. Avidya cannot be both real and unreal because it '
is a contradiction to hold that the same entity can be simultaneously
existent and non-existent. Therefore the ontological status of avidya is
distinct from what is real and unreal ( sadasadvi1ak gana) and hence it is
said to be indeterminable as either real or unreal. The world too, as the
effect of the primary avidya , has an indeterminable status (see comment
to 1.42.).
■4.10.
- 4.10. Although the exponents of maya do not accept that, in reality, the
pure Brahman who is the Original has the experience of Ignorance, it is
taught as accepted by the exponents of roaya and then for the refutation
of that [view which the Advaitins do not accept] a great net of logic
has been stated by the text beginning (&rT.B.Para.62,p,133.):
The experience of Ignorance is not possible for
Brahman whose sole nature is eternal, free, self-
luminous consciousness
528
Nothing whatsoever is said by way of reply there. Because the exponents
of maya do not accept it to be so.
4.11.
qr?: i I
(^n° i° M ) ^3% ^^4^-
i m
3 tRhtto <f?qTqrc\ { ^ qidrfa
^r^mm it <nn: | <pt
3^4 4^4 tg: l mr ^nnw4
* <ra* ’ # h% v^q^r; j ^ 4-
^^pti qn*n-
qpn^rw ft
^t4t ^t'Tt <r^t%wr *4 i #-
^fr4t^r ^wwt #*: wtw: i 4-
®V c
%q#^TH&TOT ^TTTM ^ ^'Wf l
ti\ww ^n%r ^m^nftpnr^fcr qi>i4 I ^
3^HTTWR% 3T W(4f f^TT^JJT^T <IWT I 3TH-
^tTT ^ ’T I W* Z?ti W[ttl sTST ^
3wqwn«? ^^4 I
4.11. But what has been said (^rI.B.Para,63.p.136.):
Moreover, the exponent of an error being based upon
an unreal defect has difficulty in proving the
impossibility of error without a substratum. For there
is the logical possibility of error even in a substratum
which has no absolute reality, just as when the defect
which is the cause of error and the locus of the defect
[are both unreal]. Therefore everything would only be
emptiness.
That is based upon the denial of the discrimination between the nature
of being not absolutely real and the nature of being fictitious. To
explain. Indeed the discrimination of the nature of those two is thus:
529
what is unreal and appears to be real is "not absolutely real". What
does not appear at any time is "fictitious". With regard to those two,
fictitiousness can possibly be the reason for the emptiness of everything,
not the nature of being not absolutely real. But by the word
"therefore" you specified being not absolutely real to be the reason for
the emptiness of everything. So what is this throwing dust into one's
eye?
But if [you say]; perhaps there cannot be the demonstration of the
emptiness of everything, but the absolute reality of Brahman accepted by
the exponents of maya is not established; for there is the possibility of
error even in a substratum which has no absolute reality, [we reply];
Certainly not. Because this defect, which can be expressed by the word
"Ignorance" which is something positive, is beginningless and depending
upon Brahman it has superimposed itself by itself alone in the form of
being the power of that [Brahman], Depending upon that [Brahman] alone,
the individual soul has itself [ignorance] as its locus and being a
reflection of that [Brahman] in itself [in Ignorance] is superimposed as
the knower of itself [i.e, the knower of Ignorance, in the manner that;
"I am ignorant"]. Having depended upon that alone [i.e. being the knower
of Ignorance] and having superimposed there [in Ignorance] the nature of
being an object of knowledge, that very [Brahman, who is unknown] is
superimposed as the object of itself [of Ignorance. In the statement; "I
am ignorant", ignorance is the object of the jiva . In the statement; "I
do not know Brahman", Brahman is the object of that ignorance]. And
depending upon that alone [Brahman who is the object of Ignorance] and
having that [Brahman] alone as its basis, [ignorance] itself transforms
into the manifest world beginning with space on account of the connection
[of Ignorance] with that [Brahman], If Brahman were to be fictitious or
not absolutely real, then the operation of this defect would depend upon
what? But if there is no operation, nothing whatsoever could be seen
530
anywhere at any time. And because the world is seen, therefore it has to
be necessarily accepted that Brahman is neither fictitious nor without
absolute reality,
4.12. ,
\i ^ \%rr I R^r*in%<T \
WRWHRT W^fR-
Wt^ TcTR%: I R^TR^Rnt: WRRbn I RJRRRR-
WR% RIRROTRI R^tFR ^ ’T^RRT 3?JRiRR& 1 .
4.12. [5]^ This beginningless Ignorance, which is the defect, is
established by inference also (iarl.B.Para .61 ,p.1 31 .) :
The knowledge gained by a means of proof, which is
the subject of dispute, is preceded by another entity
which is different from the prior non-existence of
knowledge, which conceals the object of knowledge,
which is able to be removed by knowledge and which
exists at the same place as knowledge.
Because [knowledge] reveals a thing which was not
revealed before.
Like the light of a lamp first lit in the midst of
darkness.
In regard to [the word] "knowledge" which is mentioned here, because the
Knowledge which is the essential nature of Brahman is not preceded by
another entity, for the purpose of the exclusion of that [Knowledge], the
specification of the subject ( pak ga) was made as: the knowledge gained by
a means of proof. The specification of what is to be proved ( sadhya )
begins with: [preceded by another entity which is different from] the
prior non-existence of knowledge. The meaning is: the other entity which
531
precedes is different from the prior non-existence of knowledge, conceals
the object of knowledge, is able to be removed by knowledge and. exists
at the same place as knowledge.
4.13.
TO}
IR RTOTRTH: TO TT
aiffcpnnsuprc. ^<pr<Riwn-
I TO-
tourft
I ft wiw% tr
% SRRT H ! TO ” #,
4.13, What has been said here in regard to the inference proving the
Ignorance which is a positive entity (3rl.B.Para,63,p,136f.):
Because the reason is contradictory since it proves
another ignorance which is not accepted even in
regard to Ignorance,
If this is the intended meaning of that [statement]; the exponents of maya
have demonstrated the Ignorance which is a positive entity through an
inference, having introduced as the reason ( hetu ); revealing a thing which
was not revealed before. That very reason would prove that the knowledge
gained by a means of proof, in the form of such an inference, is preceded
by another ignorance concealing the Ignorance which is a positive entity
which is the object of that [other ignorance]. Because the Ignorance which
is a positive entity, which was not revealed previously, is revealed by
that very inference. The exponents of maya certainly do not accept another
such ignorance. Because if the Ignorance which is a positive entity is
concealed by another [ignorance], liberation is indeed established of its
own accord and so there would be no worldly existence. Therefore the
reason is contradictory.
4.14
532
fqqrqq-qrq
i it l 4 qiqiqfTqqqfq^ i
fWt I ft 5 n% I ^ 'ft J T^"
^t *nqw$raqqRRi^ l ftq *nqw$H*nqOTT'qinq^q ^q-
WfRRTqTWHF^qqqft mfaflsft q q^ftfi^ft; 1 3f9RRR*T qiq-
wnH^ I q 3 fqq^qft I q%mqft q ■ qq ^qrcrsft qfai
’RT^l q q qiqwmq^iTq^ qwiwqFqq qq^q^rq^m^ I
sqfFFqmqr^q qq^qifaqTqTqTftft qr^qij; I
T-*qft.<5<jift I q^wqwn ^ wiftft I
fw qq qrfaqwr. ^sqrftqrftqqft fre qqq?qq l ftq
sqRSTT^qrft mvnw * qftqft s^qq qRqqrq i qm^lsfo
qfttqqtqqr^qqftlqq q sqTmfcift qq qq qqqft qq q^qisT"
*q wrn^^i ft g °qisi#H*q I ^qra^ qq^Rqsqraq^g-
ftq q]ft qqqq^ I
4.14, Then [if that is the interpretation], it is examined in the
following manner. This reason is not contradictory. Because a reason is
contradictory when it is pervaded by the absence of vhat is to be proved.
But the meaning: "it is contradictory according to the view of the
exponents of maya ” is contrived. Moreover, this inference does not reveal
a thing which was not revealed before. Because the Ignorance which is a
positive entity is revealed through the direct perception; "I am ignorant"
Moreover, even though the knowledge gained by a means of proof, which
establishes the Ignorance which is a positive entity, is demonstrated to
be preceded by another ignorance concealing the Ignorance which is a
positive entity, there is no impairment whatsoever. The Ignorance which is
a positive entity is concealed by another ignorance, but it is not
destroyed. And in the absence of its destruction, how could liberation be
established of its own accord?
It should not be said; if the Ignorance which is a positive entity
is concealed, because that [ignorance] is not recognized, how can it be
the cause of the effect in the form of the manifest world? Because what
is not recognized and what is not absolutely real is not the cause of an
533
effect, [reason] Because fire etc., though not recognized and not
absolutely real, is seen to be the cause of effects such as burning etc.
Its effect too must be without absolute reality, but that is another
matter. Furthermore, an apparent snake which is indeed not recognized
[since it does not exist] certainly produces even knowledge which is not
of an apparent nature. Moreover, even a cause pertaining to ordinary
relations, though not at all recognized, possesses causality. For example,
a fire -which is indeed existing though it is not recognized— produces
burning. And where a tiger etc., which is certainly recognized, produces
fear, the tiger is not the cause of the fear but rather the knowledge of
the tiger. But the tiger is figuratively referred to in the world as the
cause of fear since it produces fear by means of knowledge [of its effects
4.15.
teiVs&r ft inwN ? (
I
4.15. But if this is the intended meaning [of the statement "Because the
1 8
reason is contradictory...", supra ] ; just as the knowledge gained by a
means of proof is established as being preceded by another entity due to
the reason that [knowledge] reveals a thing which was not revealed before,
so too, because that other entity, though it is Ignorance, reveals an
object in the form of the manifest world which was not revealed before,
then in the consequence of it being preceded by another entity, another
ignorance would be established. And the exponents of maya certainly do not
accept that. Because if the manifest world is indeed concealed by another
534
ignorance, liberation is established of its ovn accord, [refutation] Even
then, just as before, the reason is certainly not contradictory. Moreover,
the Ignorance which is a positive entity is the material cause of the
manifest world but it is not the revealer of the manifest world. The clay
certainly does not reveal the pot. You yourself have said (^ri.B.Para.63.
p,137.): ’’Because everywhere it is Knowledge alone which reveals",
comment
The discussion which follows is in response to Ramanuja’s objection
to the example given in the syllogism, i.e. "Like the light of a lamp
first lit in the midst of darkness". Ramanuja states that it is cognition
alone which reveals things. The senses only cause the origination of the
cognition which reveals the object and the light of a lamp merely assists
the senses through the removal of darkness, Ramanuja maintains that what
is meant by "revealing" is not a mere removal of something but the accurate
determination of the object, which can only occur through cognition.
Abhyankar's statement, while accepting that cognition brings about the
accurate determination of the object, seeks to establish Ramanuja's
prima facie view,i.e. the analogy of light with cognition is apt because
their nature is similar in so far as they both remove what is contrary
to themselves.
4,1 6 * cTOTfa ^TpifR-
i i
Hf qo op q 0
4.16. Although Knowledge alone reveals because it brings about the
accurate determination of the object, still, the light is also said to
reveal as it is the means for optical knowledge. Because that too, like
535
Knowledge, removes what is contrary to itself. For "revealing" is said
to be the removal of the cause of non-revealing. The light of a lamp was
specified only with this intended meaning.
The sense organs, however, produce Knowledge by means of the
operation consisting of the connection with the sense object. But not by
means of the removal of any thing. So because they do not reveal a thing
which was not revealed before, there is no impairment even in the absence
of being preceded by another entity. But [the statement] (^ri.B.Para.64.
p.137.) such as j
If the auxiliary factors too are accepted as revealing
a thing which was not revealed before, then because the
sense organs are the most helpful [among those factors]
they would have to be accepted as revealing things which
were not revealed before. If that is the case, the reason
["Because of revealing a thing which was not revealed
before"] is inconclusive because those [sense organs] are
not preceded by another entity which they can remove.
That is worthless. Because the exponents of maya do not accept that all
auxiliary factors reveal, but only those which remove what is contrary to
revealing,
4.17. <s. , „
A ro ^r-
wnm ft ^ i r w
^Rr^ ? ft ^ I \ ^fR
I ^ cT5T
tWR w srteaft ! vs w^t^r wwrii'
*T [-m R^WFT^R-
^ i c ?tr ^ hr
536
mm ^ li :
fom w ^ 35JTK I ^ WHWRUH »T ^RT^R, WfTWTRT^
i
4,17- The demonstration of nine contrary inferences (£rI.B,Para.64.p,138f.)
is incongruous. Because he [Ramanuja] has shown the counter syllogisms
in this manner:
(1) Ignorance does not have Brahman, which is pure
Knowledge, as its locus. Because it is Ignorance,
Like the ignorance of a pearl-oyster etc. Bor that
has the knower as its locus,
(2) Ignorance does not conceal Knowledge. Because
it is Ignorance. Like the ignorance of a pearl-oyster
etc. For that conceals the object.
(3) Ignorance cannot he removed by knowledge. Because
it does not conceal the object of knowledge [the Advaitin
says Ignorance conceals Brahman who is not an object of
knowledge]. Whatever Ignorance can be removed by knowledge,
conceals the object of knowledge. Just as the ignorance
of a pearl-oyster etc,
(4) Brahman is not the substrate of Ignorance, Because
[Brahman] is bereft of knowership. Like a pot etc.
(5) Brahman does not have Ignorance as its concealing
factor. Because [Brahman] is not an object of knowledge.
Whatever has ignorance as its concealing factor is an
object of knowledge. Like a pearl-oyster etc.
(6) Brahman does not possess Ignorance which can be
removed by knowledge. Because [Brahman] is not an
object of knowledge. Whatever possesses ignorance
which can be removed by knowledge, is an object of
537
knowledge. Like a pearl-oyster etc.
(7) The knowledge gained by a means of proof is not
preceded by an Ignorance different from the prior
non-existence of knowledge. Because it is knowledge
gained by a means of proof. Like the knowledge gained
by a means of proof which demonstrates the Ignorance
you accept.
(8) Knowledge does not destroy an object. Because it
is [only] knowledge when it is bereft of being augmented
by a particular power. Whatever destroys an object -whether
it is knowledge or ignorance- is seen to be augmented by
a particular power. Like the knowledge belonging to the
Lord and yogins etc. And like [the ignorance] belonging to
a hammer etc.
(9) Ignorance which is a positive entity cannot be
destroyed by knowledge. Because it is something positive.
Like a pot etc.
% %q sucistfmT \
I qmfqrq-
( I ^) I wt ^ q?riq qqnq asuq-
fqqqRTOq-
Riqqqtq
<nRq ^ 1 q^q
foronn; I ^ q§ qr^qR \ wfa fRf^RTqqrf!^-
qinm i =qi3qi% ssrt ^ q to i * qraw-
irR^Rwn^itR^T Hrew^q^RRqqlq;^ mftfaq r
»ii% qRqi^qi^(I ^ qr^qF? ftra^mr-
^ I q urtfr^R fqqT5jq> # frft l ^iqq^rn%qq5q-
538
ft^gro'ww^ 1 ^ ^3^ ei#i^ ti:i
qrRn%R^lrofa^ 1 h
I *rsrwi IRqiTOtflMtft ^ ftraHJ I
<F*£^ ^ ^rf^TTFT I 3Ri: WRT^TIWn t
4.18, Among these counter syllogisms vhich have been stated, the first
and the fourth inference are not inimical to us. Because vhat is to be
proved there, i.e. Brahman who is pure Knowledge is not the locus of
Ignorance, is accepted by us also. It was mentioned just previously (4,11)
that the locus of Ignorance is the individual soul who is a reflection
and who is superimposed as a knower.
Thus pure Brahman, although not concealed by Ignorance, still,
Ignorance, depending upon that very Brahman and being the power of that
[Brahman] has as though entered into that [Brahman] because of being a
power and having superimposed in that Brahman the nature of being an object
of knowledge, and having superimposed the nature of being an object of
itself [of Ignorance], subsequently that [Brahman] is concealed. Just as
fire, though able to be extinguished by water, enters into water -even
though it is contradictory to itself- in a subtle form and having
superimposed the nature of being an object of itself and having superimposed
its own quality of heat in that [water], it conceals the coldness belonging
to that [water]. It is like that. On account of this, the second inference
and the fifth inference are refuted.
The reason is not established in the third and the sixth inference.
Because that [Brahman] is concealed by Ignorance, only having superimposed
upon Brahman the nature of being an object of knowledge. And in the
seventh inference, the example is certainly not possible. Because it was
stated just previously (4.14.); "even though the knowledge gained by a
means of proof, which establishes the Ignorance which is a positive entity,
is demonstrated to be preceded by another ignorance concealing the
Ignorance which is a positive entity, there is no impairment whatsoever".
539
In the eighth inference there is proving of what is already
established. Because we do not accept that the knowledge of Brahman
destroys a [real] object. Because in our system, even the manifest world
beginning with space is superimposed and is therefore not a real object.
Moreover, the reason too is not established. Because being bereft of
augmentation by a particular power cannot be ascertained in regard to the
knowledge of Brahman.
*
In the ninth inference the reason possesses a limiting condition.
Because referring to what is absolutely real acts as a limiting
condition. There is the pervasion of what is to be proved ( sadhya ) by:
whatever is not able to be destroyed by knowledge certainly possesses
absolute reality. There is no rule: whatever is a positive entity certainly
possesses absolute reality. Because there is deviation in regard to
Ignorance which is a positive entity and in regard to the manifest world
beginning with space which is based upon that [ignorance]. Therefore there
is no pervasion of the means ( sadhana ) [i.e. the reason].
■4.19.
^ l
w I m STtefam ft <r ttmVr \ ft 3 rwr-
^RKFRrert * 3 1 <rtr mw
-4,19. Furthermore, this reason [in the ninth syllogism] is inconclusive,
for the destruction of fear, though it is something positive as it is
produced by the knowledge of the snake, is seen to occur through the
knowledge "this is a rope". But if [you say]: the destruction of fear is
540
from the destruction of the cause of fear which is the knowledge of the
snake, hut not from the knowledge of the rope, [our reply is] Even then
[the reason] is certainly inconclusive. Because the destruction of the
knowledge of the snake, which is something positive, is seen to occur
through the knowledge of the rope.
[objection] There is no destruction of the knowledge of the snake
through the knowledge of the rope, but it occurs spontaneously because it
is momentary,
[reply] No. Did the supreme Lord indicate to you that "knowledge is
momentary"? Rather, knowledge remains as long as there is the presence of
the cause such as a sense object etc. Because cognition is just in that
manner. It should not be said: still, the destruction of the knowledge of
the snake is because of the destruction of the snake, but not because of
the knowledge of the rope, [reason] Even then the inconclusiveness is just
the same as before, because the destruction of the snake, which is
something positive, occurs through the knowledge of the rope.
** R ?) ^imft w^ h wm\-
4.20. Vhat has been said (^rT.B.Para.65.p .1 40,):
If those fears etc. are not momentary, then the result
would be the perception of multiple fears; because in
the continuous stream of cognitions which are the cause
of fear etc., all the cognitions without exception would
be the cause for the origination of fear etc.
That is mediocre. Because the one who accepts that fear is not momentary
should accept that Knowledge too is certainly not momentary. And so
because there is no continuous stream of Knowledge, therefore the
consequence of the perception of multiple fears is far removed.
541
4.21 .
SRftfSRcfT ^TFF^T ’ ( ^o W <T<> ^ jpfa qft-
fR: 'W ^ wr t tow
Ml r H 1 s-d
<RR^ I WTTTWR TOTO WRTW
i i% ^ TOHTfrcr ^r*rt hWwpi^-
TOHHl#»W«{ m^T ^IRqRW'4 I * a^fR
^ sWTTTO r * W ^T|TRRT^» ^ HTR-
^j; 1 tr t^Ttto R^r i^rr, <f?pr tcfsj W
rerafr ^wm, ^rh %t4 1 }
4.21. The ridicule made by this text (^ri.B.Para.65.p.1 40.):
[Tour] skill in syllogisms has been revealed by the
mention of meaningless qualifications: "preceded by
another entity which is different from the prior non¬
existence of knowledge"
is, however, out of place. Although these words: "different from the prior
non-existence of knowledge" and "another" are meaningless when the
statement is just; "preceded by an entity" which is established only by
the word "entity" which signifies something positive, still, it is told
in that manner for the facility of comprehension on the part of the
listener. Since the Vaise§ikas count even non-existence among the seven
categories, therefore there is the possibility of confusing even that as
an entity.
Furthermore, how is it that [you], who are causing the ridicule of
another in this manner, did not see at the time of showing the nine
counter syllogisms that the fourth inference is meaningless since it is
established by the first inference? There is only a difference in the
arrangement of the words here: "Ignorance does not have Brahman as its
542
locus" and "Brahman is not the substrate of Ignorance". There is no
difference at all concerning what is to be proved. It should be
investigated in this manner by intelligent people; the fifth inference is
meaningless since it is established by the second, the sixth is
meaningless since it is established by the third and the ninth is
meaningless since it is established by the eighth,
4 ' 22 ‘ to ‘ ^ rtot-
W ^ ) ^rf: -
^jt(% *rriihTTO^ n
5 to to: n ^ * H
4.22, Although it has been said (^rI.B.Para.65.p.140.);
This [view of the Advaitin] too; "the material cause of
a thing which is false ought to be indeed false", is
refuted by the reasoning in this section [beginning with
the sutra ~]; "No, on account of the dissimilarity" (B.S.2.1 .4.).
In regard to that, it is said;
The material cause of a false thing is false. The
world is indeed of an apparent nature. In the case
of error, there is certainly no possibility of the
"apprehension of the real" anywhere,20,
4.23,
TO TOR ? I WTOI-
?R ft |
fR TOlft RpRPJTO
543
fnwrm: *prafrpf I r*hh fl st§t ^r^
^i^N'i.R^'T.R'-fi TOWft ^rlT ^fTOJRXXff: ^TRf^T
4,23. The intended meaning of the exponents of maya is that; the material
cause of the false world is capable only of being false. That [material
cause] is indeed Ignorance which is a positive entity. If the purport of
that section would be: "in every way there can only be dissimilarity
between the cause and the effect" , then the Ignorance which is a positive
entity, and which is something false, cannot possibly be the cause of the
false world as it has the same characteristic as that [world]. So there
would be contradiction with that section.
But the purport of that section is only: "even though there is some
dissimilarity there is no loss of a cause-effect relation". And so the
possession of the common characteristics between the cause and the effect
must certainly be demonstrated as far as possible. The exponents of maya
made this intention very clear by using the word "it ought": "the material
cause of a thing which is false ought to be indeed false". Indeed, you
too have certainly established the possession of common characteristics
between the cause and the effect by saying: "Brahman is the cause, having
the subtle sentient beings and insentient matter as its modes, and Brahman
is indeed the effect, having the gross sentient beings and insentient
matter as its modes".
4.24.
wr: ’ (sffar
wflRRi dTT
ITORTSTT |
544
^rpm i rrrttt wm # ren*R i K^ feutsft f
fW<T I . i
4,24, Although it has been, said (£rl,B.Para.65.p.1 41 .);
For only what is perceived is an object of cognition,
error and sublation.
The exponents of maya too certainly accept that. That is not a negating
factor in the acceptance of the world as indeterminable. But having
completed the remainder of this "only what is perceived" [with the words]
"as real elsewhere", the meaning is constructed as: "only what is perceived
as real elsewhere is the object of cognition etc. elsewhere [at another
place]. Then even though the world, which has been accepted as
indeterminable, cannot possibly be an object of cognition etc. since
according to the view of the exponents of maya the world is not perceived
as real elsewhere, still, it is explained in this manner: the ignorance
of the pearl-oyster etc. certainly produces the indeterminable silver,
being assisted by the mental impression of silver. The requirement of a
cognition being real elsewhere is seen in regard to the origination of
such a mental impression. It must be so in the case of the ignorance of
the pearl-oyster etc. But because the primary Ignorance is the power of
Brahman there is no requirement of any other thing since it acts in
dependence upon Brahman, Moreover, even a mental impression certainly
exists since the individual souls are beginningless in the beginningless
cycle of worldly existence.
comment
Abhyankar fills out Ramanuja's rather enigmatic statement; "only what
is perceived is an object of cognition, error and sublation" by adding the
phrase; "as real elsewhere". The argument would then mean that the erroneous
cognition of something, such as silver upon a pearl-oyster, is possible
only if real silver has been previously experienced. Because of the prior
experience of real silver there is the production of the mental impression
545
of silver and on account of the mental impression the pearl-oyster can he
erroneously perceived as silver. But in the case of the world, this is
not possible. For if the world is superimposed upon Brahman, like silver
upon the pearl-oyster, the prior experience of a real world would be
necessary in order to generate the mental impression of a world which
could be superimposed upon Brahman, But according to the Advaitin, the
prior experience of a real world is not possible.
The Advaitin agrees that a prior impression is required, but disputes
that such an impression must be of something real. According to the
Advaitin, even a false mental impression is sufficient: if a nightmare
occurs after seeing a horror movie, the impression of the film is
required even though the film is itself unreal.
4,25,
ft i crc: i
ferpr ^ T^n?: m TTr^q-
I
*71^ I K T5Td f?ri-
\
-4.25, Although it has been said (£ri.B.Para,65,p,1 41 ,
because the appearance of one thing in another manner
cannot be avoided, even in the imagination of the
indeterminable silver in the case of the error of silver
on a pearl-oyster etc.
That is worthless. Because silver is recognized in the silver on the
pearl-oyster. Then subsequently the sublation is experienced; "this is not
silver". And this sublation is not experienced as limited by a certain
time in the manner; "this is not silver now". But [it is experienced]
only in a general way; "this silver did not exist even before". And so
the sublation certainly exists before. Only it is experienced later. So
the silver there [on the pearl-oyster] has no reality, even for an instant,
whether pertaining to absolute reality or to ordinary relations and hence
it is indeterminable as being real. So too, if it is non-existent like
the horns of a rabbit it would not be recognized even for an instant. But
it is recognized. Therefore it is indeterminable as being unreal. On
account of no other recourse, the silver etc. of this kind must be
supposed to have a momentary existence of an apparent nature. Otherwise
how could the pearl-oyster appear in the form of non-existing silver?
Because there is no possibility of the appearance of the one thing in
another manner. And this silver is certainly determinable in the manner
of having an apparent nature.
comment
Ramanuja maintains that the appearance of one thing as something
else has to be accepted. He says (3rl.B.Para.65.p.141f.) that all the
different explanations of erroneous cognition must admit that one thing
appears in another manner; in asatkhyati the non-existent appears as
existent, in atmakhyati the "self" appears as something external, in
akhyati some thing, such as "silver", is apprehended as the attribute of
something else, such as "this".
The Advaitin considers it is incorrect to hold that one thing appears
in another manner, such as a pearl-oyster appearing as silver. Because the
silver does not exist. Nor can it be said that there is the non-appearance
of what exists. Because the cognition is only "this is silver", but at
that time there is no cognition in the manner; "I do not have the cognition
of the pearl-oyster",,
FTSW flit 1 ^ WR-
I ft *r: I * 3
I 3 qRmsrcrc^q ’ q® \c)
547
I ^ ^ wq -
1 HRFFP7 SJrffi T^RTFT-
t'TT^ I W ^ F^FTHT^FT ;$%*TWRRW ■Wdti^'H MlHF<-
^fmm w l irwrswft j^m^ssm^ I
w f| ^ %^imnf{"rPT: I ^rfa %t^5t%; i v% Rmr^RT $%-
W% I ^%«r 3TRRRT?TRmTmr | JR^cT Hlfd-
TOTO I ^ m^g^mteRT^lRT ^ *wm
WT"TIR ^T(R |
4;26. Although this silver does not appear to have an apparent nature
at the time of its cognition, still, there is no impairment. Among the
modes which exist, the non-appearance of some [modes] is certainly
accepted by all the exponents of "apprehension" ( khyati ) without exception.
Because in regard to the cognition of silver upon the pearl-oyster,
everyone accepts the non-appearance of the portion which is the pearl-
oyster, This is certainly not the appearance of one thing in another
manner. Because that appearance is in a form which does not exist. Nor
is it the non-appearance of what exists. On account of this, [the statement]
{^rI.B.Para.65.p.1 41 .):
Indeed this [silver] which is assumed [by you] to be
indeterminable is not recognized as "indeterminable"
at that time but only as real silver
is refuted. Because even though [a thing] does not appear as indeterminable,
it does not appear in another manner.
It should not be said; there is the appearance in another manner
because of the appearance that the silver is real, [reason] Because the
reality exists in the pearl-oyster. It should not be said; there is the
appearance in another manner because the reality belonging to the pearl-
oyster, which is unconnected to the silver, appears to be connected to
the silver, [reason] Because the reality, though belonging to the pearl-
oyster, has been connected to the silver. For the silver is not a
transformation of Ignorance alone. Nor even of the pearl-oyster alone.
548
But only of the pearl-oyster by means of Ignorance. And the non-cognizance
of the pearl-oyster as a pearl-oyster is indeed Ignorance. But the
knowledge of the pearl-oyster as "this" is, rather, certainly the cause
for the origination of the apparent silver. Thus the mental impression of
silver belonging to the knower, and so forth, must be known respectively
to be the causes.
4.27.
(^TTo go c )
totjtsrr tor * fafr
w *m\ tr^n%g<RR^ (#n<> g°
|5Riftn^TRTi r
'TRR^rC'JT^ TOR ^ 1 R^RIRRR^rSH-
I ^WRRT'ni hrtT'Rt^* tor tr i r
TOR RRIRT RTOTO
3 <T1RRRR[ cRR^T m r^-
TOTTT m?T I
4.27. Thus when the origination of the apparent silver has been
established, [Ramanuja] commencing [with the statement] (^ri.B.Para.65.
p.142.); "the cause of the origination of that [silver] must be told",
has assumed that the cognition of silver is the cause of that [origination
of silver] -even though the exponents of maya have not said anywhere that
[the cognition of silver] is the cause of the origination of silver- and
so he is led to be the receptacle of his own ridicule through jokes in
this manner ($rI.B,Para,65.p.1 42,):
[The cognition] originated without an object and
having produced that [object] makes that its object
-this is the reasoning of great people.
In the same way, the answer [given in the ^rrbha g ya ] to that, which is
549
the supposition that the sense organs, their [inherent] defects, or
defective sense organs are the material cause of the apparent silver and
the refutation of that, are certainly worthless. Because the exponents of
maya do not accept [such a supposition] to be true.
But the defects belonging to the sense organs are certainly
accepted as the efficient cause. And that is logically possible. Because
the defects belonging to the sense organs have the possibility of being
connected to the sense object, such as the pearl-oyster etc., by means of
the visual rays etc. of the sense organs.
Thus [Ramanuja], having supposed on many occasions what the
exponents of maya do not accept, there is an elaborate logical refutation
of that, but in regard to what is accepted, some answer is given in one
line or in a half of it. So this is a new mode of refutation which is
seen.
4.28.
ztmtm ^rrcirq;' ( V\ ? O
rprm&i I ^ sffaqrtn: I f% 3 m-
I ^ vfc-
u iw<*w R I ^rRif t f%
^ > (wno 30 <> ^ q G ?<> )
-4.28. Although it has been said (3rl.B.Para.66.p.1 42,):
How does this new and indeterminable collection of
things become an object through the idea and the
word "silver 11 etc. and not through the idea and the
word "pot" etc? [Advaitin]: Because of the similarity
to the silver etc. [Visi^tadvaitin]: Then the cognition
and the word should be only: "similar to that".
550
That is incongruous. Because there is no application here for the
knowledge of similarity. But the similarity existing in relation to the
object awakens the mental impression of silver. And that awakened mental
impression transforms that ignorance of the pearl-oyster only into the
form of silver, not into the form of a pot etc. In the sequel to this,
the maya Vedantins certainly do not accept the net of fallacious reasoning
beginning (^rT.B.Para.66.p.1 42.):
If [you say] that [the similarity] is because of the
connection with the generic characteristics of silver
etc., then is that [generic characteristic] real or
unreal?
So nothing is said by way of reply there.
4.29.
TO
£ go 9^ qo y )
^ikjpr to toto: tot .ftroi I
mfan m ^ to sd ^ 1 m
qsrmuR m wftrcqr
TOd WUd RTW TO* 3TTO I d<(W%
TO dTO d I fdfcfivi f| 'fTTOT-
nTO: 1 m fq|-
^t5fg ^ To W * 1%*^ I ‘ fFTOWd
^qRJlf«lH€gqgMl4dd ^ ^ qo ^
■ ddhbtd
4.29. Ramanuja has accepted in all places the "apprehension of the real"
( satkhyati ) according to the text beginning (^rl.B.Para,66,p.143,):
The view of those who know the Veda is that all
knowledge is true.
551
In regard to that, it is being investigated in the following manner.
The meaning of that [sentence; "R. has accepted in all places the
'apprehension of the real'..."] is; "apprehension" ( khyati ) means
cognition. And that [apprehension] is everywhere only of what is real,
nowhere is it of the unreal. If the meaning of this; "of what is real" is;
"of what is real, though in a form which is apparent", then we certainly
accept the "apprehension of the real". But he [Ramanuja] does not accept
it in that manner. If the meaning is; "of what is real, in a form which is
indeed absolutely real", then there could be no cognition of water in a
mirage.
[objection] A portion of water certainly exists in the earth due
to the threefold combination or due to the fivefold combination.
[reply] True, [but] the nature of water certainly does not exist
in an object qualified according to the threefold combination. Although
the nature of water exists in the portion of water belonging to a part of
that [object], still, it is not able to be known. Because the threefold
combination is a union which is incapable of separate division. Because
the elements are not able to be perceived prior to the threefold
combination as they are extremely subtle, therefore even after the threefold
combination there is no possibility of the perception of only the water
which belongs there [in that combination].
Furthermore, it does not stand to reason that this portion of water,
though extremely subtle and though far away, is apprehended, while it is
not apprehended by those who are nearby. But only those who have faith in
21
that view could accept the statement about that (£ri.B,Para.67.p.147.)' ;
there is no apprehension of fire and earth on account
of the defect of the sense organ and because of some
unseen factor there is apprehension only of the water.
552
4.30.
IT% ^ WPRFT ^
\ m ^ h<t <r
m I W * f^R MW Hr^lWT t^wi jfet *
RTR^ 1 T% H %^RTT T^WR f^TT stTH% 1
Ri^fllKWTn TO HR RTHl TWT^ MM
i vr ^ frfFpm qfwr^r %ftr-
^t: m%t hrr # ??*?% I <r W *tr w^mm^ I
* h imFiro htrh; l sw: h^t: wprrfef^
ft m’^n% t tsrtwri%^T ft wn: ^m: h^rtt-
<n%: i h ft Hit ^r Hnwt^i fw mftiRfwrrs-
rv_ r
TR I
4.30. Furthermore, for the one who has gone near, the cognition arises:
"this is not water". And in regard to that, there is the cognition of the
water which [Ramanuja considers] is indeed real, as unreal and so the
22
appearance in another manner certainly cannot be avoided. On account of
this, [the statement: "because a portion of fire exists in the pearl-
oyster due to the threefold combination, there is the cognition of that
[fire] in the form of silver" is refuted.
Furthermore, why is that portion of fire known only in the form
of silver? It could also appear in the form of lightning, the sun etc.
Because prior to combining, the portion of fire is common to everything:
lightning, the sun etc. It should not be said: some portions of fire which
have undergone the threefold combination and have transformed into the
form of silver appear as combined in the pearl-oyster, [reason] Because
there is no means of proof for their existence there [in the pearl-oyster].
It should not be said; the cognition of silver is itself the means of proof,
[reason] Because there is mutual dependence: for when that cognition is
established as having the nature of the "apprehension of the real" the
existence of the portion of silver in the pearl-oyster is established, and
553
when, there is the establishment of the existence of the portion of silver,
that cognition is established as having the nature of the "apprehension
of the real". It should not be said: there is the assumption that a portion
of silver exists in the pearl-oyster because of the experience of the
similarity to silver, [reason] Because there is the logical possibility
of similarity in regard to the pearl-oyster since it possesses the quality
of lustre etc. which is similar to the quality of silver. There is
certainly no rule brought about by the restriction: portions of a similar
thing indeed exist in the similar object.
4.31 .
1 % ^ ^ 7 -
jrr: l ^
m RTR RTc([ I WNX RPERl^f
4.31. Furthermore, Devadatta has a confusion of ownership with regard to
the clothes and ornaments etc, belonging to Caitra, which are similar to
the clothes and ornaments etc. belonging to Devadatta. In that matter,
there is certainly no penetration of the parts of the clothes etc.
belonging to Devadatta in the clothes etc. belonging to Caitra. So how can
there be the "apprehension of the real" in that instance? Even when the
clothes etc. belonging to Devadatta have been destroyed, Devadatta, not
knowing about their destruction, is seen to have confusion of ownership
when the clothes etc. belonging to another are seen. The knowledge is well
known from a boy to an old man that even between two exceedingly similar
kar s apaq a coins the parts of one are similar to the parts of the other
but they are not those very [parts]. And the taking of the Putika ^ plant
when there is no Soma is enjoined by the sacred texts because it possesses
qualities similar to the qualities existing in the Soma , but not because
of the actual existence of parts of the Soma . The taking of wild rice'
25
when there is no cultivated rice is also due to the same reason.
Moreover, if in the water of the Ganga . which is similar to milk,
portions of milk exist, then when milk is given up in some vow even the
water of the Ganga must be given up. If even pure food is similar to meat
in form then it must be given up because parts of that [meat] exist in it.
And the demons would be deathless on account of feeding upon spirituous
liquor which is similar to the nectar of immortality. Thus there would be
much confusion.
qrq-
SiicWlta: q?ft \JR1% HT V TTT°T^IT-
^ q?wf
% q^pir: pr wt %q*i n
W(t&dpqu%: | q^q: q^pit: pts |
qqi ^
^ q^pn: *jgr: vfr^r ^flw: l
^RT ^fdMWTT V
-4.32. For the establishment of the "apprehension of the real" in dream,
what has been said by the text beginning (&ri.B.Para,66.p.1 45.):
in dream, the Lord himself creates, in accordance with
the merit or demerit of living beings, corresponding
objects capable of being experienced only by the respective
555
person and. lasting for various periods of time
is that the objects such as chariots etc. existing there [in dream] are
created by the supreme Lord and are certainly real. That is questionable.
Because fate is the common cause for all things in the world. And so there
is no such object whatsoever from which happiness or sadness is not
produced for some living being. Among those objects which the Lord created
in Devadatta's dream from which happiness or sadness was not produced for
Devadatta, by whose fate did the Lord produce that object? And many objects
of an indifferent nature are experienced in dream. And so according to
the maxim: "even a fool does not engage [in an action] without aiming at
a result"^, those objects are certainly not created by the supreme Lord
but rather they are superimposed by the individual soul. And this
superimposition is a particular type of memory.
4 ‘ 33 ' ^ ^
l m 1 wmxi g ’ * 5
sffaHt
*nfw I
4.33. The author of the sutras has loudly expressed that the objects
belonging to dream are merely maya , in the sutra : "But mere maya ..." (B.S.‘
3.2,3.;. ’ It is well known that the word " maya " signifies what is
indeterminable. And the nature of being indeterminable means just lasting
556
for various periods of time when [an object] is capable of being
experienced only by each respective person. Even though Ramanuja has
accepted that the objects belonging to dream are capable of being
experienced only by the respective person and last for various periods of
time, he has said (^ri.B.Para.68,p,1 51.): "the word maya is not seen to
signify what is indeterminable", So what is this dislike toward the word
"indeterminable"? But there is no suitability with the words of the sutra
["But mere maya ..] in the meaning (^rl.B.Para.395.p.801 f») ; " ’mere
maya ' ( mayamatram ) means producing a wonder. Because the individual soul
'has a nature which is not entirely manifest' ( kartsnyenanabhivyaktasvaru -
patvat ) [in the state of worldly existence] and therefore that [soul] has
no possibility of being the agent of the creation producing a wonder. The
creation in dream has the supreme Lord alone as its creator", [reason]
Because it is said: "But mere maya ", But it is not said; "But the
creation of the Lord" .
Furthermore, in the expectation; "what has an unmanifest nature?",
[the answer] is only gained through the contiguity; what is merely maya
[i.e. the state of dream, which is the topic], that [has an unmanifest
nature]. Having given up that, and having supplied the ellipsis "of the
individual souls", the construction of the meaning as; "because the
individual souls have a nature which is not entirely manifest" is very
clearly not accepted by the author of the sutras . Even the silver upon a
pearl-oyster etc, are capable of being experienced only by the respective
person and last for various periods of time, just like the objects
belonging to dream, and hence they are certainly unreal.
4.34.
‘ ^ f o « 1 3 . I K ° ), ^ ^
557
%
*
c ) t star vmwhi
^ trrh:
<Rnq l
4»34, Furthermore, the power of the supreme Self, whose inconceivable
power creates the objects belonging to dream which are capable of being
experienced only by the respective person and which last for various
periods of time, can in no way be restricted in regard to the creation
of silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. So why does Ramanuja not accept that
the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are absolutely real like the objects
belonging to dream? But there is no contradiction with the sacred texts;
"For he is the agent" (Brh.4,3.10 ,), "The one who [is awake] in those who
are asleep" (Hatha,2.5.8.) if the objects belonging to dream are super¬
imposed by the individual soul. Because the individual souls are not
different from the supreme Self. Although the objects belonging to dream
and the silver upon a pearl-oyster etc. are superimposed by the individual
soul, because the supreme Self is the common cause everywhere, therefore
he must necessarily be the cause there as well.
4.35.
rs
WBTTVT qn%:: 1 TTO’ptoRf ^ 3
4.35. In the case of a crystal in proximity to a red flower, the redness
occuring in the cognition; "the crystal is red" is not assumed to be un¬
real. Because that [redness] exists in the red flower. For the origination
of a thing having an apparent nature is only accepted in the case where
there is no proximity to what is to be superimposed, [refutation] But that
redness is unreal as having inherence in the crystal and so there is only
558
"the apprehension of the indeterminable".
It should be understood in the same manner in the cognition: "the
conch-shell is yellow" if the yellow colour belonging to the substance
bile exists. But if that is not accepted, even the yellow colour is
assumed to be unreal. But according to the view of Ramanuja, "the
apprehension in another manner" cannot be avoided because the redness
which is not inherently connected to the crystal and the yellow colour
which is not inherently connected to the conch-shell appear to be
inherently connected to them.
comment
For Ramanuja's explanation of perceptual error, see 2.41. and comment.
4.36.
( ^ <To \ O ) |
m W | q ft ^ I m ^ MKIW
gJIjJRN ^§^3 1f% R
sTcfcift wi w*-
29
4.-36. Although it has been said (Srx.B.Para.67.p.147.) for the
establishment of "the apprehension of the real" in the cognition of a fire¬
brand circle:
the cognition of a circle is logically possible
because there is no apprehension of the intervals.
In regard to that, it should be investigated in the following manner. It
is true that there is no apprehension of intervals in a circle which
actually exists because the intervals do not exist and though the intervals
559
do exist in a fire-brand circle they are not apprehended because of the
rapidity of movement. But is the cognition of a circle just the non-
apprehension of the intervals, or is the cognition of a circle something
other than the non-apprehension of the intervals? Not the first. Because
the non-apprehension of the intervals is the absence of the cognition of
intervals and how could that [absence of the cognition of intervals] be in
the form of the cognition of a circle? For the cognition of a cloth is not
just the absence of the cognition of a pot. For this very reason, the
learned people say that the happiness in the absence of sorrow here is
figurative: "I have become happy upon the removal of my burden". Moreover,
there is no cognition of a circle in a square even though there is the
absence of the cognition of intervals. But in the second case, the
origination of an indeterminable circle has to be accepted because the
circle in the fire-brand circle does not in reality exist.
In regard to the cognition of a face in a mirror, even though one's
own face in the cognition is certainly real, because that [face] which is
unconnected to the mirror has become connected to it, the origination of
an indeterminable connection must indeed be accepted to establish the
cognition.
4. 37 , ^ ■
qo ^VS ) ^ i
4.37, It is the same in the case of the confusion about direction also.
To explain. The cognition of the different directions such as east etc.
certainly has, as a rule, dependence everywhere, i.e. the east is with
regard to a certain thing. For this very reason, the rule is established;
560
"one should eat food while facing the east". Otherwise, because all the
different directions exist everywhere, there would be incongruity of that
[rule]. And so what is east is with regard to which [e.g. person A], for
that [east], when there is the knowledge of it being north with regard to
that very [person a] -even though the nature of north exists in the east
[with regard to another person]- because there is the absence of being
north with regard to that [person A], the new occurrence can only be
conjectured as indeterminable. On account of this, [the statement] (jSri.
B.Para.67.p.148,): "the cognition of another direction is certainly true"
is refuted,^®
4.38.
* ilH ^ RKH
^ AAA I wbh A A
fx hA AtA-
i AAr* ^ fAr-
tAh tot 1
4.38. But what has been said (£ri,B.Para.67,p.148.):
Even in the case of the knowledge of a double moon etc., two
sets of means which are mutually independent are the cause for
the double apprehension of the moon: because there is the
difference of the sets of means due to the difference of the
movement of the light of the eye by pressing with the finger,
or through cataract etc. One set of means apprehends the moon
qualified by its own location. Whereas the second, moving
somewhat at a tangent, apprehends the moon separated from its
own location after apprehending a location near to the moon.
Therefore, due to the two sets of means, when there is the
apprehension of the moon qualified by the two locations
simultaneously there is the particular [cont, next page]
561
cognition; "two moons" because there is a difference of
the form to be apprehended due to the difference in
apprehending and because there is no apprehension of
unity. The other location being an attribute of that
[moon] is due to the uninterrupted apprehension of the
other location and of the moon which is not apprehended
in its own location.
4.39.
I
m3 m3l<reiw
m3 i ^ '■
f|3mmi*TT h *ref3, ?r ^ ^3^n3^-
wr TR^fa i%3fcrcwm l
(|3iwritt m ^?h^rr33r Rfmfa 1
^ ^qifqq%si J («r°
^ I ^ ) *t 3 ^ * *r*n*rm w-n%qwq w^*3
mw r
^3; TFfT^wfwir ^f3q*ror3sm t
4.39. That is contrary to experience. For example if a cloth placed upon
a peg on the wall etc. in a house is seen with an eye pressed by a finger,
not only is that cloth seen as double but even the peg which is its locus
is seen as double. The wall which is the locus of that [peg], that house
and the earth which is the locus of that [house] are seen as double. Thus
there is indeed the experience that the whole world; the space along with
the clouds and constellations, is seen to be double. And so [the statement
supra .]; "Whereas the second, moving somewhat at a tangent, apprehends the
moon separated from its own location after apprehending a location near to
562
the moon" is not possible. There is certainly no apprehension of a
location near to the moon by the second set of means, so the apprehension
of the moon separated from its own location is certainly far off the mark.
So too, [the statement supra .]; "The other location being an attribute of
the moon is due to the uninterrupted apprehension of the moon which is not
apprehended in its own location and [the uninterrupted apprehension] of
the other location" is also not possible. Because even one among these:
the actually existing moon, the location which is its locus and the
location near to that [moon], is not apprehended by the second set of
means. Therefore the whole world which is apprehended by the second set of
means must certainly be accepted, even by someone not desirous of doing so,
as indeed indeterminable.
Hence what the venerable fsri fsankaracarya has said in respect of
the sutra ; "And because of the logical impossibility in every way" (B.S.
2.2.32.) while refuting the views of the followers of the Buddha:
the more this doctrine of the Buddhists is examined
for its possession of logical tenability, the more
it indeed breaks down like a well in sandy soil, Ve
31
do not see any logical tenability at all here.
That certainly strikes the memory upon the examination of Ramanuja's view
here.
4.40.
fra I ,
II II
4.40. Thus there is the logical possibility of the relation of negated
563
and negating since it is correct that: what is indeterminable is to be
negated and what is other than that is the negating factor. On account of
this, the supposition somehow or other of the logical possibility of the
relation of negated and negating (^ri.B.Para.68-p.150,);
The relation of negated and negating is logically
possible on account of being an object of the
experience of everyone and on account of being
devoid of that
is set aside. Moreover, it is well known in the world that a thing which
is the object of the experience of even many ignorant students is negated
by something which is the object of the experience of even a single
teacher who knows about the defect. Thus falsity, in the manner of being
indeterminable, is alone the criterion for what is to be negated. And all
this which is seen in the world is certainly indeterminable. Because its
basis is indeterminable Ignorance.
4,41 .
u hi ii
4,41. The sacred texts etc. would, accordingly, be the
means of knowledge about Ignorance. There [in regard
to Ignorance], the knowledge of the real substratum
would remove Ignorance.21.
* ) I | < qfcrT-
I fcFtt (^io vj $)
564
^ i i ^ <pr-.
’ ( mvti° u 5 l VO ?ptr l <rar 1 ^
g^iiw mwr^^mVi 3^pR 5t^T ?m '^rmrl
I^h f#w^ i **m ^ ihptr^r; i f% g irptr^- -
*ttsrk% I ^hrt qwqOTqfcpR
f%WRT ^ |
4.42, The Ignorance vhich is the basis [of the indeterminable world] is
established by sacred texts such as: "they do not find this world which is
Brahman, for they are enveloped by the untrue" (Ch,8.3.2.) etc.
Indeterminable Ignorance is spoken of by the word "untrue" (anrta). But
what has been said ($r:L .B.Para.68,p,1 50.):
Rta signifies [virtuous] actions. For there is the
statement; "both drinking the rta 11 (Katha.1 .3,1 ,).
Rta is action which is free from attachment to the
result, vhich has as its apparel the worship of the
highest Person and has the attainment of Him as its
result. Here [in the passage "enveloped by the untrue"],
anrta is action which is different from that [rta],
which has the cycle of worldly existence as its result
and which is contrary to the attainment of Brahman, For
there is the statement: "they do not find this world
32
vhich is Brahman, for they are enveloped by the untrue".
That is not so. Because the word "rta" is well known as signifying what
is true. Amarasimha, too, says: "true ( satyam ), real ( tathyam ), ytam"
(Amara.1 .6.22.). And so anrta means untrue. And that [ anr ta.] ’ is indeed
this Ignorance which is a positive entity and the cause of the ignorance
of the world vhich is Brahman [i.e. the Self], The distinction containing
the reason for the absence of knowing is: ."enveloped by the untrue". And
this Ignorance is not [just] the absence of knowledge. But it is a positive
entity which is different with regard to the absence of knowledge.
565
Otherwise, the mention of anyta as the cause for the absence of knowing
would be incongruous since there is oneness of cause and effect,
comment
Ramanuja does not accept ignorance to be something positive, but he
considers it to be the mere absence of knowledge ( aham jnanabhavavan ).
Abhyankar states that if Ignorance is not admitted to be something positive
in nature then the word " anr ta 11 could not be specified as the reason for
the absence of knowledge: "they do not find..., for they are enveloped by
the untrue (anrta)". Because if anyta is itself just the absence of
knowledge then there is no distinction between the cause —which is the
absence of knowledge— and the effect which is also the absence of knowledge
It would be equivalent to saying that the effect is the cause of the effect
4.43.
3d tomtoto 3 3v3¥^r I 3d mdr
I tod i
I to 3^FTT IWHF3-
3T3T 3T 13FT: I 3t313T3 TOldd
to v TT^ | to 31 I
3 d 3^3 to tod-
: I 3to^H3
WNdii^nq^: 1 flddg to 33313 * to tod Igr
tor: FD3 t 3 d mtoto tototomftoto 3tow*r£?-
^33 333^33 I
4.43. Here too; "both drinking the rta", the word "yta" does not signify
action. "Both drinking the pta" means that both are experiencing the
results of action. Because even though the word p ta signifies action there,
it has an implied meaning in the sense of the results of action. The usage
of the word "yta" , which signifies what is true, is easy to demonstrate in
the sense of the results of action. Because the result of action is
inevitable according to the way which was told: "action does not waste
away without [the result] being experienced" and therefore what is true,
in the manner of what will inevitably occur, exists in the result of action
566
Furthermore, according to your view, does the word "rta 11 signify
a particular action or does it signify action in general? Not the first.
Because there is contradiction with your own general statement: " rta
signifies [virtuous] actions". Moreover, in accepting a particular action,
is it understood to be preceded by attachment to the result or not
preceded by that? In the first case, there would be incongruity with your
own conclusion: action which is accompanied by attachment to the result
and which has the cycle of worldly existence as its result is understood
by the word "anyta", Because in understanding such a type of action just
by the word "yta", there would be the consequence of understanding
something contrary to that by the word "aucta". But in the second case [if
it is not preceded by attachment to the result], your reason [for showing
that the word "rta" means action]: "For there is the statement: 'both
drinking the yta 1 " would be incongruous. Because only action preceded by
attachment to the result is understood there [in regard to the reason]
since there is the teaching of the experience of the result of action:
"both drinking the ^ta".
4.44,
I Pm dim f|
dmnm to-*
fWTl% tow m
TOdim ai^ qqmlTOf 7 : \
4.44, But if the word "yta" signifies action in general, then how could
the understanding of a particular action, which is what you accept by the
567
word "an rta ", be established? For no one believes that a thing which is
a particular action is from the word "not an action". Because the purport
of a word used along with a general meaning is understood from the topic
etc. to be used in a particular meaning. But nothing is seen in that manner
here.
But [the statement];
Because the capacity of producing a result, i.e, the
absence of the knowledge of the world which is Brahman,
exists in an action preceded by attachment to the result;
such an action is taught by the word "anrta". And for the
sake of that [knowledge of the world which is Brahman],
the action which is free from attachment to the result is
intended to be said by the word "rta"
is altogether incorrect. Because in the case of a word mentioned along
with a negative particle, the intention of a particular meaning is contrary
to the derivation. And because it is not seen anywhere. Because the reason
for the use of a word expressing a counter correlate is just that it
distinguishes the state of being related to the meaning of a negative
particle [i.e. it does not give a qualified meaning]. For this very reason,
when one pot exists, even though all pots other than that do not exist at
that pla ce, there is no usage; the pot does not exist. Otherwise, there
could be the usage of the word " abrahman a" in regard to a particular
brahmag a such as Devadatta etc. Moreover, if by the word "anrta" there is
the understanding of an action accompanied by desire, because the person
who is asleep has no obstruction due to the absence of action and because
according to your view the sense of "I" is manifest at that time, then
why does the knowledge of Brahman, who is [the persons] own Self, not
arise?
568
4.45.
n'\ c \ % I 3 I « ) «R-
WtwFo^nrR I <n* ft <nr <w-
^r^rqtFTf^ I ^ *rWrcM ft*PT5^T h^-
£rc^frw orsafii i ^riq nra^raM ^nff%wr %m-
^T%SH^TW5fg^Ff WN HTRt qf^T-
Rra^wsR- %q mfcrro ^TRfrfacm
ii^wr ^raii?ct M’li^l
Rra^raif# I ^s-
<r?w TT^fMhRpr fw*m i
4.45. The Uasadaslya hymn (Tai.Bra.2,8.9.3.) is also a means of knowledge
for the Ignorance which is the Basis of the world which is indeterminable
as existent or as non-existent. Because there [in the hymn], Ignorance
is expressed by the word "darkness" ( tamas ): "darkness existed". And for
that [ignorance] the nature of being indeterminable as either existent or
non-existent is acquired through the double negation: "non-existence was
not, nor was there existence". Although by this: "non-existence was not,
nor was there existence" both existence and non-existence are said to
have merely a state of non-existence at the time of dissolution, still, at
that time, it is taught in that very hymn that darkness exists: "darkness
existed". If that [darkness] exists, there is incongruity of the negation;
"nor was there existence". If it does not exist, there is incongruity of
the negation; "non-existence was not". Therefore, as a matter of course,
that darkness is established as indeterminable as either existent or non¬
existent ,
4.46.
, ( ^PTTo $ o ? qo
tor TRf, trilsspraftit t| wst: ^frw m (trap 1 f%
^ T^W^TRr 'sftflHWrkUMgt i 3FqT%qm
fs*]p k) iVkWfq rRltq qwi%Kl% qpqqqrffi |
569
^ (%° ^ l $ i \) ^
i ^rrfq trthi^r; l ft I ^ 5
^TRT^ysfr !
4.46. But vhat has been said (£ri.B.Para.68.p.150,51.):
Here too [in the text]; "at that time, non-existence
was not, nor was there existence", the two words
"existence" and "non-existence" refer to the
individual sentient and insentient things. Nothing
is told here as having a nature which is indeterminable
as either existent or non-existent. Because this
sentence aims at teaching that the two entities which
are the individual sentient and insentient things and
which are denoted by the words " sat" and " tyat " at the
time of creation resolve, at the time of absorption,
into the entity which can be denoted by the word
"darkness" and which is the collective insentient
material.
That is not so. Because there is no means of proof that the two words
"existence" and "non-existence" refer to the individual sentient and
insentient things. For the meaning of those two words is well known;
existence is what appears as "it is" and non-existence is what is contrary
to that.
Furthermore, the disappearance of the individual souls, who are
the individual sentient entities, in the collective insentient material
is completely impossible. How do you understand from the description of
the origination of the individual sentient and insentient entities in the
sentence [denoting] origination that the statement of disappearance here
[in the sentence; "at that time, non-existence was not,.,"] is for those
very two? The statement about origination; "It became sat and tyat " (Tai.
570
2,6.1,) certainly does not belong to this topic. Nor even are the vords
the same. Because the tvo vords “ sat " and " tyat " were specified in the
statement about origination. But here the tvo vords are "existence" ( sat )
and "non-existence" (asat),
4.47.
'M' 3 ' 1 ^K'+> I WT^ ( RFI^R^RT C ( FFTW^frFTftlrT
^ m i
PTR, I *fFTt PRTTTn ! R7RRPP
RT TORS I 5^r^T^s?PR''TRT^ ( RPt W~
TR i
4.47. Furthermore, the vord " tyat " has the same meaning as the vord "that"
( tat ), The vord "that" indicates a thing vhich is remote, for there is the
statement: one should understand "that" as something remote. Moreover
the vord "that" there [having the sense of something remote] is common to
the vorld and to the Veda vhereas the vord " tyat " solely belongs to the
Veda, And moreover the vords " tyat " and "that" also have the nature of
calling to mind vhat has preceded. And so a thing vhich is remote is
expressed by the vord " tyat " here: "[it became] sat and tyat ". The meaning
[of tyat ] is "formless"Because generally there is an association
betveen being formless and being remote. The vord " sat" has the meaning of
vhat appears as "it is" and it makes knovn a thing vhich has form. For it
has proximity vith the vord " tyat " vhich has the meaning of "formless".
And because generally there is an association betveen having form
and existing. For there can be no doubt about existence in regard to
something vhich has form. Thus the vords " sat " and " tyat" certainly do
not have the meaning of individual sentient and insentient things in the
case of the statement about origination, so the vords " sat " and " asat "
571
having that meaning in the statement about dissolution, on account of
conformity with that [previous meaning], is indeed far off the mark.
4.48.
mSTO; 1 ^tor r | ^r#ttrto to
=c7Tmr^: ^rttot 3 ttttorito totto 1
^RN^pft^i ....^pfrrora totot I ....
to tortrtot rtotj 3%ro; I Rrro rtot 1 ^rcrsrfaf^
I torrrttoi Rw%q;” (st® r 1 1 ^ i i\v ) 1
^1 'jtotp: refaT, 3 xt^t 5^ %qro r^rt h^rt % ri\-
rr 1 sni^ql^rg^R ^ tottor tor; rw^toNto ! r*tr-
tottt^rr i rrto rttori( %w-
RrsTOrcroft w^rtr tvtt RrcTRrcfri^tRTO rrtto; 1)
1% 5 TO^TOTOTORTSSRR 1 TO R f^RgRRTRFiT TOU | RR|TO-
totor 1 RroroRRTOTfTOt tot to tottoto-
TTOTO TOTOrRTRTORTO TO RKRRRX RTgRR^ I RR RTO
rtr^r
totsrtoitorr
TOTTOTO^ I RTO RR! RTORTRRRTOTRTOft aSTRTORTRiMft
TOTTT^R ®R|TC: I cTTT5T TO%RIRRKRTO sTRTTOTT%R f%VRTO
TOR^ I TO TOUT m TO£TO] I RRT RRpI TOT *pt TOT RT €f*t
|r rsto^ i to to r%r hwt rtrtotor; 1 tot r rrrt toto*-
£ TOvffR? RRRTOITRIRReTOR. i
» [ IR| ! i R^RT^ ^TTO: ’ ( TOR?° { 1 <\ ) 5$ I
4.48, In that very hymn, the Ignorance vhich is the basis of the world is
expressed by this: "That one [Brahman], motionless, breathed due to its
own nature" and by this: "The world was concealed by falsity". In order
to make this clear, the meaning rendered by 3rl Sayanacarya there is
included here since it is more correct.
text
At that time, non-existence vas not, nor was there
existence. ...That one, motionless, breathed due to
its own nature. ...Darkness existed. In the beginning,
572
knowledge was hidden by darkness. All this was indeed
water. The world was concealed by falsity. That [world]
produced through the greatness of darkness was the One
(Tai.Bra.2.8.9*3-4.).
commentary of Sayaiiacarya
When the previous creation had dissolved and the following
creation had not originated, "at that time" ( tadanlm ) even
the two: "existence" ( sat ) and "non-existence" ( asat ) were
not. The world which is distinctly cognized as qualified by
name and form is expressed by the word existence. The non¬
existent, equivalent to a man's horn etc., is said as non¬
existence. Both of those "did not exist" ( naslt ). ( [Abhyankar's
addition]; The purport of this 'non-existence was not' is that
even what consists solely of imagination bereft of an
externally existing nature, such as a rabbit's horn etc., did
not exist at that time.) But some unmanifest condition existed.
And that is not existing because it is not clearly evident.
Nor even is it not existing, since it exists as the producer
of the world...."That" ( tat ) is Brahman, the reality, well
known in all the Upani§ads"Due to its own nature" ( svadhaya )
means endowed with maya which is the cause of the whole world
and which depends upon itself [i.e. upon Brahman]. "It breathed"
( anit ) means that it was active. Action here does not mean
moving, but it is specified as "motionless" ( avatam ), i.e.
having the purport of: pure existence. It means free from
wind, i.e, motionless....The primary Ignorance which is the
material cause for the transformation into the world and which
can be expressed by the words avidya . maya , sakti etc. is said
by the word "darkness" ( tamas ). Just as darkness conceals
objects, so too, this also conceals the reality which is
573
Brahman. Hence there is the expression by means of the word
darkness. Some such darkness "existed" ( asit ) depending upon
Brahman and capable of producing the transformation into the
vorld. The whole world was "hidden" ( gudham ) "by that
darkness" ( tamasa ). Just as a pot is hidden within a ball
of clay or just as a tree is hidden within a seed. It is like
that. For this very reason, the "knowledge" ( praketam ) could
not be thoroughly understood. Accordingly, it is mentioned
by Manu;
This [world] was of the nature of darkness,
unknown, without characteristics, incomprehensible
by reason, unperceivable, entirely like deep sleep
(Manu.1 .5 . ) .
4 . 49 ,
rpt sgFa: m&mft t w H qfan ^resrr: nf^J-
i to-
W ^TROTTOPRT TOfflt I TR RRdiRTFRTf q?T-
m TOT 7RRR «RT1^T$<PT I RT TO l
to totoFto i
JTOTOf TOWTTO I mi TOTO^tTOTO 1 ^ ^1"
#cTORWTO: T3TOTR%T
W{ I STTOWTO^T TOT^Vt WTTTO 'TTOR ^ I
4.49. continuation of Sayana's commentary
"Water" ( salilam ) is the illustration there. Just as
hailstones which have fallen in the rain remain as
mere water, so too, "all" ( sarvam ) the world was "this"
( idam ) darkness. The meaning is that [the world]
remained in the form of mere darkness. Indeed here, the
followers of Kaijada etc., who are the exponents of the
574
prior non-existence of the effect in the cause, say
that an effect is produced which certainly does not
exist previously in the cause. However the followers
of Sankhya etc., who are the exponents of the prior
existence of the effect in the cause, say that the
effect, which is unmanifest, certainly exists
previously and becomes manifest through the operation
of the cause. In that matter, only the view of the
exponents of the prior existence of the effect in the
cause has been accepted by the sacred text: 'hidden by
darkness'. Sbhu means "world", [its derivation is]: a_
has the sense of 'completely', bhavati ’it becomes' in
the sense that 'it originates'. That [world] was indeed
"concealed" ( apihitam ) "by falsity" ( tucchena ). The
primary Ignorance which is the cause of that [world] is
false because it can be removed by the mere knowledge of
reality. Concealed by that, means [the world] was covered
at the time of the dissolution. "Which" ( yat ) means the
world which was in such a manner, "That" (tat) world,
which was unmanifest, "was produced" ( a.jayata ) i.e, it
originated, in the form of the manifest world "through the
greatness" ( mahina ) "from darkness" ( tamasah ) which is of
the nature of Ignorance and which was mentioned previously.
That [world], though appearing in the form of the world
according to the view of ignorant people, is in reality
"the One" ( ekam ) Brahman alone.
4.50. i
575
* f%fa-
sto; i #?w ?mWf g smrf^rcffa: i
£jT*qpTjTPT*fegr, w:’ ftffcpft ^i^r I *fc?3s-
qffaqci^>q3s^ft qpn! qromranfift (^nfto v\i o<^)
^fcr ww. I -
4.50. This Ignorance, which is the basis of the world and indeterminable
as either existent or non-existent, is expressed by the word " maya ". The
nature of maya means bringing about the creation of diverse things while
being unreal. But what has been said (3ri.B.Para.68.p.1 51 .):
For the word " maya ' 1 does not everywhere refer to
what is false.
Although the word " maya " does not have the sense of falsity everywhere, in
accord with the meaning heard for this "everywhere" there [in the £srr»B.],
there is no negating factor in it having the meaning of falsity here [in
regard to the texts cited in the ^ri.B., which will be discussed below].
But there is a contradiction with what is well-known if this "everywhere"
has the meaning of "anywhere". Even boys at the present time use the
expression: "these are unreal ( mayika ) 11 , having seen the false things shown
by a magician. Maya means [something] is formed ( miyate ) in the sense that
it is made to appear as though perceptible by it [i.e. by maya ]. The affix
ya [is due to the u nadi sutra ]: "the affix ja comes after the roots ma,
35
cho and gas".
4.51 .
‘ 3iI%[%cTO3src;f i
nibr jnsIfUfer Ml ^ I
*n*rr 34 |
^ *n=T m3: I
3*t *rrqR??<4 i
^cT^( fto To )
576
wmv i \i *^rrs5?mTTfrn f¥*rr- ,
wn trrqmf^wsrcR ^rf%rfFi^ s 4: I ft«n«if
^TT I W4Tf^U T^Ti 4^3~ (
ran ^qran m %wfRf q^q: ^qf*^ l
4,51. The essential nature of this [maya 1 has also been told in the forty-
fifth chapter of the DevTpuran a:
Maya was declared by him to be like dream and magic
in that it gives unexpected results and brings about
wonderful effects in the world.
The Tapaniyasruti too is a means of knowledge about this. There is also
the statement of Vidyaraijya :
This maya is of the nature of darkness (tamas), for
that has been told in the Tapaniya . The sacred text
itself has declared empirical experience to be the
proof there (P.D.6.125.).
This is indeed the meaning of the word " maya ” here as well:
The thousand mayas of dambara were destroyed one
after another by that quickly moving [discus of
Lord Vi§nu] which is protecting the body of the
boy (Vis-P.1.1 9.20.).
The meaning is that the thousand mayas dispatched by the demon isambara
were destroyed one by one by that quickly moving discus of Vi§nu which is
protecting the body of Prahlada. A false thing, though it can be negated
by knowledge, is certainly able to be cut by a weapon. When a rope is
being cut by some person carrying a weapon —whether he has the idea that
it is a rope or he has the idea that it is a snake— a deluded person
standing at a distance knows only that; "a snake has been cut".
577
ft ^ slM«q RWft
^ \ t&vw f^RFi hf m<r
*TPnm: ) fFRifa
m tR !|^k Rif TFFffcf^Ft i ^ f| iVrt^t: Ofr*TT°
<£° ^ qo ^ ) fRqi^ | FPRFJR 3TTq RRT fFR*fT?q^
RTF^RRi: Rtf 1 * ^RlRT^fl F7R fqWrF
mwm wm *tfr^:» ( ^ » i ^ ) ‘ 3R#nw # *rt
^Tr: jttrI»(* fr° ?i ^ ) *f5$r rrm: q^q fql J ( f° ^ I
H I \<k ) ‘qq qpiT ^rr> (jfto \si ) frir qpmrRt fr-
w*k <r i q ftmq qm wrt i
4.52. Furthermore, as long as there is no rise of knowledge, the
destruction of a false object is seen to be produced by a weapon which is
false. The piece of wood in a dream is certainly seen in the dream to be
cut by an axe which [itself] belongs to the dream. On account of this,
[the statement] (^rT.B.Para.68.p,152.):
Here also various powers are spoken of: "Indra is
said to be manifold on account of his mayas " (Brh.
2.5.19. ). Indeed it is for this very reason that it
said: "He shines greatly here, [like] Tvastr" (R.V.6.
47.19. ). For no one shines who has a false nature
is set aside. The adorned elephants and horses etc. existing in a dream,
though false , are experienced by everyone as shining in the dream. The
word " maya " has only its etymological meaning in: "Prom this [ prakrti ]
the mayin [i.e. the possessor of maya ] creates this universe and in that
[ prakrti 1 another [the soul] is bound by maya " ( 3 v . 4 . 9 .), "When the soul,
asleep because of beginningless maya , awakes..." (Gaud.Ka.1 .1 6.), "Indra
is said to be manifold on account of his mayas" (B^h.2.5.19.), "my maya
is difficult to transcend" (G.7.14.) etc. No negating factor whatsoever is
seen there.
578
4.53.
$ \ c \ v ) ^
qi%: JjHnJR.
sw-
*l\ I ^^rPTlt^T *
^wTrw ^#rr-
^riFm^WH rer*n% l *r<j
r^F^rmr 7 (
3° ^ o^o *) ^h \ ^jft[f^;
vmi sTFwfpt: 11% ^
^33 5 fr^ 5 (TOT^T I zt\% |:^t m^TT%^T^q^Ti I s^r^iT
|.T<%^w^sfRr^ I ^ ^ ‘twmiw frr^t <r*f^T<t; w
*pV ft%q°fr*m sfft ?:far* ^r^l
^ <*v rs ^ ^ ^
i%% ^nlr m$ ftfaiswRl
w ^fr ftwt l %x*\ ^r-
tffcpr 3 ^wnfa ^ for%$ ?fl^^rorra hft ^WFffa: I
f% ^ <TOT, ^ -^^121%^ I rpT HTWIfWTt-
f% ^
<rcsw*itft rw: ^l
: l * ^w n^m% 7
4,53. Even the sacred, text [revealing] the identity of the individual
soul and Brahman; "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.) is a means of knowledge about
the Ignorance [previously] mentioned. If there is a difference, in reality,
between the individual soul and Brahman then the identity of those two is
not possible. Therefore it has to be accepted that the difference is only
fictitious. Since there is no logical possibility other than that, an
indeterminable Ignorance is established as producing such knowledge of
difference. But what has been said (£rI.B.Para,68.p.153.);
But the teaching of oneness is very appropriate
because even by the word "you" there is only the
mention of Brahman who has the individual soul as
His body.
That is not so. Because from [the words] "you", "I" etc, there is no
cognition anywhere of Brahman having each individual soul as His body.
Furthermore, from [the words] "you", "I" etc. does Brahman appear
579
as what is to be qualified by the individual soul, or as the mode [i.e.
the attributej of the individual soul? In the first case, there is no
logical possibility of the usage; "you are sorrowful" etc. Because Brahman
does not have even a trace of sorrow. It should not be said; the sorrow
terminates in the individual soul, who is the attribute, on account of
the maxim; "when the substantive is negated, the positive statement and
the negation terminate in the distinguishing attribute". |_ reason J The
nature of that maxim is that the idea of the listener firstly comes to
what is qualified in accordance with that [statement]; "the syntactical
relation between words is only in what is qualified", and being negated in
regard to the substantive it terminates in the distinguishing attribute.
But here in; "you are sorrowful", the idea of the listener does not come
to the qualified sense even firstly and so there is no operation of that
maxim in this case. Moreover, [the employment of that maxim] is correct
in the case of a positive statement and a negation but not in the case of
a statement. Because such a usage is generally not seen there [in regard
to a statement]. In the same manner, there is incongruity of usage [if
you say]; "it was said in this manner by you who are sorrowful" etc. and
so the situation is just the same. Furthermore, there is no logical
possibility of the use of the second person; "you are That". The usage
must be; "That is you" just like here; "Brahman is your Self".
comment
Visis^advaitins consider that in the sentence "you are That" ( tat tvam
asi ) both the words "you" and "That" directly denote Brahman. The word
"That" refers to Brahman as the omniscient cause of the world. The word
38
"you" signifies Brahman, having the individual soul as His body.
Abhyankar asks whether the word "you" refers to Brahman as the
✓ V
substantive ( vise ga) of the individual soul, or whether it refers to
Brahman as the mode, i.e. the attribute (vise gaga) of the soul. In the
first case, if the word "you" in the sentence "you are That" refers
directly to Brahman, then a statement such as "you are sorrowful" would
not be logically possible. Por the sorrow too must refer to Brahman, It may
580
be argued that the idea of the listener firstly apprehends the qualified
meaning, i.e, Brahman having the soul as His body. Because there is no
logical possibility of the sorrow referring to the substantive, i.e.
Brahman, then it must only refer to the individual soul who is the
attribute. Abhyankar replies to this argument by stating that when the
word ’’you" is uttered the first apprehension on the part of the listener
is certainly not in the qualified meaning of Brahman having the soul as
His body.
ft I ft
^ ^ ^ C C.
qjHt I
4.54. In the second case [if Brahman is the attribute of the soul], the
logical impossibility of grammatical apposition in; "you are That" would
be just the same as before. But it should not be said; the Self, who is
the mode [of the individual soul], has grammatical apposition with Brahman,
[reason] Because potness, which is the mode [i.e. attribute] of a pot, is
eternal, the usage is certainly not seen anywhere that; "the pot is
eternal" because it has the intended meaning of that [potness].
Furthermore, it is all the more logically impossible that [the
words]; "you", "I" etc. have a meaning which terminates in the Self. Because
these two designate pronouns. A word which is a pronoun recalls something.
Here in; "£>vetaketu, you are That", Ssvetaketu is being recalled by this
[pronoun] "you". And the one being recalled and being addressed by the
father is only the individual soul, not its inner—controller.
comment
In the second case, Brahman is said to be the attribute of the soul.
Abhyankar states that if this is so, there is no logical possibility of
grammatical apposition. In the first case -where Brahman is the substantive
l
581
qualified by the soul- the word "That" (tat) denotes the subject ( uddes ga)
and the word "you" ( tvam ) denotes the predicate (vidheya). The meaning of
the sentence is: "That [supreme Self] is you [the supreme Self having the
soul as His body]". In the second case, Brahman is the attribute of the
soul and so the word "you" becomes the subject and the word "That" becomes
the predicate. But in this case the predicate does not convey any
additional information. For example, one can say: "the pot is blue" since
the predicate furnishes new information, but it is meaningless to say:
"the pot is a pot". Similarly, the statement "you are That" is a tautology
if it is said: "you [the supreme Self having the soul as His body] are
That [supreme Self]".
4.55.
l srrt Miw: vwm qw-
qrqqqq I hrh qwRT qw-
q%Tt I q qmfq^ft qqqvrqiq-
^qr^rt qsrqqq ^Mq-
qrqqq: stsqr: qfqqi^vqg ?pqq:1 ‘^Rq ^ft%-
rrht > ( $ .\ \ 1 q ) ^ ^
1 ^ Rq#q srsm qqrmqR 1 ^req
mq qprqq TOq q^qq:
^ ( ?fPTTo qo $ ) qq sqqft | qq-
qiR^fs^ir^qq qiqwqrqnqrwq it 1 m\ qiqq
ipi qiHRRR^nqqrqR m Rr^q?nf% q qq qs^rr: l q it *qq\%
fq^e qqq;, qf^qr to q qq^qq > qq:^q: qqpqqnq-
fropRiS qqH I
qrq-
4.55. Furthermore, like the word "body", the two words "individual soul"
and "inert matter" are the two determining words among [those] which are
indicators [of His body]. Otherwise, the usage you accept: "the supreme
Self has the individual souls as His body", "the supreme Self has the
inert matter as His body" etc. could not be logically possible. Rather the
usage should be: "the individual soul is the supreme Self", "the inert
matter is the supreme Self". And so "you", "I" etc., mother and father etc
Devadatta and Yajnadatta etc. are words expressing particular individual
souls. So too, earth etc. and pots etc. are words expressing particular
582
inert things. So hov would they he able to teach a meaning which extends
as far as the Self? On account of this, [the view that] the word
"individual soul" has a meaning which extends as far as the Self in the
sacred text: "by this individual self" (Ch.6.3.2.) is refuted. But the
reason which was told for denoting only Brahman by the word "you" (^ri.B,
Para.68.p.153.):
[in the text]: "having entered along with this
individual self, I shall manifest name and form"
(Ch.6.3.2.) it is said that every object possesses
name and form only in so far as it terminates in
the supreme Self
is not possible. Because it was stated by the sacred text that the
manifesting of name and form is indeed preceded by the entry of the supreme
Self. And so they [visi§tadvaitins] must certainly be asked hov, on account
of this reason, the supreme Self is established as possessing the
respective names? For just by this [expression]: "ghee is hidden in milk,
without it, milk does not have the nature of being milk" the word "milk"
is not able to be called "ghee" which is the "soul" of the milk.
wicHi Wr-
jpJl^TSfq
q^inf
4.56. If it is said that the supreme Self is the producer of all things
and therefore He is also the possessor of the words expressing all things,
then even a potter, who produces pots, must be the possessor of the word
"pot". If the supreme Self brings about the convention of all words in
the manner; "this meaning is to be understood from this word" and on
account of this the supreme Self would be the possessor of all words, then
583
-even a father etc., who by chance brings about the convention of a word
such as "^ittha" [some name] for his son etc., must be the possessor
of such words. Let the matter rest here.
4 ' 57 * m.
arctafa* it
3- <^1%^ <^F7 \
<i®r iw- qnqfqiftqftfej*} tt
qjqqr Rra^aftwir iqi^gaitfissqr t
mpk ||
( STT. 3 . ?oS? | t tfo | ^ | ) |
-wm
a^qqRT qq q qpqfoi^rqwi i
q^iR^q Wfoqraffaiqiq^ H
arqqq^q^^qqrq^qqiqqq; i
q?q q;if%<w: i%^r fqsRf |j
q bt qracft err qiqqrRr ftfcra: \
qrrr^g-qqrfe a4^r a
(t 'll. U ^ I » ) ^ > !
4.57. This teaching of knowledge about Brahman is found to be very clear
in the Vayupuran a:
[Like] a snake upon a rope, water in a desert and
blueness in the sky, in the same manner, this unreal
universe which is superimposed by Ignorance appears
in which [Brahman],
This space is divided only being limited by a pot.
In the same way, what has the designation of an
"individual soul" is limited by the limiting
adjunct of the effect [i.e, the body].
The "egg of Brahma", wonderful, without equal, was
deposited, as it were, in a place in which [Brahman]
584
by maya who is [like] a painter and whose nature
consists of diverse qualities, (Va.P.104, 39,40,41.)
Also in the Devigita in the Devibhagavata ;
0 Lord of the mountains, I alone existed before.
There was nothing other than me. At that time,
the nature of the Self has only the names:
"consciousness", "awareness", "supreme Brahman".
Of that [supreme Brahman] which is incomprehensible
by reason, indescribable, without comparison and
free from sorrow, there is some power which is self-
established and which is well known as " maya ".
That [ maya ] is not existent, nor is it non-existent,
nor does it have the nature of both on account of the
contradiction. It is something distinct from these and
is at all times something substantial. (De.Gx.l.2.4.)
4.58.
fifcrer i
to: sgqre a *n%r^ [ft. 3. =1 I \ \c ] I
I qrmfe to tor*r: ^
iroftt I qq fnqpnmq:-
4.58, This teaching of Ignorance in relation to Brahman is seen in the
Vig hupuran a in the twelfth chapter of the second part. To elucidate;
0 best among the twice-born, the stars are Yigpu, the
worlds are Yignu, the forests are Vig^u and the
mountains and the directions, the rivers and the seas.
585
He alone is everything, what exists and what does
not exist (Vis,P,2.12,38.),
The word "Vi?pu" signifies the supreme Self, All the stars etc. are said
here as having identity with the supreme Self,. If the world consisting of
the stars etc, is absolutely real and in the difference of that [world]
from the supreme Self, then identity is not possible. Therefore, the
world consisting of the stars etc. must he said to be only superimposed.
And a superimposition has Ignorance as its basis. Thus the teaching
about Ignorance is established. And so the grammatical apposition: "the
stars are Vi?nu" etc. is only for the purpose of the negation of the stars
etc. [as having absolute reality].
4.59.
1 to smf totc: ( f. 3 i ^ 1 V-tf )
TO! tow to: (ft. 3 . \ I U\3) to 353 :
( ft° 30 \ I l ctf ) I ^3: (fto 30 n ^ l
^ TOT l TOT-
A-cron*
.OTT=,sfr. ^<n ^ snroru qrnRimn^iw I
"■51'?; ^ ^RK^Rtn? | ITW2[Tr^T
toto ^k; ottostoi qgktTOi qT to ^to to i toto*:
TOITOT ^
^WTO ft*^K^lftJlMt*TI TOTO telTO
TO31 TOtstf totoT qgkr to? ^ to totot: TO hi?!
I * ^ ft^RTOFTiftftri touto-
ftro toto; i ^TO^ngqrTORtqi^TO?TOTF-TOig; 1
1.59. [objection] This identity is based upon the relation of body a:
the one embodied. In the sacred text: "whose body is the earth... .whose
body is water" (B^h.3.7.3,4.) and in the Vis pupuran a: "The water is the
body of Vi§£u" (Vi?.P.2.12,37.), "all that is His body" (Vi?.P.1 .22,84,) ,
"all that, is indeed the body of Hari" (Vi?,P.1 .22.37.) it is said that
everything such as the earth, water etc. is the body of the supreme Self.
586
-And. in the sacred text; "whose body is the self" (£.Bra .1 4,6.7.30,) it is
said that the individual soul too is the body of the supreme Self. And in
the world, the identity between the body and the one embodied is spoken
of, as for example; "this individual soul is born, on account of karma ,
as a cow, a horse, a human being or a god",
[reply] No, Because even upon accepting that the individual souls
and inert matter have a connection with the supreme Self consisting of the
relation of a body and the one embodied, there remains as before the
incongruity of the usage such as; "the stars are Visiiu" since an identity
does not exist in reality. Because identity means having the same degree of
reality. But the usages such as; "this individual soul is born, on account
of karma, as a cow, a horse, a human being or a god” are based upon the
superimposition of identity. It should not be said; the identity must be
superimposed here too; "the stars are Visnu". [reason] Because when the
logical tenability is possible, an acceptance of superimposition is not
correct.
4 ' 60 * to m mimnwri ^
# I 3PCTC VZ
rr^ I r tot ito TOwnfr
| TOT$ f| wr-
wtto | w —mw t
y i PFJSTlk
I ( fro go ^ ^ |
^ tol^FT ^ go ? I rr I ) %
STSTO^TOT R ( fto Jo ^ I ^ j
HRto ! 1 to 1 (go \ j vs j
M i w
* ftTO’T:» m di * ^ i
^ Rprorq] i wnwr
^ ^RTT^d^I <3ii% I ^ 3PTTTO sqfcfffo toHR
toft] |
587
4.60. Furthermore, the relation of a body and the one embodied -on the
part of the individual souls and inert matter with the supreme Self— does
not admit of any proof. Because the body is veil knovn in the vorld as
the place for the experience of the results born of karma . And the Lord
cannot possibly have the experiences of the results born of karma . And so
vords such as "body” etc. in; "whose body is the earth" etc. have the
meaning of the essential nature. Because it is seen that the word "body"
has the meaning of "essential nature"-[in expressions like]; "the body of
the grinding-stone" [i.e. the grinding-stone itself]. For instance the
vords " kaya ", " vapu " and " tanu " too [which all denote body] in the
Vigp upuran a; "all that is His body", "The water is the body of Vignu",
"all that, is indeed the body of Hari" only have the meaning of the
essential nature. Because the word "form" (murti ), which is well knovn as
a synonym: of "essential nature", is seen as having this usage here in the
Vis nupuran a itself; "the entire form [of the world is not absolutely real]"
(Vig.P.2.12.39.). For this reason, the mention of the word "form" ( rupa )
agrees here in the Vig nupuran a itself: "the form of the universe, because
He is unchanging" (Vi§.P.1 .2.68.), "That Brahman has two forms [i.e. a
twofold nature], formful and formless" (Vi§.P.1 .22.53.).
Even the two words "power" ( sakti ) and "greatness" ( vibhuti ) in:
"The supreme power of Visnu has been told" (Vi§,P.6.7.61 .) etc. only have
the meaning of the particular essential nature. Otherwise, there could
be no consistency in meaning with statements in the Vig nupurap a such as:
"the entire form", "the form of the universe" etc. On account of this,
the etymological interpretation of the meaning of the word "body"; a body
is that which is solely to be supported, solely to be controlled and which
is solely a part, -which is the supposition for the scope of the words
"form", "power" and "greatness" as having such a meaning— is refuted.
Because the word "body" is well known in the world only as the place for
588
experience. Thus the Ignorance which is the basis of the superimposition
of the world is established due to the grammatical apposition: "the stars
are Vi§nu" which has the meaning of negation.
4,61 .
wt ^ i 'wrV q#RR*rrdift ^ q<fRd oti-
TFTn% ^ 1 rrtr
I m
I RRl^^THRRTRR: mfe-
*TR ^ i Wf‘^1 RRTI% f| 1 tRf&
Rfi qfhm <trr^t% ft ] wr
RT ff$qTR#R ^ cTTfq IT iftft I 3^r qrqRTRt
>rr I
tfim sqpT JTIQqor: iftd*. ’ ( JTo TR {\ I ? )
^R ^nRRddqRift | 9TRR^q^R< =q TRRTRW*
^ qsrrR-
emrc strut =q ftftfR ! wftR qiun^q t ?rr *tot ^31-
sr^nftfcTRR^ 1 qmq^Vn^ r
rh-r^ritr ft’RH 1
4.61. Furthermore, having specified some particular things which are well
known such as the stars etc. by the three sections of the verse, in the
fourth section it was said: "what exists and what does not exist, all that
is He alone" with the intended meaning that: what is the need of this
statement of particulars? "What exists" is recognized as something which _
is an actual entity: the entire class of individual souls, which are
sentient, and pots etc. which are insentient. "What does not exist" is
recognized as something which is not an actual entity, i„e. what is not
recognized as "it exists" such as the horns of a rabbit etc. and a kingdom
589
etc. vhich is imaginary, a "castle in the air". Although the horns of a
rabbit etc, certainly do not have an essential nature and so [it could be
asked]: "how does that [non-existent essential nature] have the supreme
Self as its essential nature?", still, even though the horns of a rabbit
etc. do not have an externally existing essential nature, an internal
essential nature certainly exists vhich is a mental superimposition. For
this very reason, because words such as "horns of a rabbit" etc. are
meaningful, the technical term "word-stem" ( pratipadika )^ is taught in
grammar. And for this very reason, the counter correlate of the negation
"the rabbit's horn does not exist" is well known. For the meaning of that
is: it does not exist as an externally existing essential nature. This is
what is said; the external thing which is visible in the manner "what
exists", all that is the supreme Self alone. So what can be said? What
does not exist means something internal vhich is to be conceived prior to
the external thing and which is only superimposed by the intellect, that
too is He [the supreme Self] alone. On account of this, the supreme Self
is said to be endowed with extraordinary greatness. This is indeed what
is expressed in the sacred text as well:
Narayana remains, having pervaded everything that is
internal and external (M.Na.1 3.5.).
Subsequent to the internal conception, if the apparatus which is the
proper means for those respective things exists, then the external nature
having such a form is seen somewhere. Just as in the case of a pot or a
palace etc. The potter and the carpenter, having firstly considered the
appearance of the pot and the appearance of the palace in the mind,
subsequently construct the pot and the palace having such an appearance.
But somewhere no externally existing nature is seen, just as in the case
of a rabbit's horns etc. And that is another thing. The horns of a rabbit
etc., vhich do not exist as an external nature and which are only
superimposed by the intellect, have only Ignorance as their basis and so
590
Ignorance is established.
4.62.
MWRmlro r wft \ tort \\ *mt?.
I a^TCHf ^ I 4 RTWt
®UTO1# ^5TR»Tfi^(^^^ Wt&Fzm ^ r
(%o ^ ^ ft 1 * TO^rcrftRft
^ ^ t^nr: fasyz; i <pn to-
TKFsmm *t TOiRm'kRRW* i ^R*r<kR 5 r
I *fT*!RR^ l
*TR < ^Tcf'fr^ I RR-
srift RfRSKtfa^r. ■»( $tw° q 0 <;) ^tk m l «i%-
<RRf TO#I W^RRRf SfT^JRT-
^rrrt^ 1 ^r^ft^sro^: w wr^mk$ w-
RTORR^Ifife: pirh%t^ w fa m
m 3 R ^t: 1 to* tro: to:
( ft® 3 ® r 1 ?r 1 ^vs) $rtf?[ TOiftw ^T^rftEft^-
RTft^^^RtTR^ t
4,62. Furthermore, the "non-existent" [i.e. the insentient matter] is not
possible to be the body of the supreme Self. Because the individual souls
are directly the body of the supreme Self. Vhereas the insentient things
[are the body of the supreme Self] only by means of the individual soul.
For you yourself have said (^ri.B.Para.73,p,167.):
Everything [is taught] as being of the nature of an
entity and being expressible through words only on
account of the entry of the individual soul who has
Brahman as its Self; "having entered along with this
individual self, I shall manifest name and form".
And your own established conclusion is: consciousness certainly exists even
in a piece of wood or a clod of earth etc., but it is unmanifest. So
because the "non-existent" [i.e. the insentient matter] is not the body of
the individual soul, there is no possibility of it being the body of the
supreme Self. The "non-existent" is in no way possible to be the body of
591
the individual soul. Because there is no experience [of such a thing].
But what has been said (3ri.B.Para.69.p.155.:
the sentient portion can be expressed by the word
"it exists" here: "what exists", because it is
imperishable. But the insentient portion is
perishable and so it can be denoted by the word
"it does not exist" *** <
That is not so. Because insentient things such as pots etc., which are
perceived as something existing, are not expressed anywhere by words such
as "it does not exist", "untrue" etc. Even though this meaning is
contradictory to what is well known, Eamanuja has only accepted it for
bringing about the logical possibility of this verse according to his own
view that grammatical apposition is based upon the relation of body and
the one embodied, for he does not accept that grammatical apposition is
for the purpose of negation. So how can [this meaning] be trustworthy?
It was mentioned just previously that words such as "body" etc. in; "The
water is the body of Yignu" (Tig.P.2.1 2.37.) etc, have the meaning of the
essential nature, for the logical possibility of oneness of meaning with
the words "form" ( rupa ). "form" ( murti ), "power" ( sakti ), "greatness"
( vibhuti ) etc.
comment
Ramanuja maintains that the sentient souls and insentient matter are
the body of the Lord which is mentioned in such verses as: "The water is
the body of Yignu" (Tig.P.2.1 2.37,). Abhyankar’s last sentence restates
the position that words such as "body" are used in the sense of "essential
nature",i.e, the water etc. are of the nature of Vigjjn.
4.63. - j
crar it n j
-■( go * m I vo
592
^ I WTT-
^trpiht wwftw i ^mgfcf: 77 #| ^m^gTfjCirqissrc-
iprceri?rcft« %ftr^f^t rfcSfa | rr v t
%r g^jaqiHn \ ^m\ i%rsi%r- |
^ ?m*\ I^F^dTR W-
3TR | ^RIRT ^rn%rTOT I fowpjH *Fg ^
^n%riRr to^: i
Rfi^'w * ^ki ^Tmr f^wt^qr
?^lt>9^ |
4,63. What has been told by this verse; "the stars are Vig^u" is that
everything is the supreme Self alone. That is not established merely by
a statement, but a reason has to be shown there. Hence he [the sage
Parasara] says;
Because the Lord is of the nature of Knowledge, He
is all forms but not an object. Therefore you should
understand that the distinctions of mountains, oceans,
earth etc. are displayed in Knowledge (Vi§.P,2.12.39.).
By this [word] "because", it is made known that this is the reason for the
meaning told in the previous verse ["the stars are Vi§nu"], [The meaning
is]; because this Lord ( bhagavan ) is, in reality, of the nature of
Knowledge ( jnanasvarupah ). All forms ( ase g amurtifr ) means the entire world
is His nature in the way that was told; all this is the supreme Self alone,
but He is not an object (na tu vastubhutah ). Everything, having this [Lord]
as its essential nature, is certainly false as it is displayed in
Knowledge ( vijnanavijrmbhitani ). Knowledge ( vijnana ) means; "diversity is
known through which [knowledge]"and it refers to the Ignorance which is the’
basis [for the appearance of diversity]. Alternatively^ 2 , [everything] is
displayed ( vi.jrmbhitani )' i.e . superimposed in Knowledge ( vijnana ) which
is the substratum, i.e. in Brahman whose nature is Knowledge. An object
consisting of being a superimposition is an effect of Ignorance and is
593
certainly false. And an object which is false is, in reality, only the
[nature of the] substratum. So the meaning told in the previous verse;
everything such as the stars etc. is the supreme Self alone, is established
The Ignorance which is the basis of the false-objects is firmly established
here by the statement concerning the falsity of the world; "but not an
object", "displayed in Knowledge".
4.64.
rW-sfR^WTf qo H ).^t
4*1 4 d t u l |
f| ^ h # I I
ft WRiw’-'RtH 1 m ftrrft
mawmgqiref ft ftwr fq-K^Htcf ^n^rr n ?ft |
wq |ft wm
441 5 34 I
^ it #K5Idd: R3RT 41 4143 H
( it o go 3 I ^ | So )
^f¥mw{ I l 4 tit i m~
-drc-R'RT HTTS^^ft I
4.64. The introduction to the verse "the nature of Knowledge" which was
told ($rx.B.Para.69.p.156.);
This [the soul] is of the nature of existence and this
[inert matter] is of the nature of non-existence. And
_this is the reason for this [inert matter] having the
nature of non-existence, hence he says: "Because the
Lord is of the nature of Knowledge"
is questionable. Because in the previous verse "the stars are Vi§qu", the
594
predicate is: "He alone is everything". But "vhat exists and vhat does
not exist" is a restatement. The nature of being a restatement is made
clear through the use of the vord "vhat". The knovers of the meaning of
sentences [i.e. Mimamsakas] consider that a reason mentioned in a later
sentence is only for the predicate portion in the previous sentence, not
for a portion being restated. Therefore this introduction is incorrect.
Having accepted vhat is the reverse i.e. the insentient pots etc., though
they are recognized as "vhat exists", are expressed by this "vhat does
not exist" , this effort too for establishing that -vhich is the mentioning
of the reason for a portion being restated- is certainly contrary and so
[this effort] is quite meaningless.
For vheh fate has become contrary, resourcefulness
is reduced to uselessness (^isu.9.6.),
He [Parasara] indeed confirms vhat was told in the verse "the nature
of Khovledge", vhich is that the different things such as mountains etc.
are displayed by Ignorance:
But vhen Knovledge is pure, natural and free from
defects upon the vasting avay of all action, then
indeed the differences among objects, vhich are the
fruits of the tree of conception, do not exist in
things {Vi§.P.2.12.40.).
"Pure" ( suddham ) means devoid of Ignorance, "Natural" ( nijarupi ) means
free from the perception of difference. "Defects" (do§ah) means attachment
etc. "Conception" ( sahkalpa ) means Ignorance, [the derivation is]:
difference is completely (samantat) conceived (kalpyate) due to this.
4 * 65 ' 1 sfto’T
ffRT * ( ^PTTo <To qo cn%-
595
/
* wsTjfi | l
*Tt*M-
t^n^K ^r: I ^ ^qrsrt
%TT¥rT <T? ^W^Tt^TH *T«fa I 3^^ Rvff ‘ ^ > ^W\-
^r HTfRnfcqFT ^|^nf i
4.65. But the explanation of this verse [above] (^rl.B.Para.69.p.1 57.)^:
" Sam " [in the word " sankalpa ] has the sense of uniting.
The assumption of the individual soul, having united
with the body, is the conception ( sankalpa ) that: "I am
a god", "I am a human being" etc. Karma alone is the
basis of this [wrong conception]. The differences among
objects, which are able to be experienced, are for the
experience of the result of karma and they indeed have
karma as their basis. Those [differences among objects],
though existing in reality, do not exist for experience
upon the cessation of the error that the body is the self.
That is questionable. Because according to the understanding of one who
knows [the truth], differences among objects do not exist in reality.
Moreover, this meaning is not acquired in a natural way from this verse.
The meaning of the word "conception" ( sankalpa ) which was told is not
well known. There is difficulty in supplying the ellipsis: "for experience".
The nature of being able to be experienced is the determining factor in
relation to what is to be negated [i.e. "they do not exist for experience"]
so how can the word "for experience", which indeed principally reveals
that [what is to be negated], be acquired just by an ellipsis? Otherwise,
in the case of an injunction ["do such and such"] there would be much
confusion upon the assumption of a contrary meaning by supplying the
ellipsis "not".
596
4-.66.
^TT%^T^«n’TtteTT ^TTT%-
T^r^^^mpTWRf Hn%rcKift v }^ ^t% ^ wm Jtffrcft 1 f^N
^r?rf^t f^m%5T ri% 1 f%j iftr ^RTHr^f
FRH%^ fT * fWiRT *fanT H WRt. ? Wlftvft-
^ igzti m mi% ^ 1
_ 44
4.66. But what has been said. (SrI.B.Para„69.p.157.) :
"the differences among objects do not exist” , so
an insentient thing is to be denoted by the word
”it does not exist" because it is connected with
states which are occasional.
In regard to that, it is said in this manner: it is not recognized anywhere
in the world that a thing having connection to an occasional state can be
denoted, at any time, by the word "it does not exist". Moreover, it is
true that the differences among objects, being occasional, are destructible.
But intelligent people must certainly discern; how is the occasional nature
or the destructibility of those [differences] directly expressed or indic¬
ated by the statement "though existing, they do not exist for experience"?
m\^i\ J 3 RTHH
tmi —
ft^r <?[!% ^ ?T cTtrqf fid fcff |*| clTdq; II
(ft® 3° * I U I «?)
*«& v&i wifew q;qrfe^r i
«\
3id: fit i%qq qtf ii
( 3°
4’.67. In the [following] two verses he [Parasara] establishes Ignorance
597
once again, by means of demonstrating the unreality of the differences
among objects even according to the way of experience in the world. The
essential meaning is expressed by this verse;
Is there an object anywhere which is without a
beginning, middle or an end, which has one
constant nature? 0 twice born, what undergoes a
change of state does not have that same condition
once again. So where and why is it real? (Yif.P.2.12.41.)
The illustration for the essential meaning told in the previous verse is
shown by this:
Earth becomes a pot, from the pot come the
fragments, the fragments become dust and
then minute particles. Say, is there an
object here? [Though] it is beheld [as an
object] by people whose ascertainment of the
Self is impeded by their own karma (Vi§„P.2.1 2.42.).
(r?o U i 8 * )
I WR q I
r go ^°) \
4.68.
Then he Concludes that what is other than the supreme Self is false
598
Therefore, 0 twice born, other than Knowledge there
is no collection of objects whatsoever, anywhere, at
any time. Knowledge, which is one, is accepted as
manifold by those whose minds are divided by the
variety of their own karma (Vig.P.2.1 2.43.).
In the first half here, the negation of difference [in respect of Knowledge]
with regard to something belonging to another class is indicated. In the
latter half, the negation of difference belonging to its own class is
indicated. And it is made clear that karma alone is the basis for the
Ignorance which is the cause of the perception of difference.
But the introduction which was stated (3r:T.B.Para .70,p.1 58.) ^ for
this: "Therefore, ...other than Knowledge there is no [collection of
objects] whatsoever";
an inert object, which is different from Knowledge, is
not able to be expressed solely by the word "it exists".
That is not correct. Because there is no cognition of such a meaning from
the verse. This [word in the verse] "is" certainly does not have the
meaning of "able to be expressed solely by the word 'it exists' ". Because
there is the consequence of implication. Moreover, although an inert object
cannot be expressed solely by the word "it exists" , it can certainly be
expressed by the word "it exists" which has a particular time and a
particular place as its adjunct: "the pot exists here at this time". So
it is not established that an inert object can be denoted by the word "it
does not exist".
^ tft'K to: tot: II
( 3° ^ I I )
599
m w4T%msfq vffr i irro4 t^fa-
tf^n l ^ t q ^frs^r-
^F^^Rqqrq^m ^Ff^qirrc ?%<nj;(
stf*— - ...
*TIH qq *FTdt JRirfit fR *WT tf*m?T>RR I
q^fPT =qlxF vpmsra a 11
( l%o qo ^ I ^ I )
srfer $mm I ^
rfq^T 3TT|-xr^% 1 %% f^PC-
4.69. All difference, being false, is only superimposed by Ignorance.
Because even an internal difference does not exist, in reality, in
Brahman. Hence he [Parasara] says:
Knowledge is completely pure, free from taint,
free from sorrow, devoid of contact with all
[things such as] greed etc. It is one, always
one and it is that supreme Lord Vasudeva other
than whom there is nothing (Vi§.P.2.1 2,44.).
In the first half here, it is indicated that even the difference caused
by the relation of attribute and its possessor does not exist. In the
latter half, the absence of the three types of difference is restated by
the expression "one”. "Always one" means free from [the sixfold
« ■ « ”i • . 46
modifications] such as birth, increase, etc. Through making known the
falsity of the world by this: "other than whom there is nothing", the
Ignorance which is the basis of that [false world] is firmly established.
He sums up what has been said:
I have thus told you what is reality; Knowledge is
real, what is other is unreal. And what pertains to
ordinary relations, on which the world depends, has
been told to you there also (Vi§.P.2.1 2.45 .).
600
Here, the falsity of everything different from Knowledge is made known
by this: "what is other is unreal". If everything is false, how is there
scope for ordinary relations? Therefore he says; "this [which pertains to
ordinary relations]". "And...has been told-there also" means that the
Ignorance which is the primary cause has been told.
4.70.
T^qq? I
i ^tt \ u*n ^
^ ‘ w*§: f
HR, |TTH ^
, fTR 77W% qTIR
irR : <^w(frfi v ^FTR ! <w * ^rtt% *rtr to %tt
wfer, * 3 i%Fri%*pr-
^ttr, qr^TR ^^ri: , hifto ^<pr<R,
w^’-piR q^iR
qjR ! I W ^Wfnlr
*t?ir wtR qs ^w^rro^q-
^TT: 1 ( 3rfaT° ?o\sqo ^ ) I ^TORTHPIR^
m\ 1 $r qqr wmti n?WT?wr ^
*TRR7tFR ^l#q-
4.70. This is to be understood here; in the verse "the stars [are Vi^u]"
the words "stars" etc. denote the subject. The word "Yig^u" relates to the
predicate. Since the stars etc. are of a nature which is visible, their
identity with the supreme Self is enjoined to make known their falsity.
For the enjoining of identity is only to make known the falsity of the
subject in the form of being the determining factor of the state of being
the subject. Just as here: "what is silver, that is the pearl-oyster".
And so in the six verses beginning with "the stars", these words: "Yi^u"
601
(2.12.38.), "...the Lord is of the nature of Knowledge" (2.12.39.), "...
Knowledge is pure, natural" (2.12.40,), "Knowledge, which is one" (2.12.
43.), "Knowledge is completely pure... It is one, always one and is that
Vasudeva" (2.12.44.), "Knowledge is real" (2.12.45.) make known Brahman
who is of the nature of Knowledge and who is the predicate in the first
sentence ["the stars are Yi§nu..."].
So too, these words: "the stars, worlds, forests, mountains, the
directions, rivers, seas, what exists and what does not exist" (2.12.38,),
"...but not an object...the distinctions of mountains etc. are displayed
in Knowledge" (2.12.39.), "...the differences among objects, which are the
fruits of the tree of conception" (2,12.40,), "...other than Knowledge
there is [no] collection of objects" (2,12.43.), "...other than whom there
is nothing" (2.12.44.), "...what is other is unreal" (2.12,45.) make known
the false things which are the subject in the first verse. Because the
comprehension of the meaning in that very manner is derived in a natural
way from the continuity of the verses. On account of this, [the statement]
(SrI.B.Para.70.p.1 59.) 4 ^:
the conclusion: "real", "unreal" occurring in the sixth
verse "what is reality" is for what was begun: "what
exists and what does not exist" in the first verse "the
stars..
is set aside. Because there is no comprehension of such a meaning in a
natural way. Because this [word] "real" is connected grammatically with
this [word] "Knowledge": "Knowledge is real" and because that [word
"Knowledge"] makes known the predicate in the first verse, therefore there,
is no possibility of summing up this: "[what exists and] what does not
exist" ~which is the subject in the first verse- by this [word] "real".
And so the summation of even both: "what exists and what does not exist"
is only by this: "what is other is unreal".
602
4.71 .
mh i m rrstc stitft
?RT*RR w *TRg*T 'T? ^ ? 5 *R 5
(wmo <j 0 \<>c ^ ) jr rr:
;, m rw fwFwtR-
ITOT^, ^ RWR
^twriw^, q^n% Hfwq- qr
5*itr i * WRfWR, wrnmi wtr ?
5RRRR#RR ■qr^j'JlTR I 1 m\W?i R 'TRSTFR, R' sRRRdTR,
ItMH Rf SRRRr* tRRRR <piiR R'RIR | 3RR^f
RH|q ; t4W{^T3R^ | WT vRR RWRT1 R SR^R
^rT^lWRR ^RRR^RRR qRR I RR R^f hrsr: ^
RT^R i tr^R '* STTRRIRWRl«M*KWf ^ ST^fMhtffaR-/
^WTOWW^ik r ( '4 rto ^o ^o<i ^o ^ ) ?r qfpR; I j
4.71. Vhen it is thus established, the sentence (&rT.B.Para.71.p.160.);
Here [in these verses], no word whatsoever is seen
which is conformable to the supreme Brahman, being
free from distinction, and to an Ignorance having
that [Brahman] as its locus and which is indeterminable
as either existent or non-existent, or to the world
being superimposed due to that [ignorance]
is only mere temerity. These words: "...the Lord is of the nature of
Knowledge", "...Knowledge is pure, natural and free from defects",
"Knowledge is completely pure, free from taint, free from sorrow, devoid
of contact with all [things such as] greed etc. It is one..." are
conformable to the supreme Brahman being free from distinction. These;
"...displayed in Knowledge", "...the fruits of the tree of conception" are
conformable to Ignorance and to the world being superimposed due to that
[ignorance]. And these; "...other than Knowledge there is no collection
of objects...", "...other than whom there is nothing", "...what is other ■
is unreal" should be understood as conformable to the world being
superimposed due to that [ignorance]. Ignorance is not non-existent because
it produces an effect in the form of the world. And it is not existent
603
because the world which is its effect is false. Thus Ignorance -which
is the cause- has the consequence of being indeterminable as either
existent or non-existent. But that is not said here directly by a word.
On account of this, [the statement] (£rI.B.Para.71.p.160.):
And because the words "exists", "does not exist",
"real" and "unreal" are incapable of directly
expressing a thing which is indeterminable as
either existent or non-existent
is answered.
4.72.
srpft t arfo.-g l u 1
fa SmTf^T *T 3T * ( «ft^To <jo \oC
5T° ^ 1 5TST-
sxTRqfa; I <rfa ^ ffar* ^ i
<m ^ vfatsm
fatfal mi t ctrrr irafat I ?mt ^
arB?*ret, far®
SRpRI ^Tlfaiaffri
t3fa ^ U«r ^ ^ 3
^R, \^RRR«R^t% *RRT i ^
«T ^ HR ^ R TalsyqcTRftit ^ *qgfa
qrWq; i ^ ^ wrr hr q«n
fa HTw^qqiTxf: t (faqiR
4.72. But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.71.p.161 .):
And here, with regard to an insentient thing, the
two words "does not exist" and "unreal" are not used
to denote fictitiousness or falsity but they refer to
destructibility. Because only destructibility i3
604
demonstrated here; "Is there an object...?", "Earth
becomes a pot", not a thing devoid of proof or which
can be sublated by knowledge.
That is not so. The inert objects are said to be in a different state at
every moment on account of the extent [of the meaning] pertaining to the
words here; "Is there an object...?", "Earth becomes a pot". And therefore
even though destructibility is demonstrated, nevertheless their purport
does not lie in demonstrating that. For there is the statement in the
same verse there; "Say, is there an object here?". And so what the author
of the Puran a intended to say is recognized as; being in a different state
at every moment is the reason for making known the absence of an object.
"Object" (vastu), "real" ( satyam ) and "truth" ( tattvam ) are
synonyms. And so the absence of the nature of being an object [i.e, the
absence of being a really existing thing] is the absence of reality and
unreality means being false. And in the beginning; "the stars are Vi§nu",
the stars etc. are certainly indicated as unreal in the form of stars etc.
on account of the statement that the stars and so forth have grammatical
apposition with the supreme Self. And in the middle [verses], unreality
is certainly expressed by this: "...but not an object", "...displayed in
Knowledge", "...the fruits of the tree of conception". And here; "Is there
an object...?", "Earth becomes a pot", that [unreality] is only confirmed
by showing the reason which is the nature of being in a different state
at every moment. And in the conclusion, [unreality] has been very clearly
told; "...other than Knowledge there is no collection of objects whatsoever"
here [occurring in the verse]; "Therefore...no..." (2.12.43.),and "...other-
than whom there is nothing" here [in the verse]; "Knowledge is completely
pure" (2.12.44.). And in summing up it is said; "Knowledge is real, what
is other is unreal" here [in the verse]; "...what is reality" (2.12.45.).
On account of that, it is said as a matter of course that what is unreal
605
is able to be sublated by knowledge. Therefore, the falsity of inert
objects is certainly established. Let the matter rest here.
4,73.
i \ l <: i vs) smiRi. w (fo ^ i ^ i ^ )
\i m (fo **| Jr?)
diM ot-Thr rr^t-
qq,%: rripr; l th * m a « uri mH -
hr?: <rit
(h° 3^0 ^ i \\ \\) ^ l h
l hr hth *n?nri i h tr wr ( h° hi o
? I £ l ?° I ??) (3?R[o $<> H°
^ ‘ ^ \%H 1 fRHH ‘ H 1
TRHH H SgGllRUTHHfq- HRFpnfflRHHRfH" HHIR
H I HIHWiTHq; ( <Jo ^ ^ qo ^3 ) | ft
H HRT VRTCft H I mnwir-
i sfatniRiiH ft hriiihrthr^ 5 SNHftut
u n
4-.73. [6] Ignorance is the primary cause of all those false objects. And
what removes that [ignorance] is the knowledge of the oneness of the Self
which is free from distinction, which is the purport of the Vedanta
statements such as: "you are That" (Ch.6.8.7.), "this Self is Brahman”
(Brh,2.5.19.), "all this which is, is this Self" (Brh.2.4.6.) etc.
48
But what has been said (^ri.B.Para.72.p.1 63.) :
there is no cessation of Ignorance from the knowledge
of Brahman free from distinction. Because of the
contradiction with numerous passages such as; "I know
this great Person, the colour of the sun, beyond
darkness. The one who knows Him in this manner becomes
immortal here, there is no other path for going [to
immortality]" (Tai.5.3.13.1.) , "All moments were born
606
from that Person vho is [like] lightning. No one rules
over Him, His name is 'great glory'. Those ■who know Him
become immortal" (M.Na.1 .8,10,11 .).
In regard to that, it is said; having repeated the knowledge of the Self
possessing qualities, which was previously mentioned, although that
[knowledge of the Self possessing qualities] was stated as the means for
the attainment of immortality by this: "The one who knows...in this
manner" and by this: "Those who know Him", still, that is only indirectly,
not directly. This was previously demonstrated (3.175.). Moreover, the
destruction of Ignorance is not at all possible through the knowledge of
Brahman possessing distinction. Because distinctions have their basis in
Ignorance. It should be understood that the knowledge of the Self
possessing distinction is a more essential means for the knowledge of the
truth.
c omment
Ramanuja's sixth objection: the logical impossibility of removing
Ignorance ( nivartakanupapatti ), seeks to demonstrate that the Advaitin has
no means to accomplish the removal of Ignorance ( avidya ). According to the
Advaitin, liberation is only through knowledge. This liberating knowledge
is revealed through a special means of knowledge -the XJpani^ad texts-
(see comment to 1 .2.) whose purport lies in the knowledge that the Self is
one and is of the nature of awareness free from all distinctions.
In this objection, Ramanuja argues that the sacred texts do not reveal
Brahman to be free from distinction. Texts such as: "I know this great
Person..." (Tai.5.3,1 3.1 .) etc. clearly reveal that Brahman possesses
distinguishing characteristics. Moreover, Ramanuja maintains that no texts
teach that Brahman is free from distinction and hence they cannot be the
means to remove this avidya which the Advaitins themselves have fabricated.
Abhyankar responds to this objection by resorting to the Advaita
distinction between a primary and secondary order of texts. Por the Advaita
method of interpretation, see 1.9. and comment and the comment to 1.48. Por
the Visi^tadvaita method, see 2,3. and comment and the comment to 2.50.
Ramanuja’s critique and Abhyankar's reply are based upon their
different exegetical methods, though they both ascribe to the axiomatic
607
belief that the sacred texts do not inherently conflict. The Advaita
method of interpretation explains statements denoting qualities as
referring to the Lord, i.e. the Self having maya as its limiting adjunct.
Advaitins accept statements denying the reality of distinctions as of
primary importance. The Visi§tadvaitins maintain that statements denoting
qualities are to be accepted just as they are. However they have
difficulty explaining statements such as: "free from qualities" (^v.6.11.)
for such expressions do not appear to deny only evil qualities but all
qualities in general. If there is mutual concord ( samanvaya ) among all the
sacred texts, then a statement denoting freedom from distinction must be
taken as the final revelation since it is necessarily subsequent to a
sentence describing qualities.
*
4.74. i
mi ^ yhr»
sriWr cTt^t n ^ u
4.74. Therefore the cessation of this Ignorance is also
not difficult to state. Having known Ignorance as
it is, one is released from the bond of karma . 22.
4 ' 73 ’ Hlfa-
i ml wfo ^ I
m ' aifan-
m i RT ^
^15: | VR^Tr^fs^ IjH RFRT l
^ rrpI r q^q qgfri: RRqft \
4.75. [ 7 ]-Because the knowledge of Brahman free from distinction removes
Ignorance, there is certainly the cessation of this [ignorance] by that
[knowledge] and so there is no logical fallacy concerning the cessation
of Ignorance. And the knowledge of Brahman free from distinction is
possible only when there is the knowledge of Ignorance as it really is.
And the knowledge of Ignorance as it is, means the knowledge of Ignorance
608
as Ignorance. Only when that [knowledge] exists is that [ignorance] able
to be removed, not otherwise. The removal of that [ignorance] is seeing
the falsity in pleasure etc. Seeing the falsity means understanding that
pleasure etc. are particular mental modifications, not qualities of the
Self. And upon the firmness of such understanding, no activity is possible
at any time for the sake of pleasure or for the sake of the cessation of
pain. And upon the absence of activity there is also the absence of karma
which is based upon that. Thus liberation from the bondage in the form of
49
karma is established.
.4.76.
JliiW ^ ^
qi mm i
( 1^0 30 ^ ! E, l — «<£ ) |
rrff l TOT’I 3PT- t
JTcftiPTH wtm
1 mrwrqi l : #if
^ \w ^ I wi
jft'r (ii» ^ ^ 1
4,76. That has been told in the Vis nupuraq a. also:
Therefore nothing is [of itself] the nature of
pain and nothing is [of itself] the nature of
pleasure. This is a modification of the mind
which is designated as pleasure and pain.
The supreme Brahman is Knowledge alone and
Knowledge is required for bondage. This
609
universe consists of Knowledge. There is
nothing beyond Knowledge. (Vis.P.2 .6.47,48.).
In the commentary upon that too it is said
"A modification of the mind" means merely a play of
the mind, like dream or a fancy. What then is real?
Therefore he says: "Knowledge". The completion of
the sense is: "Brahman", who is of the nature of
Knowledge, is alone the highest reality. Then [if you
say]; for what reason does this [Brahman] have bondage
and liberation? [it is told]: "Knowledge", which is
recognized in the form of the I-notion etc. due to
Ignorance, is certainly "required for bondage". "And"
Knowledge is certainly required for liberation because
the removal of that [ignorance] is through knowledge.
Ignorance and what is superimposed by that and knowledge
and what is to be removed through that are Knowledge
alone. Therefore he says; "consists of Knowledge".
The meaning is that the entire universe consists of Knowledge. Even the
distinction which is made between 5iva and Vigpu is only in relation to
a limiting adjunct. That too has been told in the Vig pupuran a;
0 best among the twice born, Sankara [l3iva] is
the illustrious ^auri [Vi§nu] and ^ri [Lak§ml]
is GaurT [Parvati] (Vig.P.1 .8.22.),
Thus the cessation of Ignorance is only through the knowledge of the
oneness of the Self.
4.77. ^3 3T <
(^ Uh) mrti 3 mft j
* i i 33331% 1 (^ i < i vs) \
^ ( , iwnn?; m%TO3 ^ 3*11 < /
610
sg^:»2^ | ^ it I <^r-
c« c ^
3 <uit ^ w« i
' 4t^rH flrafo to l )
4,77. Although difference between the individual soul and Brahman is
recognized due to the distinction between the agent and the object in
sacred texts such as: "My dear, the Self should indeed be seen" (B^h.2,4.5.)
etc., nevertheless, that [difference] pertains to a limiting adjunct. [That
must be so] in accordance with the identity taught in the sacred text: "you
are That" (Ch.6.8.7.). It should not be said: the identity must pertain to
a limiting adjunct in accordance with the sacred text just mentioned
[which denotes] difference, [reason] In the manner in which non-difference
is taught just by the signification [of the words] here: "you are That",
difference is not [taught] in the same manner here: "My dear, the Self
should indeed be seen". Because there [in the latter sentence], only a
seer-seen relation is told by the express signification. But there is the
postulation of difference between the two [i.e. the seer and the seen]
because there is no logical possibility of it being otherwise. And so
because the sacred text which is explicit has predominance, identity alone
is the highest truth. And in the knowledge of identity, the knowledge of
difference ceases just as a matter of course. So there is certainly the
cessation of Ignorance.
■4.78.
’Wlr+Ht | <TT£-
w 'nwf; i
611
*TTW ^ <T ^rk^^lk ;
vm<i ^53^ ^ft tfwqwr <i j^fcnft <t mft-
^^JfFrRTSPT#* *^*I H^f mWW ^^1-
^nViw^RT ^ qfqw^r I $i3r ft mROT q^q^r -
f^rc^T ^ I
4.78. Because Ignorance has manifested like hubbies from water at the
time of creation, it is firstly as though different [from Brahman] of its
own accord. This entire manifest world is only based upon such a difference.
For that reason, the individual soul too -who is superimposed by that
[ignorance] as its locus and who is reflected in that [Ignorance]-
considers the Self to be different from the supreme Self. And [the soul]
considers the world, which is the transformation of such Ignorance, to be
different from the supreme Self.
Not only to this extent, moreover: through the false conception of
various states —in the form of Knowledge and in the form of the Self- in
regard to the supreme Self who is one alone and of the nature of Knowledge,
[ignorance] manifests difference by falsely conceiving that very [supreme
Self] to be an attribute and the subject in the form of Knowledge and, in
the same manner, by falsely conceiving that very [supreme Self] to be the
possessor of the attribute and an object in the form of the Self. Even
though those two, the attribute and its possessor, i.e. Knowledge and the
Self, exist in reality in a relation of identity, [ignorance] as though
separates the two by itself coming between them. And having included the
possessor of the attribute [i.e. the Self] as its object and having made
that [Self] its own and having concealed its own false nature in making
that [Self] its own, it reveals that [Self] in itself [ignorance] in the
form of a reflection. Having falsely conceived that individual self who is
reflected in itself [in Ignorance] as the locus of the Knowledge which is
an attribute, [ignorance] itself enters there [in the soul] in the form of
612
an object and by vay of a direct modification [i.e, in the manner of the
mental modification: "I am ignorant 1 ']. Because the assumption of the
nature of being the subject is correct in regard to Knowledge, therefore
the entry [of Ignorance] there [in the soul] in the form of an object is
easily accomplished.
4.79.
mmh I
mPT X$M tot
5TTCi TWl^I WlHi RT^-
^ i qw tt?k[
Mtk 3 mT 1 TOR ^ I
4.79. Bor example, a swindler enters into the house of some wealthy
person in such a form as appears dear to him. Then, having become his
confidant and having made everything belonging to him his own, and having
concealed his own fraudulent nature [while] making all that person's
wealth his own, he becomes dearer like his [the wealthy person’s] second
heart which is external. So even though the wealthy person has been
deprived of all his wealth, he does not know himself what is to be done
about that but on the contrary he appears to consider himself a clever
person who has accomplished his object through him who is dearer than
even a son. But without him, he [the wealthy person] himself is not able
to spend anywhere even a single small coin among all the wealth, even
though it belongs to him. It is like that.
4.80.
3H ^ m wm 313^1
^ toir i ^%rwi qfa-
^ftaTRi srf^qjFTwri'R^TiVi mA &nr: l
^ | ^ y I sruto:
613
^154 3T f4f^m^PTH4sf4#frR ^ WTR* prn:#^(
^K^r wn^^r ^i%^iiTRT^Rn%i%^f ^Ts^rqqrj\ts^ gf»^m src -
3<t%*r 4^4 ^Tr-R *rmi% 4?-^ I!
4*80. And in regard to Knowledge, that [ignorance] which has entered
in the form of an object and which has Knowledge as its component, firstly
transforms into the form of the intellect and then into the form of the
"I—notion" and the "great elements" etc. The individual self, who is
reflected in Ignorance i.e. in the limiting adjunct of the intellect etc.
which are the transformations of that [ignorance], exists in conformity
with the limiting adjunct which brings about the reflection. That is this
transmigratory existence. And this is indeed the nature that Ignorance
has. When a mind, which is free from impurity on account of the
traditional instruction carried out previously in a thorough manner, is
taught by a true teacher, it understands this nature of Ignorance as it
really is and then it is liberated at that very instant. Just as [a
person] who sees various things in a dream and considering their
pleasantness or unpleasantness in accordance with the desire or aversion
for those things, and striving for the attainment of what is desired and
for the removal of what is unwanted he even begins a Vedic action such as
sacrifice etc., which has a very venerable intensity, or he begins a
worldly action such as a battle etc., but if he is awoken suddenly then
at that very instant —in a single moment- he considers all that to be
fictitious. It should be understood to be like that.
4.81. ^ #Rl4-
l m rfen*?
II RR it
4,81. Thus because of the connection with Ignorance, the seven types of
logical fallacy shown by the author of the ^rlbha g ya must be understood to
be refuted. In the same manner, even every other web of reasoning
conjectured by Ramanuja, which is contrary to the oneness of the Self and
contrary to the natural meaning of the sacred texts etc., has certainly
for the most part been refuted according to the manner told. And that
can be investigated personally by intelligent people whose minds do not
cling anywhere. Thus it is auspicious.
615
NOTES TO CHAPTER POUR: AVIDYOPAPATTI.
1 , Adapted, The text of the £rT.B. reads: na, tava.i.jrvam asritya
avidyaparikalpitatvaj jlvabhavasya ,
2. Sankara also cites this analogy. Cf. , B.S.l3. 2.1.21. p.393, line 16f.
3. For Mandana's position cf., S. Kuppuswami Sastri (ed) Brahmasiddhi
by Acharya Mandanamisra with commentary by ^apkhapani . Delhi. 2°^
ed. 1984. Intro., p.xxviii. Also, R. Balasubramanian. A study of the
Brahmasiddhi of Man d ana Misra . Varanasi. 1983. p.83.
For Vacaspati's view, cf., B.S. ( Bhamatl ) 1.4.1. p.297, line 12. Also,
Ramasastrl, op-cit ., p,129.
4. Ramaraya, op-cit ., p.282, line 15f.
5. For Suresvara’s view, cf., N.S. Ch.3, sambandhokti . For the Vivaran a
view, cf., Ramasastrl, op-cit ., p.129.
6. Ramaraya, op-cit ., p.277, line 19. Ramasastrl, ibid . , p.133.
7. Ramaraya, ibid . , p.278, line 6f.
8. ibid . , p.277, line 26.
9. ibid . , p.277, line 27.
10. This text has not been located.
11. Adapted, without deviation of meaning.
12. See ch.3, fn. 76.
13. In the Paramalaghumanju ga, Nagesabha^a discusses the usage of a
negative particle indicating what has been superimposed. See the
Paramalaghumanju s a of ^rl Nagesa Bhat f a with the commentary Jyotsna
by K. Shukla . Baroda. 1961. p.122f. Also, B. Pancoli (ed.),
Vaiyakaranabhu gan asara of ari Kaun d abha tt a with the commentaries Prabha
and Barpan a. Varanasi. 1969. p.346f.
An example of a negative particle indicating what has been
superimposed is the compound; "not a Brahman a" ( abrahman a). This is
a Tatpuru sa compound ( nan . tatpuru ga) containing the negative particle
a. and the word brahman a. In such a compound, the latter member is the
principal component (cf. Paramalaghu, p.122», Vaiyakaran a. p,346, P.
S, 2.1.22., note by Vasu.). If the compound meant "different from a
Brahmana" ( bratimanabhinna ), then the negative particle, which has the
meaning of "different", would be the principal component. For the
sake of maintaining the primacy of the latter member, the grammarians --
say that the negative particle indicates that the latter member is
something superimposed. So the compound " abrahman a" refers to
someone such as a Kg atriya etc, who possess the nature of a Brahmaqa
which has been superimposed ,( aropitabrahmapatvavan kg atriyadir iti
bodhah .).
In the topic under discussion in this section, the third
alternative is that the statement "I am ignorant" ( aham a.jnah ) refers
to knowledge having the supreme Self as its object. As in the above
example, " a.jna " is a negative Tatpurug a and so the final member is the
61 6
principal component. The final member, jna, means "one who has
knowledge" ( jSanavan ). The negative particle indicates that the
final member has the nature of being superimposed and so the meaning
of the compound is; "one who possesses knowledge of the supreme Self
which is superimposed" ( airopitaparamatmavigayaka jnanavan ). Abhyankar
argues that a liberated soul does not say "I am ignorant" and a
bound soul, who has erroneous knowledge of the supreme Self, also
does not think "I am ignorant". But a bound soul who knows nothing
of the supreme Self thinks "I am ignorant". The meaning of "ignorant"
( ajna ) is: "one who possesses knowledge of the supreme Self which is
superimposed" and such a meaning is not possible because the bound
soul has no knowledge of the supreme Self, therefore knowledge can
hardly be shown as superimposed.
In regard to the following sentence: "But the superimposition
of the knowledge relating to the supreme Self..." the sense is that
a bound soul has knowledge about worldly objects such as pots etc.
By superimposing the nature of knowledge about the supreme Self upon
the worldly knowledge, the statement "I am ignorant" could mean;
"one who possesses knowledge qualified by the nature of superimposed
knowledge relating to the supreme Self". But that meaning is not
possible because superimposition is possible where an object is
qualified by similarity. Since the knowledge of pots etc. and the
knowledge of the supreme Self are completely distinct, it is not
possible to say that there is superimposition of knowledge relating
to the supreme Self upon the knowledge relating to pots etc.
14. R. Balasubramanian, "Ramanuja as a Critic" in Studies in Ramanuja .
Madras. 1980. p.191f.
15. Ramaraya, op-cit . . p.287, line 14f.
16. The topic of "the logical fallacy concerning a means of proof" is
now being discussed in relation to inference. In 4.7. it was
introduced with regard to the perceptual cognition "I am ignorant".
17. This inference is given by Ramanuja as his prima facie argument.
18. This is Abhyankar's explanation which he had previously given in
his commentary " Samasokti " on the ^ribha s ya-catuhsutri , op—cit .,
p.158, line 12f.
19. Adapted. The text reads; anvasyanythavabhasasyavarjanTyatvat .
20. For the explanation of the "fivefold combination" see 1.37.
21 . Abhyankar has modified the sentence to indicate that adragt avasat
is to be connected with am buna eva grahan am.
22. The sense is that when one ascertains that the water is a mirage
the cognition arises: "this is not water", i.e. water does not exist
here ( atra jalam asat ). Even if it is accepted, as Ramanuja
maintains, that there is the appearance in another manner ( anyatha—
avabhasa ), the statement: "this is not water" means that the
cognition of water is being denied and so it is not possible for
Ramanuja to hold the view of satkhyati that the cognition of the
water is real.
23.
This appears to be the author's statement describing the
617
Visi^tadvaitin position rather than a direct quotation.
24. A species of plant serving as a substitute for the Soma plant in
rituals. In fari. B.Para.66.p.1 44., Ramanuja presents a verse
(supposedly by Draroidacarya, the " Bha s yakara ") stating that the
Putika plant can be substituted for the Soma plant because it
actually contains portions of Soma . ~ -
25. Cf. £r!.B.Para.66.p,1 44,
26. Cf. Jacob, A Handful of Popular Maxims ., op-cit ., iii. p,96. —
27. The complete sutra reads; "But [the dream creation is] mere maya ,
because its nature is not a manifestation fully [of the totality
of attributes found in the waking state]".
28. Adapted. The passage does not deviate in meaning from the ^ri.B.
But it has not been indented because it is not a direct quotation.
29. Slightly adapted; " tatha" is changed to " cakrapratiti ".
30. According to Ramanuja, the nature of all the directions exists in
every direction. What is east for one person is west or north in
regard to others and all such cognitions are true. Abhyankar accepts
that a direction is relative to the position of the respective
person, but he seeks to argue that a direction is established with
regard to something, such as the position of a particular person.
If that person is considered to be facing east but he thinks east
is north —even though it may be north with regard to another person-
then the person facing east is in error with regard to his direction
and the object of his error —the nature of being "north"- is
something indeterminable. It is not absolutely unreal because the
cognition of "north" exists. It is not real because it is subject to
sublation by the knowledge that he is facing east.
The statement: "one should eat food while facing the east" is
cited by Abhyankar to show that a direction is established with
reference to something. If a number of people sat facing the east,
then although they face the east with respect to themselves, in
relation to their neighbours they are seated to the west, or the
north or the south and so with regard to other people they are not di¬
rectly east. For practical purposes it is established that a certain
person is facing east and therefore everybody else too faces east.
31. B.S.vS. 2.2.32. p.479, line 4f.
32. Read " vindanti "-in the place of " vindati" .
33. Cf. Tari.g. 2.1.6. p.301 , line 7f.
34. The Inandasrama edition has the word " ekam ". from the Tai.Bra. text,
after the word " prasiddam" . It is omited here.
35. S.C. Vasu, Siddhanta Kaumudi , op-cit ,, Vol.2, U nadi affixes, p.287.
36. Cf. Nr simhottaratapaniyopani gad ch.9. 11 , ♦ . sarvatra na hy asti
dvaitasiddhir atmaiva siddho ^vitiyo mayaya hy anyad iva ... maya ca
tamorupa ,.
618
37. See ch,3, fn.31 ,
38. Cf. Esrl.B.Para ,72.p.1 63f. Also, see text 2.50. and. comment.
39. These quotations have not been located.
40. According to Paqini, a "word stem" on pratipadika is: "what
possesses meaning but is neither a verbal root nor an affix”. P^S.
1,2.45. Also, cf, Abhyankar and Shukla, A Dictionary of Sanskrit
Grammar , op-cit ., p.275,
41. Adapted.
42. This meaning follows the commentator ^ridharasvamin who considers
Knowledge to be the substratum; " vi.jnane ' dhi g t hane ". Cf. Jivananda-
vidyasagarabhattacarya (ed.), Yis nupuranam with the commentary
Svaprakasa by Sridharasvamin . Calcutta. 1882. p.307, line 14.
43. This is a substantial reconstruction of the &rT.B, text without a
deviation in meaning. Abhyankar's explanation of " sam " in the
word " sankalpa " is taken from the ^rutaprakasika , op-cit . , pt.2.
( avidyabhangabhaga ) p.46, line 11.
44. Slightly adapted.
45. Slightly adapted.
46. The sixfold modifications are mentioned in the Nirukta of Yaska,
they are; birth, existence, growth, transformation, decline and
death. Sankara refers to them in B.S.3. 1.1.2. p.48, line 2f,
47. Slightly adapted.
48. Slightly adapted.
49. This explanation appears to be modelled upon Nyayasutra 1 .1.2, "Pain
birth, activity, faults and misapprehension -on the successive
annihilation of these in the reverse order, there follows release",
cf. S.C. Vidyabhusana (trans.), The Nyaya Sutras of Gotama . ( The
Sacred Books of the Hindus . YoLviii.) Allahabad. 1913. Reprinted,
New York. 1974. p.2.
50. JTvanandavidyasagarabha^tacarya, op-cit ., p.258, line 9f. In the
edition consulted, &ridhara's commentary differs to some degree from
Abhyankar's quotation, however the meaning is identical.
619
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